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This thesis investigates the influence of political Catholicism and Catholic social doctrine on 
the evolution of the continental European welfare regimes. Paradoxically it finds that the 
doctrine had less influence on the formation of welfare regimes in countries where 
Catholicism was strong in contrast to countries where it was in a weak minority position. This 
finding does not only challenge many of the accounts that have perceived and analyzed 
religious influences on welfare state formation as a static and quantifiable variable but also 
addresses and rivals most postulations of mainstream welfare state theories such as Logic of 
Industrialism, Power Resource, Class Coalition and Employer Centered Approaches. In 
contrast to these postulations this thesis finds that welfare in continental Europe evolved 
during the 19th century and most of the 20th century as the result of a battle over ideas and 
worldviews between different societal groups and their political outlets. Which idea and 
worldview makes its way into institutional implementation is not primarily connected to the 
mere numerical strength or power resources of its societal and political representation but is 
a function of the performance of the programmatic ideas themselves. Decisive is how they 
strive in competition with other programmatic ideas. Two mechanisms stick out that 
determine whether programmatic ideas are successful: the performance and evolution of the 
idea in a process of ideational competition and the degree of ideational compatibility of a 
programmatic idea other ideas that enables the formation of ideational and political coalitions. 
The programmatic ideas and hence the worldview that performs these two tasks best wins its 
way into institutional implementation. Though, ideational competition, evolution and 
implementation is not solely endogenous to the battle of ideas but structured through a 
variety of exogenous factors such as the institutional (election system, mode of governance, 
degree of enfranchisement) and structural-material environment (pace of industrialization, 
spatial diffusion of economic development, number of ideational competitors). The thesis will 
show against the backdrop of the Italian and German welfare state development, from the 
end of the 19h century to the present, that these battles of ideas and worldviews were a 
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1 Introduction	  
1.1 The	  Religious	  foundation	  of	  the	  German	  and	  Italian	  Welfare	  States	  
This	   thesis	   is	   an	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	   the	   influence	   of	   Catholic	   social	   teaching	   on	   the	  
evolution	  of	  the	  Continental	  European	  Welfare	  regimes.	  The	  study	  examines	  how	  (and	  why)	  
the	   idea	  of	  Catholic	   social	   teaching	  contextually	  evolved	  over	   the	  past	  century,	  and	  traces	  
back	   how	   much	   impact	   it	   had	   on	   the	   institutional	   construction	   of	   modern	   continental	  
European	  welfare.	  
	   The	   results	   are	   counterintuitive.	   While	   the	   doctrine	   had	   little	   influence	   in	   countries	  
where	   Catholicism	   was	   hegemonic,	   it	   had	   a	   much	   greater	   say	   in	   the	   countries	   where	  
Catholicism	  was	   confronted	   by	   a	   Protestant	   Leitkultur	   or	   by	   strong	   left	   parties.	   In	   fact	   in	  
Catholic	  countries	  the	  development	  of	  the	  doctrine	  was	  forestalled.	  The	  approach	  to	  trace	  
back	   the	   construction	   of	   socioeconomic	   ideas	   contextually	   and	   against	   the	   backdrop	   of	  
material,	   social	   and	   institutional	   constraints	   proved	   fruitful.	   Rather	   than	   assuming	  
preferences	   or	   reading	   them	   from	   the	   institutional	   or	   socioeconomic	   environment,	   the	  
thesis	   asks	   how	  actors	   think	   about	   their	   interests	   through	   the	   lenses	   of	   their	  worldviews.	  
This	  provided	  a	  more	  detailed	  and	  nuanced	  explanation	  for	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Continental	  
European	  welfare	  cluster	  than	  the	  more	  commonly	  applied	  variations	  of	  functional	  Logics	  of	  
Industrialization,1	   Power	   Resource	   Approaches,2	   Varieties	   of	   Capitalism,3	   or	   Revisionist	  
combinations	   of	   risk	   exposure	   and	   cross	   class	   coalitions.4	   Furthermore,	   its	   explanatory	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Wilensky,	  H.	  (1975)	  The	  Welfare	  State	  and	  Equality,	  Berkley,	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  2	  Huber,	  E.	  &	  Stephens,	  J.	  D.	  (2001)	  Development	  and	  crisis	  of	  the	  welfare	  state:	  parties	  and	  policies	  
in	  global	  markets,	  Chicago,	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press;	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1990)	  The	  
Three	  Worlds	  of	  Welfare	  Capitalism,	  Princeton,	  Princeton	  University	  Press;	  Korpi,	  W.	  (1983)	  The	  
Democratic	  Class	  Struggle,	  Rutledge	  &	  Kegan	  Paul,	  London.	  3	  Hall,	  P.	  &	  Soskice,	  D.	  (2001)	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism.	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press;	  Swenson,	  P.	  (2002)	  Capitalists	  against	  markets	  :	  the	  making	  of	  labor	  markets	  and	  welfare	  states	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  and	  Sweden,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press;	  Mares,	  I.	  (2003)	  The	  Sources	  of	  Business	  Interest	  in	  Social	  Insurance:	  Sectoral	  versus	  National	  Differences,	  World	  Politics,	  Vol.	  55,	  No.	  2,	  January	  2003,	  pp.	  229-­‐258.	  4	  Baldwin,	  P.	  (1990)	  The	  politics	  of	  social	  solidarity:	  class	  bases	  of	  the	  European	  welfare	  state,	  
1875-­‐1975,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press;	  	  Cusack,	  T.,	  Iversen,	  T.	  &	  Rehm,	  P.	  (2006)	  Risks	  at	  Work:	  The	  Demand	  and	  Supply	  Sides	  of	  Government	  Redistribution,	  Oxford	  Review	  
Economic	  Policy	  22(3):	  365-­‐389;	  Rehm,	  P.,	  Hacker	  J.	  S.	  &	  Schlesinger,	  M.	  (2012a)	  Insecure	  Alliances:	  Risk,	  Inequality,	  and	  Support	  for	  the	  Welfare	  State,	  Paper	  presented	  in	  the	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power	  also	  proved	  optimal	  compared	  to	  the	  conventional	  “parties	  matter”	  approaches	  that	  
are	  used	  to	  assess	  Christian	  Democratic	  welfare	  policy	  impact.5	  
	   Three	   focal	   points	   of	   continental	   European	   history	   of	   the	   past	   150	   years	   lie	   at	   the	  
center	  of	   the	  study.	  The	  phase	  of	  early	  modern	  welfare	   implementation	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  
19th	  century,	  the	  re-­‐lock	  in	  of	  old	  paths	  after	  World	  War	  Two	  and	  the	  run	  up	  to	  recalibration	  
and	   retrenchment	   during	   the	   1990s	   and	   early	   2000s.	   The	   study	   investigates	   two	   crucial	  
cases	   of	   continental	   European	   welfare	   and	   Christian	   Democratic	   influence:	   Italy	   and	  
Germany.	  
	  
1.2 Bismarck	  and	  the	  Black	  International:	  Early	  Modern	  Social	  Security	  
While	   Catholic	   social	   teaching	   had	   little	   influence	   on	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Italian	  welfare	  
state,	   despite	   Catholicism	   being	   in	   the	   strongest	   political	   position	   in	   Italy,	   it	   did	   have	   a	  
strong	   influence	   in	  Germany	  where	   Catholics	  were	   in	   a	  minority	   position.	   The	   key	   to	   this	  
puzzle	   lies	   in	   the	  absence	  or	  presence	  of	   ideational	   challenge	  and	   competition.	  While	   the	  
Church	  held	   an	  unchallenged	  monopoly	  on	  pre-­‐modern	  welfare	   institutions	   in	   Italy	   at	   the	  
turn	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  the	  dominance	  of	   laissez	  faire	   liberalism	  amongst	  the	  early	   liberal	  
Italian	  political	  elites	  prescribed	  a	  residual	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  welfare.	  Hence,	  Catholicism	  
was	   never	   stimulated	   to	   adapt	   and	   modernize	   its	   medieval	   poor	   relief	   ideas	   nor	   was	  
liberalism	   forced	   to	   adopt	   modern	   social	   liberal	   positions.	   In	   contrast,	   Catholicism	   in	  
Germany	   was	   in	   a	   minority	   position	   and	   thus	   exposed	   not	   only	   to	   political	   authoritarian	  
(Protestant)	  pressures	  but	  also,	  later,	  to	  competition	  for	  the	  loyalty	  of	  Catholic	  workers	  from	  
the	   Left,	   so	   it	   had	   to	  modernize	   and	   update	   its	   classic	  welfare	   ideas.	   This	   resulted	   in	   the	  
formulation	   and	   partial	   institutionalization	   of	   a	   strong	   modern	   social	   policy	   doctrine	   of	  
German	  political	  Catholicism.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Comparative	  Politics	  Working	  group,	  European	  University	  Institute.	  Also	  published	  as:	  Rehm,	  P.,	  Hacker	  J.	  S.	  &	  Schlesinger,	  M.	  (2012b)	  Insecure	  Alliances:	  Risk,	  Inequality,	  and	  Support	  for	  the	  Welfare	  State,	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review	  106(2),	  pp.	  386–406.	  5	  Huber,	  E.,	  Ragin,	  C.	  &	  Stephens,	  J.	  D.	  (1993)	  Social	  Democracy,	  Christian	  Democracy,	  Constitutional	  Structure,	  and	  the	  Welfare	  State,	  The	  American	  Journal	  of	  Sociology,	  No.	  	  99,	  pp.	  711-­‐749;	  	  van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  &	  Manow,	  P.	  (2009)	  Religion,	  Class	  Coalitions	  and	  Welfare	  States.	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press;	  Schmidt,	  M.-­‐G.	  (1988)	  	  Sozialpolitik,	  Opladen,	  Leske	  und	  Budrich.	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1.3 Christian	  Socialism	  or	  the	  Spirit	  of	  Capitalism:	  The	  Post-­‐War	  Settlement	  
The	   second	  period	  under	   investigation	   centers	  on	   the	  post-­‐war	   settlement.	   In	   light	  of	   the	  
failure	   to	   forestall	   fascism	  and	   its	  partly	   intertwining	  with	   it,	  Catholicism	   in	  both	  countries	  
reformulated	  its	  doctrine.	  The	  lessons	  they	  drew	  from	  the	  past	  were	  very	  different.	  While	  in	  
Germany	  Catholicism	  was	  now	  bound	  together	  with	  Protestantism	  within	  a	  single	  Christian	  
Democratic	   movement	   and	   therefore	   open	   to	   a	   broad	   ideological	   reformulation	   of	   its	  
positions,	   this	   was	   not	   the	   case	   in	   Italy.	   In	   Germany	   this	   provoked	   a	   harsh	   battle	   which	  
ended	  in	  the	  compromise	  of	  the	  very	  special	  blend	  of	  the	  free	  market	  economy	  demanded	  
by	  the	  Protestant	  (Ordoliberals)	  coupled	  to	  a	  heavy	  social	  insurance	  state	  that	  compromised	  
Catholicism’s	  strive	  for	  corporatism.	  In	  Italy	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  Protestant	  counterforce	  led	  to	  
the	   introduction	   of	   semi-­‐corporatist	   structures	   after	   the	   liberal	   experiments	   of	   the	   De	  
Gasperi	  era.	  This	  Italian	  post-­‐war	  corporatism	  soon	  drifted	  into	  rampant	  clientelism.	  
	  
1.4 The	  End	  of	  History?	  
Both	   models	   of	   thinking	   about	   economy	   and	   welfare	   ran	   into	   trouble	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	  
1990s.	  The	  Italian	  Christian	  Democratic	  socioeconomic	  model	  stagnated	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  
thereby	  exhausting	  the	  funds	  of	  the	  clientelist	  party	  machine	  and	  leading	  to	  the	  implosion	  
of	  the	  Italian	  Christian	  Democrats	  (Democrazia	  Cristiana).	  The	  German	  Christian	  Democrats	  
witnessed,	   for	   their	  part,	  a	  major	  crisis	  of	   identity	  due	   to	   the	   influence	  of	  new	  neo-­‐liberal	  
ideas	  that	  seemed	  irreconcilable	  with	  the	  (Catholic)	  welfare	  core	  of	  the	  party.	  Furthermore,	  
post-­‐materialism,	   the	   shift	   towards	   a	   service	   economy	   and	   the	   increasing	   participation	   of	  
women	   in	   the	   workforce	   created	   demands	   on	   the	   party	   that	   did	   not	   sit	   easily	   with	   its	  
Catholic	  foundations.	  Accelerated	  through	  the	  shift	   in	  the	  German	  denominational	  balance	  
through	  unification	   and	   stipulated	  by	   the	   realignment	  of	   the	  German	   Social	  Democrats	   in	  
the	   1990s,	   this	   began	   a	   slow	   process	   of	   Christian	   Democratic	   alternation	   from	   a	   Catholic	  
towards	  a	  Neo-­‐Protestant	  party.	  This	  process	  gradually	  started	   to	  unfold	   in	   the	   late	  1990s	  
and	  early	  2000s	  parallel	  to	  the	  remodeling	  of	  the	  German	  welfare	  institutions	  by	  the	  Social	  
Democrats.	   The	   thesis	  will	   show	   the	   impact	   of	   this	   change	   against	   the	  background	  of	   the	  
dramatic	   shift	   in	   Christian	   Democratic	   family	   policy.	   The	   convergence	   of	   both	   of	   the	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formerly	   ‘big’	  welfare	  parties	   in	  Germany	  will	  be	  constitutive	   for	  a	  new	  and	  very	  different	  




The	  findings	  of	  the	  thesis	  carry	  three	  central	   implications.	  First,	  Catholicism	  had	  an	   impact	  
on	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Continental	   European	   welfare	   regimes	   but	   it	   did	   so	   in	   a	   very	  
different	  way	   than	   research	  has	   so	   far	   assumed.	   Second,	   the	   study	  of	   the	   contextual	   and	  
longitudinal	   reconstruction	   of	   social	   and	   economic	   ideas	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   the	   key	   to	  
understanding	   policy	   impact	   in	   the	   cases	   I	   studied.	   It	   was	   through	   these	   doctrines	   that	  
political	   actors	  deciphered	  and	   interpreted	  material	   interest	   and	   socioeconomic	  pressures	  
for	   their	  policies.	  Third,	   the	   transformation	  of	   the	  policy	  positions	  of	  Christian	  Democratic	  
parties	   that	   we	   witness	   today	   is	   not	   a	   de-­‐ideologization	   towards	   the	   median	   voter,	   but	  
rather	  a	  specific	  reformulation	  of	  Christian	  Democratic	   ideas	   into	  a	  Neo-­‐Protestant	  (social)	  
liberal	  position	  on	  economic	  policy.	  This	  way	  of	  thinking	  is	  not	  new	  to	  Germany.	  Indeed,	  as	  
early	   as	   the	   19th	   century	   it	   had	   been	   part	   of	   the	   ideological	   luggage	   of	   political	  
Protestantism,	  both	  in	  its	  liberal	  and	  Conservative	  subcultures.	  After	  1945	  it	  became	  part	  of	  
the	   Christian	   Democrats	   but	   has,	   to	   this	   today,	   been	   confined	   to	   a	  minority	   position.	   Its	  
resurfacing	   together	   with	   the	   third	   way	   realignment	   of	   the	   Social	   Democrats	   will	   be	  
constitutive	  of	   the	  development	  of	   the	  Continental	  European	  socioeconomic	  model	   in	   the	  
21st	  century.	  
	   The	   thesis	   deals	   with	   central	   questions	   of	   contemporary	   political	   economy.	   It	   is	   an	  
empirical	   as	  well	   as	   a	   theoretical	   contribution	   to	  both	   the	  Varieties	   of	   Capitalism	  and	   the	  
World	   of	  Welfare	   debate.	   The	   thesis	   goes	   beyond	   the	   most	   popular	   approaches	   in	   both	  
debates	  by	  empirically	   and	  historically	   reconstructing	  and	   contextualizing	   the	  evolution	  of	  
the	  specific	  Christian	  Democratic	  mode	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  interaction	  and	  structuring	  of	  
economy,	   society	  and	   state.	   It	   is	   therefore	  a	   contribution	   that	  helps	   to	  better	  understand	  
the	   origins	   of	   “Non	   Liberal	   Capitalism”.6	  What	   delineates	   the	   following	   contribution	   from	  
others	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  based	  on	  theoretically	  stylized	  actor’s	  preferences.	  Instead,	  it	  explores	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Streeck,	  W.	  (2001)	  Introduction:	  Explorations	  into	  the	  Origins	  of	  Non	  Liberal	  Capitalism	  in	  Germany	  and	  Japan,	  IN:	  Streeck,	  W.	  &	  Yamamura,	  K.	  (eds.)	  The	  Origins	  of	  Non	  Liberal	  Capitalism,	  Cornell,	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	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how	   interest	   and	   socioeconomic	   constraints	   interact	   with	   the	   political	   actor’s	   ideological	  
luggage.	   This	   two-­‐step	   approach	   of	   first	   reconstructing	   ideas	   and	   interests	   and	   then	  
checking	  for	  their	  policy	  impact	  provided	  a	  much	  more	  multifaceted	  picture	  of	  the	  evolution	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2 Theory	  and	  Concept	  
Abstract	  
This	  study	   investigates	  the	   influence	  of	  religion	  on	  the	  formation	  of	   the	  modern	  continental	  European	  welfare	  
state.	  Denominational	   influence	  on	  welfare	  has	  only	  been	   treated	  as	  a	   residual	   influential	   factor	  by	   the	  major	  
strands	  of	  welfare	  state	  theory.	  This	  is	  a	  paradox	  as	  it	  is	  common	  ground	  that	  the	  Churches	  were	  responsible	  for	  
the	  bulk	  of	  welfare	  provision	  prior	  to	  industrialization	  and	  therefore	  had	  a	  considerable	  stake	  in	  it.1	  The	  following	  
Chapter	  will	  sketch	  out	  why	  religion	  should	  not	  be	  treated	  as	  ephemeral	  in	  our	  accounts	  not	  only	  regarding	  the	  
origins	  but	  also	  the	  development	  of	  modern	  European	  welfare.	  By	  conducting	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  major	  strands	  
of	  welfare	  state	  theory	  the	  chapter	  will	  show	  that	  classic	  welfare	  state	  research	  could	  not	  incorporate	  religion	  as	  
an	   influential	   factor	   due	   to	   the	   specific	   epistemological	   takes	   of	   these	   approaches.	   The	   second	   half	   of	   this	  
chapter	   will	   show	   how	   to	   overcome	   these	   lacunas.	   I	   will	   develop	   a	   framework	   that	   draws	   on	   recent	  
developments	   of	   the	   “ideational	   turn”	   in	   comparative	   politics	   to	   do	   so.	   This	   entails	   a	   conceptualization	   of	  
religious	   views	  on	  welfare	  as	  programmatic	   ideas	  and	  worldviews.	   In	   contrast	   to	  usual	   ideational	   approaches,	  
this	  account	  of	  continental	  European	  welfare	   is	  not	  only	   interested	   in	  how	  these	  religiously	   informed	   ideas	  on	  
welfare	   influence	   institution-­‐building,	   but	   also	   how	   the	   ideas	   themselves	   evolve	   in	   response	   to	   changing	  
contextual	  conditions.	  What	  emerges	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  a	  framework	  that	  helps	  both	  the	  study	  
of	  the	  politics	  of	  religiously	   informed	  welfare	  doctrine	  and	  the	  assessment	  of	   its	   impact	  on	  policy.	  The	  chapter	  









A	  plethora	  of	  arguments	  could	  be	  made	  for	  a	  deeper	  scrutinizing	  of	  religion	  as	  an	  influential	  
factor	   on	  welfare	   state	   formation.	  Here	   I	   picked	   three	   that	   I	   deem	  of	  major	   concern:	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Besides	  the	  Churches,	  Gilds,	  Feudal	  institutions	  and	  the	  family	  were	  the	  major	  welfare	  providers.	  Alber,	  J.	  (1982)	  Vom	  Armenhaus	  zum	  Wohlfahrtsstaat,	  Frankfurt/New	  York,	  Campus	  Verlag,	  ,	  p.	  24;	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1982)	  Sozialversicherung	  in	  Deutschland	  und	  England:	  Entstehung	  und	  
Grundzüge	  im	  Vergleich,	  München,	  C.H.	  Beck.	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composition	   of	   pre-­‐modern	   welfare;	   religion	   as	   a	   key	   cleavage	   of	   modern	   continental	  
European	   politics	   in	   the	   20th	   century;	   the	   neglect	   of	   Christian	   Democracy	   in	   comparative	  
politics.	  
	   Before	  the	  advent	  of	  modern	  welfare,	  most	  of	  European	  welfare	  had	  been	  run	  by	  the	  
Churches.	  The	  major	  religious	  denominations	  all	  had	  clearly	  defined	  welfare	  doctrines	  that	  
they	   implemented	   through	   welfare	   institutions	   they	   had	   fostered	   for	   centuries.2	   The	  
Churches	  ran	  poor	  houses,	  hospitals	  and	  hospices.	  These	  were	  clearly	  vested	  interests	  which	  
gave	   denominational	   organizations	   a	   considerable	   initial	   stake	   in	   the	   political	   game	   of	  
implementing	  modern	  welfare.	   In	   fact,	  when	  modern	   states	   increasingly	   tried	   to	   organize	  
modern	  welfare	  on	   the	  national	   level,	   as	   a	   response	   to	   industrialization	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  
19th	  century,	  they	  entered	   into	  heavy	  conflict	  with	  religious	   institutions.	  Next	  to	  education	  
and	   schooling,	   the	   conflict	   around	   welfare	   was	   the	   second	   most	   important	   and	   often	  
disregarded	  battlefield	  of	  secularization	  in	  Western	  Europe.3	  
	   The	   Church-­‐State	   conflict	   is	   one	   of	   the	   foundational	   cleavages	   of	   European	   party	  
systems	   that	   manifested	   itself	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   Christian	   Democratic	   parties	   in	  
continental	   Europe.4	   This	   extends	  not	  only	   to	  how	   the	   State	  Church	   conflict,	   identified	  by	  
Rokkan,	  fused	  into	  the	  modern	  European	  democratic	  systems	  but	  also	  a	  similar	  effect,	  only	  
scarcely	   mentioned	   by	   the	   same	   author,	   regarding	   the	   interdenominational	   conflicts	   and	  
frictions	  between	  different	  versions	  of	  Christianity.	  Examples	  are	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  a	  
pillarized	  society	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  or	  the	  manifestation	  of	  Protestant	  Christian	  Democratic	  
parties	   that	   evolved	   parallel	   to	   their	   Catholic	   counterparts	   in	   Switzerland.	   In	   fact,	   religion	  
has	   managed	   to	   institutionalize	   itself	   in	   Western	   European	   state	   structures	   and	   party	  
systems	  way	  past	   the	  physical	  and	  spiritual	  process	  of	   secularization	  as	  Bartolini	  and	  Mair	  
show	   in	   their	   test	   of	   Rokkan’s	   freezing	   hypothesis.5	   Albeit	   part	   of	   one	   of	   the	  major	   four	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2Alber,	  J.	  (1982)	  p.	  24;	  Kahl,	  S.	  (2005)	  The	  Religious	  Roots	  of	  Modern	  Poverty	  Policy:	  Catholic,	  Lutheran,	  and	  Reformed	  Protestant	  Traditions	  Compared,	  Archives	  Européennes	  de	  Sociologie	  
(European	  Journal	  of	  Sociology),	  Vol.	  XLVI,	  1,	  pp.	  91-­‐126;	  Kahl,	  S.	  (2006)	  The	  Religious	  
Foundations	  of	  the	  Welfare	  State:	  Poverty	  Regimes,	  Unemployment,	  and	  Welfare-­‐to-­‐Work	  in	  Europe	  
and	  the	  United	  States.	  Dissertation,	  Humboldt-­‐Universitaet	  zu	  Berlin.	  3	  The	  conflict	  was	  especially	  virulent	  where	  a	  secular-­‐liberal	  nation-­‐building	  process	  unfolded	  in	  predominantly	  Catholic	  countries.	  The	  process	  was	  softer	  in	  countries	  where	  the	  state	  church	  conflict	  	  had	  been	  resolved	  early	  on	  by	  fusing	  state	  and	  church	  as	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  the	  Protestant	  Nordic	  state	  churches.	  4	  Lipset,	  S.	  &	  Rokkan,	  S.	  (1990	  [1967])	  Cleavage	  Structures,	  Party	  Systems,	  and	  Voter	  Alignments,	  IN:	  Mair,	  P.	  (ed.)	  The	  West	  European	  Party	  System,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  102-­‐104.	  5	  Bartolini,	  S.	  &	  Mair,	  P.	  (1990)	  Identity,	  Competition,	  and	  electoral	  availability:	  the	  stabilization	  of	  
European	  electorates	  1885-­‐1985,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  57,	  287,	  291;	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cleavage	   lines	   of	   Rokkan’s	   framework,	   religion	   has	   so	   far	   largely	   been	   neglected	   by	  
researchers	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  supposedly	  paramount	  class	  cleavage.6	  Nevertheless,	  considering	  
the	   formation	   of	   continental	   welfare,	   cross	   class	   cleavage	   cutting	   Christian	   Democracy	  
should	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration.	   Not	   only	   did	   it	   become	   the	   dominant	   political	  
movement	  in	  continental	  Europe	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  but	  “in	  some	  countries	  –	  Italy	  
being	  a	  prime	  example	  –	  social	  class	  was	  never	  a	  prime	  predictor	  of	  party	  choice”	  as	  Esping-­‐
Andersen	  remarks.7	  Various	  quantitative	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  Christian	  Democracy	  had	  
its	   own	   specific	   impact	   on	   the	   welfare	   state	   that	   differed	   considerably	   from	   its	   Social	  
Democratic	  counterpart.	  Religion	  and	  the	  state-­‐church	  cleavage	  have	  become	  a	  constitutive	  
part	   of	   the	   “freezing”	   of	   European	   electorates	   and	   party	   systems	   precisely	   because	   they	  
have	   been	   institutionalized	   and	   incorporated	   in	   a	   number	   of	   politico-­‐cultural	   western	  
European	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  welfare	  state.	  
	   The	  last	  point	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  religion	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  welfare	  
regards	   the	   fact	   that	  Christian	  Democracy	  has	  so	   far	   remained	  a	  notoriously	  understudied	  
object	   in	   comparative	   politics.8	   While	   studies	   on	   Social	   Democracy	   and	   the	   European	  
political	   left	   fill	   whole	   floors	   in	   political	   science	   libraries,	   books	   on	   Christian	   Democracy	  
usually	  do	  not	  occupy	  more	  than	  a	  shelf.9	  This	  seems	  odd	  since	  political	  Catholicism	  reacted	  
to	   the	   oppression	   of	   Bonapartist	   states	   in	   the	   late	   19th	   century	   with	   a	   politicized	  
organization	   that	   shows	   remarkable	   congruencies	   with	   the	   reactions	   of	   the	   Socialist	  
movement.	   Furthermore,	   the	   resurgent	   prominence	   in	   studies	   of	   democratization	   and	  
development	  of	  Weber’s	  thesis	  drawing	  a	  connection	  between	  Protestant	  sects,	  capitalism	  
and	  eventually	  liberal	  democratic	  institutions	  point	  out	  that	  religion	  is	  still	  a	  force	  to	  reckon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Lipset,	  S.	  M.	  &	  Rokkan,	  S.	  (1990	  [1967])	  p.	  103.	  Though,	  also	  their	  book	  studies	  the	  European	  electorates	  foremost	  along	  class	  lines	  at	  expense	  of	  the	  state	  church	  and	  center	  periphery	  cleavages.	  Bartolini,	  S.	  M.	  &	  Mair,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  65.	  6	  Bartolini,	  S.	  (2000)	  The	  Political	  Mobilization	  of	  the	  European	  Left	  1860-­‐1980,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  11-­‐14.	  7	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1999)	  Politics	  without	  Class:	  Postindustrial	  Cleavages	  in	  Europe	  and	  America,	  IN:	  Kitschelt,	  H.;	  Lange,	  P.;	  Marks,	  G.	  &	  Stephens,	  J.	  D.	  (eds.)	  Continuity	  and	  Change	  in	  
Contemporary	  Capitalism,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  p.	  308.	  8	  Kitschelt,	  H.	  (1994)	  The	  Transformation	  of	  European	  Social	  Democracy,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  p.1.	  9	  No	  such	  comprehensive	  treatments,	  both	  in	  breath	  and	  in	  depth,	  like	  the	  ones	  of	  Bartolini	  and	  Kitschelt	  on	  Social	  Democracy	  exist	  for	  Christian	  Democracy	  in	  Europe.	  See:	  Bartolini,	  S.	  (2000)	  and	  Kitschelt,	  H.	  (1994).	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with.10	  	  Not	  to	  assess	  the	  ideology	  of	  Christian	  Democrats	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  welfare	  would	  
be	  to	  cut	  off	  one	  half	  of	  the	  history	  of	  European	  modern	  political	  development.	  
	   While	  these	  are	  three	  general	  arguments	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  study	  of	  religion	  and	  modern	  
welfare	  evolution,	  the	  following	  will	  review	  the	  major	  three	  schools	  of	  comparative	  welfare	  
state	  research	  in	  comparative	  politics	  and	  assess	  why	  they	  have	  so	  far	  turned	  an	  analytical	  
blind	  eye	  to	  religion	  as	  an	  explanatory	  factor.	  
	  
2.1 The	  Origins	  of	  Welfare	  
2.1.1 The	  logic	  of	  industrialism	  
	  
the	  evolution	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  clearly	  represents	  a	  universal	  aspect	  of	  modernization	  
Peter	  Flora11	  
	  
The	  ‘Logic	  of	  Industrialism’	  (LoI)	  12	  was	  the	  first	  dominant	  welfare	  state	  research	  paradigm	  of	  
modern	   comparative	   politics.	   LoI	   is	   a	   spin-­‐off	   of	   modernization	   theory	   and	   sees	   the	  
emergence	   of	   a	   welfare	   regime	   as	   a	   functional	   response	   to	   the	   social	   needs	   created	   by	  
industrial	  production.13	  Accelerated	  urbanization	  and	  industrialization	  crowd	  out	  and	  disable	  
traditional	  risk	  hedging	  institutions	  such	  as	  family,	  guilds	  and	  religious	  institutions.14	  Modern	  
social	  security	  legislation	  evolves	  as	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  this.	  Wilensky	  gets	  to	  the	  point	  in	  
1975	   by	   noting	   that	   “On	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   cross-­‐sectional	   analysis	   of	   sixty-­‐four	   countries,	   I	  
conclude	   that	   economic	   growth	   and	   its	   demographic	   and	   bureaucratic	   outcomes	   are	   the	  
root	   cause	   of	   the	   general	   emergence	   of	   the	   welfare	   state”.15	   Technically	   LoI	   accounts	  
measured	  and	  compared	  levels	  of	  industrialization	  and	  modernization	  (urbanization,	  literacy	  
rates,	  steel	  production	  etc.)	   through	  quantitative	   indicators	  and	  confronted	  them	  with	  the	  
onset	   of	   modern	   welfare	   legislation	   across	   different	   cases.	   Divergences	   between	   welfare	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Woodberry,	  R.D.	  (2012)	  The	  Missionary	  Roots	  of	  Liberal	  Democracy,	  American	  Political	  Science	  
Review,	  Vol.	  106,	  No.2	  pp.	  244-­‐274.	  11	  Flora,	  P.	  (1986)	  Introduction,	  IN:	  Flora,	  P.	  (ed.)	  Growth	  to	  Limits:	  Volume	  2,	  Walter	  de	  Gruyter,	  Berlin,	  p.	  XIV.	  12	  Korpi,	  W.	  (2006)	  Power	  Resources	  and	  Employer-­‐Centred	  Approaches	  in	  Explanations	  of	  Welfare	  States	  and	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism:	  Protagonists,	  Consenters	  and	  Antagonists,	  World	  
Politics,	  Vol.	  58,	  No.	  2	  (Jan.	  2006),	  pp.	  167-­‐206,	  p.	  167.	  13	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1990)	  p.	  13.	  Huber,	  E.	  &	  Stephens,	  J.D.	  (2001)	  p.	  15.	  14	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K,	  &	  Beckert,	  U.	  (2002)	  Comparative	  Politics	  and	  the	  Welfare	  State,	  IN:	  Keman,	  H.	  (ed.)	  Comparative	  Democratic	  Politics,	  Sage	  Publications,	  London,	  p.	  188.	  	  15	  Wilensky,	  H.	  (1975)p.	  XIII.	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states	  were	  captured	  as	  differences	  in	  overall	  spending.	  Why	  some	  states	  spend	  more	  and	  
others	   less	   on	   welfare	   was	   attributed	   to	   divergences	   in	   timing	   of	   industrialization	   and	  
modernization.	  The	  existence	  of	  “Welfare	  state	   leaders	  and	   laggards”16	  was	  acknowledged	  
but	  over	  the	  long	  run	  they	  were	  believed	  to	  converge	  towards	  one	  welfare	  state	  model.	  The	  
early	  LoI	   literature	  was	   interested	   in	  why	  welfare	  states	  came	  about	  rather	  than	  why	  they	  
took	  different	  forms.17	  
	   An	   intermediation	   of	   functional	   demands	   through	   political	   and	   socioeconomic	  
institutions	  or	  political	  mobilization	  was	  negated.	  According	  to	  Wilensky	  	  
	  
alternative	   explanations	   collapse	   under	   the	   weight	   of	   such	   heavy,	   brittle	   categories	   as	   “socialist”	  
versus	  “capitalist”	  economies,	  “collectivist”	  versus	  “individualistic”	   ideologies,	  or	  even	  “democratic”	  
versus	   “totalitarian”	   political	   systems.	   However	   useful	   they	  may	   be	   in	   the	   understanding	   of	   other	  
problems,	  these	  categories	  are	  almost	  useless	   in	  explaining	  the	  origins	  and	  general	  development	  of	  
the	  welfare	  state.18	  
	  
Nevertheless,	   not	   even	   the	   early	   functionalists	   were	   as	   ‘functional’	   as	   their	   later	   critics	  
wished	   them	  to	  be.	   Indeed,	  Flora	  and	  Heidenheimer	  had	  already	   relaxed	   the	  depoliticized	  
orthodoxy	   of	   early	   LoI	   accounts	  when	   noting	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   their	   seminal	   volume	  
that:	  	  
	  
the	   growth	   of	   the	   modern	   welfare	   state	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   response	   to	   two	   fundamental	  
developments:	  the	  formation	  of	  national	  states	  and	  their	  transformation	  into	  mass	  democracies	  after	  
the	  French	  Revolution,	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  capitalism	  that	  became	  the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  production	  
after	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution.19	  	  
	  
Modern	  welfare	  state	  expansion	  was	  therefore	  not	  only	  a	  result	  of	  industrialization	  but	  also	  
of	  democratization.	  Intrigued	  by	  the	  timing	  of	  early	  modern	  social	  security,	  Flora	  and	  Alber	  
soon	   introduced	   a	   “‘politicized	   version’”20	   into	   LoI	   which	   casts	   modernization	   as	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Wilensky,	  H.	  (1975)	  p.	  XIV.	  17	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  &	  Beckert,	  U.	  (2002)	  p.	  189.	  Van	  Kersbergen	  puts	  this	  already	  in	  1995	  in	  elegant	  terms:	  “The	  prime	  explanatory	  problem	  for	  these	  theories	  concerns	  the	  very	  existence	  of,	  rather	  than	  the	  variation	  among,	  Western	  welfare	  states”;	  see	  also:	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1995)	  
Social	  Capitalism:	  A	  study	  of	  Christian	  Democracy	  and	  the	  Welfare	  State,	  London,	  Routledge,	  p.	  10.	  18	  Wilensky,	  H.	  (1975)	  p.	  XIII.	  19	  Flora,	  P.	  &	  Heidenheimer,	  A.	  J.	  (1981)	  The	  Historical	  Core	  and	  Changing	  Boundaries	  of	  the	  Welfare	  State,	  IN:	  Flora,	  P.	  and	  Heidenheimer,A.	  J.	  (eds.)	  The	  Development	  of	  Welfare	  States	  in	  
Europe	  and	  America,	  New	  Brunswick,	  Transaction	  Books,	  p.	  22.	  20	  Leibfried,	  S.	  &	  Mau,	  S.	  (2008)	  Introduction,	  IN:	  Leibfried,	  S.	  &	  Mau,	  S.	  (eds.)	  Welfare	  States:	  
Construction,	  Deconstruction,	  Reconstruction:	  Volume	  I,	  Analytical	  Approaches,	  Cheltham,	  Edward	  Elgar,	  p.	  XVIII.	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“multidimensional	  social	  process	  that	  brings	  about	  economic	  growth	  and	  social	  and	  political	  
mobilization,	   and	   transforms	   the	   political	   order	   through	   democratization	   and	  
bureaucratization”.21	   In	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	   Flora	   acknowledged	   in	   the	   introductory	   chapter	   to	  
his	  Growth	   to	  Limits	   series	   that	   “The	   fact	   that	   the	  modern	  welfare	   state	  originated	   in	   the	  
late	  nineteenth	  century	  in	  Europe	  may	  thus	  be	  simply	  explained	  by	  the	  comparatively	  high	  
levels	  of	   industrialization	  and	  democratization	  achieved	   in	   this	   region	  of	   the	  world.”22	  The	  
increased	   interest	   in	   politics	   becomes	   a	   constitutive	   part	   of	   later	   functionalist	   work.	   For	  
Alber	   the	   prime	   question	   is	   “whether	   social	   insurance	   primarily	   reflects	   a	   necessity	   of	  
socioeconomic	   development,	   or	   whether	   it	   can	   be	   better	   understood	   as	   a	   product	   of	  
political	   confrontation.”23	   Based	   on	   Stein	   Rokkan’s	   model	   of	   modern	   state	   development,	  
functionalism	   systematically	   later	   included	   the	   democratic	   class	   struggle	   by	   considering	  
indicators	  such	  as	  suffrage	  extension,	  the	  foundation	  of	   left	  parties,	  the	  possibility	  to	  form	  
unions	   and	   also	   increasingly	   institutional	   factors.24	   However,	   these	   works	   were	   firmly	  
anchored	   in	   a	   functionalistic	   understanding	   of	   causality,	   investigated	   through	   research	  
strategies	  of	  comparative	  statics.	  
	   A	  special	  version	  of	  functionalism	  is	  the	  neo-­‐functionalist	  literature	  of	  neo	  corporatism.	  
Scholars	   like	   Streeck	   and	   Schmitter	   point	   out	   that	   the	   roots	   of	   the	   special	   forms	   of	  
associative	   conduct	   between	   capital	   and	   labor	   that	   dominated	   the	   political	   economy	   of	  
continental	   Europe	   in	   the	   1970s	   might	   be	   traced	   to	   either	   the	   guild	   system	   that	   had	  
organized	   the	   society,	   economy	   and	   politics	   of	   the	   late	   medieval	   European	   cities	   or	   to	  
Catholic	  social	  thinking.25	  Whatever	  its	  roots	  may	  be,	  Streeck	  and	  Schmitter	  argue	  that	  neo	  
corporatism	  today	  operates	  largely	  detached	  from	  them.	  They	  put	  forward	  that	  “Of	  course,	  
Catholic	   Social	   doctrine,	   with	   its	   underlying	   concept	   of	   ‘natural	   law’	   and	   its	   organic,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Leibfried,	  S.	  &	  Mau,	  S.	  (2008)	  p.	  XVIII.	  	  22	  Flora,	  P.	  (1986)	  p.	  XIII.	  23	  “ob	  die	  Sozialversicherung	  primär	  ein	  Erfordernis	  der	  sozio-­‐ökonomischen	  Entwicklung	  darstellte,	  oder	  ob	  sie	  besser	  als	  Produkt	  politischer	  Auseinandersetzung	  verstanden	  wird.“	  	  Alber,	  J.	  (1982)	  p.	  21.	  24	  The	  results	  of	  Alber’s	  study	  are	  counterintuitive	  to	  what	  one	  would	  expect	  (namely	  that	  earlier	  parliamentarization	  would	  lead	  to	  earlier	  welfare	  formation).	  As	  Heidenheimer	  writes	  in	  a	  review	  to	  his	  book	  “he	  demonstrates	  that	  before	  1900	  the	  “not	  yet	  parliamentarized”	  monarchies	  adopted	  SI	  laws	  at	  twice	  as	  high	  a	  rate	  as	  did	  the	  parliamentary	  systems.”	  Heidenheimer,	  A.J.	  (1984)	  Review,	  The	  Journal	  of	  Interdisciplinary	  History,	  Vol.	  15,	  No.	  2	  (Autumn,	  1984),	  pp.	  324-­‐345,	  p.	  343.	  25	  Streeck,	  W.	  &	  Schmitter,	  P.	  (1985)	  Community,	  market,	  state	  –	  and	  associations?	  The	  prospective	  contribution	  of	  interest	  governance	  to	  social	  order,	  IN:	  Streeck,	  W.	  &	  Schmitter,	  P.	  (eds.)	  Private	  Interest	  Government:	  Beyond	  Market	  and	  State,	  London,	  Sage.	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collectivist	   image	   of	   society,	   cannot	   really	   provide	   a	   normative	   justification	   for	   today’s	  
secular	  corporative-­‐associative	  structures	  and	  practices.”26	  Neo-­‐corporatist	  organization	  has	  
become	   a	   pure	   functionalist	   response	   of	   capital	   and	   labor	   to	   a	   series	   of	   coordination	  
problems	  that	  the	  state	  alone	  cannot	  resolve.	  Accordingly,	  these	  scholars	  do	  not	  advocate	  
any	   distinction	   between	   Social	   Democratic	   and	   Christian	   Democratic	   forms	   of	   neo	  
corporatism.	  In	  fact	  Schmitter	  claims	  that	  aspects	  of	  corporatism	  can	  be	  found	  in	  almost	  any	  
European	  ideological	  movement	  from	  right	  to	   left.	  This	  makes	   its	   ideational	  roots	  spurious	  
and	   its	   existence	   purely	   functional.27	   Hence,	   countries	   like	   Austria,	   Norway,	   Sweden	   and	  
West-­‐Germany	  are	  all	  grouped	  under	  the	  same	  neo-­‐corporatist	  label.28	  	  
	   As	  intriguing	  the	  neo-­‐corporatist	  scholars	  are	  in	  their	  concepts,	  these	  are	  not	  of	  central	  
concern	  for	  this	  thesis.	  In	  the	  neo-­‐corporatist	  framework,	  welfare	  is	  only	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  	  the	  
intensified	   associative	   collaboration	   of	   capital	   and	   labor.29	   The	   literature	   is	   primarily	  
concerned	  with	  collective	  wage	  bargaining,	  work	  regulation	  and	  unemployment	   insurance.	  	  
These	  systems	  emerged	  in	  most	  continental	  European	  countries	  during	  the	  1920s	  as	  a	  result	  
of	   Social	   Democratic	   or	   Christian	   Democratic	   politics.	   Neo-­‐corporatism	   only	   indirectly	  
engages	  with	   the	   earlier	   social	   security	   systems	   of	   old	   age,	   invalidity	   and	   sickness,	   hence	  
with	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  that	  are	  investigated	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
	   The	   functionalist	   and	   neo	   functionalist	   research	   agenda	   also	   left	   an	   imprint	   on	  
qualitative	   researchers.	   Inspired	   by	   the	   politicized	   versions	   of	   functionalism	   scholars	   like	  
Weir,	  Orloff	  and	  Scokpol30	  found	  that	  not	  only	  did	  the	  timing	  of	  industrialization	  matter	  but	  
also	  the	  state	  structures	   in	  which	   it	  unfolded.	  This	  research	  was	  mainly	  focused	  on	  the	  US	  
and	  evolved	  as	  a	  nuanced	  off-­‐shoot	  next	  to	  the	  dominant	  paradigms.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  paved	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Streeck,	  W.	  &	  Schmitter,	  P.	  (1985)	  p.23.	  27	  Schmitter,	  P.	  (1979)	  Still	  the	  Century	  of	  Corporatism?	  IN:	  Schmitter,	  P.	  &	  Lehmbruch,	  G.	  (eds.)	  
Trends	  Towards	  Corporatist	  Intermediation,	  Beverly	  Hills,	  Sage,	  pp.	  8-­‐13.	  28	  Streeck,	  W.	  &	  Schitter,	  P.	  (1985)	  p.	  15.	  29	  So	  do	  for	  example	  Streeck	  and	  Kenworthy	  mention	  the	  word	  welfare	  only	  three	  times	  in	  their	  key	  contribution.	  See:	  Streeck,	  W.	  &	  Kentworthy,	  L.	  (2003)	  Theories	  and	  Practices	  of	  Neo	  Corporatism,	  IN:	  Janoski,	  T.,	  Alford,	  R.	  R.,	  Hicks,	  A.	  M.	  &	  Schwartz,	  M.	  A.	  (eds.)	  The	  Handbook	  of	  
Political	  Sociology,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  30	  Weir,	  M.;	  Orloff,	  A.	  S.	  &	  Skocpol,	  T.	  (1988)	  ‘Introduction:	  Understanding	  American	  Social	  Politics’	  In:	  Weir,	  M.;	  Orloff,	  A.	  S.	  &	  Skocpol,	  T.	  (eds.)	  The	  Politics	  of	  Social	  Policy	  in	  the	  United	  
States,	  New	  Jersey,	  Princeton	  University	  Press;	  see	  also:	  Skocpol,	  T.	  (1992)	  Protecting	  Soldiers	  
and	  Mothers,	  Harvard,	  Harvard	  University	  Press;	  and:	  Skocpol,	  T.	  (1985)	  Bringing	  the	  State	  Back	  
In:	  Strategies	  of	  Analysis	  in	  Current	  Research,	  IN:	  Evans,	  P.B.;	  Rueschemeyer,	  D.	  &	  Skocpol,	  T.	  (eds.)	  Bringing	  the	  State	  Back	  In,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	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the	  way	  for	  the	  neo-­‐institutionalist	  historical31	  phase	  of	  the	  early	  1990s	  when	  scholars	   like	  
Steinmo,	  Immergut	  and	  Thelen	  applied	  institutionalist	  arguments	  to	  explain	  the	  evolution	  of	  
public	  policy	  such	  as,	  tax-­‐,	  unemployment-­‐,	  and	  health	  care	  policy.32	  
	   Religion	  also	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  late	  functionalist	  frameworks.	  In	  line	  with	  Stein	  Rokkan,	  
Catholicism	   and	   Protestantism	   are	   ascribed	   a	   welfare	   retarding	   and	   enhancing	   role,	  
respectively.	   Protestantism	   entails	   quicker	   industrialization	   and	   democratization	   and	  
therefore	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   welfare	   state	   begins	   earlier.	  We	   can	   conclude	   that,	   even	  
though	   it	   is	   open	   to	   considering	   political	   and	   even	   religious	   variables,	   even	   ‘later’	  
functionalism	  is	  also	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  functional	  logic	  and	  timing	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  
modern	  welfare	  programs	  rather	  than	  on	  systematic	  differences	  between	  welfare	  regimes.33	  
	   	  
	  
2.1.2 Power	  Resource	  Approach	  
in	  a	  capitalist	  democracy	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  development	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  economic	  democracy	  
depends	  primarily	  on	  changes	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  resources	  between	  its	  major	  classes	  
Walter	  Korpi34	  
	  
During	   the	  1980s,	   the	  Logic	  of	   Industrialism	  was	   increasingly	  criticized	   for	   the	  narrow	  role	  
that	   it	  attributed	  to	  politics.	   In	  particular,	  Marxist	  and	  neo-­‐Marxist	   scholars	   lamented	  that	  
the	  key	  social	  concepts	  of	  class,	  class	  formation	  and	  class	  struggle	  were	  absent	  in	  most	  LoI	  
accounts.35	   With	   the	   decline	   of	   LoI,	   the	   Power	   Resource	   Approach	   (PRA)	   rose	   as	   the	  
dominant	  paradigm	  in	  welfare	  state	  research	  during	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s.	  Central	  to	  PRA	  is	  
a	  class	  model	  in	  which	  capital	  and	  labor	  are	  pinned	  against	  one	  another.	  The	  relative	  power	  
resources	  of	  labor	  (left-­‐wing	  parties	  and	  unions)	  are	  the	  most	  crucial	  factors	  in	  determining	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Steinmo,	  S.;	  Thelen,	  K.	  &	  Longstreth,	  F.	  (1992)	  Structuring	  Politics:	  Historical	  Institutionalism	  in	  
Comparative	  Analysis,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  32	  Immergut,	  E.	  (1992)	  Health	  Politics,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press;	  Thelen,	  K.	  (1991)	  
Union	  of	  Parts:	  Labor	  Politics	  in	  Postwar	  Germany,	  Ithaca	  NY,	  Cornell	  University	  Press;	  Steinmo,	  S.	  (1993)	  Taxation	  and	  Democracy:	  Swedish,	  British	  and	  American	  approaches	  to	  Financing	  the	  
Modern	  State,	  New	  Haven,	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  33	  Jens	  Albers	  writes	  in	  the	  preface	  of	  his	  ground	  breaking	  contribution	  from	  1982	  that	  the	  “analysis	  scrutinizes	  variation	  in	  timing	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  social	  insurance.	  See:	  „Die	  erste	  hier	  neu	  angestellte	  Analyse	  untersucht	  die	  zeitlichen	  Variationen	  der	  Einführung	  der	  Sozialversicherung.“	  Alber,	  J.	  (1982)	  p.	  21.	  34	  Korpi,	  W.	  (1983)	  p.	  4.	  35	  Korpi,	  W.	  (1983)	  pp.	  1-­‐2.	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the	   shape	   and	   size	   of	   a	   welfare	   regime.36	   As	   Huber	   and	   Stephens	   summarize,	   “to	   power	  
resource	   theory,	   the	   balance	   of	   class	   power	   is	   the	   primary	   determinant	   of	   variations	  
through	  time	  and	  across	  countries	  in	  welfare	  state	  effort”.37	  Wilensky’s	  central	  question	  of	  
the	  welfare	  state	  –	  “who	  gets	  what,	  how,	  and	  why”38	  –	  	  is,	  in	  contrast	  to	  LoI,	  not	  a	  function	  
of	  the	  speed	  of	  industrialization	  for	  PRA	  but	  of	  the	  power	  resources	  of	  class.	  The	  approach	  
assumes	   ample	   ideological	   overlap	   between	   the	   interest	   of	   labor	   and	   Social	   Democracy.	  
Walter	  Korpi,	  one	  of	   the	   fiercest	  promoters	  of	  PRA,	  notes	   that	   “the	  presence	  of	   reformist	  
socialist	   parties	   in	   the	   government	   can	   bring	   public	   policies	   closer	   to	   wage-­‐earner	  
interests.”39	  Therefore,	  the	  more	  power	  Social	  Democracy	  accumulates	  in	  a	  country	  through	  
the	  organization	  of	  wage	  earners	  within	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  movement,	  the	  better	  it	  can	  
translate	  this	  power	  into	  egalitarian,	  universal	  and	  redistributive	  welfare	  arrangements.40	  In	  
the	  long	  run	  this	  alters	  the	  class	  relation	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  working	  class.	  Korpi	  concludes	  that	  
in	   Sweden	   “through	   this	   process	   they	   have	   undermined	   the	   foundation	   of	   the	   capitalist	  
system	  of	  wage	  labour.”41	  Religion	  has	  no	  place	  in	  such	  a	  model	  as	  an	  actor’s	  motivation	  is	  
strictly	  based	  on	  the	  material	  divergences	  of	  class.	  PRA	  has	  to	  actively	  negate	  the	  potential	  
influence	  of	  religion	  as	  it	  would	  ultimately	  delegitimize	  the	  PRA	  model.	  When	  PRA	  scholars	  
are	  confronted	  with	  the	  empirical	  fact	  that	  a	  part	  of	  continental	  European	  workers	  found	  a	  
political	  home	  within	  Christian	  Democratic	  parties	  and	  unions	   they	  usually	  attribute	  “false	  
consciousness”	  to	  these	  workers.42	  
	   The	   PRA	   model	   builds	   largely	   on	   studies	   of	   Social	   Democracy	   in	   Scandinavia.43	   This	  
“Swedocentrism”44	   was	   one	   of	   the	   earliest	   critiques	   of	   the	   model.	   Tests	   of	   PRA	   beyond	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Leibfried,	  S.	  &	  Mau,	  S.	  (2008)	  p.	  XVII.	  37	  Huber,	  E.	  &	  Stephens,	  J.	  D.	  (2001)	  p.	  3.	  38	  Wilensky,	  H.	  (1975)	  p.	  XV.	  39	  Korpi,	  W.	  (1983)	  p.	  25.	  40	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K,	  &	  Beckert,	  U.	  (2002)	  p.	  190.	  41	  Kropi,	  W.	  (1983)	  p.	  4.	  42	  The	  reaction	  of	  classical	  PRA	  scholars	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  workers	  organizing	  in	  confessional	  parties	  or	  confessional	  unions	  was	  to	  claim	  that	  these	  workers	  must	  have	  joined	  Christian	  Democratic	  parties	  out	  of	  ‘false	  consciousness’.	  Orthodox	  PRA	  treats	  it	  as	  a	  strategic	  move	  of	  the	  Vatican	  to	  weaken	  the	  working	  class	  movement	  in	  Continental	  Europe.	  See:	  Korpi,	  W.	  (2006)	  pp.	  175-­‐176.	  Maybe	  not	  too	  surprisingly,	  the	  Catholic	  side	  argues	  the	  other	  way	  round.	  Striking	  is	  that	  early	  promoters	  of	  Catholic	  Social	  teaching	  like	  Bishop	  Ketteler	  in	  Germany	  had	  already	  warned	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  that	  the	  hostility	  of	  the	  socialist	  workers’	  movement	  towards	  religion	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  weakening	  split	  in	  the	  working	  class.	  Misner,	  P.	  (1992)	  p.	  588.	  43	  In	  his	  1983	  contribution	  Korpi	  analyses	  the	  OECD	  countries	  but	  his	  main	  case	  study	  is	  Sweden.	  Also	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  focuses	  in	  his	  1985	  book	  on	  Denmark,	  Sweden	  and	  Norway.	  44	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1990)	  p.	  17.	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Scandinavia	   by	   second	   generation	   PRA	   scholars	   led	   to	   a	   number	   of	   modifications	   of	   the	  
original	  concept.45	  	  
	   In	  an	  early	  critique	  Swenson	  pointed	  out	  that	  for	  a	  class	  approach	  PRA	  had	  focused	  too	  
narrowly	   on	   the	   power	   resources	   of	   the	   working	   class	   and	   turned	   a	   blind	   eye	   to	   the	  
capitalist	   class.46	   Furthermore,	   second	  generation	  PRA	  scholars	  argued	   that	   classes	  do	  not	  
have	  to	  primordially	  be	  pinned	  against	  one	  another.	   In	  fact,	   it	  was	  historically	  seldom	  that	  
the	  working	  class	  built	  universal	  welfare	  states	  alone	  as	  left	  parties	  were	  usually	  not	  able	  to	  
achieve	  an	  absolute	  majority.	  Peter	  Baldwin	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  systematically	  show	  that	  
the	  Scandinavian	  welfare	  states	  were	  effectively	  the	  result	  of	  a	  cross	  class	  coalition	  between	  
working	  and	  middle	  class.	  Struck	  by	  the	  high	  benefit	  levels	  of	  the	  Scandinavian	  system	  and	  
“encouraged	   by	   the	   failure	   to	   develop	   a	   more	   applicable	   version”47	   of	   the	   “laborist	  
approach”	  (PRA)	  he	  puts	  forward	  that	  “In	  fact,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  social	  policy	  has	  ever	  gone	  
beyond	   economically	   and	   functional	   minimum,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   deny	   the	   role	   played	   by	   the	  
middle	   classes”.48	   Baldwin	   argues	   that,	   depending	   on	   the	   development	   of	   the	   historical	  
context,	   different	   classes	  might	   develop	   common	   interests	   if	   they	   share	   similar	   risks.	   His	  
analysis	  points	  out	   that	   “In	  many	   cases,	   the	  bourgeoisie,	   or	   various	   subcategories	   thereof	  
also	  developed	  pressing	  interests	   in	  social	  policy,	  not	  just	  as	  Bonapartist	  manipulators,	  but	  
as	  creatures	  subject	  to	  misfortune”.49	  
	   Other	   second	   generation	   PRA	   scholars	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   the	  
political	   right	   was	   favorable	   for	   universal	   and	   redistributive	   welfare	   regimes.50	   Reasoning	  
about	   the	   potential	   influence	   of	   the	   right,	   Stephens	   mentions	   that	   Christian	   Democratic	  
parties	   could	   have	   played	   a	   major	   role	   in	   establishing	   social	   security.51	   Esping-­‐Andersen	  
builds	  on	  this	  and	  points	  to	  the	  severe	  fallacy	  of	  the	  PRA	  school’s	  equation	  of	  the	  preference	  
of	   labor	  with	  Social	  Democracy.	  He	  puts	  forward	  that	  “we	  cannot	  assume	  that	  Socialism	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Leibfried,	  S.	  &	  Mau,	  S.	  (2008).	  46	  Swenson,	  P.	  (1991)	  Bringing	  Capital	  Back	  in,	  or	  Social	  Democracy	  Reconsidered:	  Employer	  Power,	  Cross-­‐Class	  alliances,	  and	  Centralization	  of	  Industrial	  Relations	  in	  Denmark	  and	  Sweden,	  
World	  Politics,	  Vol.	  43,	  No.	  4	  (Jul.,	  1991),	  pp.	  513-­‐544;	  p.	  514.	  47	  Baldwin,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  9.	  48	  Baldwin,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  9.	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  emphasizes	  in	  a	  similar	  vein	  that	  in	  the	  Scandinavian	  case	  it	  was	  not	  only	  the	  working	  class	  but	  instead	  a	  coalition	  between	  workers	  and	  farmers	  and	  their	  political	  representatives	  that	  brought	  these	  regimes	  about.	  49	  Baldwin,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  9.	  50	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  &	  Beckert,	  U.	  (2002)	  p.	  191.	  51	  Stephens,	  J.	  (1979).	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the	   natural	   basis	   for	   wage-­‐earner	   mobilization”52	   and	   points	   out	   “that	   denominational	  
(usually	   social	   Catholic)	   parties	   in	   countries	   such	   as	   Holland,	   Italy	   and	   Germany	  mobilize	  
large	   sections	  of	   the	  working	   classes	  and	  pursue	  welfare-­‐state	  programs	  not	  drastically	   at	  
variance	   with	   their	   socialist	   competitors”.53	   Note	   though	   that	   Esping-­‐Andersen	   does	   not	  
diverge	  from	  the	  material	  class	  base	  of	  PRA.	  
	   Like	   the	   second	   generation	   LoI	   scholars,	   the	   PRA	   second	   generation	   was	   never	   as	  
orthodox	   as	   their	   later	   critics	  depicted	   them.	   Instead,	   they	  opened	   the	  PRA	  orthodoxy	  by	  
emphasizing	   the	   reality	  of	  cross	  class	  coalitions	  and	  contributed	   to	   the	  advent	  of	   the	  next	  
upcoming	  paradigm	  in	  welfare	  state	  research	  which	  emphasized	  the	  role	  of	  employers	  that	  
constructed	  the	  welfare	  state	  in	  alliance	  with	  the	  working	  class.	  
	  
	  
2.1.3 Employer	  Centered	  Approaches	  
unions	  and	  the	  Left	  exercise	  institutionalized	  power	  in	  advanced	  industrial	  societies	  not	  against	  or	  in	  
any	  way	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  employers	  
Peter	  Swenson54	  
	  
The	   core	   argument	  of	   the	   Employer	   Centered	  Approaches	   (ECAs)	   is	   that	   employers	   had	   a	  
genuine	  interest	  in	  welfare	  state	  formation	  because	  it	  guaranteed	  them	  higher	  advantages	  
and	  benefits	   in	   their	  economic	  productivity.55	  ECAs	  have	   taken	  many	  different	   shapes	  and	  
forms	  over	  the	  past	  decade,	  but	  they	  all	  share	  one	  common	  denominator:	  the	  driving	  force	  
for	   employers	   to	   actively	   engage	   and	   demand	   social	   security	   schemes	   is	   rooted	   in	  
employer’s	  fixed	  preferences	  to	  maximize	  their	  material	  profits	  and	  welfare	  can	  contribute	  
positively	  to	  reaching	  this	  goal.	  
	   Swenson	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  make	  an	  employer	  centered	  argument.	  In	  a	  qualitative	  
study	   of	   the	   Danish	   and	   Swedish	   case,56	   he	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   the	   production	   and	   export	  
strategy	   of	   a	   given	   industrial	   sector	   that	   determines	   whether	   employers	   push	   for	   social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1990)	  p.	  17.	  	  53	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1990)	  p.	  17.	  54	  Swenson,	  P.	  (1991)	  p.	  514.	  55	  Curiously,	  rational	  choice	  based	  ECAs	  employ	  a	  logic	  very	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  earlier	  neo-­‐Marxist	  accounts	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  where	  “Welfare	  exists	  because	  capital	  needs	  it”	  as	  van	  Kersbergen	  puts	  it.	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1995)	  p.	  11.	  See	  also:	  O’Connor,	  J.	  (1973)	  The	  fiscal	  Crisis	  of	  the	  State,	  New	  York,	  St.	  Martin’s.	  	  56	  Swenson,	  P.	  (1991).	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security	   arrangements.	   It	   is	   therefore	   not	   the	   working	   class	   power	   resources	   that	   drive	  
welfare	  expansion	  but	   instead	  welfare	   is	  promoted	  by	  a	  cross-­‐class	  coalition	  of	  employers	  
and	  workers	  within	   the	   same	  production	   regime.57	  He	  notes	   that	   “In	   fact,	   the	  Danish	  and	  
Swedish	   Left	   secured	   power	   in	   tacit	   alliance	   with	   dominant	   groups	   of	   employers.”	   This	  
“cross-­‐class	  alliance	  model”	  –	  as	  Swenson	  calls	  it	  –	  was	  the	  product	  of	  “mutual	  interests	  of	  
sectoral	   groupings	   that	   dominated	   employer	   and	   union	   confederations.”58	   Swenson	  
essentially	   argues	   that	   conflict	  within	   classes	   can	   lead,	   under	   certain	   conditions,	   to	   cross-­‐
class	   alliances	   that	   bring	   about	  welfare	   state	   expansion.	   Therefore,	   “Organized	  employers	  
wanted	   and	   aggressively	   promoted	   the	   centralization	   of	   industrial	   relations	   in	  
Scandinavia.”59	   Furthermore,	   for	   Swenson,	   the	   “corporatist	   fusion	   of	   state	   and	   societal	  
power”	   in	  Scandinavia	  was	  a	  process	  which	  was	  “co-­‐optative,	  operating	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  
labor	  rather	  than	  of	  capital.”60	  
	   Taking	  this	  as	  a	  point	  of	  departure,	  Hall	  and	  Soskice	  developed	  their	  VoC	  (Varieties	  of	  
Capitalism)	   argument.61	   VoC	   puts	   the	   firm	   at	   the	   center	   of	   analysis	   and	   argues	   that	  
employers’	   and	   employees’	   demand	   for	   welfare	   is	   regulated	   by	   their	   reliance	   on	   asset	  
specific	   or	   general	   skills.	   VoC	   sees	   the	   OECD	   countries	   divided	   into	   Coordinated	   Market	  
Economies	  (CMEs)	  and	  Liberal	  Market	  Economies	  (LMEs).	  Whereas	  firms	  operating	  in	  LMEs	  
do	   not	   rely	   on	   highly	   specific	   skill	   assets	   of	   the	   workforce,	   those	   operating	   in	   CMEs	   do.	  
Employers	  will	  demand	  social	  security	  schemes	  in	  CMEs	  as	  it	  increases	  labor’s	  willingness	  to	  
invest	  in	  highly	  specific	  and	  non-­‐transferable	  skills.62	  According	  to	  Estevez-­‐Abe,	  Iversen	  and	  
Soskice	   “Young	   people	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   invest	   in	   specific	   skills	   if	   the	   risk	   of	   loss	   of	  
employment	  opportunities	   that	   require	   those	   specific	   skills	   is	  high.”63	  Welfare	  makes	   sure	  
that	   workers	   invest	   in	   specific	   skills	   and	   hence	   employers	   “who	   rely	   on	   specific	   skills	   to	  
compete	   effectively	   on	   international	   markets”64	   support	   welfare.	   CME	   countries	   are	  
therefore	   very	   likely	   to	   have	   complex	   and	   encompassing	   social	   security	   schemes	   because	  
“Workers	  must	  be	  persuaded	  to	  invest	  in	  such	  skills,	  however,	  especially	  given	  the	  risk	  that,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Korpi,	  W.	  (2005)	  p.	  169.	  58	  Swenson,	  P.	  (1991)	  p.	  514.	  59	  Swenson,	  P.	  (1991)	  p.	  515.	  60	  Swenson,	  P.	  (1991)	  p.	  516.	  61	  Hall,	  P.	  &	  Soskice,	  D.	  (2001).	  62	  Hall,	  P.	  &	  Soskice,	  D.	  (2001)	  p.	  51.	  63	  Estevez-­‐Abe,	  M.;	  Iversen,	  T.	  &	  Soskice,	  D.	  (2001)	  Social	  Protection	  and	  the	  Formation	  of	  Skills:	  A	  Reinterpretation	  of	  the	  Welfare	  State.	  In:	  Hall,	  P.	  &	  Soskice,	  D.	  (eds.)	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  p.	  145.	  64	  Estevez-­‐Abe,	  M.;	  Iversen,	  T.	  &	  Soskice,	  D.	  (2001)	  p.	  145.	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if	   they	   are	   laid	   off	   and	  must	   take	   employment	   in	   another	   sector,	   they	  may	   never	   realize	  
their	   investment.”65	   In	   line	  with	   their	  argument	  of	   institutional	  complementaries,	  “welfare	  
states	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  complements	   to	  national	  production	  systems	  requiring	  asset-­‐
specific	  skills.”66	  	  
	   Mares	  seeks	  to	  critically	  develop	  ECAs	  further.	  She	  points	  out	  that	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  
detected	   strong	   divergences	   in	   employer	   preferences	   regarding	   social	   security,	   not	   only	  
between	  LMEs	  and	  CMEs	  but	  also	  within	  CME’s	  and	  within	  different	  sectors	  of	  production.67	  
Mares	  agrees	  with	  the	  core	  assumption	  of	  ECA	  that	  employers	  were	  heavily	  involved	  in	  the	  
bargaining	   on	   social	   policy	   but	   she	   also	   “documents	  widespread	   employer	   antagonism	   to	  
legislated	  social	  security	  programs.”68	  Her	  answer	   is	   that	  employers	  are	   influenced	   in	  their	  
preferences	  for	  social	  policy	  by	  the	  size	  of	  their	  firm,	  the	  strength	  of	  trade	  unions,	  the	  firm’s	  
skill	   profile,	   the	   exposure	   of	   the	   firm	   to	   competitive	   pressure	   or	   whether	   workers	   are	  
exposed	  to	  high	  or	  low	  risks	  in	  the	  firm.	  According	  to	  these	  needs,	  firms	  will	  either	  promote	  
or	  oppose	  universalist,	   sectoral	   or	   firm-­‐level	   based	   insurance	  programs.	   Furthermore,	   this	  
determines	  whether	   employers,	   unions	   or	   the	   state	   control	   and	   administer	   the	   schemes.	  
Mares’	   contribution	   is	   a	  major	   breakthrough	   in	   the	   ECA	   literature	   as	   she	   breaks	  with	   the	  
assumption	  that	  employers	  would	  have	  fixed	  and	  stable	  preferences	  across	  space	  and	  time.	  
Yet,	   strangely	   enough,	   institutional	   features	   such	   as	   Corporatist	   and	   Neo-­‐Corporatist	  
legacies	   are	   not	   included	   in	   the	   model.	   Mares	   also	   omits	   that	   preferences	   in	   industrial	  
relations	  are	  mutually	  constitutive,	  especially	  in	  CMEs.	  	  
	   Throwing	   the	   baby	   out	   with	   the	   bath-­‐water	   is	   symptomatic	   for	   most	   VoC	   accounts	  
which	  did	  a	  great	  job	  of	  bringing	  the	  preference	  formation	  of	  employers	  into	  welfare	  state	  
research	  by	  postulating	   that	   it	   “can	  no	   longer	  be	  premised	  on	   the	  assumption	  of	  business	  
opposition	   towards	   social	   insurance.”69	   But	   ECAs	   cannot	   explain	   why	   workers	   in	   most	  
Continental	   European	   countries	   joined	   ideological	   trade	   unions	   such	   as	   Catholic	   or	   liberal	  
unions.	  Following	  Estevez-­‐Abe,	  Iversen	  and	  Soskice	  one	  would	  instead	  expect	  the	  formation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Hall,	  P.	  &	  Soskice,	  D.	  (2001)	  p.	  51.	  Nevertheless,	  they	  qualify	  that	  only	  some	  VoC	  scholars	  use	  this	  approach	  to	  welfare	  and	  put	  forward	  on	  the	  same	  page	  that	  “Governments	  introduce	  social	  legislation	  for	  many	  reasons,	  some	  of	  them	  conditioned	  by	  partisan	  competition	  and	  the	  demands	  of	  labor.”	  66	  Korpi,	  W.	  (2006)	  p.	  170.	  67	  Mares,	  I.	  (2003)	  The	  Sources	  of	  Business	  Interest	  in	  Social	  Insurance	  Sectoral	  versus	  National	  Differences,	  World	  Politics,	  Volume	  55,	  Number	  2,	  January	  2003,	  pp.	  229-­‐258.	  68	  Korpi,	  W.	  (2006)	  pp.	  183-­‐184.	  69	  Mares,	  I.	  (2003)	  p.	  257.	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of	   high-­‐skilled	   and	   low	   skilled	   unions.	   Especially	   in	   CMEs	   that	   have	   often	   emphasized	  
stakeholder	   value	   over	   shareholder	   value,	   driving	   forces	   for	   employers	   and	   employees	   in	  
industrialized	  conflict	  other	  than	  pure	  profit	  maximization	  might	  exist.70	  It	  is	  good	  to	  include	  
employers	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   welfare	   formation	   but	   this	   can	   hardly	   mean	   that	   one	   can	  
discount	  all	  other	  influential	  variables.71	  Furthermore,	  the	  hunt	  for	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  the	  
ECA	   arguments	   has	   just	   begun.	   Paster72	   found	   in	   a	   pioneering	   study	   of	   employers’	  
involvement	   in	   the	   German	  Welfare	   State	   over	   the	   past	   century	   that	   German	   employers	  
always	  opposed	   social	   security	   in	   their	   first	   order	  preferences	   and	  only	   accepted	   them	  as	  
the	   lesser	   evil	  when	   they	   had	   no	   choice.	   In	   a	   similar	   vein	  Münnich	   shows	   that	   ideational	  
frames,	   rather	   than	   bold	   interest	   maximization,	   played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   New	   Deal	  
compromise.73	  Today,	  research	  in	  the	  ECA	  tradition	  has	  increasingly	  started	  to	  search	  for	  a	  
combination	   of	   cross-­‐class	   coalition	   and	   employer	   centered	   approaches	   and	   institutional	  
explanations.	   Such	   “Revisionist	   Approaches”	   have	   become	   the	   dominant	   research	   strand	  
during	  the	  past	  years.	  It	  is	  less	  centered	  on	  employers	  but	  rather	  on	  different	  risk	  categories	  
in	  society	  that	  engage	  in	  coalition	  building.	  Departing	  from	  Baldwin’s	  seminal	  contribution,	  
researchers	  such	  as	  Häusermann,74	  Iversen75	  or	  Rehm	  and	  Hacker76	  have	  shown	  that	  shifts	  in	  
risk	  categories	  and	  their	  political	   representation	  are	   increasingly	  relevant	   for	  welfare	  state	  
retrenchment.	   This	   branch	   of	   research	   resembles	   some	   of	   the	   older	   functional	   accounts,	  
though	   executed	   today	   on	   micro	   level	   data	   and	   with	   an	   extremely	   high	   level	   of	  
methodological	  sophistication.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  People	  can	  for	  example	  start	  a	  company	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  build	  the	  best	  sports	  car	  (Porsche).	  This	  might	  also	  explain	  the	  comparatively	  high	  number	  of	  engineers	  as	  CEOs	  in	  continental	  European	  countries	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  prevalence	  of	  MBAs	  in	  Anglo	  Saxon	  capitalism.	  71	  Aware	  of	  the	  lacuna	  of	  presenting	  an	  ‘institution	  less	  account’	  Iverson	  links	  in	  his	  more	  recent	  work	  the	  evolution	  of	  different	  welfare	  regimes	  through	  the	  evolution	  of	  different	  electoral	  institutions	  to	  specific	  economic	  skill	  profiles	  of	  countries.	  See:	  Iversen,	  T.	  (2005)	  Capitalism,	  
Democracy	  and	  Welfare,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  72	  Paster,	  T.	  (2011)	  The	  Role	  of	  Buisness	  in	  the	  development	  of	  Welfare	  State	  and	  Labor	  Market	  in	  
Germany,	  London,	  Routledge.	  73	  Münnich,	  S.	  (2010).	  74	  Häusermann,	  S.	  (2010) The	  Politics	  of	  Welfare	  State	  Reform	  in	  Continental	  Europe:	  
Modernization	  in	  Hard	  Times,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  75	  Iversen,	  T.	  (2005).	  76	  Rehm,	  P.;	  Hacker	  J.	  &	  Schlesinger,	  S.	  (2012).	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2.2 Ideas	  and	  Welfare	  Regimes	  
Ideology	   plays	   only	   secondary	   roles	   in	   the	   three	   main	   pillars	   of	   welfare	   state	   theory.	   If	  
ideology	  is	  employed,	  it	  usually	  comes	  about	  through	  the	  backdoor	  and	  from	  the	  Left.	  PRA	  
scholars	   like	  Korpi	  use	   left	  party	  strength	  and	  therefore	  also	   left	  party	   ideology	  as	  a	  proxy	  
for	  labor	  mobilization.	  Alber	  indirectly	  uses	  ideas	  in	  his	  LoI	  accounts	  when	  he	  charts	  out	  the	  
founding	  dates	  of	  Social	  Democratic	  parties	  in	  Europe	  in	  order	  to	  see	  whether	  they	  correlate	  
with	   welfare	   state	   formation.77	   Conservative	   parties,	   or	   religiously	   informed	   political	  
movements	   like	   the	   Christian	   Democrats,	   are	   usually	   not	   concerned.	   This	   seems	   odd	   as	  
welfare	   provision	   was,	   up	   until	   the	   era	   of	   industrialization,	   one	   of	   the	   core	   domains	   of	  
religious	   institutions.	   However,	   some	   second	   generation	   PRA	   scholars	   like	   Huber	   and	  
Stephens	   also	   point	   out	   that	   the	   weakness	   of	   Conservative	   parties	   and	   hence	   their	  
ideological	   power	   is	   constitutive	   for	   the	   evolution	   of	   universal	   welfare	   regimes.78	  
Furthermore,	   the	   “parties	   do	   matter”	   research	   agenda	   picked	   up	   and	   investigated	   the	  
potential	  impact	  of	  Conservative	  and	  Christian	  Democratic	  parties	  on	  welfare	  state	  spending	  
but	  never	  investigated	  Conservative	  and	  Christian	  Democratic	  welfare	  ideology	  in	  itself.79	  	  
	   One	  of	   the	  earliest	   accounts	   that	   systematically	   dealt	  with	   the	  possible	   ideational	  
influences	  was,	   paradoxically,	   the	   1990	  book	  of	   the	  PRA	   scholar	   Esping-­‐Andersen.	   Esping-­‐
Andersen	   finds	   that	   there	   is	   no	   single	   maximum	   model	   of	   welfare	   (the	   Scandinavian	  
universal	  model)	   from	  which	   a	  welfare	   state	   can	   be	  more	   or	   less	   distanced	   in	   degrees	   of	  
universality,	  coverage	  and	  benefit	  rates	  as	  he	  and	  the	  PRA	  school	  had	  previously	  believed.	  
Instead,	   his	   seminal	   quantitative	   analysis	   shows	   that	   three	   diverse	   regime	   clusters	   (Social	  
Democratic,	  Conservative,	  Liberal-­‐Residual)	  exist.	  
	   The	   interesting	   part	   about	   Esping-­‐Andersen’s	   account	   for	   this	   thesis	   is	   that	   he	  
identifies	   systematic	   patterns	   of	   divergence	   of	   welfare	   regimes	   in	   continental	   Europe	  
(Conservative	  regime	  cluster)	  that	  cannot	  be	  subsumed	  under	  the	  minimal	  Liberal-­‐Residual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Alber,	  J.	  (1982)	  p.	  39.	  78	  Huber,	  E.	  &	  Stephens,	  J.	  D.	  (2001).	  79	  Schmidt,	  M.	  G.	  (1996)	  When	  parties	  matter:	  A	  review	  of	  the	  partisan	  influence	  on	  public	  policy,	  
European	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Research	  30,	  pp.	  155-­‐183;	  Seeleib-­‐Kaiser,	  M.;	  Van	  Dyk,	  S.	  &	  Roggenkamp,	  M.	  (2008)	  Polity	  Politics	  and	  Social	  Welfare:	  	  Comparing	  Christian	  and	  Social	  
Democracy	  in	  Austria,	  Germany	  and	  the	  Netherlands,	  Cheltham,	  Edward	  Elgar;	  For	  a	  more	  recent	  overview	  see:	  	  Häusermann,	  S.;	  Picot,	  G.	  &	  Geering,	  D.	  (2010)	  Rethinking	  Party	  Politics	  and	  the	  Welfare	  State:	  Recent	  Advances	  in	  the	  Literature,	  April	  6,	  2010.	  Paper	  Presented	  for	  the	  17th	  International	  Conference	  of	  the	  Council	  for	  European	  Studies,	  Montreal,	  April	  15-­‐17,	  2010;	  To	  a	  certain	  extent	  also:	  	  Huber,	  E.;	  Ragin,	  C.	  &	  Stephens,	  J.	  D.	  (1993);	  and:	  Huber,	  E.	  &	  Stephens,	  J.	  D.	  (2001).	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and	  the	  maximal	  Social	  Democratic-­‐Scandinavian	  poles	  of	  welfare.80	  Therefore,	  their	  shape	  
could	  not	  be	  explained	  by	  being	  half	  way	  stuck	  between	  residualism	  and	  universalism	  due	  to	  
halfhearted	   labor	   mobilization.	   In	   these	   Conservative	   welfare	   regimes,81	   social	   rights	   are	  
attached	   to	   status	  and	   redistribution	   is	  moderate.	  These	  welfare	   states	  preserve	   status	   in	  
society	   rather	   than	   equalizing	   it.	   In	   contrast	   to	   liberal	   regimes	   the	   market	   plays	   only	   a	  
marginal	   role	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   social	   protection.	   Instead,	   the	   family	   is	   the	   major	   risk	  
hedging	   institution.	   A	   strong	   family	   bias	   emphasizes	   a	  male	   breadwinner	  model	   of	   social	  
protection	   and	   family	   benefits	   encourage	   motherhood	   and	   female	   labor-­‐marked	  
participation	   is	   generally	   not	   facilitated	   through	   the	   provision	   of	   day-­‐care	   services.82	  
Conservative	   welfare	   states	   are	   characterized	   by	   status	   maintenance	   and	   gender	   heavy	  
patriachism.	   This	   is	  mirrored	   through	  high	   transfer	  payments,	   low	   service	  provision	   and	  a	  
highly	   fragmented	   program	   structure	   that	   is	   self-­‐administered	   by	   the	   social	   partners.	   The	  
group	   of	   Conservative	   welfare	   States	   includes	   the	   core	   Continental	   European	   States	   in	  
which	  Catholicism	  is	  an	  important	  denomination	  and	  where	  Christian	  Democracy	  played	  an	  
important	  role	  in	  the	  party	  system	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  France),	  such	  as	  Austria,	  Germany,	  
France,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Belgium,	  Italy	  and	  Switzerland.83	  
	   As	  one	  of	  the	  prominent	  PRA	  scholars,	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  does	  not	  argue	  that	  these	  
welfare	   states	   are	   the	   results	   of	   Conservative	   ideology.	   Instead,	   he	   still	   employs	   a	   class	  
model.	  He	  puts	  forward	  that	  the	  Conservative	  welfare	  states	  were	  the	  result	  of	  “corporatist-­‐
statist	  legacies”	  that	  tried	  to	  form	  cross	  class	  alliances	  and	  attract	  the	  middle	  classes.	  In	  fact,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  In	  fact,	  for	  PRA	  and	  LoI	  there	  were	  only	  two	  poles	  of	  Welfare	  regimes.	  One	  was	  the	  Liberal-­‐Residual	  minimal	  version	  and	  the	  other	  the	  Social-­‐Democratic	  maximal	  one.	  Where	  one’s	  welfare	  state	  was	  situated	  on	  a	  continuum	  between	  the	  two	  depended	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  industrialization-­‐modernization	  or	  labour	  mobilization	  in	  terms	  of	  power	  resources.	  	  81	  The	  labels	  of	  this	  regime	  cluster	  differ.	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  calls	  them	  Conservative.	  Ferrera	  labels	  the	  same	  cluster	  Bismarckian,	  while	  Bonoli	  describes	  them	  as	  Continental	  and	  Korpi	  and	  Palme	  call	  them	  State-­‐Corporatist.	  See:	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1996)	  The	  ‚Southern	  Model’	  of	  Welfare	  in	  Social	  Europe,	  Journal	  of	  European	  Social	  Policy,	  Vol.	  6,	  No.	  1,	  pp.	  17-­‐37;	  Bonoli,	  G.	  (1997)	  Classifying	  Welfare	  States:	  a	  Two-­‐dimensional	  Approach,	  Journal	  of	  Social	  Policy,	  Vol.	  26,	  No.	  03,	  pp.	  351-­‐372;	  Korpi,	  W.	  &	  Palme,	  O.	  (2003)	  New	  Politics	  and	  Class	  Politics	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Austerity	  and	  Globalization:	  Welfare	  State	  Regress	  in	  18	  Countries	  1975-­‐1995,	  American	  Political	  
Science	  Review,	  Vol.	  97,	  No.	  3,	  pp.	  425-­‐448.	  82	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1990)	  p.	  27.	  83	  Note	  though	  that	  Switzerland	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  are	  borderline	  cases.	  They	  are	  classified	  by	  some	  authors	  as	  conservatives,	  while	  for	  others	  the	  Netherlands	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  Social	  Democratic	  type	  while	  Switzerland	  is	  Liberal-­‐Residual;	  Bonoli,	  G.	  (1997);	  Korpi	  &	  Palme	  (2003).	  For	  an	  overview	  see:	  Arts,	  W.	  &	  Gelissen,	  J.	  (2002)	  Three	  Worlds	  of	  Welfare	  Capitalism	  or	  more?	  A	  state	  of-­‐the-­‐art-­‐report,	  Journal	  of	  European	  Social	  Policy,	  Vol.	  12,	  No.	  2,	  pp.	  137-­‐158.	  Furthermore,	  Italy,	  Spain	  and	  Greece	  are	  often	  described	  as	  a	  distinct	  „Southern“	  regime	  type.	  See:	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1996).	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he	   notes	   that	   “The	   cause	   is	   historical.	   Developed	   by	   Conservative	   political	   forces,	   these	  
regimes	   institutionalized	   a	  middle-­‐class	   loyalty	   to	   the	   preservation	   of	   both	   occupationally	  
segregated	   social-­‐insurance	   programs	   and,	   ultimately,	   to	   the	   political	   forces	   that	   brought	  
them	  into	  being.”84	  Hence	  the	  status	  preserving	  aspects	  and	  the	  distinction	  between	  white	  
and	  blue	  collar	  schemes	  in	  these	  regimes.	  But,	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  also	  points	  out	  that	  this	   is	  
not	  the	  whole	  story.	  Instead,	  	  
	  
the	  corporatist	  regimes	  are	  also	  typically	  shaped	  by	  the	  Church,	  and	  hence	  strongly	  committed	  to	  the	  
preservation	   of	   traditional	   family-­‐hood.	   Social	   insurance	   typically	   excludes	   non-­‐working	  wives,	   and	  
family	   benefits	   encourage	   motherhood.	   Day	   care,	   and	   similar	   services	   are	   conspicuously	  
underdeveloped.85	  
	  
Esping-­‐Andersen	   is	   not	   interested	   in	   the	   Conservative	   welfare	   states	   but	   his	   student	   van	  
Kersbergen	   picks	   up	   the	   issue	   and	   puts	   forward	   the	   first	   groundbreaking	   analysis	   of	  
Christian	   Democratic	   influence	   on	   Continental	   welfare.	   He	   builds	   a	   strong	   case	   that	   the	  
Continental	   European	   welfare	   states	   were	   not	   simply	   incomplete	   versions	   of	   the	  
Scandinavian	  welfare	  states	  as	  PRA	  and	  LoI	  assumed.	  Van	  Kersbergen	  shows	  instead	  that	  all	  
the	   aspects	   that	   Esping-­‐Andersen	   highlights	   of	   the	   Continental	   welfare	   model	   are	  
encapsulated	   in	   the	   continental	   European	   political	   movement	   of	   Christian	   Democracy.	   In	  
fact	   Christian	  Democracy	   is	   a	   religiously	  motivated	   cross	   class	  movement	  which	   claims	   to	  
represent	  both	  the	  interests	  of	  capital	  and	  labor.86	  The	  basis	  of	  these	  regimes	  is	  ideological,	  
rather	  than	  a	  diluted	  or	  thwarted	  class	  struggle.	  
	   Van	   Kersbergen	   develops	   the	   model	   of	   Social	   Capitalism	   to	   capture	   this	   ideological	  
conception,	  which	  consists	  of	  three	  key	  aspects:	  familialism,	  mediation	  and	  subsidiarity.	  
	  
This	  model	  of	   social	   capitalism	  significantly	  and	  systematically	  differs	   from	  both	   the	   liberal	  and	   the	  
social	  democratic	  concepts	  of	  social	  citizenship,	  although	  real	  differences	  between	  Social	  Democratic	  
and	  Christian	  Democratic	  welfare	  state	  regimes	  are	  concealed	  behind	  a	  veil	  of	  comparable	   levels	  of	  
social	  spending.87	  
	  
In	   an	   extraordinary	   encompassing	   and	   substantial	   qualitative	   and	   quantitative	   analysis	   he	  
shows	   that	   the	   key	   components	   of	   Social	   Capitalism	   are	   mirrored	   by	   the	   organization,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1990)	  p.	  32.	  85	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  E.	  (1990)	  p.	  27.	  86	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1994).	  87	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1995)	  p.	  177.	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spending	  and	  financing	  patterns	  of	  the	  Conservative	  welfare	  state	  cluster.	  Social	  Capitalism	  
is	   an	   “organic	   theory	   of	   society”	   based	   on	  Neo-­‐Thomasian	   philosophy	  which	   rejects	   class	  
struggle.	   Van	   Kersbergen	   emphasizes	   that	   “Neither	   unions	   nor	   employers	   nor	   parties	   are	  
class	  agents,	  but	  instruments	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  society	  as	  an	  organism”.88	  In	  contrast	  
to	   liberal	   individualism	   and	   the	   collectivism	   of	   Socialism,	   the	   organic	   perception	   of	   Social	  
Capitalism	   has	   the	   family	   as	   the	   central	   reference	   point	   in	   society.	   The	   regimes	   “are	  
characterized	  by	  a	  family	  bias	  in	  their	  tax-­‐benefit	  system	  and	  on	  a	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  benefits	  
in	   cash	   rather	   than	   in	   kind.”89	   In	   fact,	   Van	   Kersbergen	   finds	   that	   “Christian	   Democracy	   is	  
positively	   related	   to	   the	   family	   bias	   in	   tax-­‐benefit	   regimes”90	   and	   continental	   regimes	  
provide	  “paid	  jobs	  for	  men,	  unpaid	  domestic	  labor	  for	  women”.91	  
	   The	   second	   key	   feature	   of	   social	   capitalism	   is	   the	   concept	   of	   mediation.	   As	   political	  
movements	   that	   promote	   social	   capitalism	   are,	   by	   their	   very	   definition,	   cross	   class	  
movements,	   they	   need	   a	   system	   to	   mediate	   between	   these	   different	   components	   of	  
society.92	   One	   part	   of	   the	   complex	   system	   that	   enables	   this	   is	   the	   welfare	   state.	   Social	  
Capitalism	   therefore	   produces	   welfare	   regimes	   that	   are	   based	   on	   transfer	   payments	  
between	   different	   segments	   of	   society.	   These	   systems	   engage	   in	   “repair	   work”,93	   rather	  
than	  altering	  the	  logic	  of	  a	  segmented	  and	  stratified	  society,	  so	  Social	  Capitalism	  therefore	  
does	   not	   feature	   a	   commitment	   to	   full	   employment	   but	   instead	   offers	   compensation	   for	  
unemployment.	  
	   The	   last	   principle	   of	   Social	   Capitalism	   is	   the	   subsidiarity	   principle	   which	   pleads	   for	   a	  
limitation	  of	   the	   influence	  of	  state	   intervention	  on	  welfare	  and	   in	  society.	  Van	  Kersbergen	  
sees	  the	  parastatal	  organization	  of	  continental	  European	  welfare	  states	  and	  the	  segregation	  
of	   social	   security	   along	   different	   vocational	   groups	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   this	   subsidiarity	  
principle.94	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1995)	  p.	  186.	  89	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1995)	  p.	  4.	  90	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1995)	  p.	  139.	  91	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1995)	  p.	  190.	  92	  Wilarty	  explores	  and	  captures	  these	  features	  of	  the	  internal	  organization	  of	  the	  German	  Christian	  Democrats	  by	  creating	  the	  concept	  of	  	  “catch	  all	  corporatism”,	  Wilarty,	  S.	  (2010)	  The	  
CDU	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Gender	  in	  Germany:	  Bringing	  Women	  to	  the	  Party,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  93	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1995)	  p.	  188.	  94	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1995)	  p.	  189.	  Nevertheless,	  van	  Kersbergen	  fails	  to	  explain	  where	  these	  principles	  come	  from.	  This	  thesis	  finds	  that	  subsidiarity	  comes	  mainly	  as	  a	  response	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  to	  challenges	  from	  liberal	  or	  protestant	  state	  elites	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	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   Van	  Kersbergen’s	  Social	  Capitalism	  concept	  was	  a	  major	  breakthrough	  in	  the	  research	  
on	  continental	  European	  welfare	  but	  early	  on	   it	  was	  criticized	   for	   its	   failure	   to	  explain	   the	  
huge	   variation	   in	   the	   Conservative	   cluster.	   If	   Social	   Capitalism,	   and	   its	   embodiment	   in	  
Christian	   Democracy,	   was	   the	   constituting	   factor	   of	   continental	   welfare	   then	   why	   were	  
Switzerland	   and	   the	   Netherlands,	  with	   their	   longstanding	   Christian	   Democratic	   traditions,	  
borderline	  cases?95	  Van	  Kersbergen	  points	  out	  that	  Social	  Capitalism	  represents	  only	  a	  core	  
set	  of	  ideas	  around	  which	  variation	  is	  possible.	  For	  him	  	  
	  
there	  is	  an	  association	  between	  Catholics	  and	  Welfare	  Catholicism,	  between	  Christian	  Democracy	  and	  
Social	   Capitalism.	   The	   relation	   is	   not	   a	   simple	   linear	   association,	   but	   can	   be	   better	   appreciated	   as	  
variations	  around	  a	  common	  kernel	  of	  social	  capitalism.96	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  van	  Kersbergen	  says	  little	  on	  how	  this	  variation	  comes	  about.97	  
	   As	  Manow	  suggests	  in	  a	  thought	  provoking	  piece,	  the	  diverging	  social	  policy	  regimes	  of	  
the	  Netherlands	  or	  Switzerland	  might	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  countries	  had	  not	  
only	   Christian	   Democratic	   parties	   but,	   for	   long	   time	   spans,	   also	   witnessed	   competition	  
between	   several	   denominational	   parties.98	   Manow’s	   point	   is	   “that	   Protestantism	   –	   in	  
contrast	  to	  the	  received	  wisdom	  in	  the	  literature	  (Kersbergen	  1995;	  Huber/Ragin/Stephens	  
1993;	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  1990;	  Langer	  1998)	  has	  contributed	   in	  a	  substantial	  and	  distinctive	  
way	   to	   the	   development	   of	   the	   western	   welfare	   state”.99	   He	   thinks	   that	   the	   variation	   in	  
Esping-­‐Andersen’s	  Conservative	  welfare	  cluster	  cannot	  be	  sufficiently	  accounted	  for	  by	  only	  
referring	  to	  a	  more	  or	  less	  Catholic	  interpretation	  of	  Continental	  denominational	  influence.	  
Instead,	   especially	   reformed	   Protestantism	   (Pietism,	   Calvinism,	   Zwinglianism)	   with	   its	  
“individual	   ascetism”100	   should	   have	   a	   retarding	   effect	   or	   at	   least	   favor	   residual	   types	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Switzerland	  is	  often	  classified	  as	  a	  liberal-­‐Residual	  while	  the	  Netherlands	  are	  often	  percieved	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  cluster.	  For	  an	  overview	  on	  the	  debate	  see:	  Arts,	  W.	  &	  Gelissen,	  J.	  (2002).	  96	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1995)	  p.	  178.	  97	  Social	  Capitalism	  is	  constructed	  as	  a	  Weberian	  Ideal	  type.	  Though,	  van	  Kersbergen	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  account	  for	  deviations	  from	  this	  ideal	  type.	  98	  Manow,	  P.	  (2004)	  The	  Good,	  the	  Bad,	  and	  the	  Ugly:	  Esping-­‐Andersen’s	  Regime	  Typology	  and	  the	  Religious	  Roots	  of	  the	  Western	  Welfare	  State,	  	  MPIfG	  Working	  Paper	  04/3,	  Sept	  2004.	  This	  article	  was	  published	  in	  German	  already	  in	  2002:	  Manow,	  P.	  (2002)	  ‘The	  Good,	  the	  Bad,	  and	  the	  Ugly':	  Esping-­‐Andersens	  Wohlfahrtsstaatstypologie	  und	  die	  konfessionellen	  Grundlagen	  des	  westlichen	  Sozialstaats,	  Kölner	  Zeitschrift	  für	  Soziologie	  und	  Sozialpsychologie,	  54,	  pp.	  203-­‐225.	  99	  Manow,	  P.	  (2004)	  p.	  5.	  100	  Manow,	  P.	  (2004)	  p.	  5.	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welfare	   regimes.101	  Manow	   points	   to	   the	   explanatory	   power	   of	   other	   denominations	   and	  
liberal	   Protestantism	   that	   goes	   beyond	   the	   basic	   Stein	   Rokkian-­‐assumption	   of	   having	   a	  
positive	  effect	  on	  welfare	  because	   it	   facilitates	   secularization.	  Nevertheless,	  his	  account	   is	  
static	   and	   does	   not	   theorize	   what	   happens	   when	   different	   Christian	   denominations	   or	  
secular	  and	  religious	  movements	  clash	  on	  welfare.	  
	   To	  resolve	  some	  of	  these	  controversies,	  van	  Kersbergen	  and	  Manow	  joined	  forces	  and	  
published	  an	  edited	  volume	  together	   in	  2009.	  Surprisingly	   it	  dismantles	  many	  of	  their	  own	  
previous	   conclusions	   on	   religion	   and	   welfare.	   In	   the	   introduction	   they	   write	   that	   “the	  
dominant	   reading	   in	   the	   literature,	  which	  explains	   the	   specific	   features	  of	   the	   continental	  
welfare	  regime	  as	  a	  manifestation	  of	  Catholic	  social	  doctrine,	  is	  historically	   inadequate”.102	  
Instead,	  they	  argue	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  reformulation	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  Protestantism	  on	  welfare.	  
Protestant	  influence	  is	  not	  only	  the	  flipside	  of	  less	  Catholic	  influence	  but	  can	  also	  promote	  
welfare	  if	  it	  adopts	  the	  form	  of	  state	  church	  Lutheranism.	  While	  Protestant	  sects	  usually	  had	  
a	  retarding	   influence	  on	  welfare,	  “the	  Lutheran	  state	  church	   in	  Germany	  or	   in	  Scandinavia	  
held	  no	  major	  reservations	  against	  the	  state	  playing	  a	  dominant	  role	  in	  social	  protection”.103	  
This	  “Rokkanian	  compliment”	  foresees	  that	  whenever	  the	  State	  Church	  conflict	  was	  settled	  
early	   on	   (as	   in	   Protestant	   Scandinavia)	   and	   Protestantism	   became	   state	   church	   it	   had	   a	  
positive	  effect	  on	  welfare.	  
	   Furthermore,	  the	  2009	  account	  finally	  addresses	  the	  scarce	  reference	  to	  institutions	  in	  
the	   previous	   frameworks.104	   Building	   on	   Iversen	   and	   Soskice’s	   earlier	   work	   on	   election	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  Manow,	  P.	  (2004).	  Manow’s	  model	  roots	  in	  an	  earlier	  account	  of	  Heidenheimer,	  which	  elegantly	  sketches	  the	  different	  welfare	  conceptions	  of	  the	  major	  Continental	  European	  Christian	  Denominations	  by	  presenting	  a	  fictive	  dialogue	  during	  a	  fictive	  encounter	  between	  the	  two	  religious	  sociologists	  Ernst	  Trölsch	  and	  Max	  Weber	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  Heidenheimer,	  A.	  J.	  (1983)	  Secularization	  patterns	  and	  the	  westward	  spread	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  1883-­‐1983:	  Two	  dialogues	  about	  how	  and	  why	  Britain,	  the	  Netherlands,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  have	  differed,	  IN:	  Tomasson,	  R.F.	  (ed.)	  The	  Welfare	  State	  1883-­‐1983,	  Comparative	  Social	  Research	  6,	  Greenwich	  &	  London,	  Jai	  Press.	  Van	  Kersbergen	  picks	  this	  discussion	  up	  in	  the	  reminder	  of	  his	  book	  but	  does	  not	  discuss	  the	  potential	  political	  consequences	  for	  his	  model	  of	  Social	  Capitalism.	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1995)	  pp.	  195-­‐196.	  102	  Manow,	  P.	  &	  van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (2009)	  Religion	  and	  the	  Western	  Welfare	  State	  –	  The	  Theoretical	  Context.	  IN:	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  &	  Manow,	  P.	  (eds.)	  Religion,	  Class	  Coalitions,	  and	  
Welfare	  States,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  p.	  3.	  	  	  103	  Manow,	  P.	  &	  van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (2009)	  p.	  4.	  	  However,	  this	  interpretation	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  	  why	  the	  German	  and	  Swedish	  welfare	  regimes	  developed	  in	  such	  diverging	  ways.	  104	  The	  laggard	  development	  of	  the	  Swiss	  welfare	  state	  can	  for	  example	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  multiple	  veto	  points	  that	  federalism	  provided	  for	  Calvinist	  anti	  welfare	  state	  parties.	  See:	  Obinger,	  H.	  (2009)	  Religion	  and	  the	  Consolidation	  of	  the	  Swiss	  Welfare	  State,	  1848-­‐1945,	  IN:	  Van	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systems	  and	  redistribution	  they	  “propose	  a	  Rokkonian	  complement	  to	   Iversen	  and	  Soskice	  
(2006)	  model	  of	  welfare	  state	  class	  coalitions”.105	  Van	  Kersbergen	  and	  Manow	  argue	  that,	  in	  
majoritarian	   two	   party	   systems,	   political	   representation	   and	   conflict	   will	   be	   reduced	   to	   a	  
dominant	  capital-­‐labor/right-­‐left	  cleavage	  while	  proportional	  representation	  and	  multiparty	  
systems	  allow	  for	  the	  reflection	  and	  incorporation	  of	  more	  cleavages	  in	  the	  party	  system.106	  
On	   the	   continent,	   with	   its	   fierce	   state-­‐church	   conflicts,	   this	   led	   to	   the	   translation	   of	   the	  
religious	   cleavage	   into	   the	   formation	   of	   Christian	   Democratic	   parties,	   whereas	   in	  
Scandinavia	  it	  saw	  the	  formation	  of	  agrarian	  parties.107	  The	  second	  variable	  they	  proscribe	  is	  
that	   the	  highest	   influence	  on	  welfare	   state	   formation	   is	  not	   religion	  but	   class.	  Building	  on	  
Esping-­‐Andersen,	   they	   assume	   that	   any	   group	   wanting	   to	   build	   welfare	   will	   need	   the	  
support	   of	   the	   lower	   classes	   and	   hence	   Social	   Democracy.	   This	   “Rokkanian	   complement”	  
allows	  them	  to	  “identify	  which	  type	  of	  middle	  class	  party	  has	  entered	  into	  a	  coalition	  with	  
Social	  Democracy.”108	  The	  diverging	  outcomes	  between	  Scandinavia	  and	  Continental	  Europe	  
can	   then	  be	   explained	  by	   the	   fact	   that,	   in	   Scandinavia,	   Social	  Democracy	   could	   align	  with	  
agrarian	  parties	  whereas	  it	  had	  to	  join	  forces	  with	  Christian	  Democracy	  on	  the	  continent.	  In	  
fact,	  religion	  enters	  the	  framework	  only	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  pacified	  state	  church	  conflict	  in	  the	  
Nordic	   countries	   or	   as	   a	   Christian	   Democratic	   label	   on	   the	   middle	   class	   in	   Continental	  
Europe.	  
	   It	  seems	  odd	  that	  two	  authors,	  that	  for	  a	  decade	  tried	  to	  introduce	  the	  religious	  factor	  
into	  welfare	  state	  research,	  are	  all	  of	  a	  sudden	  at	  the	  forefront	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  ushering	  
religion	  out	   the	  door.	   It	   is	   surprising	   that,	   in	  contrast	   to	   the	  preface	  and	  title	  of	   the	  book,	  
religion	   and	   different	   social	   conceptions	   of	   Protestantism,	   Catholicism	   and	   reformed	  
Protestantism	  are	  confined	  to	  a	  residual	  role.	  What	  emerges	  is	  a	  mechanistic	  interpretation	  
of	  politics	  whose	  summary	  by	  the	  authors	  is	  telling:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  &	  Manow,	  P.	  (eds.)	  Religion,	  Class	  Coalitions,	  and	  Welfare	  States,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  105	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  &	  Manow,	  P.	  (2009)	  p.	  23.	  106	  Based	  on	  Duverger,	  the	  original	  Iversen-­‐Soskice	  model	  promotes	  that	  proportional	  representation	  leads	  to	  multiparty	  system	  in	  which	  the	  left	  is	  more	  often	  in	  power,	  which	  leads	  to	  an	  alliance	  between	  the	  lower	  and	  middle	  classes	  to	  tax	  the	  upper	  class.	  In	  contrast,	  majoritarian	  systems	  lead	  to	  two-­‐party	  systems	  where	  the	  middle	  class	  will	  align	  with	  the	  upper	  class	  and	  hence	  no	  redistribution	  will	  be	  implemented.	  107	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  &	  Manow,	  P.	  (2009)	  p.	  19.	  108	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  &	  Manow,	  P.	  (2009)	  p.	  23.	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Welfare	  state	  regimes	  can	  then	  be	  explained	  as	  formulas	  of	  political	  compromise	  between	  different	  
electoral	  and	  societal	  groups,	  a	  compromise	  between	  farmers’	  and	  workers’	  interests	  in	  Scandinavia	  
and	  both	  an	  interparty	  and	  intraparty	  compromise	  between	  workers	  and	  the	  Catholic	  middle	  class	  on	  
Europe’s	  continent.109	  	  	  
	  
In	  this	  framework,	  regime	  choice	  boils	  down	  to	  institutional	  constraints	  that	  predispose	  and	  
enable	  certain	  material	  interest	  based	  class	  coalitions	  before	  others.	  
	   Manow’s	   and	   Van	   Kerbergen’s	   research	   agenda	   of	   the	   past	   two	   decades	   helped	   to	  
untangle	  many	  issues	  associated	  with	  the	  strong	  correlations	  between	  Christian	  Democracy	  
and	  specific	  welfare	  formations	  in	  continental	  Europe.	  Especially	  fruitful	  were	  their	  findings	  
that	  different	  branches	  of	  Protestantism	  had	  different	  effects	  on	  welfare	  state	  development	  
and	   that	   this	   effect	   can	   even	   be	   positive	   if	   Protestantism	   is	   backed	   by	   a	   state	   church.	  
Furthermore,	  they	  have	  to	  be	  applauded	  for	  fusing	  class	  into	  their	  religion	  framework	  (albeit	  
to	  an	  extent	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  crowd	  out	  religion).	  That	  they	  also	  grant	  political	  institutions	  a	  
stronger	  role	  also	  garners	  merit.	  	  
	   Nevertheless,	   Van	   Kersbergen’s	   and	   Manow’s	   work	   is	   opens	   up	   to	   three	   points	   of	  
criticism.	  First,	  all	  three,	  Van	  Kersbergen’s	  original	  Social	  Capitalism	  concept	  from	  1995,	  the	  
Manow	   account	   of	   2002	   and	   the	   revised	   van	   Kersbergen-­‐Manow	  model	   from	   2009,	   pay	  
scant	  attention	  to	  Esping-­‐Andersen’s	  implication	  that	  parts	  of	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  Conservative	  
welfare	  cluster	  can	  be	  explained	  with	  the	  etatist	  traditions	  of	  the	  countries	   in	  which	  these	  
regimes	   surface.	   In	   particular,	   historians	   emphasize	   that	   such	   a	   Bonapartist	   influence	   has	  
played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  early	  modern	  welfare	  state	  formation.110	  Second,	  van	  Kersbergen	  and	  
Manow	   pay	   little	   attention	   to	   differences	   between	   the	   same	   denomination	   in	   different	  
countries	   (e.g.	  German	  or	   Italian	  Catholicism).	   Their	   framework	  assumes	   for	   example	   that	  
the	   Protestant	   state	   churches	   of	   Scandinavia	   wanted	   the	   same	  welfare	   that	   the	   Prussian	  
Protestant	  state	  church	  wanted	  (albeit	  one	  was	  mainstream	  Lutheran	  and	  a	  state	  church	  for	  
centuries	  while	  the	  other	  was	  Pietist).	  The	  framework	  also	  has	  trouble	  in	  incorporating	  the	  
outcomes	  of	   the	   interaction	  of	   dominant	   denominations	   in	   a	   country	  with	   other	   religions	  
(Catholicism)	   or	   other	   secular	   actors	   (Liberalism,	   Socialism).	   Furthermore,	   not	   only	   the	  
interaction	  of	  Lutheranism	  with	  Catholicism	  but	  also	  the	  interactions	  within	  Protestantism	  –	  	  
for	  example	  between	  Lutheranism,	  Calvinism	  or	  Pietism	  –	  are	  under-­‐theorized.111	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  &	  Manow,	  P.	  (2009)	  p.	  33.	  110	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1982);	  Baldwin,	  P.	  (1990)	  pp.	  39-­‐40.	  111	  Not	  surprisingly	  the	  book	  does	  not	  feature	  a	  Chapter	  on	  Germany.	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   To	   sum	   up,	   Van	   Kersbergen	   and	   Manow	   offer	   a	   conceptual	   tool	   that	   can	   include	  
Religion,	   Class	   and	   Institutions,	   though	   the	   framework	   offers	   little	   that	   would	   help	   to	  
capture	  what	  happens	  when	  all	  of	  them	  interact.	  It	  is	  a	  static	  and	  linear	  concept	  in	  which	  the	  
existence	  of	   state	  church	  x	  or	  predominant	   religion	  x	   leads	   to	  welfare	   regime	  x	  which	  can	  
possibly	   be	   diluted	   in	   its	   impact,	   but	   not	   fundamentally	   altered,	   through	   the	   influence	   of	  
religion	  y	  or	  secular	  force	  z.	  But	  what	  if	  we	  consider	  the	  plausible	  possibility	  that	  when	  x,	  y	  
and	  z	   interact	  that	  something	  fundamentally	  new	  is	  created?	  Indeed,	  parts	  of	  evolutionary	  
theory	   and	   natural	   history	   point	   out	   that	   this	   is	   possible.	   Steinmo	   and	   Lewis	   call	   this	  
phenomena	   “emergence”112	   while	   Streeck	   subsumes	   it	   under	   the	   label	   of	   the	   “variation-­‐
cum-­‐selection-­‐retention	   model”.113	   The	   claims	   are	   similar	   and	   Streeck	   points	   out	   that	  
“imperfect	  variation	  might	  be	  caused	  by	  innovative	  ideas	  that,	  by	  their	  very	  nature,	  deviate	  
in	  unforeseeable	  ways	  from	  established	  ideas	  and	  received	  wisdom”.114	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  last	  
point	  of	  criticism.	  Van	  Kersbergen	  and	  Manow	  leave	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  huge	  variation	  
on	  the	  continent	  and	  in	  the	  Conservative	  regime	  cluster	  to	  different	  degrees	  of	  hegemony	  of	  
Christian	   Democracy,	  which	   “allows	   to	   address	   systematically	   the	   question	   of	  within-­‐type	  
variation	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Conservative	   Christian	   Democratic	   welfare	   state”.115	   That	  
Christian	  Democracy	  has	  started	  out	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  as	  a	  Catholic	  political	  movement	  
that	   fused	   in	   some	   countries	  with	   Protestantism	   and	   created	   fundamentally	   new	  political	  
movements	  after	   the	  Second	  World	  War	   is	  barely	  discussed.	  The	   framework	   turns	  a	  blind	  
eye	  to	  the	  pertinent	  question	  of	  whether	  political	  and	  social	  Catholicism	  evolves	  differently	  
in	   different	   countries.116	   Is	   Catholic	   social	   teaching	   really	   the	   same	   in	   countries	   where	   it	  
evolved	  bottom	  up	  as	  a	  political	  force	  (as	  in	  Germany)	  or	  top	  down,	  under	  strong	  control	  of	  
the	   Vatican	   (as	   in	   Italy)?	   The	   point	   to	   make	   here	   is	   that	   political	   Catholicism	   evolved	   in	  
different	   ways	   in	   different	   countries	   at	   different	   points	   in	   time.	   In	   majoritarian	   Catholic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Lewis,	  O	  &	  Steinmo,	  S.	  (2007)	  Taking	  Evolution	  Seriously:	  Institutional	  Analysis	  and	  Evolutionary	  Theory,	  Manuscript,	  p.	  14.	  Published	  also	  in	  a	  later	  version	  as:	  Lewis,	  O.	  &	  Steinmo,	  S.	  (2010)	  Taking	  Evolution	  Seriously:	  Institutional	  Analysis	  and	  Evolutionary	  Theory,	  Theory	  in	  
Bioscience,	  Vol.	  129.	  No.	  2-­‐3,	  pp.	  235-­‐245.	  113	  Streeck,	  W.	  (2009)	  Institutions	  in	  History:	  Bringing	  Capitalism	  Back	  In,	  MPIfG	  Discussion	  Paper,	  09/8,	  p.	  20.	  Also	  published	  as:	  Streeck,	  W.	  (2010)	  Institutions	  in	  History:	  Bringing	  Capitalism	  Back	  In,	  IN:	  Morgan,	  G.;	  Campbell,	  J.	  L.;	  Crouch,	  C.;	  Pedersen,	  O.K.	  &	  Whitley,	  R.	  (Eds.),	  
The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Comparative	  Institutional	  Analysis,	  Oxford/New	  York,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  659-­‐686.	  114	  Streeck,	  W.	  (2009)	  p.	  20.	  115	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  &	  Manow,	  P.	  (2009)	  p.	  23.	  116	  Especially	  as	  the	  centralization	  of	  power	  within	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  the	  Vatican	  hierarchy	  is	  largely	  a	  construction	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  as	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	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France,	   for	   example,	   it	   led	   to	   the	   counterintuitive	   phenomenon	   of	   a	   non-­‐formation	   of	   a	  
Christian	  Democratic	  party	  (albeit	  it	  developed	  a	  Conservative	  welfare	  state)117	  while	  in	  Italy	  
it	   led	   to	   the	   very	   belated	   –	   	   but	   strong	   –	   development	   of	   a	   Christian	   Democratic	   party	  
(although	  without	   the	  development	  of	   a	  Conservative	  welfare	   state).	   This	  might	   very	  well	  
mean	   that	   Catholicism	   developed	   different	   social	   doctrines	   in	   different	   countries	   and	   in	  
response	  to	  different	  political	  and	  socioeconomic	  settings.	  
	   This	   is	   a	   point	   that	   is	   at	   least	   worth	   scrutinizing	   as	   diverging	   doctrine	   developments	  
under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   the	   same	   ideology	   can	   produce	   outcomes	   as	   different	   as	   Nazi	  
Germany	  or	  Social	  Democratic	  Sweden,	  as	  Berman	  showed	  in	  her	  seminal	  accounts	  on	  the	  
evolution	   of	   continental	   European	   Social	   Democracy.118	   Van	   Kersbergen	   himself	  
acknowledges	  this	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  1995	  book	  where	  he	  briefly	  shows	  that	  the	  elements	  of	  
his	  Social	  Capitalism	  are	  constructed,	  reconstructed	  and	  deconstructed	  constantly	  over	  time	  
and	   in	   response	   to	   the	   changing	   political	   and	   socioeconomic	   structural	   environment.	   The	  
following	  study	  picks	  up	  this	  baton.	  The	  idea	  is	  not	  to	  study	  even	  more	  potentially	  influential	  
factors	  within	  the	  model	  of	  a	  religion-­‐influenced	  welfare	  state,	  but	  rather	  to	  account	  for	  the	  
way	   these	   different	   contextual	   features	   influenced	   and	   shaped	   the	   different	   evolutionary	  
pathways	   of	   Catholic	   social	   teaching	   before	   scrutinizing	   how	   they	   impacted	   on	   social	  
security	  legislation.	  From	  this	  it	  follows	  that	  one	  cannot	  solely	  rely	  on	  linear	  or	  static	  macro	  
models	  in	  which	  different	  denominations	  and	  societal	  forces	  are	  attributed	  certain	  interests	  
in	  welfare.	  Instead,	  one	  has	  to	  find	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  that	  can	  capture	  the	  potential	  
flexibility	  of	  such	  moving	  influential	  factors.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  one	  has	  to	  develop	  a	  
framework	   in	   which	   all	   elements	   are	   constantly	   in	   flux	   but	   rather	   that	   one	   needs	   a	  
conceptual	  framework	  that	  is	  sensitive	  to	  changes	  within	  the	  main	  influential	  political	  force,	  
in	   this	   case	   political	   and	   social	   Catholicism,	   under	   scrutiny.	   Such	   a	   framework	   will	   be	  
developed	  in	  the	  following.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Kalyvas,	  S.	  N.	  (1996)	  The	  rise	  of	  Christian	  Democracy	  in	  Europe,	  Ithaca,	  N.Y.,	  Cornell	  University	  Press;	  Kalyvas,	  S.	  N.	  (1998)	  From	  Pulpit	  to	  Party:	  Party	  Formation	  and	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  Phenomenon,	  Comparative	  Politics,	  Vol.	  30,	  No.	  3,	  pp.	  293-­‐312.	  118	  Berman,	  S.	  (1998)	  The	  Social	  Democratic	  Moment:	  ideas	  and	  politics	  in	  the	  making	  of	  interwar	  
Europe.	  Cambridge,	  Harvard	  University	  Press;	  Berman,	  S.	  (2006)	  The	  primacy	  of	  politics:	  Social	  
Democracy	  and	  the	  making	  of	  Europe’s	  twentieth	  century,	  New	  York,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	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2.3 A	  Concept	  for	  the	  study	  of	  Ideas	  and	  the	  Western	  Welfare	  State	  
	  
the	  very	  notion	  that	  one	  would	  need	  to	  make	  a	  plea	  for	  taking	  ideas	  and	  discourse	  seriously	  would	  





2.3.1 Catholic	  Social	  teaching	  as	  an	  idea	  
As	  discussed	  before,	  previous	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  Catholicism	  and	  Christian	  Democracy	  
are	   correlated,	   or	   at	   least	   associated,	   with	   continental	   European	   welfare	   states.	  
Nevertheless,	   there	   is	   still	   little	   clarity	   on	   how	   this	   influence	   unfolded.	   Approaches	   that	  
explicitly	   incorporate	   Catholic	   and	   Christian	   Democratic	   welfare	   influence	   all	   share	   one	  
common	   lacuna:	  while	  matching	   Christian	   Democratic	   and	   Catholic	   power	   resources	  with	  
specific	  welfare	  state	  outcomes,	  they	  rarely	  assessed	  how	  Catholic	  and	  Christian	  Democratic	  
thinking	  about	  modern	  welfare	  itself	  evolved.	  Therefore,	  they	  turn	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  important	  
questions	  such	  as	  whether	  there	  are	  divergences	  between	  Christian	  Democratic	  thinking	  in	  
different	   countries	   or,	   for	   that	  matter,	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   such	   thinking	  was	   confronted	  
with	   other	   ideas	   on	   welfare.	   This	   is	   a	   fallacy	   because	   modern	   Catholic	   and	   Christian	  
Democratic	  thinking	  evolved	  contextually	  and	  often	  as	  a	  response	  to	  challenges	  arising	  from	  
other	   domestic	   political	   elements,	   religious	   actors	   or	   through	   the	   socioeconomic	  
environment.120	  To	  fill	  this	  gap	  this	  thesis	  uses	  a	  two-­‐step	  approach.	  In	  Step	  A	  the	  contextual	  
evolution	   of	   Catholic	   and	   other	   rivaling	   welfare	   ideas	   are	   reconstructed	   for	   the	   major	  
periods	  of	  modern	  welfare	   state	   formation.	   Step	  B	   scrutinizes	  how	   these	   ideas	  were	   then	  
contested,	   compromised	   and	   partly	   reformulated	   in	   the	   political	   arena	   until	   they	   were	  
implemented.121	   The	   aim	   of	   the	   next	   section	   is	   to	   construct	   a	   conceptual	   apparatus	   that	  
allows	  for	  the	  undertaking	  of	  this	  twin	  task.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  Schmidt,	  V.A.	  (2008)	  Discursive	  Institutionalism:	  The	  Explanatory	  Power	  of	  Ideas	  and	  Discourse,	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Vol.	  11:	  pp.	  303-­‐326,	  p.	  303.	  120	  It	  is	  therefore	  not	  surprising	  that	  they	  often	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  considerable	  amount	  of	  variation	  within	  Continental	  European	  welfare.	  121	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  thesis	  has	  two	  dependent	  variables.	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   This	   study	   draws	   on	   insights	   from	   the	   “turn	   to	   ideas”122	   of	   comparative	   politics	   that	  
emerged	  during	  the	  2000s.	  Sheri	  Berman,	  one	  of	  the	  pioneers	  of	  this	  approach,	  postulated	  
in	  1998	  that	  “political	  science	  neglected	  the	  study	  of	  ideas	  for	  decades”123	  and	  already	  Peter	  
Hall	  argued	  already	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s	  that	  “we	  need	  to	  know	  much	  more	  than	  we	  now	  do	  about	  the	  role	  that	  ideas	  play	  in	  policymaking”124	  This	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  said	  to	  
apply.	  The	  past	  two	  decades	  have	  “made	  ideas	  a	  variable	  difficult	  to	  pass	  over	  in	  silence”125	  
as	  Carstensen	  puts	  forward.	  In	  fact	  there	  has	  been	  a	  mushrooming	  of	  different	  concepts	  and	  
approaches	   on	   how	   to	   integrate	   ideas	   into	   social	   science	   analysis	   over	   the	   past	   years.	  
Christian	  Democracy	   is	   especially	   suitable	   for	   such	   an	   approach	   as	   it	   is	   based	  on	  multiple	  
material	   interests	   due	   to	   its	   explicit	   cross-­‐class	   appeal.	   This	   cross-­‐class	   tradition	   partly	  
upsets	  traditional	  material	  interpretations	  of	  politics	  and	  was	  already	  rooted	  in	  the	  Catholic	  
parties	  of	  religious	  defense	  before	  World	  War	  Two.	  The	  German	  Catholic	  Center	  Party	  was	  a	  
political	   movement	   that	   as	   “first	   people’s	   party	   included	   all	   social	   strata”.126	   Christian	  
Democracy	   is	   not,	   as	  often	  assumed,	   a	  bourgeois	   class	  movement	   like	  other	  Conservative	  
parties.	   Instead,	   Kalyvas	   showed	  us	   that	  Christian	  Democratic	   Parties,	   and	  especially	   their	  
Catholic	   predecessors,	   emerged	   as	   parties	   of	   religious	   defense	   whose	   prime	   task	   was	   to	  
defend	  the	  interests	  and	  ideas	  of	  Catholicism	  and	  Catholics.127	  The	  main	  glue	  that	  held	  the	  
different	   components	   of	   Christian	  Democracy	   together	  was	   an	   ideological	   derivate	   of	   the	  
Vatican’s	   teachings	   rather	   than	   the	   material	   interests	   of	   its	   followers.	   Even	   scholars	   like	  
Berman	  that	  predominantly	  research	  class	  based	  Social	  Democratic	  parties	  put	  forward	  that	  
“it	   is	   impossible	   to	   understand	   for	   example,	   the	   cross-­‐class	   coalitions,	   “people	   party”	  
strategies,	  […]	  without	  reference	  to	  their	  ideology”.128	  
	   Critics	  might	   argue	   that	   political	   Catholicism	   evolved	   in	   order	   to	   defend	   the	   pure	  
material	   interest	   of	   the	   Vatican.129	   However,	   Kalyvas	   shows	   in	   his	   profound	   comparative	  
study	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   Christian	   Democracy	   in	   Europe	   that	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  Blyth,	  M.	  (2003)	  Structures	  do	  not	  come	  with	  an	  instruction	  sheet,	  Perspectives	  on	  Politics,	  Vol.	  1.	  No.	  4,	  pp.	  695-­‐706,	  p.	  695.	  123	  Berman,	  S.	  (1998)	  p.	  14.	  	  124	  Hall,	  P.	  A.	  (1993)	  Policy	  Paradigms,	  Social	  Learning,	  and	  the	  State,	  Comparative	  Politics,	  Vol.	  25,	  No.	  3,	  pp.	  275-­‐296,	  p.	  292.	  Hall’s	  article	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  the	  foundational	  articles	  of	  ideational	  research	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  125	  Carstensens,	  M.	  B.	  (2011).	  126	  “erste	  Volkspartie	  umfasste	  sie	  alle	  sozialen	  Schichten“	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1981)	  p.	  93.	  127	  Kalyvas,	  S.	  N.	  (1996,	  1998)	  	  128	  Berman,	  S.	  (2006)	  p.	  11.	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Catholic	   parties	   was	   done	   decisively	   against	   the	   will	   of	   the	   Vatican	   hierarchy.130	   It	   was	  
largely	  an	  unintended	  consequence	  of	  the	  Vatican’s	  early	  strategy	  of	  lay	  mobilization.	  These	  
parties	   claimed	   to	   represent	   all	   Catholics	   and	   not	   only	   Catholics	   from	   a	   specific	   social	  
stratus.131	  Political	  Catholicism	  was	  therefore	  explicitly	  an	  ideational	  movement.	  From	  this	  it	  
follows	   that,	   if	   one	  wants	   to	   study	   the	   influences	  and	   interests	  of	  political	  Catholicism	  on	  
welfare,	   then	   one	   must	   study	   the	   content	   and	   emergence	   of	   its	   worldviews	   and	  
programmatic	  ideas.	  This	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  ideas	  and	  interests	  in	  politics.	  	  
2.3.2 Ideas	  as	  Interests	  
Scholars	   in	   political	   science	   that	   incorporated	   ideas,	   ideology	   or	   worldviews	   into	   their	  
explanatory	   frameworks	   had	   a	   hard	   time	   for	  most	   of	   the	   second	  half	   of	   the	   20th	   century.	  
Berman	  opines	  that	  political	  science	  was	  dominated	  by	  a	  “widespread	  belief	  that	  ideas	  are	  
epiphenomenal	   –	   that	   is,	   they	   are	   simply	   the	   consequence	   of	   other	   factors”.132	   This	   view	  
originates	   in	   the	   19th	   century.	   For	  Marx	   interests	   are	   not	   primordial	   but	   the	   result	   of	   the	  
organization	   of	   society	   and	   the	   distribution	   of	   material	   resources	   embedded	   in	   the	   class	  
structure.	  In	  a	  capitalist	  society,	  interests	  are	  clearly	  material	  and	  contradictory	  as	  the	  ruling	  
capitalist	  class	  wants	  more	  profits	  while	  labor	  demands	  higher	  wages.	  No	  other	  motivations	  
for	   socioeconomic	   action	   exist.	   Cultural,	   religious,	   ideological,	   freedom	  or	   equity-­‐oriented	  
motivations	  are	  “superstructures”	  (Überbau)	  only	  employed	  by	  the	  ruling	  capitalist	  class	  to	  
“veil”	   the	   “base”	   (Basis)	   of	   the	   real	   capitalist	   forces	   and	   relations	   of	   production.133	   In	   the	  
Marxian	  framework,	  therefore,	  ideas	  and	  ideology	  are	  ephemeral	  to	  material	  interests	  that	  
evolve	  in	  capitalist	  society.	  This	  makes	  it	  easier	  to	  understand	  why	  most	  theoretical	  models	  
about	   the	   origins	   of	   modern	   welfare	   are	   so	   hostile	   to	   the	   possible	   influence	   of	   culture,	  
ideology	  or	  religion.	  Power	  Resource	  Approaches,	  as	  well	  as	  most	  rational	  choice	  grounded	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  As	  for	  example	  Korpi	  does	  when	  arguing	  that	  workers	  only	  joined	  Catholic	  parties	  out	  of	  false	  consciousness.	  See	  Korpi,	  W.	  (2005)	  pp.	  175-­‐176.	  130	  Kalyvas	  stress	  that	  „There	  was,	  in	  other	  words,	  neither	  intention	  nor	  plan	  to	  create	  confessional	  parties.	  Such	  parties	  were	  unwanted	  by	  the	  church	  because	  they	  would	  end	  its	  monopoly	  of	  the	  representation	  of	  lay	  Catholics	  and	  undermine	  its	  universalistic	  claims.”	  Kalyvas,	  S.	  N.	  (1996)	  p.	  23.	  This	  is	  confirmed	  by	  most	  historical	  accounts	  on	  the	  country	  level.	  See	  for	  example:	  Lönne,	  K.-­‐E.	  (1986)	  Politischer	  Katholizismus	  im	  19.	  und	  20.	  Jahrhundert,	  Frankfurt,	  Suhrkamp.	  Or:	  Morsey	  R.	  (1981)	  Der	  Politische	  Katholizismus	  1890-­‐1933,	  IN:	  Rauscher	  A.	  (ed.)	  
Der	  Soziale	  und	  politische	  Katholizismus,	  München,	  Olzog.	  131	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1994)	  pp.	  31-­‐47.	  132	  Berman,	  S.	  (1998)	  p.16	  133	  Münnich,	  S.	  (2010)	  Interessen	  und	  Ideen,	  Frankfurt,	  Campus,	  p.	  39.	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approaches	   (such	   as	   Employer	   Centered	   Approaches),	   explicitly	   build	   their	   theory	   on	   the	  
diverging	  material	  interests	  of	  classes.	  In	  fact,	  a	  full	  century	  and	  a	  half	  ago	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  
postulated	  that	  “ideas,	  unless	  outward	  circumstances	  conspire	  with	   them,	  have	   in	  general	  
no	  very	  rapid	  or	  immediate	  efficacy	  in	  human	  affairs.”134	  Most	  contemporary	  rational	  choice	  
oriented	  welfare	  scholars	  seem	  to	  have	  taken	  this	  advice	  to	  heart	  but	  have	  overlooked	  how	  
the	  statement	  is	  qualified	  by	  another	  postulation	  a	  sentence	  later:	  “But	  when	  the	  right	  ideas	  
meet,	  the	  effect	  is	  seldom	  slow	  in	  manifesting	  itself”.135	  Berman	  therefore	  laments	  that	  “For	  
many	   Marxists,	   rational-­‐choice	   Scholars	   and	   realists,	   for	   example,	   ideologies	   are	   best	  
understood	   as	   mere	   tools	   or	   ‘covers’	   adopted	   and	   used	   by	   political	   actors	   for	   various	  
reasons,	  but	  not	  determining	  outcomes	  on	  their	  own.”136	  As	  for	  functionalist	  scholars,	  they	  
have	  a	  similar	   take	  on	   ideas	  but	  the	  problem	  is	  exacerbated	  because	   in	  their	  case	  there	   is	  
even	  more	   truth	   to	   Berman’s	   general	   observation	   that	   “Political	   Scientists	   prefer	   to	  work	  
with	  things	  that	  can	  be	  easily	  observed	  and	  quantified	  and	  ideologies	  do	  not	  fit	  the	  bill.”137	  
	   Indeed,	   ideas	   and	   ideology	   are	   not	   easily	   quantifiable	   and	   are	   certainly	   shaped	   and	  
influenced	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   other	   factors,	   but	   I	   can	   hardly	   see	   how	   this	  would	  make	  
them	  spurious	  as	   influential	   factors.	   I	  would	  even	  argue	  that	   ideas	  are	  not	  only	  subject	   to	  
structural	   and	   material	   factors	   but	   are,	   beyond	   this,	   influenced	   by	   their	   own	   ideational	  
legacies	  and	  their	  interaction	  with	  other	  ideas.	  Therefore,	  I	  would	  relax	  Berman’s	  suggestion	  
that	  ideational	  influence	  can	  only	  be	  traced	  back	  when	  an	  “ideational	  theorist	  can	  show	  that	  
over	   time	   an	   idea	   takes	   on	   a	   life	   at	   its	   own,	   separate	   from	   the	   context	   within	   which	   it	  
arose”.138	   Instead,	   in	  my	  view,	   ideas	  evolve	   in	  constant	   interaction	  with	  their	  environment	  
(material,	   institutional	   etc.).	   It	   is	   true,	   though,	   that	   they	   rarely	   do	   so	  by	  way	  of	  mechanic	  
responses.	  It	  is	  exactly	  because	  of	  this	  that	  they	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  influential	  factors	  
in	  their	  own	  right.	  
	   Max	  Weber	  comes	  closest	  to	  such	  a	  take	  on	  ideas.	  He	  employs	  a	  reciprocal	  model	  that	  
grants	  culture,	  ideology,	  religion,	  ideas	  and	  worldviews	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Mill,	  J.	  S.	  (1845)	  “The	  claims	  of	  Labour”	  Edinburgh	  Review	  81,	  No.	  164,	  pp.	  498-­‐525,	  cited	  IN:	  Hutchinson,	  T.	  W.	  (1979)	  Notes	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  Economic	  Ideas	  on	  Policy:	  the	  Example	  of	  the	  German	  Social	  Market	  Economy,	  Journal	  of	  Institutional	  and	  Theoretical	  Economics,	  Vol.	  135,	  No.	  3,	  pp.	  426-­‐441,	  p.	  427;	  Cited	  also	  in	  Berman,	  S.	  (1998)	  p.	  25.	  135	  Mill,	  J.	  S.	  (1845)	  The	  claims	  of	  Labour,	  Edinburgh	  Review,	  Vol.	  81,	  No.	  164,	  pp.	  498-­‐525.	  Cited	  in	  Hutchinson,	  T.	  W.	  (1979)	  p.	  440.	  136	  Berman,	  S.	  (2006)	  p.	  9.	  137	  Berman,	  S.	  (2006)	  p.	  9.	  138	  Berman,	  S.	  (1998)	  p.	  18.	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interests	   in	   politics.	   Münnich	   analyses	   that	   “Ideas	   take	   on	   a	   sweeping	   importance	   for	  
Weber:	  wherever	  interests	  are	  primarily	  defined	  in	  material	  terms,	  worldviews	  also	  have	  the	  
role	   of	   influential	   ‘switch	   men’	   for	   the	   dynamics	   of	   interests”.139	   For	   Weber,	   “Interests	  
(material	   and	   ideational),	   not:	   ideas,	   directly	   command	   humans’	   action.	   But:	   the	  
‘worldviews’	  which	   are	   created	   through	   ‘ideas’	   have	   very	  often	  determined	  as	   switchmen	  
the	  paths,	   in	  which	   the	  dynamics	   of	   interests	   stir	   action.”140	   Interests	   are	   essential	   in	   this	  
concept	  but	  what	  they	  are,	  and	  how	  they	  are	  both	  perceived	  and	  processed,	  is	  a	  function	  of	  
the	  worldviews	  through	  which	  the	  political	  actor	  processes	  them.	  The	  bigger	  the	  questions	  
and	   the	   more	   far-­‐reaching	   the	   social	   and	   political	   impact	   of	   the	   decisions,	   the	   more	  
important	   these	   worldviews	   become.	   Hence,	   for	   Weber	   ideas	   are	   not	   necessarily	  
subordinate	   to	   interests	  but	   interests	  are	  embodied	   in	   ideas.	  Note	   though	   that	   for	  Weber	  
interests	  are	  not	  confined	  to	  material	   interests.	  Weber,	   therefore,	  not	  only	   takes	  a	  stance	  
against	   pure	  material	   interest	   based	   interpretations	   of	   social	   and	   political	   action	   but	   also	  
partly	  discounts	   ideas	  as	  being	  purely	  derived	  from	  functionalistic	  experience	  as	  promoted	  
in	  many	  contemporary	  ideational	  frameworks.141	  
	   Contemporary	   political	   science	   has	   produced	   a	   plethora	   of	   ideational	   approaches,	  
which	  has	  become	  a	  true	  jungle	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  Approaches	  and	  accounts	  differ	  
greatly	   in	   level	   of	   analysis	   (individual	   ideas	   vs.	   collective	   ideas),	   type	   of	   ideas	   (problem	  
solving	  policy	  prescription	  vs.	  world	  views),	  function	  of	  ideas	  (functionalist	  vs.	  value),	  level	  of	  
ideas	   (psychological-­‐primordial	   vs.	   constructivist)	   and	   level	   of	   policy	   impact	   (paradigmatic	  
change	   vs.	   policy	   instruments).	   This	   thesis	   sets	   this	   contemporary	   conceptual	   jungle	   aside	  
and	  goes	  back	  to	  Weber	  who	  declared,	  in	  1919,	  that	  whenever	  one	  moves	  from	  the	  level	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  “Ideen	  haben	  bei	  Weber	  eine	  weitreichende	  Bedeutung:	  Auch	  dort,	  wo	  Interessen	  primär	  materiell	  definiert	  sind,	  beeinflussen	  Weltbilder	  als	  „Weichensteller”	  die	  Dynamik	  der	  Interessen.“	  Münnich,	  S.	  (2011)	  Interessen	  und	  Ideen:	  Soziologische	  Kritik	  einer	  problematischen	  Unterscheidung,	  Zeitschrift	  für	  Soziologie,	  Vol.	  40,	  No.	  5,	  Oktober	  2011,	  pp.	  371-­‐387,	  p.	  376.	  140	  “Interessen	  (materielle	  und	  ideelle),	  nicht:	  Ideen,	  beherrschen	  unmittelbar	  das	  Handeln	  der	  Menschen.	  Aber:	  die	  ‚Weltbilder’	  welche	  durch	  ‚Ideen’	  geschaffen	  wurden,	  haben	  sehr	  oft	  als	  Weichensteller	  die	  Bahnen	  bestimmt,	  in	  denen	  die	  Dynamik	  der	  Interessen	  das	  Handeln	  fortbewegte.“	  Weber,	  M.	  (1988)	  Einleitung	  in	  die	  Wirtschaftsethik,	  IN:	  Weber,	  M.	  (eds.),	  
Gesammelte	  Aufsätze	  zur	  Religionssoziologie,	  I,	  Tübingen,	  Mohr,	  p.	  252,	  Cited	  IN:	  Münnich,	  S.	  (2011)	  p.	  376.	  141See	  for	  example:	  Culpepper,	  P.	  (2008)	  The	  Politics	  of	  Common	  Knowledge:	  Ideas	  and	  Institutional	  Change	  in	  Wage	  Bargaining,	  International	  Organization,	  62,	  Winter	  2008,	  pp.	  1-­‐33;	  Jacobs,	  A.M.	  (2009)	  How	  Do	  Ideas	  Matter?	  Mental	  Models	  and	  Attention	  in	  German	  Politics,	  
Comparative	  Political	  Studies,	  2009	  Vol.	  42	  No.	  2,	  pp.	  252-­‐279.	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“welfare	   and	   economic	   care”142	   (e.g.	   poor	   relief	   regulations,	   plant	   inspections,	   work	  
protection	   laws)	   towards	   greater	   questions	   of	   “welfare	   and	   economic	   politics”143	   (e.g.	  
residual,	   status	   upholding	   or	   universal	   and	   equalizing	   welfare	   models	   –	   the	   question	   of	  
regime	  choice)	  the	  “battles	  are	  not	  only,	  as	  we	  like	  to	  believe	  so	  much	  today,	  between	  ‘class	  
interests’,	  but	  also	  between	  worldviews”.144	  For	  Weber,	  decisions	  made	  in	  response	  to	  these	  
questions	  are	  subject	  to	  “last	  highest	  personal	  axioms	  of	  creed	  and	  value	  ideas”.145	  The	  fight	  
over	  social	  and	  economic	  policy	  therefore	  becomes	  a	  battle	  of	   ideas	  because,	  “the	  highest	  
ideals	   that	  motivate	   us	   the	  most	   forcefully	   for	   all	   times	   only	   impact	   through	   battles	  with	  
others’	  ideals	  that	  are	  as	  holy	  to	  others	  as	  our	  own	  are	  to	  us”.146	  This	  is	  precisely	  where	  the	  
following	  thesis	  picks	  up	  the	   issue,	  by	  conceptualizing	  the	   formation	  of	  modern	  welfare	   in	  
continental	  Europe	  as	  a	  Battle	  of	  Ideas	  between	  worldviews.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  class,	  
material	   interests	   or	   institutions	   are	   sidelined.	   Instead,	   the	   thesis	   sheds	   light	   on	   how	  
political	   actors	   think	   about	   class,	  material	   interests	   and	   institutions	   through	   the	   lenses	   of	  
specific	  worldviews.	  To	  give	  an	  example:	  a	  Socialist	  and	  a	  Catholic	  worker	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  
of	   the	  19th	   century	  might	  have	  had	   the	   same	  objective	  material	   interest	  but	  how	   the	   two	  
think	  subjectively	  about	  it,	  and	  the	  conclusions	  for	  political	  action	  they	  derive	  from	  it,	  might	  
be	  fundamentally	  different.	  Therefore,	  good	  ideational	  scholarship	  is	  not	  about	  interests	  or	  
ideas	  or	  institutions	  but	  instead	  about	  ideas	  and	  interests	  and	  institutions.	  
	  
2.3.3 Ideas	  are	  not	  static	  
What	   constitutes	   an	   ideational	   approach	   that	   “takes	   ideas	   seriously”,	   as	   Blyth	   advocates,	  
and	  what	  delineates	  it	  from	  other	  approaches?	  Usually	  political	  science	  uses	  ideas	  as	  static	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  Weber,	  M.	  (1973	  [1917])	  Die	  ‚Objektivität‘	  Sozialwissenschaftlicher	  Erkenntnis,	  IN:	  Winckelmann,	  J.	  (ed.)	  Max	  Weber	  Soziologie,	  Körner,	  Stuttgart,	  5th	  Edition,	  p.	  192.	  143	  Weber,	  M.	  (1973	  [1917]	  )	  p.	  192.	  144	  “und	  es	  wird	  gestritten	  nicht	  nur,	  wie	  wir	  heut	  so	  gern	  glauben,	  zwischen	  	  >>Klasseninteressen<<	  sondern	  auch	  zwischen	  Weltanschauungen“	  Weber,	  M.	  (1973	  [1917])	  p.	  192.	  145	  “letzten	  höchst	  persönlichen	  Axiome	  des	  Glaubens	  und	  der	  Wertideen“	  Weber,	  M.	  (1973	  [1917])	  p.	  192.	  146	  “die	  höchsten	  ideale	  die	  uns	  am	  mächtigsten	  bewegen,	  für	  alle	  Zeit	  nur	  im	  Kampf	  mit	  anderen	  idealen	  sich	  auswirken,	  die	  anderen	  ebenso	  heilig	  sind,	  wie	  die	  unseren“	  Weber,	  M.	  (1973	  [1917])	  p.	  193.	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entities.147	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  van	  Kersbergen	  and	  Manow,	  ideas	  are	  perceived	  as	  influencing	  
preferences,	  or	  even	  being	  preferences	  themselves,	  but	  so	  far	  “preferences	  are	  things	  with	  
which	   to	  do	  explaining,	  not	   things	   to	  be	  explained.”148	   In	  a	   similar	  way	  Berman	  complains	  
about	   the	   “status	   quo	   bias,	   treating	   ideologies	   as	   preexisting	   parts	   of	   a	   landscape	   and	  
focusing	  on	  how	  they	  influence	  actor’s	  behavior	  over	  time.”149	  But	  if,	  as	  Schmidt	  postulates	  
with	   a	   Weberian	   connotation,	   “Interests	   are	   subjective	   ideas,	   which,	   though	   real,	   are	  
neither	  objective	  nor	  material”150	  then	  there	  must	  inevitably	  be	  a	  continuous	  power	  struggle	  
over	  the	  content	  and	  meaning	  of	  ideas	  and	  worldviews.	  
	   An	  ideational	  account	  must	  therefore	  not	  only	  observe	  what	  ideas	  actors	  embody,	  and	  
how	  they	  use	  them,	  but	   it	  must	  also	  deal	  with	  how	  these	  ideas	  come	  about	  and	  evolve.151	  
Berman	  uses	  the	  image	  of	  the	  “ideational	  life	  cycle”	  which	  postulates	  that	  researchers	  must	  
scrutinize	  how	  ideas	  are	  constructed,	  rise	  to	  prominence,	  decline	  and	  subsequently	  become	  
substituted	   by	   new	   ideas.	   In	   line	   with	   this,	   the	   study	   will	   show	   that	   ideas	   are	   neither	  
primordial	  nor	  do	  they	  fall	  from	  the	  sky	  (a	  fact	  that	  holds	  especially	  for	  religious	  ideas).	  
	  
2.3.4 Worldviews,	  Programmatic	  Ideas	  and	  Policy	  Ideas	  
Interests	   (except	   pure	   material	   interests)	   are	   embedded,	   or	   at	   least	   intertwined,	   with	  
ideas.152	  However,	  we	   still	   need	   to	   clarify	  what	   this	   thesis	  understands	  by	   the	   ideas	   label.	  
For	  many	  scholars	   in	  the	  ideational	  tradition	  ideas	  can	  be	  equated	  to	  preferences.	  For	  this	  
thesis	  they	  cannot.	  The	  term	  preference	   indicates	  that	   individuals	  can	  rationally	  rank	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  For	  an	  excellent	  discussion	  of	  the	  static	  (ab)use	  of	  ideas	  in	  political	  science	  of	  the	  1990s	  see:	  Blyth,	  M.	  (2003).	  148	  Blyth,	  M.	  (2003)	  p.	  697.	  149	  Berman,	  S.	  (2006)	  p.	  9.	  150	  Schmidt,	  V.A.	  (2008)	  p.	  303.	  151	  As	  already	  mentioned	  above,	  a	  good	  ideational	  approach	  should	  therefore	  include	  two	  dependent	  variables.	  One	  is	  the	  idea	  itself	  and	  how	  it	  evolves.	  The	  second	  is	  the	  impact	  that	  it	  has	  on	  its	  political	  environment.	  152	  Conflating	  ideas	  and	  interests	  might	  be	  an	  epistemological	  problem.	  Note	  though	  that	  I	  do	  not	  say	  that	  ideas	  and	  interests	  are	  the	  same	  but	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  very	  hard	  to	  separate	  in	  the	  empirical	  research.	  A	  clear	  distinction	  of	  interests	  and	  ideas	  is	  only	  possible	  at	  times	  when	  they	  do	  not	  overlap.	  However,	  the	  empirics	  of	  this	  thesis	  show	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case	  far	  less	  often	  than	  researchers	  assume.	  Only	  if	  one	  has	  an	  epistemological	  take	  that	  a	  priori	  declares	  ideas	  and	  interests	  as	  incompatible,	  or	  either	  one	  of	  them	  as	  ephemeral,	  can	  one	  clearly	  distinguish	  the	  two.	  The	  thesis	  took	  a	  perhaps	  murkier,	  but	  more	  faithful	  to	  the	  empirical	  world,	  way	  out	  of	  this	  dilemma	  by	  arguing	  that	  interests	  and	  ideas	  can	  often	  overlap.	  Peter	  Hall	  has	  a	  similar	  interpretation	  when	  he	  suggests	  that	  many	  study	  objects	  “militate	  against	  a	  rigid	  distinction	  between	  power-­‐based	  and	  ideas-­‐based	  models	  of	  politics.”	  Hall,	  P.	  (1993)	  p.	  289.	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interests	   through	   hierarchically	   listing	   them.	   I	   doubt	   that	   individuals	   can	   do	   this	   with	  
programmatic	   ideas	  and	  worldviews	  as	  they	  are,	  by	  definition,	  compound	  constructs.	  They	  
are	  likely	  to	  evade	  a	  clear	  rational	  hierarchical	  ordering	  by	  individuals	  most	  of	  the	  time.	  
	   This	   thesis	   uses	   the	   notion	   of	   ideas	   in	   three	   analytical	   ways:	   worldviews	   (as	  
Weltanschauung	   in	  Weber),153	  programmatic	   ideas	  (as	  programmatic	  beliefs	   in	  Berman)	  154	  
and	  policy	  ideas	  (as	  policy	  instruments	  in	  Hall).155	  
	   Worldviews	   operate	   on	   the	   macro	   level.	   They	   are	   the	   overarching	   encompassing	  
categories	  that	  refer	  to	  broad	  systems	  of	  meaning	  and	  identification.156	  Worldviews	  provide	  
actors	  with	  an	  idea	  of	  how	  the	  world	  goes	  round.	  As	  Gramsci	  postulates,	  worldviews	  provide	  
“ideological	  unity	  as	  a	  whole	  social	  block”.157	  The	  application	  of	   the	  Gramscian	  concept	  of	  
hegemonic	  worldviews	  is,	  however,	  slightly	  modified	  here	  as	  the	  empirics	  show	  that	  it	  is	  not	  
just	  the	  ruling	  class	  that	  tries	  to	  diffuse	  its	  worldviews	  in	  order	  to	  stabilize	  its	  hegemony	  but	  
that,	  in	  fact,	  each	  of	  the	  existing	  worldviews	  and	  their	  political	  outlets	  within	  a	  polity	  strives	  
for	  hegemony.	  Politics,	   the	   struggle	   for	  power	   in	   society,	   is	   therefore	  a	   constant	  battle	  of	  
ideas	  and	  worldviews.	  
	   Programmatic	  ideas	  operate	  on	  the	  meso	  level.	  They	  can	  be	  best	  understood	  as	  applied	  
worldviews	  or	  communication	  devices	  for	  specific	  issues	  of	  social	  organization.	  They	  provide	  
“mutual	  expectations	  and	  mutual	  predictability	  of	  intention”158	  while	  for	  Berman	  (who	  calls	  
them	   programmatic	   beliefs)	   “they	   provide	   a	   relative	   clear	   and	   distinctive	   connection	  
between	   theory	   and	   praxis”.159	   In	   the	   realm	   of	   modern	   politics,	   programmatic	   ideas	  
manifest	  themselves	  in	  the	  programmatic	  platforms	  of	  political	  parties	  or	  in	  communicative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  The	  concept	  of	  worldviews	  draws	  heavily	  on	  Max	  Weber’s	  concept	  of	  Weltanschauung.	  	  Weber,	  M.	  (1973	  [1917]).	  154	  The	  concept	  of	  programmatic	  ideas	  is	  derived	  from	  Sheri	  Berman’s	  concept	  of	  programmatic	  beliefs	  in	  her	  superb	  study	  of	  diverging	  developmental	  paths	  of	  European	  Social	  Democracy.	  I	  re-­‐label	  her	  ‘programmatic	  beliefs’	  as	  ‘programmatic	  ideas’	  as	  I	  see	  beliefs	  anchored	  in	  worldviews	  and	  ideas	  as	  slightly	  more	  flexible	  and	  adaptable	  entities	  that	  operate	  on	  the	  program	  level.	  Berman,	  S.	  (1998)	  p.	  21.	  	  155	  Hall,	  P.	  A.	  (1993)	  	  156	  To	  this	  extent,	  at	  least,	  a	  world	  view	  is	  quite	  similar	  to	  the	  term	  ideology	  though	  it	  is	  more	  encompassing	  as	  religious	  systems	  of	  meaning	  such	  as	  Protestantism	  and	  Catholicism	  are	  also	  included	  in	  the	  worldview	  concept	  while	  ideology	  usually	  only	  refers	  to	  the	  secular	  –isms,	  such	  as	  Liberalism,	  Socialism	  or	  Fascism.	  157	  Gramsci	  cited	  IN:	  Bates,	  T.R.	  (1975)	  Gramsci	  and	  the	  Theory	  of	  Hegemony,	  Journal	  of	  the	  
History	  of	  Ideas,	  Vol.	  36,	  No.	  2,	  pp.351-­‐366,	  p.	  351.	  158	  Ruggie,	  J.,	  cited	  IN:	  Berman,	  S.	  (1998)	  p.	  21.	  159	  Berman,	  S.	  (1998)	  p.	  21.	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acts	  of	  politicians.	  They	  are	   the	  connection	  between	  worldviews	  and	   the	   third	  micro	   level	  
category:	  policy	  ideas.	  	  
	   Policy	   ideas	   that	  operate	  on	  the	  micro	   level	  become	   important	  whenever	   it	  comes	  to	  
policy	  making	   and	   the	  political	   agent	  of	   a	  worldview	  aims	  at	   institutionalizing	  parts	  of	   his	  
programmatic	  ideas.	  Policy	  ideas	  are	  practical	  applications	  and	  responses	  of	  worldviews	  and	  
programmatic	   ideas	   in	   the	   day	   to	   day	   business	   of	   policy	   making.	   They	   are	   a	   technical	  
application	   and	   adaptation	   of	  worldviews	   and	   programmatic	   ideas	   to	   a	   specific	   structural	  
problem.	   On	   these	   policy	   ideas,	   political	   actors	   representing	   different	   worldviews	   can	  
engage	   in	   horse-­‐trading.	  Note	   though	   that	   not	   every	   horse-­‐trade	   is	   possible	   as	   the	  micro	  
level	  of	  policy	  ideas	  always	  remains	  a	  function	  of	  the	  higher	  orientations	  of	  worldviews	  and	  
programmatic	   ideas.	   If	   a	   compromise	   diverges	   too	   much	   from	   its	   macro	   or	   meso	   level	  
origins	  then	  it	  can	  harm	  the	  coherence,	  and	  therefore	  the	  collective	  action	  potential,	  of	  the	  
relevant	  worldviews.	  Too	  much	  compromise	  hurts	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  programmatic	  ideas’	  
carriers.	  The	  following	  figure	  shows	  the	  different	  ideational	  levels.	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐1	  Ideational	  Levels	  of	  Abstraction	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2.3.5 What	  do	  Ideas	  do?	  
Scholars	   that	  use	   ideas	   in	   their	   frameworks	  usually	   see	   them	  as	   functionalistic	   devices.	   In	  
other	   words,	   ideas	   are	   what	   they	   do.	   Blyth	   ascribes	   them	   four	   core	   functions:	   first,	   they	  
solve	  collective	  action	  problems	  (Lewis	  and	  Steinmo	  have	  a	  similar	  interpretation)160	  as	  they	  
provide	   actors	   with	   shared	   “mental	   models”.161	   Second,	   they	   serve	   as	   “institutional	  
blueprints”162	   in	   times	  of	  uncertainty.	  Third,	   they	   function	  as	  “cognitive	   locks”	  as	   they	  can	  
create	   intellectual	   path	   dependency”.163	   Fourth,	   they	   function	   as	   “weapons	   in	   distributive	  
conflicts”.164	  In	  this	  thesis,	  programmatic	  ideas	  fulfill	  all	  of	  these	  functions	  but	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
worldviews	   they	   go	   beyond	   pure	   functionalist	   prescriptions.	   Worldviews,	   in	   and	   of	  
themselves,	   are	   complex	   and	   congruent	   systems	   of	   meaning	   through	   which	   individuals	  
interpret	  the	  world.	  They	  are,	   therefore,	  reference	  points	  that	  tell	  political	  actors	  how	  the	  
world	  goes	  round	  and	  indicate	  how	  they	  should	  deal	  with	  structural,	  material,	  political	  and	  
institutional	  inputs.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  filter	  how	  we	  see	  the	  world	  and	  make	  sense	  of	  it.	  
From	   the	   19th	   century	   up	   until	   the	   1960s,	   worldviews	   were	   deeply	   entrenched	   and	  
connected	  with	  subcultures	  that	  provided,	  through	  a	  vast	  set	  of	  institutional	  structures,	  an	  
institutional	  backbone	  for	  the	  transmission	  and	  regeneration	  of	  the	  relevant	  worldview.	   In	  
contrast,	   programmatic	   ideas	   are	   the	   instrumental	   and	   political	   outlets	   that	   these	  
worldviews	  bear	  and,	   in	  fact,	  they	  fulfill	  all	  the	  different	  functional	  tasks	  mentioned	  above	  
by	   Blyth.	   Beyond	   Blyth’s	   ascriptions,	   one	   has	   to	   add	   that	   programmatic	   ideas	   are	   also	   a	  
means	   of	   political	   communication	   that	   can	   be	   used	   not	   only	   as	   discursive	   tools	   (ideas	   as	  
weapons)	   and	   devices	   to	   achieve	   in-­‐group	   cohesion	  within	   a	  worldview	   (collective	   action	  
resource),	  but	  also	  as	  an	  advertisement	  device	  with	  which	  new	  members	  can	  be	  attracted	  
and	  lured	  into	  one’s	  worldview.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  Lewis,	  O.	  &	  Steinmo,	  S.	  (2010).	  161	  Blyth,	  M.	  (2003)	  p.	  696.	  162	  Blyth,	  M.	  (2001)	  p.	  2.	  163	  Blyth,	  M.	  (2001)	  p.	  2.	  164	  Blyth,	  M.	  (2001)	  The	  Transformation	  of	  the	  Swedish	  model:	  Economic	  ideas,	  distributional	  conflict,	  and	  institutional	  change.	  World	  Politics,	  Vol.	  52,	  pp.	  1-­‐26.	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2.3.6 Carriers	  
Worldviews	   in	   themselves	   are	   pretty	   helpless	   in	   bringing	   about	   institutional	   change	   or	  
innovation.	   They	   need	   organizational	   resources	   that	   carry	   and	   embody	   them.	   Such	  
“organizational	  vessels”165	  can	  be	  manifold,	  tend	  to	  differ	  between	  levels	  of	  observation	  and	  
usually	  change	  over	  time.	  
	   In	   the	   late	   19th	   century	   ideational	   carriers	  were	   generated	   by,	   and	   deeply	   rooted	   in,	  
subcultures	   (Mileus)	   that	   provided	   the	   institutional	   backdrop	   for	   worldviews.166	   Each	  
subculture	  boasted	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  associations	  that	  spanned	  every	  aspect	  and	  instance	  of	  
human	   life	   (“from	   the	   cradle	   to	   the	   grave”).	   Ideational	   carriers	   were	   therefore	   all	   the	  
different	  components	  of	  the	  subculture	  –	  from	  the	  local	  parish	  priest	  to	  the	  Catholic	  knitting	  
club	   or	   workers	   union.	   Almost	   all	   Western	   European	   societies	   were	   divided	   along	   these	  
“socio	   cultural	   structures”167	   (subcultures)	   and	   these	   structures	   sometimes	  even	   led	   to	  an	  
“institutionalized	  segmentation”	  168	  of	  the	  polity	  as,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	  
	   With	  the	  dawn	  of	  mass	  politics	  through	  the	  enlargement	  of	  the	  franchise	  towards	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  these	  subcultures	  produced	  political	  outlets	  in	  the	  form	  of	  modern	  
parties.	   These	   “Ghetto	   Parties”169	   and	   their	   politicians	   were	   the	   political	   agents	   of	   the	  
respective	  subculture	  and	  its	  worldview.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Catholicism,	  these	  were	  the	  parties	  
of	   religious	   defense	   that	   emerged	   from	   the	   various	   state-­‐church	   conflicts	   in	   continental	  
Europe.	   They	   transformed	   into	   Christian	   Democratic	   parties	   after	   the	   Second	  World	  War	  
sometimes	  by	  opening	  up	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Protestants.	  
	   A	  substantive	  part	  of	  this	  thesis	  deals	  with	  the	  parties	  and	  the	  politicians	  that	  emerge	  
from	   these	   subcultures	   because	   they	   are	   the	   agents	   that	   take	   the	   ideas	   embodied	   in	  
worldviews	   and	   programmatic	   ideas	   and	   carry	   them	   into	   parliament	   in	   order	   to	  
institutionalize	  them	  via	  legislation.	  Parties	  became,	  next	  to	  the	  executive,	  the	  main	  political	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  Berman,	  S.	  (2006)	  p.	  11.	  166	  The	  subculture	  concept	  is	  in	  this	  analysis	  based	  and	  derived	  from	  the	  Milieu	  concept	  that	  Durkheim	  developed	  and	  which	  was	  adapted	  for	  the	  study	  of	  the	  society	  of	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  by	  Lepsius.	  Lepsius	  detects	  a	  Conservative	  Protestant,	  liberal,	  Catholic	  and	  later	  a	  Socialist	  subculture.	  For	  a	  deeper	  discussion	  of	  subcultures	  and	  Milieu,	  see	  page	  102	  in	  chapter	  two	  or:	  Lepsius,	  M.	  R.	  (1993).	  167	  Lepsius,	  M.	  R.	  (1993)	  p.	  59.	  168	  Lipset,	  S.	  M.	  &	  Rokkan,	  S.	  (1976	  [1990])	  p.	  103.	  169	  ”Ghettoparteien”	  Lipset	  and	  Rokkan	  borrow	  this	  term	  from	  Fraenkel.	  Lipset,	  S.	  M.	  &	  Rokkan,	  S.	  (1976[1990])	  p.	  109.	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vehicle	   that	   implemented	   ideas	   and	   interests	   in	   legislative	   arenas	   of	   a	   parliamentarizing	  
continental	  Europe	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  
	   Researching	  the	  formation	  of	   legislation	  entails	  dealing	  with	  the	   influence	  of	   ideas	  on	  
the	   formation	   of	   institutions.	   However,	   as	   I	   have	   argued	   before,	   one	   needs	   to	   assess,	   a	  
priori,	   how	   ideas	   come	   about	   and	  what	   forms	   they	   take.	   The	   question	   is	   therefore:	  what	  
makes	  some	  programmatic	   ideas	  garner	  more	  success	  than	  others	  and	  why	  do	  some	  have	  
seemingly	  less	  trouble	  in	  becoming	  institutionalized	  than	  others?	  The	  following	  will	  flesh	  out	  
two	  mechanisms	  that	  this	  thesis	  identifies	  as	  being	  of	  crucial	  importance	  in	  this	  process.	  
	  
2.4 Vicious	  and	  Virtuous	  Cycles:	  	  Ideational	  Competition	  
A	  considerable	  amount	  of	   ideational	  analysis	   stems	   from	  the	   field	  of	  comparative	  political	  
economy.	  It	  usually	  scrutinizes	  how,	  and	  under	  which	  conditions,	  two	  large	  hegemonic	  idea	  
sets	  (usually	  Keynesianism	  and	  Neo-­‐Liberalism)	  alternate.170	  The	  focus	  lies	  on	  the	  process	  of	  
how	  one	  hegemonic	  set	  of	  ideas	  becomes	  replaced	  by	  another	  one.	  The	  key	  for	  alternation	  
is	  often	  identified	  as	  an	  external	  shock	  in	  which	  the	  old	  hegemonic	  idea	  loses	  legitimacy	  and	  
opens	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	   for	   the	  new	   idea	   to	   take	  over.171	   I	   advance	  here	   that	   two	  
other	   ideational	   settings	   also	   exist	   where	   the	   patterns	   of	   competition	   and	   ideational	  
renovation	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  different.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  two	  major	  idea	  sets	  are	  
present	  but	  neither	  of	  them	  can	  reach	  a	  dominant	  hegemonic	  position.	  This	  is	  the	  situation	  
of	  a	  frozen	  Bi-­‐Polar	  ideational	  world.	  The	  second	  is	  a	  multipolar	  ideational	  situation	  in	  which	  
there	   are	  more	   than	   two	   ideas	   competing	  with	   each	   other	   for	   domination,	   part	   of	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  170	  The	  foundational	  article	  that	  takes	  such	  an	  approach	  is	  Hall’s	  piece	  on	  policy	  paradigms	  in	  which	  he	  analyses	  the	  replacement	  of	  Keynesian	  ideas	  through	  monetarist	  economic	  interpretations	  in	  Great	  Britain.	  Hall,	  P.	  (1993).	  For	  review	  articles	  on	  ideational	  approaches	  see:	  Beland,	  D.	  &	  Cox,	  R.	  H.	  (2011)	  Introduction,	  IN:	  Beland,	  D.	  &	  Cox,	  R.	  H.	  (eds.)	  Ideas	  and	  Politics	  in	  
social	  Science	  Research,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press;	  Carstensen,	  M.	  B.	  (2011)	  Paradigm	  man	  vs.	  the	  bricoleur:	  bricolage	  as	  an	  alternative	  vision	  of	  agency	  in	  ideational	  change,	  European	  
Political	  Science	  Review,	  Vol.3,	  No.1,	  147-­‐167;	  Carstensen,	  M.B.	  (2011),	  Ideas	  are	  Not	  as	  Stable	  as	  Political	  Scientists	  Want	  Them	  to	  Be:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Incremental	  Ideational	  Change,	  Political	  Studies	  Vol.	  59,	  No.	  3,	  pp.	  596-­‐615;	  Blyth,	  M.	  (1997)	  Any	  more	  bright	  ideas?	  The	  ideational	  turn	  of	  comparative	  political	  economy,	  Comparative	  Politics	  Vol.	  29,	  No.	  1,	  pp.	  229-­‐250;	  Blyth,	  M.	  (2003)	  Structures	  do	  not	  come	  with	  an	  instruction	  sheet:	  interests,	  ideas,	  and	  progress	  in	  political	  science,	  PS:	  Political	  Science	  and	  Politics	  Vol.	  1,	  No.4,	  pp.	  695-­‐706.	  171	  In	  Peter	  Hall’s	  words,	  a	  policy	  paradigm	  replacement	  is	  “initiated	  by	  a	  specific	  kind	  of	  event,	  namely	  by	  events	  that	  proved	  anomalous	  within	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  prevailing	  paradigm”.	  Hall,	  P.	  (1993)	  p.	  291.	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also	   entails	   occasionally	   forging	   coalitions	   with	   one	   another.	   The	   first	   situation	   is	   one	   of	  
stasis,	  the	  second	  one	  of	  competition.	  
	   If	  considerable	  functional	  pressures	  are	  exerted	  on	  the	  existing	  ideational	  landscape	  
(e.g.	   industrialization,	   urbanization)	   and,	   especially,	  when	  one	  of	   the	  political	   competitors	  
incorporates	  these	  functional	  pressures	  into	  its	  programmatic	  ideas,	  then	  the	  other	  existing	  
political	  players	  have	  to	  respond	  by	  updating	  their	  programmatic	  ideas	  if	  they	  do	  not	  want	  
to	   be	   side-­‐lined	   and	   outdated	   in	   the	   political	   competition.172	   Therefore,	   when	   one	   party	  
updates,	  modernizes	   or	   adapts	   its	   programmatic	   ideas	   to	   new	   contextual	   conditions,	   this	  
exerts	   considerable	   competitive	   pressure	   on	   the	   others.	   What	   happens	   next	   is	   that	   the	  
other	   political	   players	   also	   start	   to	   update	   their	   ideas.	   I	   call	   this	   phenomenon	   a	   virtuous	  
cycle	  of	  ideational	  competition.	  
It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  such	  a	  cycle	  does	  not	  unfold	  in	  light	  of	  contextual	  changes.	  A	  
stalemate	   or	   clear-­‐cut	   and	   frozen	   power	   relations	   between	   the	   parties	   can	   lead	   to	   the	  
emergence	   of	   a	   vicious	   rather	   than	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	   ideational	   competition.	   In	   a	   vicious	  
cycle	  of	  competition	  none	  of	  the	  political	  actors	  departs	  from	  the	  status	  quo	  in	  response	  to	  
a	  new	  contextual	  challenge	  and,	  hence,	  no	  modern	  ideas	  regarding	  the	  contextual	  issue	  are	  
generated.	  While	  one	  situation	  leads	  to	  progress,	  the	  other	  one	  leads	  to	  stasis.173	  
	   The	   two	   situations	  mentioned	   above	   crystallize	   in	   the	   two	   cases	   of	   early	  modern	  
social	  security	  formation	  that	  this	  thesis	  scrutinizes.	  In	  Germany,	  the	  accelerated	  functional	  
pressures	  of	   industrialization	   from	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century	  onwards	  gave	  rise	   to	  a	  new	  social	  
stratus,	   that	  of	   the	   industrial	  worker.	  Facilitated	  through	  the	  proliferation	  of	  Marx’s	   ideas,	  
this	  new	  social	  stratus	  threatened	  to	  form	  a	  new	  coherent	  subculture	  based	  on	  the	  Socialist	  
worldview.	   This	  was	   alarming	   for	   the	   other	   existing	   subcultures	   and	  worldviews	   and	   they	  
responded	   by	   developing	   their	   own	   ideas	   on	   social	   security	   in	   congruence	   with	   their	  
worldviews	   (Social	   Catholicism,	   Conservative	   Protestant	   State	   Socialism,	   and	   Social	  
Liberalism).	  The	   functional	  pressures	  of	   industrialization,	  and	   their	   ideational	  politicization	  
through	  Marx,	  triggered	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  of	  ideational	  competition	  on	  modern	  welfare	  ideas	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  In	  the	  early	  1990s	  Peter	  Hall	  saw	  two	  main	  mechanisms	  propelling	  paradigmatic	  ideational	  shifts:	  “electoral	  competition”	  and	  “a	  broad	  societal	  debate”.	  Hall,	  P.	  (1993)	  p.	  291.	  I	  would	  nevertheless,	  emphasize	  that	  ideational	  competition	  can	  be	  facilitated	  by	  electoral	  competition,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  or	  unique	  precondition	  for	  its	  emergence.	  It	  can	  for	  example	  also	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  quest	  for	  credibility	  or	  a	  challenge	  on	  membership	  amongst	  subcultures	  without	  electoral	  competition.	  173	  At	  least	  in	  the	  cases	  investigated	  in	  this	  thesis.	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in	   Germany.	   Once	   the	   first	   political	   exponent	   of	   a	   worldview	   (Bismarck)	   made	   a	   step	   to	  
implement	  his	  ideas	  in	  welfare	  legislation,	  the	  others	  had	  to	  follow	  suit	  in	  order	  not	  to	  lose	  
touch	  with	  the	  members	  of	  their	  subculture	  (the	  workers).	  A	  political	  battle	  unfolded	  which	  
was	   followed	   by	   a	   series	   of	   political	   compromises	   on	   welfare	   legislation.	   In	   Italy,	  
contrastingly,	  the	  unification	  of	  the	  nation	  led	  to	  a	  Bi-­‐Polar	  rivalry	  between	  Liberal	  State	  and	  
Church	  in	  which	  neither	  of	  the	  two	  could	  establish	  hegemony	  over	  the	  other.	  This	  Bi-­‐Polar	  
stalemate	   led	   to	  a	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  competition	   in	  which	  neither	  power	  generated	  modern	  
welfare	   state	   ideas	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   functional	   pressures	   generated	   through	  
industrialization	  and	  liberal	  de-­‐corporation	  of	  society	  in	  the	  19th	  century.	  
	   These	   cycles	   are	   of	   a	   dynamic	   and	   reciprocal	   nature.	   Their	   unfolding	   is	   not	   only	  
conditioned	  by,	  but	  also	  feeds	  back	  into,	  their	  environment.	  This	  goes	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  
standard	   comparative	   analytic	   frameworks	   that	   build	   on	   the	   logic	   of	   comparative	   statics.	  
Instead,	   the	   patterns	   of	   ideational	   competition	   and	   cycles	   that	   this	   thesis	   found	   in	   the	  
empirics	  are	  perhaps	  best	  described	  using	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  evolution	  of	   ideas.	   	   In	  fact,	  the	  
dynamics	  and	  changes	  of	  programmatic	  ideas	  and	  worldviews	  described	  in	  this	  thesis	  mirror	  
some	   of	   the	   dynamics	   in	   the	   evolutionary	   concepts	   that	   are	   used	   to	   explain	   the	  
development	  of	  species	  on	  earth.	  In	  fact,	  there	  are	  congruencies	  between	  the	  unfolding	  of	  
cycles	  of	  competition	  of	  programmatic	  ideas	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  guide	  the	  evolution	  
of	   life	  on	  earth	   (selection,	  variation,	   retention).	   	  Variation	   finds	   its	  empirical	  expression	   in	  
the	  fact	  that	  no	  clones	  seem	  to	  exist	  in	  politics	  and	  history,	  but	  that	  instead	  every	  country,	  
welfare	   system,	   party	   or	   religious	   configuration	   is	   unique.	   This	   comes	   close	   to	   the	  
implications	  of	  the	  Darwinian	  concept	  of	  “population	  thinking”.174	  Furthermore,	  the	  virtuous	  
cycles	   of	   ideational	   competition	   described	   before	   mirror	   the	   selection	   mechanisms	   that	  
drive	  biological	  evolution.	  Retention,	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  as	  the	  biological	  equivalent	  to	  path	  
dependency,	   has	   characteristics	   and	   effects	   similar	   to	   vicious	   cycles	   of	   programmatic	  
competition	  in	  which	  ideas	  do	  not	  develop.	  
However,	   there	   are	   also	   fundamental	   differences.	   The	  most	   important	   is	   that	   the	  
mechanisms	   that	   drive	   ideational	   competition	   cannot	   be	   equated	   with	   a	   “survival	   of	   the	  
fittest”175	  or	  a	  “social	  Darwinism”176	  of	  ideas.	  Unlike	  biological	  species,	  programmatic	  ideas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  Mayr,	  E.	  (2001)	  What	  Evolution	  Is,	  New	  York,	  Basic	  Books,	  p.	  75.	  175	  Streeck,	  W.	  (2009)	  p.	  18.	  176	  Streeck,	  W.	  (2009)	  p.	  19.	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and	  worldviews	  cannot	  die	  out	  (they	  can	  just	  be	  muted	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time).177	  Only	  
their	   organizational	   carriers	   can	   vanish.178	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   judge	   at	   this	   point,	   without	  
embarking	   on	   the	   empirical	   analysis	   below,	   just	   how	   far	   the	   analogies	   between	   the	  
framework	  of	  virtuous	  and	  vicious	  cycles	  of	   ideas	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  underlying	  biologic	  
evolution	   go.	   	   On	   the	   pro-­‐side,	   the	   confinement	   of	   Darwinian	   Theory	   to	   ideas	   in	   politics	  
would	   rescue	   it	   from	  biological	   reductionism.	  On	   the	   con-­‐side	   stands	   the	   question	  where	  
the	  selection	  pressures	  for	  an	  evolution	  of	   ideas	  should	  come	  from	  if	  they	  cannot	  die	  out.	  
There	  are	  also	  other	  problems	  of	  a	  direct	  analogy:	  change	  in	  politics	  can	  also	  be	  quick	  and	  
drastic,	  Darwin	  has	  discredited	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  “saltations”	  (evolutionary	   lingo)	  with	  
the	   turn	   to	   gradualism	   that	   he	   pushed	   in	   Evolutionary	   Theory.	   	   Another	   problem	   is	   the	  
confinement	  of	  Evolutionary	  Theory	  to	  the	  phrase	  that	  “Evolution	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  the	  
genetic	   turnover	  of	   the	   individuals	  of	  every	  population	   from	  generation	   to	  generation.”179	  
This	  seems	  exclude	  agency,	  which	  is	  certainly	  a	  central	  concept	  of	  politics	  and	  history,	  from	  
an	  evolutionary-­‐ideational	  approach.	  However,	  there	  are	  parts	  of	  evolutionary	  research	  that	  
increasingly	  point	  towards	  the	  importance	  of	  agency	  in	  sexual	  selection,	  especially	  through	  
mating	   and	   courtship	   behaviors.180	   That	   said,	   conclusions	   cannot	   be	   drawn	   without	   an	  
evaluation	  against	  the	  background	  of	  the	  empirics.	  The	  plan	  is	  therefore	  to	  turn	  to	  a	  more	  
thorough	  evaluation	  of	   the	  possibilities	  of	   an	  evolutionary	  approach	   to	   the	   study	  of	   ideas	  
after	   having	   analysed	   and	   assembled	   the	   conclusions	   of	   the	   empirical	   cases	   in	   the	  
concluding	  chapter.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  Counter	  intuitively,	  especially	  neo-­‐classical	  economists	  who	  are	  usually	  not	  too	  keen	  on	  ideas	  in	  their	  analysis	  seem	  to	  know	  that	  (they	  do	  not	  call	  them	  ideas).	  Milton	  Friedmann	  put	  forward	  that	  the	  task	  of	  economists	  remains	  “to	  develop	  alternatives	  to	  existing	  policies,	  to	  keep	  them	  alive	  and	  available	  until	  the	  politically	  impossible	  becomes	  politically	  inevitable”	  Friedmann,	  M.	  cited	  in	  Blyth	  2012	  Unpublished	  manuscript	  pp.	  57-­‐58.	  178	  The	  concept	  of	  virtuous	  and	  vicious	  cycles	  of	  ideational	  competition	  shares	  some	  resemblance	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  programmatic	  party	  competition.	  See:	  Kitschelt,	  H.;	  Mansfelova,	  Z.;	  Markowski,	  R.	  &	  Toka,	  G.	  (1999)	  Party	  Systems,	  Competition,	  Representation,	  and	  Inter	  Party	  
Cooperation,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press;	  Kitschelt,	  H.	  &	  Wilkinson,	  S.	  (2006)	  	  A	  Research	  Agenda	  for	  the	  study	  of	  Citizens-­‐Political	  linkages	  and	  Democratic	  Accountability,	  IN:	  Kitschelt,	  H.	  &	  Wilkinson,	  S.	  (eds.)	  Partons,	  Clients	  and	  Politicians,	  	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  179	  Mayr,	  E.	  (2001)	  p.	  76.	  180	  Miller,	  G.	  (1998)	  How	  Mate	  Choice	  shaped	  Human	  Nature:	  A	  Review	  of	  Sexual	  Selection	  and	  Human	  Evolution,	  IN:	  Crawford,	  C.	  &	  Krebs,	  D.	  (eds.)	  Handbook	  of	  Evolutionary	  Psychology,:	  Ideas,	  Issues,	  and	  	  Applications,	  Mayham,	  Lawrence	  Erlbaum.	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2.4.1 Ideational	  Compatibility	  and	  Compromise	  
Politics	  is	  the	  art	  of	  the	  possible.	  
Otto	  von	  Bismarck181	  
	  
The	   striving	   of	   programmatic	   ideas	   in	   ideational	   competition	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   translate	  
these	   ideas	   directly	   into	   institutions.	   Instead,	   in	   order	   to	   make	   laws	   in	   a	   parliamentary	  
multiparty	  setting,	  the	  ideational	  carriers	  usually	  need	  allies	  and	  coalition	  partners.182	  Thus	  
the	  power	  resources	  that	  a	  successful	  carrier	  of	  updated	  programmatic	  ideas	  possesses	  (e.g.	  
number	   of	   seats	   in	   parliament)	   are	   not	   the	   only	   important	   factor.	   Instead,	   this	   study	  will	  
show	  that	   it	  also	  depends	  on	  how	  the	   ideas	   that	   it	   transports	  are	  compatible	  with	  others.	  
Ideational	  compatibility	  does	  not	  work	  based	  on	  simple	  affinities	  on	  a	  right-­‐left	  dimension	  as	  
parts	  of	  rational	  choice	  based	  coalition	  theory183	  or	  Tsebelis’s	  “winset”	  and	  “yolk”184	  would	  
suggest.	  Instead,	  whether	  ideas	  can	  be	  subject	  to	  compromise	  depends	  on	  whether	  a	  match	  
is	  possible	  between	  their	  different	  levels	  of	  ideational	  abstraction	  and	  their	  interests.	  Social	  
policy	   has	  many	   layers	   and	   dimensions	   that	   span	   from	   purely	   organizational	   institutional	  
aspects	  to	  redistributive	  questions	  or	  even	  to	  higher	  normative	  values	  of	  human	  solidarity.	  If	  
a	  carrier	  of	  a	  programmatic	  idea	  has	  acquired	  a	  specific	  blueprint	  for	  social	  security	  then	  this	  
can	  have	  as	  much	  to	  do	  with	  his	  programmatic	  beliefs	  as	  with	  the	  situational	  interests	  of	  his	  
worldviews.	  The	  multilevel	  character	  of	  ideas	  and	  the	  different	  layers	  of	  social	  security	  open	  
up	  the	  space	  for	  ideational	  compromises	  and	  coalitions.	  Even	  if	  the	  programmatic	  beliefs	  of	  
two	  worldviews	  are	  fundamentally	  at	  odds	  with	  one	  another,	  they	  can	  still	  compromise	  on	  
their	   policy	   ideas	   if	   their	   interests	   are	   aligned.	   Such	   compromise	   can	   only	   work	   if	   the	  
generated	  policy	  instrument	  can	  be	  sold	  as	  being	  in	  congruence	  with	  both	  worldviews.	  Such	  
situations	  are	  rare	  but	  when	  they	  happen	  they	  can	  have	  tremendous	  impact.	  Let	  us	  take	  an	  
example:	  	  	  	  
	   The	  worldviews	  of	  Catholics	  and	  Liberals	  might	  be	  fundamentally	  at	  odds	  but	  they	  can	  
reach	  a	  compromise	  when	  facing	  a	  force	  that	  fundamentally	  threatens	  the	  interests	  of	  both	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  Bismarck,	  O.	  (1867)	  Remark	  to	  Wadek	  on	  the	  11th	  August	  1867.	  182	  This	  depends	  heavily	  on	  the	  institutional	  environment	  (e.g.	  whether	  parliament	  is	  required	  to	  enact	  laws,	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  system	  of	  proportional	  representation	  etc.).	  183	  Strom,	  K.;	  Müller,	  W.	  &	  Bergman,	  T.	  (2008)	  Cabinets	  and	  Coalition	  Bargaining,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  184	  Tsebelis,	  G.	  (1995)	  Decision	  Making	  in	  Political	  Systems:	  Veto	  Players	  in	  Presidentialism,	  Parliamentarism,	  Multicameralism	  and	  Multipartysm,	  British	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Vol.	  25,	  No.	  3,	  pp.	  289-­‐325;	  Tsebelis,	  G.	  (2002)	  Veto	  Players:	  How	  Political	  Institutions	  Work,	  Princeton,	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	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of	  their	  worldviews	  –	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  Bismarck	  and	  his	  state	  socialist	  challenge.	  In	  such	  
a	   situation,	   Liberals	   and	   Catholics	   were	   able	   to	   formulate	   welfare	   provisions	   together	   as	  
their	  interests	  lay	  in	  limiting	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  (or	  Bismarck).	  This	  was	  facilitated	  not	  only	  
by	  Bismarck’s	  threat	  but	  also	  because	  the	  bases	  of	  Catholic	  and	  Liberal	  programmatic	  ideas	  
opened	  the	  door	  for	  an	  ideational	  match.	  	  Liberals	  could	  sell	  the	  result	  as	  being	  in	  line	  with	  
the	   laissez	   faire	  residual	  of	   their	  worldview	  while	  Catholics	  could	  emphasize	  that	  they	  had	  
hampered	   the	   role	   of	   the	   central	   state	   in	   welfare	   as	   demanded	   by	   their	   subsidiarity	  
doctrine.	   In	   contrast,	   Bismarck’s	   state	   socialist	   and	   the	   Social	   Democrat’s	   programmatic	  
ideas	  on	  how	  to	  run	  the	  economy	  were	  almost	  identical.	  In	  other	  words,	  Bismarck	  and	  the	  
Socialists	  would	  have	  been	  very	  close	  on	  a	  right-­‐left	  dimension	  but	  agreement	  on	  policy	  was	  
impossible	  as	  the	  interests	  of	  their	  worldviews	  were	  fundamentally	  at	  odds.	  
	  
2.4.2 A	  note	  on	  Policy	  Paradigms	  
Peter	  Hall’s	  1993	  article	  on	  Policy	  Paradigms	  is	  arguably	  the	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  most	  of	  
the	   ideational	   scholarship	   that	   started	   to	   emerge	   during	   the	   1990s.	   Hall,	   like	  most	   other	  
researchers	  that	  include	  ideas	  in	  their	  analysis,	  is	  usually	  concerned	  with	  the	  substitution	  of	  
one	  set	  of	  paradigmatic	  policy	   ideas	  by	  another.	  Hall’s	  original	  contribution	  deals	  with	  the	  
crowding	  out	  of	  Keynesian	   ideas	  among	  British	  politicians,	  bureaucrats	  and	  the	  public	  and	  
the	  wide-­‐scale	  adoption	  of	  monetarist	  ideas	  in	  their	  place	  during	  the	  1980s.	  This	  process	  is	  
initiated	  by	  an	  external	  shock,	  that	  is	  “initiated	  by	  a	  specific	  kind	  of	  event,	  namely	  by	  events	  
that	  proved	  anomalous	  within	   the	   terms	  of	   the	  prevailing	  paradigm”185	  but	   it	   is	  ultimately	  
driven	  by	  electoral	  competition.186	  Hall’s	  framework,	  therefore,	  seems	  broadly	  similar	  to	  the	  
concept	   of	   ideational	   competition	   sketched	   out	   above.	   However,	   there	   are	   also	   strong	  
divergences	   between	   both	   approaches.	   Hall’s	   framework	   was	   explicitly	   modeled	   on	   the	  
British	   experience.	   The	   replacement	   of	   one	   paradigm	   by	   another	   through	   electoral	  
competition	  comes	  therefore	  as	  no	  big	  surprise	  given	  the	  institutional	  settings	  of	  bi-­‐partisan	  
competition	  that	  is	  facilitated	  through	  a	  winner	  takes	  all,	  first	  past	  the	  post-­‐election	  system.	  
The	  situation	  whereby	  more	  than	  two	  ideational	  paradigms	  compete,	  which	   is	  empirically-­‐
speaking	  much	  more	  frequent	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  is	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  framework.	  In	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	  Hall,	  P.	  (1993)	  p.	  291.	  186	  Hall,	  P.	  (1993)	  p.	  288.	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words,	  Hall	  helped	  us	  to	  a	  much	  better	  understanding	  of	  ideational	  politics	  and	  competition	  
in	  majoritarian	   democracies	   but	   we	   know	   still	   very	   little	   on	   such	   processes	   in	   consensus	  
democracies	   with	  multiparty	   settings	   where,	   although	   ideational	   competition	   and	  winner	  
takes	  all	  politics	  do	  matter,	   ideational	  compromise	   is	  also	  crucial.	  Here	   this	   thesis	  and	   the	  
framework	  developed	  above	  fill	  a	  gap.	  A	  further	  peculiarity	  of	  this	  work	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  
Hall	   is	   its	   recognition	   that	   electoral	   competition	   is	   not	   solely	   responsible	   for	   ideational	  
competition	   but	   that	   such	   competition	   can	   also	   be	   stimulated	   outside	   of	   electoral	  
institutions	   (although	   electoral	   competition	   is	   nevertheless	   acknowledged	   as	   facilitating	  
ideational	   competition).	   The	   ideational	   competition	   studied	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   that	   which	  
unfolded	   in	   the	   late	  19th	   century,	  and	  revolves	  around	   identities	  and	   the	  stability	  of	   these	  
identities.	  It	  is	  not	  an	  electoral	  competition	  in	  which	  parties	  can	  simply	  reconfigure	  and	  put	  
together	   ideas	   on	   their	   platforms	   according	   to	   an	   electoral	   logic	   of	   supply	   and	   demand.	  
Instead,	   parties	   embark	   on	   a	   process	   of	   nurturing	   their	   ideational	   developments	   through	  

















	   	   	   49	  
3 Comparative	  Framework,	  Methods,	  Plan	  of	  Thesis	  
3.1 Caveats	  
The	   study	   of	   ideas	   brings	   caveats.	   As	   early	   as	   1993,	   Peter	   Hall	   put	   forward	   that	   “this	  
dimension	   of	   policymaking	   has	   proven	   especially	   difficult	   to	   model”	   187	   and	   that	   “Like	  
subatomic	   particles,	   ideas	   do	   not	   leave	  much	   of	   a	   trail	  when	   they	   shift”.188	   	   A	   prominent	  
accusation	   is	   that	   research	   that	   includes	   ideas	   as	   independent	   variables	   lends	   itself	   too	  
easily	   to	  post-­‐hoc	  explanations.	  Besides	  knitting	   the	  empirical	  net	  as	   tight	  as	  possible,	   the	  
most	   important	   point	   is	   certainly	   that	   the	   researcher	   establishes	   up	   front	  what	   the	   exact	  
content	  of	  a	  programmatic	  idea	  is.	  This	  is	  safeguarded	  through	  an	  approach	  that	  sees	  it	  as	  
essential	   to	   trace	   the	   evolution	   of	   ideas	   themselves	   before	   assessing	   their	   influence	   on	  
policy.	  Whether	  ideas	  and	  interests	  fall	  together	  in	  a	  programmatic	  idea	  must	  be	  traced	  in	  
each	  specific	  case.	  Considering	  the	  question	  of	  causal	   influence	  of	  programmatic	   ideas	  the	  
researcher	   has	   to	   show	   that	   no	   other	   concurrent	   theoretical	   framework	   matches	   the	  
empirical	  findings	  better.	  For	  this	  thesis,	  this	  means	  that	  none	  of	  the	  other	  welfare	  theories	  
(Power	   Resource,	   Employer	   Centered	   Approaches	   etc.)	   nor	   the	   political	   actors	   that	   they	  
identify	  (left	  parties,	  employer	  associations,	  cross	  class	  coalitions	  etc.)	  have	  more	  (direct	  or	  
indirect)	   influence	  on	   the	   formation	  of	   social	   legislation	   than	  Catholic	  programmatic	   ideas	  
and	   carriers.	   In	   other	  words,	   to	  make	   a	   proper	   argument	   about	   the	   influence	   of	   Catholic	  
programmatic	  ideas	  on	  social	  security,	  the	  thesis	  must	  show	  that	  these	  ideas	  were	  brought	  
into	  the	  parliamentary	  arena	  by	  the	  respective	  political	  carriers	  and	  vessels	  of	  Catholicism	  
(Catholic	  parties,	  Christian	  Democratic	  parties,	  Pope,	  etc.)	  and	  could	  make	  their	  way	  (more	  
or	  less	  watered	  down)	  through	  the	  legislative	  process	  into	  institutions.	  
	  
3.2 Cases:	  Object	  of	  Study	  and	  Timeline	  
Two	   cases	   have	   been	   selected	   for	   analysis:	   Italy	   and	   Germany.	   Both	   countries	   have	  
longstanding	   traditions	  of	  Catholic	  and	  Christian	  Democratic	  parties	  and	  have	  experienced	  
the	  critical	  junctures	  of	  WWI,	  WWII	  and	  fascist	  dictatorship.	  The	  two	  countries	  were	  ‘catch	  
up’	   states,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   nation	   state	   formation	   and	   industrialization	   in	   the	   19th	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  290.	  188	  Hall,	  P.	  (1993)	  p.	  290.	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century.189	   They	   developed	   distinct	   non-­‐liberal	   political	   economies	   during	   the	   20th	  
century.190	   Not	   only	   do	   they	   share	   similar	   historical	   trajectories	   but	   they	   also	   share	  
communalities	   today.	   Hall	   and	   Soskice	   place	   them	   among	   the	   coordinated	   market	  
economies,191	   while	   Esping-­‐Andersen	   puts	   both	   into	   his	   Conservative	   welfare	   state	  
cluster.192	   Recent	   work	   that	   reviewed	   and	   critically	   updated	   these	   categories	   also	   retains	  
these	   conclusions.193	   Furthermore,	   classics	   of	   the	   comparative	   politics	   literature	   like	  
Lijphart’s	  Patterns	  of	  Democracy	  see	  strong	  similarities	  between	  the	  institutional	  set	  ups	  of	  
the	  two	  countries.194	  
	   There	   has	   been	   much	   controversy	   about	   these	   categorizations	   (see	   for	   example	  
Ferrera’s	   well	   taken	   point	   about	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   distinct	   southern	   welfare	   model	   and	  
Esping-­‐Andersen’s	  own	  revision	  of	  his	  work)195,	  however,	  this	  is	  not	  my	  main	  concern	  here.	  
Instead,	  all	  of	  the	  categorizations	  above	  remain	  snapshots	  based	  on	  the	  evaluation	  of	  data	  
from	  specific	  points	  in	  time.	  Neither	  Esping-­‐Andersen’s	  nor	  Hall	  and	  Soskice’s	  contributions	  
use	   historical	   or	   time	   series	   data	   to	   cement	   their	   conclusions	   but	   their	   arguments	   always	  
imply	   a	   longstanding	   historical	   developmental	   path.	   However,	   if	   one	   takes	   the	   historical	  
dimension	  of	  both	  cases	  into	  account	  then	  a	  picture	  emerges	  where	  Italy	  and	  Germany	  are	  
not	   at	   all	   as	   similar	   as	  most	  modern	   political	   science	   categorizations	   would	   suggest.	   This	  
holds	   not	   only	   for	   their	   political	   economies	   and	   their	   welfare	   regimes	   but	   also	   for	   the	  
historical	  political,	  institutional	  and	  social	  conditions	  under	  which	  these	  evolved.	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  Italy	  unified	  in	  1861	  while	  Germany	  did	  so	  a	  decade	  later	  in	  1871.	  Industrialization	  took	  off	  a	  bit	  earlier	  in	  Germany,	  from	  the	  1850s	  onwards,	  while	  Italy	  started	  to	  industrialize	  heavily	  in	  the	  1870s	  and	  entered	  high	  industrialization	  in	  the	  1890s,	  albeit	  regionally	  confined	  to	  the	  North.	  	  190	   Streeck,	  W.	   (2001)	   Introduction:	  Explorations	   into	   the	  Origins	  of	  Non	  Liberal	   Capitalism	   in	  Germany	  and	  Japan,	  IN:	  Streeck,	  W.	  &	  Yamamura,	  K.	  (eds.)	  The	  Origins	  of	  Non	  Liberal	  Capitalism,	  Cornell,	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  	  191	  Hall,	  P.	  &	  Soskice,	  D.	  (2001)	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism,	  IN:	  Hall,	  P.	  &	  Soskice,	  D.	  (eds.)	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  1-­‐68.	  192	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  sees	  strong	  similarities	  between	  both	  countries	  and	  their	  welfare	  regimes	  in	  terms	  of	  decommodification	  (p.52),	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  employment	  sector	  (p.	  158)	  and	  their	  overall	  conservative	  character	  (p.	  74).	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1990).	  193	   See:	   Esping-­‐Andersen,	   G.	   (1999a)	   The	   Social	   Foundations	   of	   Postindustrial	   Economies,	  Oxford,	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   Arts,	   W.	   &	   Gelissen,	   J.	   (2002)	   Three	   Worlds	   of	   Welfare	  Capitalism	  or	  more?	  A	  state	  of-­‐the-­‐art-­‐report,	  Journal	  of	  European	  Social	  Policy,	  Vol.	  12,	  No.	  2,	  pp.	  137-­‐158,	   Iversen,	   T.	   &	   Stephens,	   J.	   D.	   (2008)	   Partisan	   Politics,	   the	   Welfare	   State,	   and	   Three	  Worlds	  of	  Human	  Capital	  Formation,	  Comparative	  Political	  Studies,	  Vol.	  41,	  No.	  4-­‐5,	  pp.	  600-­‐637. 194	  For	  Lijphard	  both	  countries	  have	  “semi	  plural	  societies”.	  Lijphardt,	  A.	  (1999)	  Patterns	  of	  
Democracy:	  Government	  Forms	  and	  Performance	  in	  Thirty-­‐Six	  Countries,	  New	  Haven,	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  p.	  74.	  195	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1996),	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1999a).	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   In	   fact,	   both	   countries	   significantly	  differed	  on	   four	   key	   comparative	  dimensions	   that	  
varied	   throughout	   the	   late	  19th	   and	  early	  20th	   century:	  nature	  of	   regime	   (authoritarian	  vs.	  
liberal),	  suffrage	  expansion	  (early	  vs.	  late	  and	  slow),	  party	  system	  (early	  structuring	  vs.	  late	  
structuring)	  and	  church-­‐state	  relations	  (political	  opposition	  vs.	  systemic	  opposition).196	  	  
	   The	   political	   and	   institutional	   regimes	   differed	   significantly	   prior	   to	   WWI.	   	   After	   its	  
unification	   in	   1861,	   Italy	   can	   be	   counted	   as	   a	   prototypical	   liberal	   regime,	   albeit	   a	  
constitutional	   monarchy,	   in	   which	   cabinets	   needed	   the	   support	   of	   the	   majority	   of	  
parliament.	   This	   was	   not	   the	   case	   in	   Imperial	   Germany	   where	   the	   government	   was	  
independent	  from	  the	  Reichstag	  and	  responsible	  only	  to	  the	  Kaiser.	  This	  made	  Germany	  an	  
authoritarian	   regime	   which	   can	   be	   labeled	   as	   “limited	   absolutist”.197	   However,	   even	   in	  
Germany	   the	   chancellor	   also	   needed	   a	  majority	   in	   the	   parliament	   to	   pass	   legislation.	   The	  
transition	   of	   the	   interwar	   period	   left	   Italy’s	   constitutional	   monarchic	   institutions	   largely	  
unchanged.	   In	   contrast,	   Germany	  witnessed	   a	   regime	   change	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   defeat	   in	  
WWI	   and	   the	   November	   revolution	   of	   1918/1919	   and	  went	   on	   to	   become	   a	   presidential	  
democracy.	   After	   WWII	   both	   countries	   became	   parliamentary	   democracies	   where	  
governments	  needed	  the	  support	  of	  parliament	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  
	   Strong	  divergences	  also	  existed	  regarding	   the	   franchise	   in	  both	  countries.	  While	  male	  
suffrage	   was	   only	   reluctantly	   and	   gradually	   expanded	   in	   Liberal	   Italy	   (out	   of	   fear	   of	   the	  
uneducated	   and	   religious	   masses),	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich’s	   constitution,	   despite	   being	   of	   an	  
authoritarian	  nature,	  provided	  for	  universal	  male	  suffrage.	  Furthermore,	  while	  women	  were	  
granted	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  Weimar	  Republic,	  Italian	  women	  would	  only	  get	  to	  exercise	  
their	  fundamental	  democratic	  rights	  after	  WWII.	  
	   The	  differences	  in	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  franchise	  had	  strong	  effects	  on	  the	  structuring	  
of	  the	  party	  system	  in	  both	  countries.	  While	   Imperial	  Germany	  developed	  a	  comparatively	  
stable	   party	   system	   early	   on	   due	   to	   suffrage	   extension	   and	   the	   existence	   of	   coherent	  
subcultures,	   such	   developments	   only	   occurred	   in	   Italy	   after	   WWI.	   Decisive	   in	   the	   late	  
development	  of	  modern	  parties	  was	  not	  only	  the	  perpetual	  postponing	  of	  universal	  suffrage	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	  I	  owe	  much	  of	  these	  categories	  to	  the	  very	  insightful	  comments	  of	  Stefano	  Bartolini	  on	  an	  earlier	  version	  of	  the	  manuscript.	  197	  Limited	  absolutism	  refers	  to	  countries	  in	  which	  “the	  king	  could	  appoint	  his	  cabinet	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  composition	  of	  parliament”,	  Stephens,	  J.	  	  (1989)	  Democratic	  Transition	  and	  Breakdown	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  1870-­‐1939:	  A	  Test	  of	  the	  Moore	  Thesis,	  American	  Journal	  of	  
Sociology,	  Vol.	  94,	  No.	  5,	  pp.	  1019-­‐1077,	  p.	  1023.	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in	  combination	  with	  the	  single	  member	  district	  system	  in	  Italy198	  but	  also	  the	  	  hostile	  stance	  
of	   the	   Pope	   towards	   the	   new	   nation	   state.	   Through	   the	   issuing	   of	   the	   “Non-­‐Expedite”	   in	  
1874,	  Pius	  IX	  forbade	  all	  Italian	  Catholics	  to	  vote	  or	  run	  for	  public	  office.	  As	  a	  consequence	  
of	  this,	  none	  of	  the	  two	  dominant	  political	  subcultures	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  in	  Italy	  formed	  a	  
modern	  vehicle	  of	  political	  representation.	  In	  this	  regard,	  Imperial	  Germany	  and	  Liberal	  Italy	  
represented	   the	   two	   ends	   of	   the	   spectrum	   of	   the	   European	   experience	   in	   the	   late	   19th	  
century.	  
	   The	   fourth	   comparative	   dimension	   in	   which	   the	   analytic	   framework	   of	   the	   thesis	   is	  
situated	   regards	   the	   dimension	   of	   the	   state-­‐church	   conflict.	   Even	   though	   both	   countries	  
experienced	  a	  harsh	  state-­‐church	  conflict,	   it	   took	  much	   longer	  to	  resolve	   it	   in	   Italy	  than	   in	  
Germany.	  While	  the	  German	  Culture	  War	  (Kulturkampf)	  only	  lasted	  for	  seven	  years,	  it	  went	  
on	  for	  almost	  70	  years	   in	   Italy.	   In	  addition,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  conflict	  was	  different	   in	  both	  
countries.	   The	   Vatican	   took	   up	   a	   position,	   culminating	  with	   the	   issuing	   of	   the	   Syllabus	   of	  
Errors,199	  of	  fundamental	  systemic	  opposition	  against	  liberalism	  and	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  
of	   the	   Italian	   state.	   In	   Germany,	   Catholicism	   confronted	   the	   Protestant	   state	   authorities	  
from	  within	  the	  political	  system.	  Hence,	  it	  was	  a	  political	  confrontation	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  
the	   constitution.	   The	   denominational	   split	   of	   the	   German	   case	   also	   allows	   for	   different	  
political	  dynamics	  based	  on	  the	  very	  different	  social	  doctrines	  that	  both	  religions	  developed	  
in	   response	   to	   industrialization.200	   In	   Catholic	   Italy	   such	   dynamics	   were	   foreclosed.	  
Furthermore,	   the	  Pope	  and	  the	  Vatican,	   the	  center	  of	   the	  Catholic	  Church,	  were	   (and	  are)	  
situated	   in	   Italy	   while	   no	   such	   religious	   power	   center	   exists	   in	   Germany.	   The	   special	  
proximity	  between	  the	  Pope,	  the	  Catholic	  hierarchy	  and	  the	  Italian	  Catholic	   lay	  movement	  
allowed	   for	   a	   much	   fiercer	   and	   direct	   control	   of	   Italian	   Catholicism.	   In	   Germany,	   on	   the	  
other	  hand,	  the	  pope’s	  leverage	  over	  his	  flock	  was	  considerably	  limited.201	  The	  consequence	  
was	  that	  a	  Catholic	  party	  of	  religious	  defense	  emerged	  only	  comparatively	  late,	  with	  Sturzo’s	  
Partito	  Populare	  in	  1919,	  almost	  half	  a	  century	  after	  the	  German	  Catholic	  Center	  party	  had	  
been	   founded.202	   Furthermore,	   when	   Christian	   Democratic	   parties	   emerged,	   after	   the	  
interludes	  of	  fascism	  and	  WWII	  in	  both	  countries,	  these	  also	  took	  diverging	  forms.	  While	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  See	  Chapter	  5	  of	  this	  thesis,	  especially	  pp.	  173-­‐178.	  199	  See	  Chapter	  5	  of	  this	  thesis,	  especially	  pp.	  194-­‐201.	  200	  For	  the	  Catholic	  side	  see:	  pp.	  132-­‐134,	  for	  the	  Protestant	  side	  see:	  pp.	  120-­‐125,	  both	  Chapter	  4	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  201	  Kalyvas,	  S.	  (1998).	  202	  Kalyvas,	  S.	  (1996).	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foundation	   of	   the	   CDU	   marked	   a	   historical	   interconfessional	   compromise	   between	  
Protestants	  and	  Catholics,	  the	  DC	  in	  Italy	  remained	  a	  purely	  Catholic	  party.	  As	  a	   last	  point,	  
the	   early	   1990s	   saw	   the	   end	   of	   Christian	   Democracy	   in	   Italy,	   while	   the	   German	   Christian	  
Democrats	   were	   able	   to	   adapt	   in	   the	   post-­‐cold	   war	   era	   and	   survive.	   The	   comparative	  
dimensions	  are	  summarized	  in	  the	  following	  table	  according	  to	  the	  historical	  time	  slots	  that	  
are	  scrutinized	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
Figure	  	  Four	  Comparative	  Dimensions	  
  REGIME SUFFRAGE PARTY	  SYTEM CHURCH-­‐STATE	  Relations 
Pre-­‐WWI 
Italy Liberal Low Non	  Existent Long	  Conflict 
Germany Autoritarian High Solid Short	  Conflict 
Post-­‐WWII 
Italy Democracy High Solid Excellent 
Germany Democracy High Solid Excellent 
End	  of	  History 
Italy Democracy High Breakdown Good 
Germany Democracy High Solid Medium 
	  
What	   follows	   is	   that	   where	   a	   country	   stands	   on	   each	   of	   the	   four	   dimensions	   (regime,	  
suffrage,	  party	  system,	  church-­‐state	  relation)	  has	  consequences	  not	  only	  for	  the	  formation	  
of	  social	  security	  but	  also	  for	  the	  formation	  of	   ideas	  on	  social	  security.	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  
four	   dimensions	   constitute	   the	   framework	   within	   which	   vicious	   or	   virtuous	   cycles	   of	  
competition	  unfold.	  Note,	   however,	   that	   it	   is	   almost	   impossible	   to	   read	   linear	   predictions	  
about	   the	   unfolding	   of	   such	   cycles	   through	   a	   logic	   of	   comparative	   statics	   from	   the	   above	  
table.	   To	   give	   an	   example:	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   government	   is	   not	   responsible	   to	   a	   parliament	  
suggests	  that	  government	  would	  be	  immune	  to	  demands	  from	  parliamentarians.	  However,	  
it	   might	   be	   easier	   for	   the	   executive	   to	   take	   a	   lead	   on	   welfare	   against	   the	   will	   of	  
parliament.203	  Hence,	  theoretically	  the	  same	  regime	  type	  can	  lead	  to	  more	  or	   less	  welfare.	  
However,	   as	   the	   empirical	   chapters	   will	   show,	   historically	   it	   was	   not	   possible	   to	   push	  
through	   welfare	   legislation	   against	   the	   will	   of	   parliamentarians.	   Even	   Bismarck	   needed	   a	  
majority	  in	  the	  Reichstag	  to	  pass	  legislation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  presence/absence	  of	  federalism	  and	  the	  consequences	  it	  entailed	  for	  legislative	  procedures	  had	  much	  more	  influence	  on	  welfare	  legislation	  than	  liberal	  monarchic	  parliamentarism	  vs.	  semi-­‐absolutism.	  In	  the	  end,	  semi-­‐absolutism	  might	  not	  have	  been	  that	  far	  from	  today’s	  liberal	  democratic	  practices	  as	  it	  seems	  at	  a	  first	  glance.	  Sweden	  and	  Denmark	  (but	  also	  Spain)	  can	  be	  classified	  as	  limited-­‐absolutist	  regimes	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  Stephens,	  J.	  (1989)	  p.	  1023.	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   This	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   the	  above	  categories	  do	  not	  have	  any	  substantial	   impact	  on	  
the	  formation	  of	  social	  security.	  An	  early	  suffrage	  extension	  facilitates	  the	  early	  emergence	  
of	  a	  party	  system	  with	  coherent	  collective	  actors	  that	  are	  needed	  for	  coalition	  building	  and	  
political	   compromises	   on	   welfare.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   necessarily	   always	   the	   case.	  
Furthermore,	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   church-­‐state	   conflict	   determines	   whether	   a	   Christian	  
Democratic	  representation	  surfaces	  in	  the	  political	  arena	  and	  how	  much	  of	  a	  distinctive	  anti-­‐
state	  connotation	  it	  develops.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  church-­‐state	  conflict	  is	  
low	   and	   a	   Christian	   Democratic	   party	   emerges,	   then	   Catholic	   voters	   are	   more	   easily	  
absorbed	  by	  the	  political	  system	  which	  grants	  it	  higher	  legitimacy	  and	  stability.	  
	   The	   categories	   sketched	   above	   are	   deeply	   intertwined	   and	   often	   reinforce	   and	   feed	  
back	   into	   one	   another.	   Similarly,	   the	   suffrage	   issue	   influences	   the	   party	   system	   and	   the	  
state-­‐church	   relation	   can	   impact	   negatively	   on	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   party	   system.	  What	  
follows	  is	  that	  these	  categories	  are	  useful	  but	  only	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  seen	  in	  light	  of	  how	  
they	  emerge	   in	  the	  empirics:	   interconnected	  and	   intertwined	  entities	  that	   form	  a	  dynamic	  
process.	  To	  sum	  up,	  the	  four	  comparative	  categories	  help	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  scope	  conditions	  
under	   which	   welfare	   legislation	   is	   made	   but	   only	   in	   combination	   with	   the	   dynamics	   of	  
vicious	  and	  virtuous	  cycles	  of	  competition.	  
	   If	   Italy	   and	   Germany	   diverge	   so	   much	   on	   the	   four	   general	   analytic	   comparative	  
dimensions,	  how	   is	   it	   that	   they	   remain	  useful	   for	  a	   comparative	   study	  on	   the	   influence	  of	  
Catholic	   social	   doctrine	   on	   welfare	   legislation?	   First	   of	   all,	   there	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   a	  
process	  of	  relative	  convergence	  in	  both	  cases	  –	  beginning	  from	  their	  divergent	  positions	  in	  
the	   19th	   century	   towards	   the	   classics	   of	   political	   economy,	   comparative	   politics	   and	  
comparative	  welfare	  state	  literature.	  The	  dissimilarities	  appear	  to	  have	  given	  way	  to	  a	  phase	  
of	   convergence	   in	   the	   20th	   century	   that	   started	   before	   fascism	   but	   accelerated	   especially	  
after	  WWII	  and	  only	  came	  to	  a	  halt	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Of	  course,	  no	  two	  countries	  are	  completely	  
alike	  and	  the	  conversion	  mainly	  refers	  to	  the	  broad	  and	  inclusive	  categories	  such	  as	  those	  in	  
Hall	  and	  Soskice’s’	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism,	  Esping-­‐Andersen’s	  Worlds	  of	  Welfare	  Capitalism	  
or	   Arendt	   Lijphardt’s	   Patterns	   of	   Democracy.204	   Still,	   it	   is	   intriguing	   that	   a	   relative	  
convergence	  happened	  no	  matter	  how	  broad	   the	   categories	   are.	  A	   secondary	   task	  of	   this	  
study	   is	   to	   explore	   why	   this	   convergence	   occurred.	   The	   argument	   is	   that	   religion,	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  204	  Needless	  to	  say,	  these	  categorizations	  have	  themselves	  been	  subject	  to	  perpetual	  critique	  and	  discussions	  among	  political	  scientists.	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especially	  Catholicism,	  as	  a	  political	  force	  can	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  
these	  processes.	  
	   As	   already	   mentioned,	   Italy	   and	   Germany	   emerge	   as	   telling	   cases	   because	   of	   their	  
parallel	   and	   consistent	   exposition	   to	   processes	   of	   late	   industrialization,	   late	   nation-­‐state	  
formation	   and	  war.	  Nevertheless,	   this	   study	   is	   not	   a	  most	   similar	   case	   design.	   Instead,	   as	  
shown	   before,	   divergences	   emerge	   through	   the	   religious	   and	   political-­‐institutional	  
configurations	  of	  both	  countries,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  often	  interlinked	  and	  endogenous	  to	  one	  
another.	  While	  Germany	  was	   a	   denominationally	   split	   country	  with	   a	   ruling	  Conservative-­‐
Protestant	  majority,	   Italy	  was	   almost	   a	   hundred	   percent	   Catholic	   and	   the	   Pope	   exercised	  
substantial	   control	   over	   the	   people	   there.	   While	   the	   ratio	   between	   Catholics	   and	  
Protestants	   varied	   in	   Germany	   according	   to	   its	   territorial	   reach,	   influenced	   through	  
territorial	   compensations	   and	   reparations	   after	   the	   lost	   wars	   and	   partition	   as	   well	   as	  
reunification,	   the	   Italian	   religious	   composition	   remained	   largely	   stable.	   The	   comparison	  of	  
the	  most	  Catholic	  country	  in	  Europe	  and	  one	  where	  Catholicism	  was	  in	  a	  minority	  position	  
grants	  ample	  leverage	  for	  comparative	  conclusions	  on	  the	  inherent	  dynamics	  of	  religion	  as	  a	  
political	  force,	  how	  religious	  welfare	  doctrines	  are	  formed	  and	  how	  they	  influenced	  welfare	  
legislation.	   	   It	   is	   the	   divergence	   of	   these	   two	   cases	   on	   that	   matter	   that	   will	   provide	   the	  
necessary	  insight	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  for	  the	  other	  cases	  of	  European	  Christian	  Democracy.	  
	   One	   question	   remains:	   why	   does	   this	   study	   scrutinize	   Italy	   and	   Germany	   instead	   of	  
some	   other	   countries	   with	   conservative	   welfare	   regimes,	   coordinated	   market	   economies	  
and	   in	  which	   Catholicism	   plays	   a	   role?	   The	   answer	   lies	   in	   the	   independent	   variable.	   Both	  
countries	   developed	   strong	   Christian	   Democratic	   parties	   after	  WWII,	   a	   fact	   that	   excluded	  
other	  major	  Catholic	  countries	  such	  as	  Spain,	  Portugal	  and	  France,	  all	  of	  which	  did	  not	  see	  
the	   long-­‐lasting	   emergence	   of	   such	   parties.	   Furthermore,	   among	   the	   countries	   with	  
longstanding	  Christian	  Democratic	   traditions,	   the	  Netherlands	  and	  Switzerland	  did	  not	  suit	  
this	  study	  because	  both	  feature	  large	  Calvinist	  sections	  of	  society205	  which	  would	  have	  been	  
a	   further	   influential	   factor	   on	   social	   security.206	   Austria	  was	   excluded	   due	   to	   its	   relatively	  
small	   size	  which	  makes	   it	   a	   case	   for	   Katzenstein’s	   argument	   about	   Small	   States	   in	  World	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  With	  Calvinist	  	  Christian	  Democratic	  parties	  of	  religious	  defense.	  206	  Kahl,	  S.	  (2005);	  Manow,	  P.	  (2004).	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Markets	  rather	  than	  a	  telling	  case	  for	  social	  Catholicism’s	  influence	  on	  welfare	  (Belgium	  was	  
dropped	  for	  the	  same	  reason).207	  
	   	  
	  
3.3 Facts	  and	  Fictions208	  
This	  thesis	  builds,	  especially	  for	  the	  German	  case,	  on	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  primary	  sources	  
such	  as	  political	  speeches,	  party	  manifestos,	  newspaper	  articles,	   letters	   from	  politicians	  to	  
their	   wives,	   police-­‐reports,	   memoires	   and	   parliamentary	   records.	   Furthermore,	   the	   study	  
draws	   on	   the	   rich	   body	   of	  work	   on	   the	   evolution	   of	   both	  welfare	   states	   from	   historians,	  
political	  economists,	  sociologist	  and	  political	  scientists.	  These	  secondary	  accounts	  bring	  the	  
caveat	   that	   they	   are	   interpretations.	   They	   are	   biased	   by	   the	   authors’	   ideological	   frame,	  
methodological	   approach,	   the	   interests	   of	   their	   sponsors,	   the	   vicissitudes	   of	   the	   review	  
process,	  or	  simply	  by	  the	  fashion	  that	  their	  respective	  discipline	  was	  exposed	  to	  at	  the	  point	  
of	  writing.	  This	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  how,	  what	  and	  which	  parts	  of	  the	  secondary	  accounts	  
to	   interpret.	   In	   other	  words,	   how	   can	  one	  make	   sure	   that	   the	   “double	   interpretation”	   by	  
both	   the	  original	  author	  and	  myself	  does	  not	  completely	   spin	  off	  and	  detach	   from	  reality.	  
The	   answer	   that	   historians	   have	   to	   this	   problem	   is:	   historiography.	   Historiography	   is	   the	  
study	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   historical	   approaches,	   interpretations	   and	   findings	   in	   a	   general	  
sense	  (e.g.	  history	  from	  below	  or	  history	  from	  above)	  or	  on	  a	  specific	  topic	  (e.g.	  history	  of	  
Bismarckian	  social	  insurance)	  or	  subfield	  (e.g.	  Italian	  19th	  century	  history).	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  
is	  not	  the	  direct	  study	  or	  the	   interpretation	  of	  historic	  events	  but	   instead	  the	  study	  or	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  these	  events	  by	  historians.209	  In	  a	  way,	  this	  study	  follows	  E.	  H.	  Carr’s	  advice	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  207	  Katzenstein,	  P.	  (1985)	  Small	  States	  in	  World	  Markets:	  Industrial	  Policy	  in	  Europe,	  Cornell,	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  208	  “Fakten	  und	  Fiktionen”	  is	  the	  German	  title	  of	  Richard	  J.	  Evans’	  book	  on	  historiography	  The	  English	  title	  “In	  Defense	  of	  History”	  is	  much	  more	  drastic.	  Evans,	  R.	  J.	  (1998)	  Fakten	  und	  
Fiktionen:	  Über	  die	  Grundlagen	  der	  historischen	  Erkenntnis,	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main,	  Campus.	  	  209	  The	  Oxford	  dictionary	  of	  Critical	  Theory	  defines	  historiography	  as:	  “The	  study	  of	  the	  writing	  of	  history,	  the	  way	  style,	  narrative,	  metaphors,	  and	  so	  on	  affect	  how	  the	  historical	  record	  is	  received	  and	  understood.	  It	  can	  also	  refer	  to	  debates	  within	  a	  particular	  field	  of	  academic	  history	  (e.g.	  the	  history	  of	  Australia).	  The	  key	  point	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  actual	  events,	  or	  to	  history	  as	  such,	  it	  only	  refers	  to	  the	  interpretation	  and	  articulation	  of	  these	  events.	  It	  thus	  asks	  what	  counts	  as	  history	  and	  more	  particularly	  which	  methods	  reliably	  produce	  history.”	  Buchanan,	  I.	  (2010)	  A	  Dictionary	  of	  Critical	  Theory,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  accessed	  as	  online	  version	  2012.	  Evans	  has	  a	  similar	  definition:	  historiography	  is	  “nicht	  die	  Geschichte	  selbst	  sondern	  wie	  wir	  sie	  studieren,	  erforschen,	  beschreiben	  und	  lesen.”	  Evans,	  R.	  J.	  (1998)	  p.	  11.	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to	  “first	  study	  the	  historian	  and	  then	  his	  facts”.210	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  chapter	  of	  this	  
thesis	   the	  reader	  will	   find	  a	  brief	   introduction	  to	   the	  relevant	  historiographical	  debates.211	  
These	  sections	  will	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  different	  historical	  interpretations	  that	  have	  
surfaced	   so	   far	   and	   will	   help	   to	   better	   place	   the	   evidence	   of	   primary	   sources	   and	   the	  
author’s	  own	  interpretation	  and	  conclusion	  into	  context.	  In	  this	  work,	  the	  fact	  of	  placing	  the	  
empirics	   into	   the	   broader	   framework	   provided	   by	   the	   intellectual	   history	   of	   welfare	  
historians	   acts	   as	   a	   safeguard	   against	   the	   cherry-­‐picking	   of	   historical	   evidence	   that	   is	   so	  
common	  among	  political	  scientists.	  One	  question	  remains:	  what	   is	  the	  difference	  between	  
historiography	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  literature	  reviews	  that	  political	  scientists	  and	  sociologists	  
usually	  use?	  A	  literature	  review	  is	  usually	  a	  mere	  summary	  of	  the	  state	  of	  the	  art	  concerning	  
a	  given	  research	  question.	  It	  does	  usually	  not	  bother	  with	  the	  different	  intellectual	  histories	  
of	  different	  approaches	  themselves	  and	  is	  also	  not	  interested	  in	  how	  and	  why	  they	  evolved	  
over	  time.	  In	  contrast,	  historiography	  is	  especially	  interested	  in	  these	  questions,	  which	  is	  the	  
only	  way	  to	  place	  historical	  evidence	  in	  context	  and	  to	  evaluate	  it	  properly.	  
	  
3.4 What	  to	  look	  at?	  
Most	  studies	  capture	  the	  welfare	  state	  by	  measuring	  spending	  patterns,	  program	  structures	  
and	   stratification	   outcome	   quantitatively.	   This	   tends	   to	   assume	   the	   link	   between	   policy	  
input	  and	  outcome	  more	  than	  tracing	  the	  link	  between	  the	  two.	  This	  thesis	  takes	  a	  different	  
approach.	   It	   will	   qualitatively	   study	   the	   political	   actors,	   political	   discourse	   and	   decision-­‐
making	   process	   around	   the	   major	   laws	   of	   social	   security	   throughout	   the	   century.	   It	   was	  
ironic	   that	   it	   was	   Bismarck’s	   own	   flagship	   project	   of	   modern	   social	   security	   where	   his	  
famous	   populist	   claim	   that	   “Not	   by	   speeches	   and	   votes	   of	   the	   majority,	   are	   the	   great	  
questions	   of	   the	   time	   decided	   […]	   but	   by	   iron	   and	   steel”212	   was	   proven	   wrong.	   Social	  
security	   was	   formed	   through	   speeches	   and	   majority	   voting,	   a	   fact	   that	   left	   Bismarck	   so	  
disgruntled	  that	  he	  did	  not	  once	  mention	  “his”	  great	  social	  security	  project	  in	  his	  memoires.	  
The	  following	  work	  therefore	  follows	  Peter	  Baldwin’s	  powerful	  statement	  that	  “the	  welfare	  
state	  is	  a	  series	  of	  laws,	  a	  framework	  of	  legislation.	  To	  study	  its	  origins	  and	  development	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  Carr	  paraphrased	  in	  Evans,	  R.	  J.	  (1998)	  p.	  12.	  The	  original	  statement	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Carr’s	  famous	  book	  “What	  is	  History”.	  Carr,	  E.	  H.	  (1961)	  What	  is	  History,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  211	  Which	  will	  also	  include	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  major	  contributions	  from	  other	  subfields	  e.g.	  political	  science,	  political	  economy,	  etc.	  212	  Bismarck,	  O.	  (1862)	  Speech	  in	  the	  Budget	  committee	  of	  the	  Prussian	  Parliament.	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to	  deal	  in	  legislative	  and	  political	  history.	  Social	  issues	  play	  an	  important	  role	  here,	  but	  only	  
as	  filtered	  through	  the	  parliamentary	  membrane.”213	  For	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  social	  security	  
programs	  that	  will	  be	  investigated	  I	  will	  limit	  the	  project	  to	  the	  early	  “big	  four”	  as	  they	  tend	  
to	  come	   in	  a	   rather	  coherent	  package	   in	   the	  early	  developmental	  phase	  of	  social	   security.	  
Therefore,	   the	   main	   social	   security	   programs	   and	   legislation	   under	   investigation	   will	   be	  
(industrial)	   accident	   insurance,	   sickness	   insurance,	   pensions	   and	   invalidity	   insurance.	  
Unemployment	   insurance	   was	   enacted	   in	   both	   countries	   during	   the	   1920s	   and	   will	   be	  
excluded	  from	  the	  analysis.	  
	   An	  extensive	  focus	  on	  a	  complete	  timeline	  of	  social	  policymaking	  is	  not	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  
thesis.	   Social	   security	   might	   be	   subject	   to	   constant	   amendments,	   but	   the	   shape	   and	  
structure	   of	   a	   welfare	   regime	   is	   decided	   through	   a	   set	   of	   fundamental	   laws	   or	   reforms	  
enacted	   at	   very	   specific	   points	   in	   time.	   The	   thesis	   focuses	   on	   three	   key	   stages	   of	   social	  
security	   formation	  during	   the	  past	  one	  and	  a	  half	   centuries.	  The	   first	   stage	  deals	  with	   the	  
initial	  implementation	  of	  modern	  social	  security	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  The	  second	  
phase	  under	   investigation	   is	  the	  crucial	  re-­‐lock	   in	  phase	  of	  social	  security	  after	  the	  Second	  
World	   War	   and	   fascist	   dictatorships	   in	   both	   countries.	   The	   third	   phase	   analyses	   the	  
remaining	  vestiges	  of	  Catholic	  social	  teaching	  in	  both	  countries	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  21st	  
century.	  	  
	   These	   three	   phases	   happen	   to	   coincide	  with	  what	   Bartolini	   and	  Mair	   identify	   as	   the	  
crucial	   phases	   of	   West	   European	   democratic	   expansion.	   The	   early	   formation	   of	   modern	  
welfare	  takes	  place	  during	  the	  first	  mobilization	  phase	  of	  mass	  electoral	  politics	  at	  the	  end	  
of	   the	   19th	   century	   up	   until	   the	   start	   of	  World	  War	   One,	   the	   second	   part	   deals	   with	   the	  
steady	  phase	  of	  electoral	  politics	  between	  1945	  and	  1965,	  while	  the	  third	  part	  analyses	  the	  
effects	  of	  the	  increasing	  electoral	  volatility	  that	  Bartolini	  and	  Mair	  detect	  between	  1965	  and	  
1985.214	  The	  interwar	  period	  is	  treated	  only	  as	  a	  short	  interlude	  (pp.	  223-­‐230).	  	  The	  reason	  
not	  to	  primarily	  investigate	  social	  security	  and	  the	  development	  of	  Catholic	  social	  doctrine	  in	  
between	  the	  wars	  was	  not	  down	  to	  the	  extreme	  complexity,	  fragmentation	  and	  polarization	  
of	   the	   political	   landscape	   that	   provoked,	   especially	   in	   Germany,	   civil	   war	   like	   conditions.	  
Instead,	   the	   reason	   was	   that	   the	   interwar	   times	   did	   not	   see	   as	   many	   noteworthy	  
modifications	   to	   the	   original	   social	   security	   schemes,	   but	   rather	   those	   years	   witnessed	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	  Baldwin,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  53.	  214	  Bartolini,	  S.	  &	  Mair,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  9.	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mere	  expansion	  driven	  in	  both	  cases	  by	  red-­‐black	  coalitions	  between	  Socialists	  and	  Catholics	  
(the	  greatest	  exception	   to	   this	  pattern	  was	   the	   introduction	  of	  unemployment	   insurance).	  
The	   extraordinary	   expansion	   of	   the	   schemes	   ultimately	   led,	   especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
Germany,	   to	   the	   fall	   of	   democracy	   when	   the	   parties	   (like	   those	   in	   the	  Weimar	   coalition)	  
started	   to	   row	   back	   on	   the	   social	   security	   system	   in	   light	   of	   the	   crisis	   of	   the	   1930s	   and	  
thereby	  lost	  all	  their	  credibility	  and	  appeal.	  However,	  I	  account	  for	  the	  main	  developments	  
of	   Catholic	   social	   doctrine	   during	   the	   interwar	   period	   (especially	   the	   social	   encyclical	  
Quadragnesimo	  Anno	  from	  1931)	  by	  discussing	  them	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  chapters.	  
	  
3.5 Plan	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
Chapter	  four	  examines	  the	  socio	  political	  and	  economic	  context	   in	  Germany	  against	  which	  
social	   Catholicism	   developed	   in	   the	   run	   up	   to	   unification.	   The	   chapter	   analyses	   the	   twin	  
processes	  of	   industrialization	  and	  nation	  building	  that	   led	  to	  the	   incorporation	  of	  a	  Liberal	  
and	   Catholic	   subculture	   into	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich	   under	   the	   political	   and	   social	   dominance	   of	  
Conservative	  Protestantism.	  It	  will	  show	  how,	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  a	  Battle	  
of	   Ideas	   on	   modern	   social	   security	   unfolded	   between	   Conservative	   Protestantism,	  
Liberalism	   and	   political	   Catholicism.	   This	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	   ideational	   competition	   was	  
triggered	   by	   the	   emergence	   of	   Socialism	   in	   Germany	   during	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   19th	  
century.	   Once	   the	   socialists	   started	   to	   attract	   ever	   more	   followers	   among	   the	   rapidly	  
growing	  working	  class,	  the	  other	  political	  actors	  reacted	  by	  developing	  and	  offering	  specific	  
programmatic	  ideas	  targeted	  to	  working	  class	  demands.	  
	   Chapter	   five	   assesses	   the	   programmatic	   ideas	   on	   social	   security	   of	   all	   four	  major	  
political	   actors	   in	   the	   German	   Empire	   during	   the	   1880s.	   It	   will,	   in	   a	   second	   step,	   follow	  
closely	  the	  lawmaking	  process	  for	  all	  four	  major	  social	  security	  laws	  (Sickness,	  Accident,	  Old	  
Age	   and	   Invalidity	   Insurance)	   that	   had	   been	   planned	   by	   Bismarck.	   The	   chapter	   finds	   that	  
Bismarck’s	  plan	  to	  use	  social	  insurance	  as	  a	  political	  device	  to	  bolster	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  
Protestant	   Conservative	   subculture	   failed	   due	   to	   the	  parliamentary	   co-­‐decision	   powers	   of	  
the	  two	  parliamentary	  chambers.	  Not	  only	  was	  Bismarck	  forced	  to	  compromise	  heavily	  but	  
also	   none	   of	   the	   other	   subcultures	  were	   able	   to	  make	   a	   full	   homerun	   on	   social	   security.	  
Instead,	   the	   laws	   were	   established	   through	   different	   coalitions	   and	   compromises	   in	   the	  
Reichstag.	   Sickness	   was	   a	   Catholic-­‐Liberal-­‐Conservative	   compromise	   while	   Accident	   was	  
built	  on	  a	  Catholic-­‐Conservative	  compromise	  (Rye	  and	  Rome)	  where	  the	  Catholics	  were	  able	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to	  wield	  considerable	  influence.	  Old	  Age	  and	  Invalidity	  was,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  victory	  for	  
the	  Conservatives	  and	  (National)	  Liberals.	  The	  findings	  suggest	  that	  modern	  German	  social	  
security	  has	  its	  roots	  not	  in	  a	  class	  compromise,	  the	  pure	  prevalence	  of	  political	  Catholicism	  
or	  employer’s	  demands	  but	  rather	  in	  a	  denominational	  compromise	  between	  Conservative	  
Protestantism	  and	  political	  Catholicism.	  
	   Chapter	   six	   turns	   to	   Italy.	   It	   examines	   the	  political	  unification	  of	   the	   Italian	  nation	  
state	   and	   the	   consequences	   of	   this	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   key	   political	   and	   societal	  
players	  in	  post-­‐unification	  Italy.	  In	  Italy,	  unification	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  two	  key	  political	  
players	   that	  were	   fiercely	   at	   odds	  with	   one	   another,	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   and	   the	   Liberal	  
nation-­‐building	  elites.	  Both	  were	  equally	  powerful,	   though	   in	  different	   spheres.	  While	   the	  
Church	  had	  held	  strong	  temporal	  powers	  in	  the	  vast	  territories	  of	  the	  Papal	  States,	  and	  the	  
Liberals	   had	   been	   confined	   to	   the	   “realm	   of	   ideas”	   in	   pre-­‐unification	   Italy,	   it	   turned	   the	  
other	  way	   around	   in	   post-­‐unification	   Italy.	  Now	   Italian	   Liberalism	  presided	   over	   the	   state	  
institutions	   and	   the	   Church	   commanded	   the	   “ideas”	   of	   an	   Italian	   society	   that	  was	   almost	  
exclusively	  Catholic.	  This	  polarized	  situation	  soon	  led	  to	  a	  stalemate	  between	  the	  two	  forces	  
where	  neither	  wanted	  to	  intrude	  into	  the	  other’s	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  As	  the	  chapter	  shows,	  
this	   inhibited	   the	   political,	   industrial,	   and	   welfare	   development	   in	   Italy	   up	   until	   the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  
	   Chapter	   seven	   examines	   in	   greater	   detail	   how	   the	   polarized	   stalemate	   between	  
state	  and	  Church	  in	  post-­‐unification	  Italy	  came	  to	  be	  played	  out	  in	  the	  field	  of	  welfare.	  For	  
the	   first	   three	  decades	  after	  unification	  Catholicism	  and	  Liberalism	  entered	  a	  stalemate	   in	  
which	  both	  sides	  could	  retreat	  to	  their	  comfortable	  orthodox	  ideological	  fall	  back	  positions	  
of	   laissez	   faire	   (Liberal	   side)	   and	   subsidiarity	   (Catholic	   side).	   The	   two	   doctrines	   matched	  
each	  other	  in	  a	  perverted	  comfortable	  fit	  as,	  even	  though	  they	  were	  diametrically	  opposed	  
regarding	   their	   worldviews,	   they	   were	   nevertheless	   perfectly	   compatible	   in	   a	   practical	  
sense.215	   Only	   once	   the	   stalemate	   was	   broken	   by	   the	   liberal	   prime	  minister	   Crispi	   at	   the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  1890s	  could	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  on	  programmatic	  social	  security	  ideas	  unfold,	  
albeit	   even	   this	  was	   too	   late	   to	   produce	   substantial	   social	   policy	   ideas	   quickly	   enough	   to	  
bring	  about	  a	  comprehensive	  social	  security	  system	  during	  the	  19th	  century	  as	  was	  seen	  in	  
Imperial	  Germany.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  215	  As	  they	  both	  boiled	  down	  to	  limited	  state	  engagement	  in	  society	  and	  therefore	  prescribed	  non-­‐intervention	  in	  one	  another’s	  spheres	  of	  interest.	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   Chapters	  eight	  and	  nine	  mark	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  which	  
examines	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  Two	  welfare	  compromises	  in	  both	  countries.	  
	   Chapter	   eight,	   firstly,	   shows	   how	   the	   disastrous	   experiences	   of	   Nazism	   and	   the	  
Holocaust	   led	   to	   a	   denominational	   compromise,	   between	   the	   two	   major	   subcultures	   of	  
Conservative	  Protestantism	  and	  Catholicism,	  within	  a	  single	  Christian	  Democratic	  party.	  The	  
chapter	   examines	   how	   the	   specific	   bond	   between	   the	   two	   distinct	   worldviews	   was	  
engineered	   through	   a	   difficult	   compromise	   on	   programmatic	   ideas	   and	   policy	   ideas,	   and	  
then	  looks	  at	  how	  this	  compromise	  was	  manifested	  in	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  welfare	  and	  economic	  
order	  of	  Germany.	  
	   Chapter	   nine	   goes	   on	   to	   scrutinize	   the	   post-­‐war	   developments	   in	   Italy.	   Here	   the	  
special	   conditions	   under	   which	   fascism	   was	   ousted	   from	   the	   peninsula,	   the	   absence	   of	  
Protestantism	   and	   the	   exclusion	   of	   the	   Left	   from	   political	   competition	   led,	   at	   first,	   to	   a	  
phase	  of	  Catholic	  economic	  and	  social	  policy	  liberalism	  under	  De	  Gasperi	  during	  the	  1950s.	  
This	   was	   engineered	   in	   a	   delicate	   compromise	   with	   the	   Church	   that	   partly	   mirrored	   the	  
post-­‐unification	   stalemate	   between	   Catholicism	   and	   Liberalism	  of	   the	   19th	   century.	   In	   the	  
1960s,	   the	   fall	   of	   De	   Gasperi	   and	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   Catholic	   Left	   under	   Fanfani	   led	   to	   the	  
introduction	  of	  a	  corporatist	  socioeconomy	  modeled	  closely	  on	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  papal	  
encyclical	  Quadragesimo	  Anno.	  As	  the	  second	  largest	  political	  party	  and	  subculture,	  the	  PCI,	  
were	  permanently	  excluded	  from	  politics	  no	  virtuous	  cycle	  of	   ideational	  competition	  could	  
unfold.	  	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  this	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  vicious	  cycle	  that	  
created	  a	  stalemate	  between	  the	  two	  ideologies	  because	  there	  was	  no	   longer	  a	  perverted	  
fit	  between	  them.	  	  Instead,	  this	  system,	  that	  initially	  followed	  Catholic	  Christian	  Democratic	  
programmatic	   ideas,	   quickly	   drifted	   and	   was	   transformed	   into	   an	   extremely	   fragmented	  
welfare	  complex	  that	  became	  subject	  to	  clientelism	  and	  favoritism.	  
	   Chapter	  ten	  concludes	  the	  thesis	  by	  examining	  what	  remains	  of	   the	  programmatic	  
ideas	   that	  emerged	  during	  one	  and	  a	  half	   centuries	  of	  Christian	  Democratic	  development,	  
what	   form	   they	   have	   taken	   and	   whether	   they	   still	   influence	   policy	   in	   Italy	   and	   Germany	  
today.	   It	   will	   therefore	   take	   a	   look	   at	   the	   deep	   seated	   societal	   changes	   that	   have	   been	  
ongoing	   since	   the	   1970s.	   Enhanced	   secularization,	   emancipation	   and	   the	   shift	   towards	   a	  
service	  economy	  are	  all	  perceived	  as	  posing	  strong	  challenges	   to	   the	  Christian	  Democratic	  
worldview.	  The	  chapter	  will	   explore	   the	   fall	  of	   the	   Italian	  Christian	  Democrats	   in	  a	  vicious	  
cycle	  of	  competition	  that	  was	  sparked	  by	  the	  fiscal	  pressures	  of	  enhanced	  globalization	  and	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the	   absence	   of	   new	   challengers	   like	   a	   Green	   party	   that	   could	   have	   pressured	   the	   Italian	  
Christian	  Democrats	   into	  a	  new	  cycle	  of	  competition.	  In	  the	  German	  case,	  the	  Chapter	  will	  
show	   how	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	  Green	   party,	   the	   tipping	   of	   the	   denominational	   balance	  
through	   unification	   and	   the	   Third	  Way	   transformation	   of	   the	   Social	   Democrats	   prompted	  
the	  Christian	  Democrats	  to	  take	  up	  an	  adaptive	  position	  that	  finally	  started	  to	  react	  to	  the	  
social	  changes	  that	  had	  been	  ongoing	  since	  the	  1970s.	  This	  helped	  them,	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  1990s,	  to	  reflect	  and	  incorporate	  the	  deep	  seated	  societal	  changes	  of	  post-­‐industrialism	  
that	   had	   been	   ongoing	   since	   the	   1980s	   and	   had	   been	   successfully	   incorporated	   by	   new	  
political	   challengers	   such	   as	   the	   Green	   Party	   and	   the	   realigning	   Social	   Democrats.	   The	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Structuring	  Politics:	  Germany	  
	  
At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  Catholicism	  had	  only	  rudimentary	  answers	  to	  the	  socioeconomic	  
problems	   caused	   by	   capitalism	   and	   industrialization.	   Concepts	   and	   ideas	   did	   not	   go	   beyond	   poor	  
relief	  and	  the	  giving	  of	  alms,	  and	  were	  generally	  characterized	  by	  a	   longing	  for	  the	  foregone	  “good	  
old	  days”	  during	  medieval	   times	  when	   the	  old	   social	   fabric	  was	   still	   intact	  and	  Church	  power	  went	  
uncontested.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century,	  Catholicism	  had	  developed	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  and	  distinct	  social	  
doctrine.	  What	  triggered	  this	  shift	  from	  passive	  to	  active	  doctrine	  development?	  	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  
chapter	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  political	  developments	  that	  unfolded	  in	  the	  process	  of	  German	  
unification	  and	  how	  this	  process	   led	  to	   the	   incorporation	  of	   three	  distinct	  subcultures	   in	   the	  Kaiser	  
Reich.	   The	   second	   part	   introduces	   the	   specificities	   of	   the	   development	   of	   German	   industrialized	  
capitalism	  during	  the	  19th	  century.	  The	  third	  part	  examines	  the	  Church-­‐State	  conflict	   in	  19th	  century	  
Germany	  and	  scrutinizes	  how	  the	  Catholic	  subculture	  produced	  a	  coherent	  social	  doctrine	  at	  the	  end	  
of	   the	   century.	   The	   argument	   is	   that	   Catholic	   concepts	   on	  modern	  welfare	  developed	   through	   the	  
pressures	   of	   a	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	   ideational	   competition	   that	   unfolded	   among	   the	   Conservative,	  
Catholic,	   Liberal	   and	   Socialist	   subcultures,	   all	   of	   which	   tried	   to	   lure	   the	   workers	   into	   their	   own	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4.1 Structure	  I:	  Politics	  
4.1.1 A	  short	  note	  on	  Historiography	  of	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  
Any	  intensive	  engagement	  with	  the	  Bismarck	  Empire	  bumps	  into	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  economic	  and	  
political	  modernization	  
Gerhard	  A.	  Ritter1	  
	  
Prior	   to	   the	   1960s,	   German	   history	   had	   been	   written	   in	   the	   traditional	   way	   of	   Historism	  
(Historismus).2	  Politics	  were	  national	  high	  politics	  and	  history	  was	  the	  result	  of	  the	  decisions	  
of	   powerful	   statesmen	   that	   hauled	   nations	   on	   different	   developmental	   trajectories.3	   The	  
influence	   of	   micro	   level	   material	   or	   social	   structures	   on	   the	   unfolding	   of	   history	   was	  
neglected.	  History	  was	  made	  from	  above	  and	  manifested	  within	  the	  container	  of	  the	  nation	  
state.	  German	  history	  was	  one	  of	  a	  positive	  German	  Exceptionalism	  (Sonderweg)	  different	  
from	   any	   other	   national	   development.	  World	  War	  One,	   the	  Nazi	   regime,	  World	  War	   Two	  
and	  the	  Holocaust	  were	  mere	  accidents	  of	  chance	  (Betriebsunfall4).	  The	  tide	  changed	  with	  
the	  advent	  of	  the	  Fischer	  controversy	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  which	  brought	  compelling	  evidence	  
that	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  had	  not	  stumbled	  into	  World	  War	  One	  but	  had	  been	  an	  active	  driving	  
force	  behind	  it.	  
	   The	   insights	   from	   the	   Fischer	   controversy	   triggered	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	   the	   1970s	   the	  
advent	   of	   socioeconomic	   history.5	   Historians,	   influenced	   by	   developments	   in	   other	   social	  
sciences,	  became	  ever	  more	   interested	   in	  the	  “the	  great	  brute	  facts	  of	  material	  and	  social	  
life”.6	   	  During	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  historical	   research	  on	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  became	   largely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Ritter,	  G.A.	  (1976)	  p.	  7.	  2	  Note	  that	  historism	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  historicism.	  Both	  terms	  are	  heavily	  criticised	  by	  Popper.	  Historims	  as	  it	  sees	  a	  particularity	  and	  individuality	  in	  every	  historical	  situation	  which	  in	  the	  end	  makes	  the	  work	  of	  the	  historian	  primarily	  descriptive.	  Historicism	  because	  it	  sees	  history	  unfolding	  along	  universal	  laws.	  A	  similar	  critique	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  Weber’s	  writings.	  3	  Maybe	  the	  most	  prominent	  historian	  from	  this	  tradition	  that	  still	  heavily	  influenced	  the	  after	  war	  period	  especially	  regarding	  the	  formation	  of	  German	  historians	  post	  World	  War	  Two	  was	  the	  conservative	  Protestant	  historian	  Gerhard	  Georg	  Bernhard	  Ritter	  (Born	  in	  1888,	  died	  in	  1967).	  Not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  working	  class	  and	  welfare	  historian	  Gerhard	  A.	  Ritter	  (born	  in	  1929)	  whose	  works	  are	  cited	  frequently	  in	  this	  thesis.	  4	  One	  of	  the	  first	  to	  criticise	  this	  position	  fervently	  was	  Frizt	  Fischer.	  See:	  Fischer,	  F.	  (1992)	  Hitler	  
war	  kein	  Betriebsunfall:	  Aufsätze,	  München,	  Beck.	  5	  Hentschel,	  V.	  (1978)	  Wirtschaft	  und	  Wirtschaftspolitik	  im	  wilhelminischen	  Deutschland,	  
Stuttgart,	  Klett-­‐Cotta,	  p.	  9.	  6	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  XIX.	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structural	   history	   (Strukturgeschichte)7.	   It	   focuses	   on	   the	   effects	   that	   industrialization	  had	  
on	   social	   mobility,	   migration,	   urbanization,	   housing	   and	   crime	   and	   how	   politics	   tried	   to	  
patch	  over	  these	  social	  tensions.	   It	  was,	  as	  Blackbourn	  analyses,	  a	  “history	  of	  hard	  facts”.8	  
The	  prime	   conceptual	   tool	  was	   class	   and	   therefore	  much	  of	   this	   research	   postulated	   that	  
industrialization	   had	   given	   rise	   to	   interests	   that	   had	   shaped	   a	   negative	   Exceptionalism	  
(Sonderweg)	  of	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich.9	  The	  main	  watershed	  for	  Germany’s	  negative	  development	  
was	  identified	  in	  the	  socioeconomic	  regime	  that	  emerged	  after	  the	  economic	  crash	  of	  1873.	  
This	   “organized	   capitalism”10	   had	   generated	   a	   state	   that	   “largely	   catered	   to	   particular	  
economic	  interests”.11	  In	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  German	  history	  was	  understood	  as	  one	  of	  a	  
perpetual	  struggle	  of	  Conservative	  elites	  seeking	  to	  secure	  their	  “traditional	  rule	  against	  the	  
modern	   forces	  of	  society”12	  brought	  about	  by	  capitalist	   industrialization.13	  World	  War	  One	  
was	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   friction	   between	   a	   closed	   elitist	   authoritarian	   political	   system	   in	   a	  
highly	  modernized	  economy.	  Negative	  German	  Exceptionalism	  was	  used	  not	  only	  to	  explain	  
Germany’s	  historical	  road	  into	  World	  War	  One,	  but	  also	  the	  later	  rise	  of	  fascism,	  World	  War	  
Two	  and	  the	  Holocaust.	  This	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  thesis	  of	  the	  “Rye	  and	  Iron”	  coalition.14	  It	  
found	   its	   most	   forceful	   expression	   in	   the	   writings	   of	   the	   German	   historians	   Hans	   Ulrich	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Thomas	  Nipperdey	  calls	  them	  ‘structural	  historians’;	  “Strukturhistoriker”	  Nipperdey,	  T.	  (1992)	  
Deutsche	  Geschichte	  1866-­‐1918,	  Second	  Volume,	  München,	  Beck,	  p.	  11.	  8	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  XX.	  9	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  XIX.	  10	  For	  a	  critical	  assessment	  of	  the	  concept	  see	  Kocka,	  J.	  (1980)	  Organisierter	  Kapitalismus	  im	  Kaiserreich?	  Historische	  Zeitschrift,	  Vol.	  230,	  No.3	  (Jun.,	  1980)	  pp.	  613-­‐631.	  11	  “Bild	  eine	  Staates	  entstanden,	  der	  weitgehend	  im	  Dienst	  partikularer	  ökonomischer	  Interessen	  stand“	  Hentschel,	  V.	  (1978)	  p.	  10.	  Kocka	  calls	  this	  the	  „social-­‐economisation	  of	  politics“;	  „Sozialökonoomisierung	  der	  Politik“	  Kocka,	  J.	  (1980)	  p.	  621.	  12	  “	  traditioneller	  Herrschaft	  gegen	  moderne	  gesellschaftliche	  Kräfte“	  Hentschel,	  V.	  (1978)	  p.	  10.	  13	  Gerhard	  A.	  Ritter	  formulated	  the	  central	  question	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  by	  asking	  “why,	  despite	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  highly	  industrialized,	  economically	  efficient	  and	  even	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  welfare	  politics	  comparatively	  progressive	  society,	  parliamentary-­‐democratic	  constitutional	  bodies	  had	  remained	  underdeveloped.”	  Original	  Quote:	  	  “warum	  trotz	  der	  Herausbildung	  einer	  hochindustrialisierten,	  wirtschaftlich	  leistungsfähigen	  und	  selbst	  sozialpolitischen	  Gesellschaft	  parlamentarisch-­‐demokratische	  Verfassungsformen	  unterentwickelt	  geblieben	  sind.“	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1976)	  Arbeiterbewegung,	  Parteien	  und	  Parlamentarismus	  Göttingen,	  Vandenhoeck	  &	  Rupprecht,	  p.	  7.	  14	  Torp,	  C.	  (2010)	  The	  ‘Coalition	  of	  ‘Rye	  and	  Iron’’	  under	  the	  Pressure	  of	  Globalization.	  A	  Reinterpretation	  of	  Germany’s	  Political	  Economy	  before	  1914,	  Central	  European	  History,	  Vol.	  43,	  No.	  3,	  pp.	  401-­‐427.	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Wehler	  and	  Heinrich	  August	  Winkler.15	  On	  the	  international	  level,	  the	  historical	  sociologists	  
Barrington	  Moore	  Jr.	  and	  Alexander	  Gerschenkron	  promoted	  prominent	  versions	  of	  it.16	  	  
	   The	   1980s	   and	   especially	   the	   1990s	  marked	   a	   turning	   point	   in	   historiography	   on	   the	  
Kaiser	  Reich.17	  Blackbourn	  notes	   in	  the	  1990s	  that	  we	  “have	  witnessed	  a	  move	  away	  from	  
quantification,	  and	  a	  large	  dissatisfaction	  with	  structural	  socioeconomic	  history.”18	  Religion,	  
local	   disparities,	   gender,	   political	   ideas	   and	   the	   power	   of	   single	   politicians	   had	   been	  
neglected	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  class.19	  Historical	  accounts	  from	  the	  
late	  1980s	  onwards	  on	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  opened	  research	  towards	  cultural	  approaches	  that	  
tried	   to	   provide	   a	   more	   encompassing	   picture	   of	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich	   by	   integrating	   ‘history	  
from	  above’	  with	  ‘history	  from	  below’.	  Research	  made	  a	  “shift	  to	  the	  social	  construction	  and	  
cultural	   meaning(s)	   of	   categories	   such	   as	   religion,	   class	   and	   gender”.20	   The	   focus	   was	   on	  
“people’s	  identities,	  and	  how	  these	  identities	  were	  constructed	  and	  expressed”21	  in	  politics,	  
society	  and	  the	  economy	  of	  the	  Reich.	  This	  brought	  a	  much	  richer	  picture	  not	  only	  of	  how	  
the	  economic	  changes	  impacted	  on	  peoples’	  living	  conditions,	  perceptions	  and	  feelings	  but	  
also	   how	   high	   politics	  was	   affected	   by	   the	   huge	   socioeconomic	   transformations	   and	   how	  
politicians	  reasoned	  about	  them.	  What	  has	  evolved	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s	  is	  a	  much	  more	  
balanced	   and	   nuanced	   picture	   of	   politics	   and	   interests	   that	   has	   moved	   away	   from	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Smith,	  H.	  W.	  (2008)	  When	  the	  Sonderweg	  Debate	  left	  us,	  German	  Studies	  Review,	  Vol	  31,	  No.	  2	  (May,	  2008)	  pp.	  225-­‐240,	  p.	  227;	  See:	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1973)	  Das	  Deutsche	  Kaiserreich	  1871-­‐1918,	  Goettingen,	  Vandenhoeck	  &	  Ruprecht.	  16	  Moore,	  B.	  Jr.	  (1966)	  The	  social	  Origins	  of	  Dictatorship	  and	  Democracy,	  Boston,	  Beacon	  Press;	  Gerschenkron,	  A.	  (1943)	  Bread	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Germany,	  Berkley,	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  17	  Smith,	  H.	  W.	  (2008)	  p.	  227;	  Ledford,	  K.F.	  (2003)	  Comparing	  comparisons:	  Disciplines	  and	  the	  Sonderweg,	  Central	  European	  History,	  Vol.	  36,	  No.	  3	  (2003),	  pp.367-­‐374.	  Highly	  influential	  in	  the	  turn:	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  &	  Eley,	  G.	  (1984)	  The	  Peculiarities	  of	  German	  History:	  Bourgeois	  Society	  and	  
Politics	  in	  Nineteenth	  Century	  Germany,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  This	  was	  also	  possible	  because	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  World	  War	  One	  had	  been	  intentional	  or	  not	  had	  been	  settled.	  18	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  XX.	  19	  Smith,	  H.	  W.	  (1995)	  German	  Nationalism	  and	  Religious	  Conflict,	  Princeton,	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  p.	  14.	  20	  Ledford,	  K.	  F.	  (2003)	  p.	  372.	  21	  Smith,	  H.	  W.	  (1995)	  p.	  14.	  
	   	   	   67	  
exclusive	  interpretation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  material	  interests.22	  The	  field	  has	  evolved	  towards	  “a	  
cultural	  history	  of	  society”.23	  
	   Historians’	  efforts	  to	  study	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  on	  multiple	  levels	  also	  led	  to	  
a	   demystification	   of	   the	   Rye	   and	   Iron	   interpretation	   of	   the	   German	   Peculiarities	  
(Sonderweg).	  Especially	   in	  economic	  history,	   it	   is	  now	  univocal	  that	  the	  process	  of	  German	  
industrialization	  unfolded	   similarly	   to	  other	   continental	   or	  Asian	   countries	   that	  developed	  
models	  of	  Non-­‐Liberal	  capitalism.24	  
	   The	  historiographical	  turn	  after	  the	  1980s	  is	  important	  for	  this	  thesis	  as	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  
draw	   upon	   an	   increasing	   reservoir	   of	   cultural	   historical	   analysis	   of	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  deterioration	  of	  historians’	  backing	  of	  the	  Rye	  and	  Iron	  coalition	  suggests	  
that	  social	  security	  was	  not	  the	  mere	  product	  of	  a	  coalition	  of	  interests	  between	  East-­‐Elbian	  
large	  estate-­‐holding	  elites	  and	  West	  German	   industrialists	   in	  order	  to	  fortify	  their	  material	  
interests.	   Instead,	   recent	   historical	   research	   suggests	   that	   the	   political	   institutions	   of	   the	  
Kaiser	   Reich	   seemed	   to	   be	   influenced	   by	   much	  more	   than	   only	   brute	   material	   interests.	  
However,	  this	  has	  remained	  still	  unexplored	  in	  the	  field	  of	  welfare.	  For	  example,	  one	  lacuna	  
is	   that	   very	   little	   comparative	  work	   is	   done	  on	   the	   evolution	  of	   social	   security	   thinking	   in	  
Catholicism.25	  The	  reasons	  are	  manifold:	  Leftist	  political	  movements	  seem	  in	  general	  to	  be	  
of	  higher	  attraction	  for	  scholars.	  The	  advent	  of	  modernization	  theory	  in	  the	  1960s	  basically	  
eclipsed	   religion	   as	   a	   study	   object	   for	   some	   years,	   and	   the	   study	   of	   Catholic	  movements	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Abelshauser,	  W.	  (2005)	  p.	  49.	  The	  sociologist	  Rainer	  Lepsius	  also	  sees	  the	  friction	  between	  economic	  modernization	  and	  laggard	  political	  opening	  as	  the	  main	  driving	  force	  to	  catastrophe	  but	  attributes	  the	  culpability	  less	  to	  the	  economic	  elites	  but	  rather	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  revolution	  from	  below	  due	  to	  the	  self-­‐encapsulation	  of	  the	  various	  sub-­‐cultures	  in	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich.	  Lepsius,	  M.	  R.	  (1993)	  p.	  7.	  23	  Ledford,	  K.	  F.	  (2003)	  p.	  372.	  24	   Abelshauser,	   W.	   (2005)	   pp.	   2-­‐3,	   31,	   46;	   Streeck,	   W.	   (2001).	   That	   the	   non-­‐development	   of	  democratic	  institutions	  at	  the	  same	  time	  would	  have	  led	  to	  an	  unsurpassable	  friction	  within	  the	  system	  as	  argued	  in	  the	  1970s	  might	  just	  be	  due	  to	  a	  misconception	  of	  modernization	  theory	  of	  the	   1960s	   which	   saw	   the	   modern	   world	   evolving	   towards	   or	   according	   to	   the	   Anglo-­‐Saxon	  model.	  25	  Especially	  transnational	  comparisons	  between	  different	  Catholic	  Social	  movements	  are	  rare.	  Misner	  writes	  in	  a	  historiographical	  review	  essay	  in	  the	  1990s	  that	  “International	  synthesis	  are	  rare”,	  Misner,	  P.	  (1992)	  Social	  Catholicism	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  Europe:	  A	  Review	  of	  Recent	  Historiography,	  The	  Catholic	  Historical	  Review,	  Vol.	  78,	  No.	  4	  (Oct.,1992)	  pp.	  581-­‐600,	  p.	  585.	  Unfortunately	  this	  has	  not	  changed	  much	  over	  the	  past	  20	  years.	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  accounts	  that	  compare	  the	  evolution	  of	  Catholic	  Social	  teaching	  with	  the	  social	  program	  of	  other	  denominations	  or	  with	  the	  social	  ideologies	  of	  secular	  political	  movements	  like	  Socialism	  or	  liberalism.	  Misner,	  P.	  (1992)	  p.	  587.	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suffers	   from	  a	   lack	  of	  primary	  sources.26	  Another	   reason	   is	   that	  most	  accounts	  concerning	  
Catholicism	  are	  written	  by	  Church	  scholars	  or	  former	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	  activists.27	  
The	   projects	   are	   usually	   financed	   by	   the	   Church	   affiliated	   associations	   and	   published	   by	  
Catholic	   publishing	   houses.	   Kaiser	   bluntly	   states	   that	   any	   historian	   trying	   to	   critically	  
scrutinize	   the	   history	   of	   Catholicism	   in	   Germany	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s	  was	   likely	   to	   be	  
“caught	  in	  the	  cross	  fire	  […]	  and	  immediately	  attacked	  by	  the	  Catholic	  review	  mafia”.28	  
	  
4.1.2 The	  Politics	  of	  Unification	  
The	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire	  was	  not	  a	  territorial	  state.	  Instead,	  it	  was	  made	  up	  of	  hundreds	  of	  
separate	   territorial	   entities	   that	   were	   loosely	   interconnected.	   In	   the	   Napoleonic	   wars	  
Napoleon	  managed	  to	  boil	  these	  down	  to	  a	  “dozen”.29	  	  Nevertheless,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
19th	   century	   Germany	   was	   still	   described	   as	   a	   “Flickenteppich”,	   a	   patchwork,	   strongly	  
divided	   along	   territorial,	   regional	   and	   denominational	   lines	   and	  whose	   citizens	   often	   had	  
multiple	  loyalties	  –	  to	  the	  local	  ruler,	  the	  guilds,	  the	  feudal	  lord	  or	  the	  Church.30	  Goethe	  and	  
Schiller	  asked	   in	   their	   famous	  poem	  “Germany?	  But	  where	   is	   it?	   I	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	   find	  
such	  a	  country”	  and	  Heinrich	  Heine	  replied	  sarcastically	  from	  his	  exile	  in	  1840	  “Where	  does	  
the	  German	  begin?	  Where	  does	  it	  end?	  May	  a	  German	  smoke?	  The	  majority	  says	  no.	  May	  a	  
German	  wear	  gloves?	  Yes,	  but	  only	  buffalo	  hide.	  But	  a	  German	  may	  drink	  beer,	  indeed	  as	  a	  
true	  son	  of	  Germanians	  he	  should	  drink	  beer”	  This	  nice	   juxtaposition	  of	   the	  two	  quotes	   is	  
not	  mine	  but	  originates	  from	  an	  article	  by	  the	  historian	  James	  Sheehan.31	  	  The	  point	  is	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Records	  and	  files	  about	  the	  development	  of	  political	  Catholicism	  in	  Wilhelmina	  Germany	  are	  notoriously	  hard	  to	  find	  (Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1978);	  Loth,	  W.	  (1984)).	  The	  Center	  Party	  was	  not	  a	  classical	  mass-­‐organization	  like	  the	  parties	  on	  the	  left.	  A	  modern	  centralized	  party	  apparatus	  and	  therefore	  membership	  and	  documentary	  archives	  were	  only	  built	  up	  in	  Weimar.	  Most	  files	  were	  kept	  in	  private	  hands	  and	  documentation	  is	  therefore	  scattered	  and	  fragmented.	  Most	  of	  the	  little	  existing	  documentation	  was	  lost	  during	  WW	  II	  and	  the	  main	  file	  cabinet	  in	  Berlin	  was	  hit	  by	  an	  allied	  firebomb	  during	  WWII	  (Loth,	  W.	  (1984)	  p.31).	  The	  Cologne	  City	  Archive,	  where	  most	  of	  the	  personal	  files	  of	  important	  Center	  Party	  politicians	  were	  located,	  collapsed	  in	  2009	  due	  to	  a	  misconstruction	  in	  the	  Cologne	  underground	  expansion.	  27Kaiser,	  W.	  (2004)	  Christian	  Democracy	  in	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  Europe.	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  
History.	  Vol.	  39,	  No.	  1,	  p.	  128-­‐131.	  28	  Kaiser,	  W.	  (2004)	  p.129.	  29	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  XVI.	  30	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  XVI.	  31	  Sheehan,	  J.	  (1981)	  What	  is	  German	  History?	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Role	  of	  the	  Nation	  in	  German	  History	  and	  Historiography.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  History,	  Vol.	  53,	  No.1	  (Mar	  1981)	  pp.	  1-­‐23,	  pp.	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the	  territory	  that	  would	  later	  become	  Germany	  was	  heavily	  divided	  along	  numerous	  societal	  
cleavages,	   of	   which	   the	   religious	   one	   was	   certainly	   the	   strongest.	   Therefore,	   when	   two	  
rivaling	   regional	   powers	   emerged	   and	   gradually	   began	   to	   dominate	   the	   loose	   German	  
federation	   (Deutscher	  Bund	  1815-­‐1866),	  which	  had	  emerged	  as	   the	   successor	  of	   the	  Holy	  
Roman	  Empire	  (Middle	  Ages–1806),	   it	   is	  of	   little	  surprise	  that	  one	  was	  Protestant	  (Prussia)	  
and	  the	  other	  was	  Catholic	  (Austria).	  
	   Bismarck	   brutally	   answered	   Goethe	   and	   Schiller’s	   question	   by	   bringing	   together	   the	  
heterogeneous	  entities	  through	  warfare.32	  The	  three	  successive	  wars	  (Danish-­‐Prussian	  War	  
1864,	  Austrian-­‐Prussian	  War	  1866,	  French-­‐Prussian	  War	  1870)	  of	  unification	  put	  an	  end	  to	  
the	   discussion	   on	   the	   boundaries	   of	   Germany	   for	   the	   time	   being.	   Bismarck’s	   decision	   in	  
favor	   of	   a	   “small	   German	   solution”	   (Kleindeutsche	   Loesung)	   can	   be	   understood	   from	   a	  
denominational	  perspective.	  It	  made	  Prussian	  domination	  of	  the	  Reich	  easier	  by	  cutting	  off	  
the	  Austrian	  Empire	  and	  shifting	  the	  religious	  balance	  towards	  Protestantism	  as	   it	  was	  the	  
denomination	  of	  the	  Prussian	  Elites	  (and	  Bismarck).33	  From	  this	  point	  onwards,	  Catholicism	  
found	  itself	  in	  a	  minority	  position	  until	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  went	  up	  in	  smoke	  in	  the	  revolutions	  
following	  World	  War	  One.34	   The	  Austro-­‐Prussian	  war	   of	   1866	   had	   seen	  Germany	   become	  
“unified	  by	  partition”35	  while	   the	  subsequent	  German-­‐French	  war	   in	  which	  Prussia	  aligned	  
with	  the	  Southern	  German	  States	  marked	  the	  peak	  of	  unification.	  On	  the	  18th	  January	  1871	  
King	  Wilhelm	   I	  was	   crowned	   in	   the	  Hall	   of	  Mirrors	   in	  Versailles	   and	  Bismarck	  became	   the	  
Reich’s	  first	  Chancellor.	  
	   Sheehan	  notes	  that	  “The	  victorious	  wars	  of	  unification	  had	  fixed	  the	  boundaries	  at	  last,	  
for	  the	  future	  and	  also	  from	  the	  past.	  Germany	  was	  Bismarck’s	  Reich.”36	  Indeed	  the	  German	  
Reich	  was	  a	  construction	  of	  Bismarck,	  unified	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  Protestant	  Prussian	  state	  
machine	  and	  military.	  
	   The	  Kaiser	  Reich	  was	  an	  authoritarian	  Monarchy	  albeit	  federalist	  and	  with	  surprisingly	  
open	  electoral	  institutions.	  The	  constitution	  of	  1871	  gave,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  all	  men	  over	  25	  
the	   right	   to	   vote	   regardless	   of	   property,	   literacy,	   profession	   or	   other	   disenfranchisement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1-­‐2.	  The	  Goethe/Schiller	  citation	  seems	  popular	  among	  historians.	  See:	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  XV.	  32	  Unification	  was	  achieved	  mainly	  through	  three	  wars:	  the	  Danish-­‐Prussian	  war	  (1864),	  the	  Austrian-­‐Prussian	  war	  (1866)	  and	  the	  French-­‐Prussian	  war	  (1870).	  33	  Lönne,	  K.-­‐E.	  (1986)	  p.	  151.	  34	  Nipperdey,	  (1992)	  p.	  340.	  35	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  XV.	  36	  Sheehan,	  J.	  (1981)	  p.	  1.	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thresholds	   that	   were	   used	   in	   other	   countries	   of	   19th	   century	   liberal	   Europe.	   Despite	   its	  
autocratic	  fame,	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  therefore	  witnessed	  “the	  development	  of	  a	  political	  mass	  
marked	   facilitated	   through	   the	   franchise”.37	   However,	   the	   relatively	   open	   electoral	  
institutions	   had	   been	   planned	   by	   Bismarck,	   not	   because	   he	   believed	   in	   democracy,	   but	  
explicitly	   in	   order	   to	   function	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   populist	   acclamations	   for	   his	   policies.	   The	  
Reichstag	   had	   therefore	   a	   weak	   position	   in	   the	   institutional	   power	   structure.	   The	  
government	  and	  Chancellor	  who,	  together	  with	  the	  Kaiser,	  formed	  the	  executive	  were	  not	  
responsible	  to	  parliament.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  the	  chancellor	  could	  dissolve	  the	  Reichstag	  and	  
call	   for	  new	  elections	  with	   the	  help	  of	  Kaiser	  and	   the	   federal	   chamber	   (Bundesrat).38	  That	  
being	   said,	   the	   Reichstag	   still	   had	   some	   prerogatives	   which	   made	   it	   an	   active	   player	   in	  
politics	  and	  especially	   in	   social	   security	  development.	  Government	  was	  not	   responsible	   to	  
parliament	  but	  parliament	  had	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  formation	  of	   laws,	  hence	  government	  
needed	   a	   majority	   if	   it	   wanted	   to	   pass	   legislation.39	   In	   a	   time	   when	   legal	   positivism	  
(Rechtspositivismus)	   was	   a	   principle	   value	   it	   was	   hard	   to	   sideline	   parliament	   on	   these	  
matters.40	   Together	  with	   the	   increasing	   politicization	   of	   the	   citizen,	  which	   can	   be	   derived	  
from	   the	   constantly	   increasing	   turnout	   throughout	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich,	   this	   led	   to	   the	  	  
unintended	   (by	  Bismarck	  at	   least)	   effect,	   that	   the	  Reichstag	  and	  Bundesrat	   could	   severely	  
influence	  lawmaking	  and	  the	  executive’s	  policy	  making.	  
	   In	   fact,	   his	   original	   idea	   of	   autocratic	   style	   governance	   backed	   through	   popular	  
acclamations	   that	   could	  be	  used	   to	   sideline	  parties	   and	  bureaucrats	   (Weber	  had	  a	   similar	  
idea	   expressed	   in	   his	   concept	   of	   Charismatic	   Leadership)	   backfired	   for	   most	   of	   the	  
Bismarckian	   era.	   It	   seems	   that	   Bismarck	   had	   underestimated	   the	   segmentation	   of	   the	  
Reich’s	   electorate.	   What	   Bismarck	   had	   unified	   into	   the	   German	   Reich	   was	   a	   heavily	  
fragmented	   and	   segregated	   territory.	   These	   divisions	   manifested	   in	   the	   major	   four	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Nipperdey,	  T.	  (1992)	  p.	  879.	  38	  This	  is	  the	  authoritarian	  side	  of	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  that,	  according	  to	  the	  generation	  of	  historians	  that	  evolved	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  led	  to	  a	  permanent	  friction	  between	  closed	  anti-­‐democratic	  institutions	  and	  the	  a	  rapidly	  modernizing	  socioeconomic	  system	  and	  society	  in	  Germany.	  This	  friction	  dragged	  Germany	  into	  World	  War	  One	  and,	  some	  argue,	  even	  further	  towards	  the	  Nazi	  takeover,	  World	  War	  Two	  and	  the	  Holocaust.	  This	  turn	  of	  historiography	  towards	  a	  negative	  German	  Exeptionalism	  (Sonderweg)	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  below.	  In	  Germany	  the	  most	  prominent	  representatives	  of	  this	  interpretation	  are	  the	  historians	  Hans	  Ulrich	  Wehler	  and	  Heinrich	  August	  Winkler,	  on	  the	  international	  level	  the	  sociological	  historians	  Barrington	  Moore	  Jr.	  and	  Alexander	  Gerschenkron	  both	  promoted	  variations	  of	  this	  argument.	  39	  Nipperdey,	  T.	  (1992)	  p.	  103.	  40	  Furthermore,	  it	  had	  the	  traditional	  budgetary	  function	  and	  could	  question	  the	  government.	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subcultures	   (Catholicism,	   Conservative	   Protestantism,	   Liberalism	   and	   Socialism)	   that	  
constituted	  and	  managed	  society	  and	  politics	  in	  the	  Reich.	  Bismarck’s	  plan	  was	  to	  assimilate	  
the	   other	   subcultures	   under	   his	   own	   Protestant	   Conservative	   subculture.	   However,	   the	  
other	  groups	  proved	  to	  be	  highly	  resilient	  and	  impermeable.	  Bismarck	  also	  underestimated	  
the	   popularity	   of	   the	   new	   democratic	   possibilities	   that	   suffrage	   expansion	   had	   brought	  
about.	   Turnout	   jumped	   from	   51%	   in	   1871	   to	   77%	   in	   1887.	   The	   chancellor	   had	   not	  
anticipated	  that	  an	  opening	  of	  the	  political	  system	  would	  trigger	  a	  shift	   from	  elite	  to	  mass	  
politics	  within	  less	  than	  two	  decades.41	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐1	  Turnout	  KaiserReich	  elections	  1871-­‐1912.	  
	  
Data	  from	  Lepsius,	  M.R.	  (1993)	  p.33.	  
	  
The	  Kaiser	  Reich	  existed	  formally	  from	  1871	  until	  1918	  when	  Wilhelm	  II	  had	  to	  abdicate	  in	  
the	   face	   of	   domestic	   revolution	   after	   Germany’s	   defeat	   in	  World	  War	   One.	   Employing	   a	  
crude	  periodization	  one	  can	  divide	   the	  Kaiser	  Reich	   into	   two	  main	  phases.	  The	   first	  one	   is	  
the	  Bismarckian	  era	  from	  1871	  to	  1890	  after	  which	  the	  second	  is	  the	  Wilhelmina	  Phase	  from	  
1890	   to	   1914.42	   The	   political	   development	   of	   the	   Bismarck	   era	   is	   characterized	   by	   three	  











1871	   1874	   1877	   1878	   1881	   1884	   1887	   1890	   1893	   1898	   1903	   1907	   1912	  
Turnout	  in	  Percent	  
Turnout	  in	  Percent	  
	   	   	   72	  
confrontation	  with	   the	   Socialists	   (Sozialistengesetze)	   and	   the	   social	   policy	   package	   of	   the	  
1880s.	  Economically	  the	  Era	  is	  marked	  by	  a	  steep	  economic	  boom	  of	  the	  Founder’s	  Epoch	  up	  
until	   1873	   (Gründerzeit)	   that	   ended	   with	   a	   sharp	   decline	   in	   the	   Founder’s	   Crisis	   of	   1873	  
(Gründerkirse).	  Political	  and	  economic	  development	  are	  deeply	  intertwined	  throughout	  the	  
Kaiser	  Reich,	  as	  the	  bust	  of	  1873	  led	  to	  the	  demise	  of	  liberalism	  in	  Germany,	  not	  only	  as	  an	  
economic	   ideology	   but	   also	   as	   a	   political	   force.	   The	   Reich	   witnessed	   a	   protectionist	   and	  
nationalist	   turn	  from	  1878/79	  onwards	  with	  the	  renaissance	  of	  German	  Conservatism	  (the	  
emergence	  of	  the	  famous	  but	  disputed	  Rye	  and	  Iron	  coalition)	  which	  ended	  with	  the	  demise	  
of	   Bismarck	   as	   chancellor	   a	   decade	   later	   in	   the	  Wilhelmina	   era.	   The	  Wilhelmina	   era	   was	  
politically	  a	  phase	  of	  German	  Imperialism	  and	  nationalist	  radicalization.	  Economically	  it	  saw	  
the	   advent	   of	   the	   second	   industrial	   revolution	   (high	   industrialization)	   in	   Germany	   that	  
brought	  the	  country	  a	  leading	  global	  position	  in	  the	  chemical	  and	  electronic	  industry.	  
	   This	  chapter	  concentrates	  on	  Germany’s	  “catch	  up”43	  phase	  in	  terms	  of	  industrialization	  
and	  political	  consolidation	  throughout	  the	  19th	  century	  up	  until	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Bismarck	  
era.	   It	   is	  an	  essential	  prerequisite	   to	  understanding	  how	  and	  why	  social	  security	  measures	  
were	  undertaken	  in	  the	  1880.	  
	  
4.1.3 Subcultures	  
By	  ‘subculture’	  I	  understand	  in	  this	  thesis	  the	  milieu	  concept	  that	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  Durkheim’s	  
sociology.44	  The	  concept	  was	  modified	  by	  the	  German	  sociologist	  Lepsius	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  
politics	  and	  society	  in	  the	  German	  Kaiser	  Reich.	  For	  Lepsius,	  subcultures	  or	  “The	  Mileu	  is	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  XIV.	  This	  turn	  of	  West	  German	  historians	  was	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  the	  revival	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Eckhard	  Kehr,	  a	  German	  historian	  who	  had	  in	  the	  1930s	  argued	  already	  for	  the	  “primacy	  of	  domestic	  politics”.	  See:	  Eley,	  G.	  (1978)	  Capitalism	  and	  the	  Wilhelmine	  State:	  Industrial	  Growth	  and	  political	  Backwardness	  in	  recent	  German	  Historiography,	  1890-­‐1918,	  The	  Historical	  Journal,	  Vol.	  21,	  No3,	  pp.	  737-­‐750;	  p.	  738.	  The	  first	  book	  that	  stipulated	  this	  debate,	  and	  the	  huge	  controversy	  later	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Fischer	  controversy’,	  between	  ‘old	  and	  new’	  West	  German	  historians	  about	  the	  origins	  of	  World	  War	  One	  was:	  Fischer,	  F.	  (1994	  [1961])	  
Griff	  nach	  der	  Weltmacht:	  Die	  Kriegszielpolitik	  des	  Kaiserlichen	  Deutschlands.	  1914-­‐1918,	  Düsseldorf,	  Droste.	  44	  The	  concept	  is	  scarcely	  used	  in	  contemporary	  political	  science	  but	  it	  is	  used	  in	  many	  modern	  classics.	  See:	  Lipset,	  S.	  M.	  &	  Rokkan,	  S.	  (1967[1990]).	  Also	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  uses	  it	  in	  more	  recent	  contributions.	  See:	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1999a).	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socio	   cultural	   structure”.45	   This	   gives	   the	   concept	   two	   major	   components:	   culture	   and	  
structure.	   The	   structural	   component	   of	   a	   subculture	   is	   made	   up	   by	   a	   dense	   web	   of	  
intermediary	  organizations	  and	  civil	  society	  associations	  that	  span	  all	  levels	  and	  instances	  of	  
human	  life	  (“from	  the	  cradle	  to	  the	  grave”).	  Such	  associations	  can	  take	  myriad	  forms	  such	  as	  
Conservative	   sport	   clubs,	  Catholic	  workers	  unions,	  Socialist	   lawyer	  circles	  or	   Liberal	   choral	  
societies.	   The	   organizational	   network	   of	   each	   subculture	   was	   topped	   off	   with	   a	   modern	  
political	  party.	  The	  cultural	  component	  of	  the	  subculture	  is	  its	  worldview.	  This	  common	  and	  
congruent	  system	  of	  meaning	  holds	  the	  subculture	  together.	  The	  worldviews	  simultaneously	  
provide	   the	   subculture	   with	   internal	   grip	   and	   cohesion	   and	   supply	   the	   members	   of	   the	  
subculture	   with	   prescriptions	   of	   how	   to	   interpret	   socio-­‐cultural	   and	   socioeconomic	  
phenomena.	   These	   worldviews	   offer	   terms	   of	   conduct	   and	   guidance	   to	   its	   members	   for	  
everyday	  life.46	  The	  subculture/milieu	  concept	  is	  more	  encompassing	  than	  the	  class	  concept	  
as	  it	  also	  includes	  identities	  that	  are	  not	  solely	  built	  on	  material	  interests.	  Lepsius	  identifies	  
four	   major	   subcultures	   in	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich:	   the	   Conservative	   Protestant,	   the	   Liberal	  
Protestant,	   the	   Catholic	   and	   the	   Socialist.	   All	   of	   them	   survived	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich,	   and	  
persisted	  at	  least	  until	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Weimar	  Republic	  and	  arguably	  structured	  the	  German	  
electorate	  even	  into	  the	  1960s.	  
	   The	   highest	   political	   representative	   entities	   of	   these	   subcultures	   formed	   the	   party	  
system	  of	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich.	  The	  figure	  below	  shows	  the	  ascendance	  and	  descendance	  of	  the	  
different	  subcultures	  as	  represented	  in	  the	  Reichstag	  vote	  from	  1871	  to	  1912.	  Major	  shifts	  
happened	  only	  after	  the	  1890s	  when	  the	  Bismarckian	  era	  had	  come	  to	  an	  end.	  Before	  this,	  
even	  the	  ascendance	  of	  the	  Socialists	  was	  only	  gradual.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  „Das	  Milieu	  ist	  ein	  sozio-­‐kulturelles	  Gebilde“	  Lepsius,	  M.R.	  (1993)	  Demokratie	  in	  Deutschland:	  
soziologisch-­‐historische	  Konstellationsanalysen.	  Ausgewählte	  Aufsätze,	  Göttingen,	  Vandenhoeck	  und	  Ruprecht;	  p.	  38.	  46	  For	  a	  discussion	  oft	  he	  term	  worldview	  see	  chapter	  one.	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Figure	  4-­‐2	  Percentage	  of	  votes	  cast	  by	  subculture.	  
	  
Data	  from	  Lepsius,	  M.	  R.	  (1993)	  p.	  33.	  
	  
This	  thesis	  deals	  with	  the	  politics	  and	  worldviews	  of	  the	  Catholic	  subculture,	  which	  will	  be	  
discussed	  in	  a	  separate	  section	  later,	  but	  it	  is	  indispensable	  to	  furnish	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  the	  
other	  sub-­‐cultures,	  as	  political	  Catholicism	  co-­‐evolved	  with,	  and	  partly	  in	  response	  to,	  them.	  
The	   Conservative	   subculture,	   represented	   by	   the	   German	   Conservative	   Party	  
(Deutschkonservative	  Partei,	  Reichspartei),	  had	  its	  regional	  strongholds	  in	  East-­‐Prussia	  (Ost-­‐
Preussen),	  Pomerania	  (Pommern),	  Brandenburg	  (Brandenburg)	  and	  Saxony	  (Sachsen).	  Their	  
electorate	  was	   Protestant,	   Agrarian,	   regionally	   enclosed	   and	   traditional	   paternalist.47	   This	  
was	   the	  Prussian	  Protestant	   stronghold	  of	   the	  Chancellor	  and	  Kaiser.	  However,	  Protestant	  
workers	   gradually	   started	   to	   defect	   from	   the	   Protestant	   Conservative	   subculture	  with	   the	  
advent	  of	  the	  Socialist	  movement.	  The	  Liberal	  sub-­‐culture	  was	  split	   into	  a	  Left-­‐Liberal	  wing	  
represented	   by	   the	   Progress	   Party	   (Fortschritts	   Partei)	   and	   a	   Conservative-­‐Liberal	   wing	  
represented	  by	  the	  National	  Liberal	  Party	  (Nationalliberale	  Partei).48	  The	  Liberal	  subculture	  
also	  deteriorated	  throughout	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  because	  its	  representation	  could	  not	  achieve	  
a	   substantial	   liberalization	   of	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich.49	   Despite	   being	   liberal	   parties,	   they	   both	  
represented,	   along	  with	   the	   Conservatives,	   the	   protestant	   hegemony	   in	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich.	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This	   “traditional	   dichotomy”50	   of	   German	   Protestantism	   meant	   that	   Protestants	   in	   cities	  
voted	  liberal	  while	  rural	  Protestant	  Germany	  rallied	  behind	  the	  Conservatives.	  The	  decisive	  
new	   force	   that	   evolved	   from	   the	   twin	   developments	   of	   national	   unification	   and	  
industrialization	   were	   the	   Socialists.	   It	   was	   the	   one	   subculture	   that	   grew	   exponentially	  
throughout	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich.	   It	   increased	  from	  basically	  zero	  to	  one	  fifth	  of	  the	  vote	  share	  
towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Bismarckian	  era	  (1890)	  and	  augmented	  its	  vote	  to	  one	  third	  at	  the	  
eve	  of	  World	  War	  One.	  Due	  to	  Bismarck’s	  repressive	  Socialist	  Laws	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  




4.2 Structure	  II:	  Capitalist	  Industrialization	  
4.2.1 Capitalism	  and	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  
John	  Maynard	   Keynes	   described	  Bismarck’s	   unification	   strategy	   as	   one	  of	   “Coal	   and	   Iron”	  
paraphrasing	  Bismarck’s	   famous	  speech	   in	   the	  Prussian	  Parliament	  on	  30	  September	  1862	  
where	   he	   spoke	   of	   the	   German	   unification	   as	   one	   of	   “Blood	   and	   Iron”.51	   Indeed,	   the	  
dominant	   German	   school	   of	   historical	   economics	   of	   the	   late	   19th	   century,	   and	   even	  Max	  
Weber,	  postulated	  that	  economic	  policy	  should	  serve	  the	  “	   ’power	  political	   interest	  of	   the	  
nation’	  ”.52	  German	  economic	  expansion	  and	  industrialization	  was	  always	  a	  prime	  object	  of	  
national	  politics,	  and	  although	  it	  was	  still	  informed	  by	  a	  dominant	  paradigm	  of	  liberalism	  in	  
the	   first	   three	  quarters	  of	   the	  19th	   century	   this	   shifted	  drastically	   towards	  a	   state	   socialist	  
approach	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  that	  century.	   	  
	   Industrialization	   arrived	   in	   Germany	   late,	   compared	   to	   the	   frontrunner	   England	   and	  
other	  industrializing	  countries	  like	  France	  and	  Belgium,	  but	  once	  it	  took	  off	  it	  came	  fast	  and	  
forcefully.	   It	   is	   a	   typical	   case	   of	   “catching	   up	   growth”53	   as	   Pepenkieper	   and	   Tilly	   call	   it.	  
Despite	  being	  basically	  unindustrialized	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  19th	  century,	  Germany	  had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Lepsius,	  M.	  R.	  (1993)	  p.	  41.	  51	  Zorn,	  W.	  (1976)	  Wirtschafts-­‐	  und	  Sozialgeschichtliche	  Zusammenhänge	  der	  deutschen	  Reichsgruendungszeit	  (1850-­‐1879),	  IN:	  Wehler,	  H-­‐U.	  (ed.)	  Moderne	  Deutsche	  Sozialgeschichte,	  5th	  Edition,	  Köln,	  Kiepenreuther	  &	  Witsch,	  p.	  255.	  52	  Lee,	  W.R.	  (1988)	  Economic	  Development	  and	  the	  State	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  Germany.	  The	  
Economic	  History	  Review,	  New	  Series,	  Vol.	  41,	  No.	  3	  (Aug.,	  1988)	  pp.	  346-­‐367;	  p.	  358.	  53	  Pierenkemper,	  T.	  &	  Tilly,	  R.	  (2004)	  The	  German	  Economy	  during	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century,	  New	  York/Oxford,	  Berghahn	  Books,	  p.	  XV.	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overtaken	  most	   other	   European	   countries	   by	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   First	  World	  War.54	   The	  
watershed	   years	   for	   industrialization	   in	   Germany	   were	   the	   1850s	   after	   which	  
industrialization	  started	  to	  gain	  pace	  massively.	  Two	  factors	  were	  central	  to	  the	  take-­‐off:	  a	  
package	  of	   liberalization	  policies	  in	  Prussia	  and	  other	  German	  states	  that	  cumulated	  in	  the	  
‘customs	   union’	   (Zollverein,	   expanding	   constantly	   1834-­‐1866)	   and	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	  
railway	  sector	  that	   functioned	  as	  a	   leading	  sector	  complex	  and	  boosted	   iron,	  steel,	  mining	  
and	  heavy	  industry.	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐3	  Industrialization	  Take	  Off	  in	  Europe	  
Industrialization	  Take	  Off	  in	  Europe	  
	  
Data	  from:	  Alber,	  J.	  (1982)	  p.39.	  
	  
4.2.2 Liberal	  Reforms	  
From	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   18th	   century	   the	   states	  making	   up	   the	  German	   territory	   had	   seen	   a	  
number	  of	  liberal	  reforms.	  A	  Prussian	  agrarian	  reform	  of	  1807	  by	  Baron	  vom	  Stein	  abolished	  
peasant	  serfdom	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  freed	  the	  landholders	  from	  any	  social	  responsibilities	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  his	  workers.	  This	  meant	  the	  “destruction	  of	  the	  peasant	  as	  a	  dependent	  but	  highly	  
entitled	   estate”55	   as	   Boehm	   comments.	   The	   result	   was	   that	   “Propertyless,	   uprooted,	  
homeless,	  belonging	  neither	  to	  the	  state	  nor	  an	  estate,	  almost	  half	  of	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  
German	  population	  lived	  in	  misery”56	  but	  the	  agrarian	  reform	  freed	  vast	  labor	  resources	  for	  
the	  upcoming	  industrialization.57	  Furthermore,	  a	  series	  of	  commercial	  reforms	  were	  enacted	  
in	  Prussia	  and	  most	  German	  states	  whereby	  old	  legal	  monopolies	  and	  prerogatives	  such	  as	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“decorporation	   of	   society”,58	   as	   Abelshauser	   calls	   it.	   The	  most	   important	   of	   these	   liberal	  
measures	   was	   the	   establishing	   of	   the	   German	   customs	   union	   (Zollverein)	   between	   all	  
German	   states	   in	   1834	   “which	   finally	   created	   a	   vast	   internal	   market,	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
important	   steps	   in	   the	   development	   of	  market	   forces	   in	   Germany”.59	   Before	   the	   customs	  
union	  Prussia	  alone	  had	  no	  less	  than	  67	  local	  customs	  tariffs	  and	  custom	  borders	  to	  protect	  
the	  local	  mercantilist	  regimes.60	  Karl	  Friedrich	  Nebenius,	  author	  of	  the	  customs	  initiative	  of	  
the	   state	   of	   Baden,	   put	   forward	   in	   1819	   that	   “Eight-­‐hundred-­‐thirty	   toll	   and	   road	   charge	  
barriers	  benumb	  domestic	  traffic	  […]	  In	  order	  to	  trade	  from	  Hamburg	  to	  Austria,	  from	  Berlin	  
to	  Switzerland,	  one	  must	  pass	   ten	  states,	   study	   ten	  custom	  and	   toll	   regimes,	  pay	   tolls	   ten	  
times.”61	  
	   Liberalism	   endured	   in	   most	   German	   states	   for	   the	   first	   three	   quarters	   of	   the	   19th	  
century.	  Nevertheless,	   liberalization	  did	  not	   lead	   industrialization	  to	  unfold	  as	  a	   linear	  and	  
smooth	  process	  that	  came	  about	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  Germany	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Instead,	  the	  fact	  
that	  Germany	  had	  been	  cut	  for	  so	  long	  into	  different	  political	  and	  geographic	  entities	  meant	  
that	   “separate	   islands	   of	   economic	   activity”62	   persisted	   throughout	   the	   19th	   century.	   Lee	  
remarks	  that	  “indeed,	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  identifiable	  German	  economy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
nineteenth	   century	   remains	   heuristic	   abstraction”.63	   The	   various	   liberalizations	   and	   the	  
Custom	  Union	   did	   not	   lead	   to	   convergence	   of	   the	   different	   German	   regions	   either.64	   The	  
German	   economy	   featured	   a	   resilient	  West-­‐East	   and	   North-­‐South	   downward	   slope	   in	   its	  
development	  throughout	  the	  19th	  century.	  Fatality	  rates	  in	  the	  East	  and	  South	  were	  higher,	  
as	  were	  the	  cases	  of	  tuberculosis	  and	  child	  mortality.65	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Abelshauser,	  W.	  (2005)	  p.	  31.	  59	  Abelshauser,	  W.	  (2005)	  p.	  26.	  60	  Böhme,	  H.	  (1978)	  p.	  2.	  61	  “Achtunddreißig	  Zoll-­‐	  und	  Mautlinien	  lähmen	  den	  Verkehr	  im	  Inneren	  […]	  Um	  von	  Hamburg	  nach	  Österreich,	  von	  Berlin	  in	  die	  Schweiz	  zu	  handeln,	  hat	  man	  zehn	  Staaten	  zu	  durchschreiten,	  zehn	  Zoll-­‐	  und	  Mautordnungen	  zu	  studieren,	  zehnmal	  Zoll	  zu	  bezahlen.“	  Cited	  from	  Görtenmarker,	  M.	  (1994)	  Deutschland	  im	  19.	  Jahrhundert,	  Opladen,	  Leske	  und	  Budrich,	  p.	  166.	  62	  Lee,	  W.R.	  (1988)	  p.	  346.	  63	  Lee,	  W.R.	  (1988)	  p.	  346.	  64	  In	  a	  way	  the	  result	  is	  astonishingly	  similar	  to	  the	  persistence	  of	  regional	  differences	  and	  divergences	  in	  the	  EU	  after	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Single	  Market.	  65	  Lee,	  W.R.	  (1988)	  p.	  351.	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4.2.3 Railroads	  
The	   big	   pull	   factor	   of	   German	   industrialization	   was	   the	   railroad	   expansion	   as	   a	   “leading	  
sector	   complex”.66	  Railroads	  were	  key	  as	   they	   stimulated	  expansion	  and	   innovation	   in	   the	  
iron	  and	  steel	  industries	  but	  also	  in	  mining	  and	  engineering	  of	  heavy	  industry	  products.67	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐4	  Prussian	  Railroad	  Expansion	  
	  
Tilly,	  R.H.	  (1990)	  Vom	  Zollverein	  zum	  Industriestaat,	  München,	  DTV,	  p.213	  
	  
	  
During	   the	   first	   third	   of	   the	   19th	   century,	   German	   know-­‐how	   in	   engineering	   and	   iron	  
production	   was	   very	   poor.	   More	   than	   80	   %	   of	   bar	   iron	   and	   over	   90	   %	   of	   pig	   iron	   was	  
produced	  in	  small	  furnaces	  employing	  medieval	  methods.68	  Up	  until	  1840,	  foreign	  suppliers	  
of	  locomotives	  and	  wagons	  dominated	  the	  German	  market.	  From	  the	  1840s	  onwards,	  these	  
made	   gradually	   way	   for	   increasing	   domestic	   production	   through	   an	   import	   substitution	  
strategy.69	   Furthermore,	   German	   railroad	  manufacturers	   went	   to	   England	   and	   France	   for	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apprenticeships	  while	  French	  and	  Belgian	  steel	  workers	  were	   increasingly	  employed	  in	  the	  
Rhineland	   and	   Ruhr	   area.	   	   The	   results	   were	   drastic:	   while	   in	   1838	   zero	   out	   of	   seven	  
locomotives	  purchased	  by	  the	  Prussian	  railways	  came	  from	  German	  producers,	  in	  1853,	  99	  
of	  a	  total	  of	  105	  vehicles	  were	  sourced	  domestically.70	  	  
	  
	  
Germany	   turned	   from	   an	   importer	   into	   an	   exporter	   of	   railway	   goods.	   Between	   1850	   and	  
1865	   Prussia	   imported	   10,200	   thousand	   tons	   of	   rails	  while	   exporting	   23,600	   thousand.	   In	  
the	  period	  between	  1866	  and	  1871,	  by	  contrast,	   it	   imported	  23,600	  and	  exported	  149,900	  
thousand	  tons.71	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐5	  Rails	  used	  in	  German	  Railroad	  expansion	  1850-­‐1871	  
	  
Rails	  used	  in	  German	  railroad	  expansion	  measured	  in	  thousands	  of	  metric	  tons.	  Source:	  Fremdling,	  R.	  (1977)	  p.	  591.	  
	  
The	   railroads	   also	   became	   the	   biggest	   employer	   in	  Germany.	   In	   1850	   only	   26,000	   people	  
were	  fully	  employed	  by	  the	  railroad	  companies	  in	  the	  customs	  union,	  but	  this	  figure	  rose	  to	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234,100	   in	   1873.72	   The	   expansion	   led	   to	   a	   drastic	   increase	   of	   workers	   in	   iron	   and	   steel	  
industries	  where	  33,105	  workers	  were	  employed	  in	  1850	  and	  106,724	  in	  1873.73	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐6	  Pig	  iron	  and	  steel	  workers	  in	  Germany	  1850-­‐1873	  
	  	  
Data	  from	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1995)	  p.	  78.	  
	  
Steel	   and	   iron	   production	   needed	   coal,	   and	   the	   sharp	   reduction	   in	   transportation	   costs	  
through	   railroad	   expansion	  made	   coal	   from	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich	   competitive.	   In	   1850	   Prussia	  
produced	  4.58	  million	  tons	  of	  coal	  while	  the	  numbers	  had	  six	  folded	  up	  to	  32.35	  million	  tons	  
only	  twenty	  years	  later.	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Figure	  4-­‐7	  Miners	  in	  the	  Ruhr	  1850-­‐1873	  
	  
Data	  from	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1995)	  p.	  78.	  
This	   industrialization	   process	   went	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   rapid	   urbanization.	   Berlin	   doubled	  
from	   412,000	   inhabitants	   in	   1850,	   to	   826,000	   only	   twenty	   years	   later	   and	   had	   2,071,000	  
inhabitants	  in	  1910.74	  Other	  major	  industrial	  cities	  followed.	  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Hohorst,	  G.;	  Kocka,	  J.	  &	  Ritter,	  G.A.	  (1978)	  Sozialgeschichtliches	  Arbeitsbuch	  II:	  Materialien	  zur	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Figure	  4-­‐8	  Urbanisation	  Germany:	  Expansion	  of	  major	  industrial	  cities	  1850-­‐1910	  
 
Data from Hohorst, G.; Kocka, J. & Ritter, G.A. (1978) Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch II: Materialien zur Statistik 
des Kaiserreichs 1870-1914, München, C.H. Beck, p. 45.  
 
Urbanization	  was	   accompanied	   by	   a	   construction	   boom	   resulting	   in	   the	   erection	   of	  more	  
than	   one	   million	   new	   buildings	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   century.	   The	   number	   of	   non-­‐
agricultural	  buildings	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  skyrocketed	  from	  280,000	  in	  1850	  
to	  around	  1,077,000	  in	  1870.75	  
	  
4.2.4 Social	  Impact	  
Nevertheless,	   construction	   could	   not	   keep	  pace	  with	   the	   rapid	   urbanization.	   In	   particular,	  
the	   housing	   and	   sanitary	   conditions	   in	   the	   sprawling	   slums	   of	   the	   precarious	   work	   force	  
were	  disastrous.	  Most	  major	  cities	  were	  not	  prepared	  to	  absorb	  the	  influx	  of	  new	  citizens.	  
Towns	   lacked	   canalization	   systems	   and	   waste	   management,	   infrastructure	   that	   was	  
introduced	   only	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   20th	   century.	   Tuberculosis,	   pneumonia	   and	   diphtheria	  
were	   widespread.	   The	   child-­‐mortality	   ratio	   in	   the	   working	   class	   boroughs	   was	   up	   to	   one	  
third.76	  Furthermore,	  every	  individual	  was	  now	  subject	  to	  the	  shocks	  of	  the	  capitalist	  market	  
system	   (also	   because	   everyone	   became	   part	   of	   it).	   Blackbourn	   puts	   it	   bluntly:	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industrialization	   had	   the	   advantage	   that	   it	   broke	   the	   cycle	   of	   “dearth	   and	   starvation,	  
boosted	  output	   and	  demand,	   and	  provided	   employment	   for	   the	  unemployed”	  but	   on	   the	  
other	   hand	   the	   population	   was	   exposed	   all	   of	   a	   sudden	   to	   the	   “vicissitudes	   of	   the	   trade	  
cycle”.77	   The	   volatility	   of	   the	  market	   and	   capitalist	   production	  was	   aggravated	  by	   the	   fact	  
that	  the	  liberal	  reforms	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  had	  disrupted	  the	  old	  social	  fabric.	  Guilds,	  church	  
based	   poor	   relief	   systems,	   asset	   inheritance	   and	   other	   medieval,	   feudal	   or	   mercantilist	  
forms	  of	  economic	  organization	  and	  protection	  had	  disappeared	  through	  urbanization,	  had	  
been	  actively	  dismantled	  through	  liberal	  reforms	  or	  had	  proved	  to	  be	  outdated	  attempting	  
to	  cope	  with	  the	  new	  scale	  of	  social	  problems.	  
	   Functional	   demands	   for	   new	   forms	   of	   social	   security	   therefore	   existed,	   though	   these	  
remained	   largely	   unarticulated	   in	   the	   political	   sphere.	   Only	   when	   Marx	   and	   Engels	   put	  
forward	  the	  Communist	  Manifesto	   in	  1848,	  and	  when	  Marx	  published	  the	  first	  part	  of	  Das	  
Kapital	   in	   1867,	   did	   the	   grievances	   and	   pitfalls	   of	   industrialized	   capitalism	   come	   to	   be	  
articulated	   in	   an	   encompassing	   critique	   which	   could	   guide	   political	   and	   social	  
countermeasures.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   demand	   for	   political	   action	   on	   welfare	   and	   social	  
security	  remained	  muted	  as	  long	  as	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  developed	  with	  extraordinary	  economic	  
growth	  rates	  that	  provided	  “welfare	  through	  growth”.	  
	  
4.2.5 The	  Crash	  of	  1873	  
The	  liberal	  period	  came	  to	  a	  sudden	  end	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  Germany	  had	  
experienced	  a	  “stormy	  growth	  phase”78	  from	  1849	  to	  1873	  and	  the	  early	  1870s	  had	  seen	  an	  
unprecedented	   economic	   boom	   period	   known	   as	   the	   Founder	   Epoch	   (Gründerzeit	   1871-­‐
187379).	  The	  Founder	  Epoch	  was	  a	  massive	  investment	  boom	  in	  the	  German	  economy.	  In	  the	  
two	   years	   between	   1871	   and	   1873,	   2.9	   Billion	   Marks	   flowed	   into	   shares	   of	   German	  
companies.	   This	   was	   half	   a	   billion	   more	   than	   had	   been	   invested	   in	   the	   twenty	   years	  
preceding	   the	   crisis	   of	   1873	   and	   around	   the	   same	   amount	   that	   was	   invested	   in	   the	   two	  
decades	   after	   the	   crisis.	   Share	   revenue	   climbed	   to	   12.49	  %	   between	   1871	   and	   1873.	   The	  
brother	  in	  law	  of	  Alfred	  Krupp,	  the	  steel	  tycoon,	  warned	  him	  in	  a	  letter	  by	  commenting	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  pp.	  189-­‐190.	  78	  “stürmische	  Aufschwungphase”	  Rosenberg,	  H.	  (1976)	  p.	  235.	  79	  The	  timeframe	  is	  disputed	  as	  sometimes	  the	  term	  ‘Founder	  Epoch’	  is	  used	  for	  the	  growth	  period	  between	  1850-­‐1873.	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the	  economic	  development	  between	  1871	  and	  1873	  that	  “the	  enormous	  founder	  fraud	  […]	  
will	  bring	  us	  a	  great	  common	  enterprise	  crisis”.80	   Indeed,	  the	  Founder	  Epoch	  ended	  with	  a	  
harsh	  economic	  bust	   in	   the	  shape	  of	   the	  Founders	  Crisis	  of	  1873	   that	  made	  way	   for	  what	  
contemporary	   commentators	   describe	   as	   the	   “long	   depression”.81	   The	   crisis	   had	   been	  
triggered	   by	   “sectoral	   overshooting”82	   whereby	   the	   investment	   bubble	   had	   created	  
enormous	   over-­‐capacities	   in	   certain	   industrial	   sectors.	   The	   economy	   would	   only	   recover	  
fully	  in	  1897.	  
	   Cross-­‐Class	   coalition	   approaches,	   as	   used	   in	   second	   generation	   Power	   Resource	  
accounts	  and	  in	  the	  risk	  coalition	  literature,	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  economic	  downturn	  after	  
the	   crisis	   altered	   the	   risk	  perception	  of	   the	  German	  middle	   class	  and	   led	   therefore	   to	   the	  
implementation	   of	   German	   modern	   social	   security	   in	   the	   1880s.	   However,	   the	   empirical	  
record	  shows	  that	  the	  crisis,	  while	  heavily	   impacting	   industry	  and	  investment,	  was	  not	  too	  
dramatic	   for	   employees	   and	   workers.83	   It	   is	   not	   disputed	   that	   in	   the	   1880s	   the	   social	  
situation	  was	  still	  one	  of	  a	  mass	  pauperized	  proletariat	  but	  the	  1880s	  were	  not	  worse	  than	  
the	   four	   decades	   that	   preceded	   them.	   Indeed,	   Rosenberg	   argues	   that	   the	   situation	   was	  
ameliorating	  for	  the	  lower	  social	  stratus.	  Roughly	  20	  %	  of	  the	  workforce	  lost	  their	  jobs	  in	  the	  
Founders	  Crisis.	  However,	  for	  those	  who	  kept	  their	  jobs	  the	  repercussions	  of	  the	  economic	  
downturn	   were	   relatively	   mild	   as	   the	   deflation	   of	   prices	   hit	   producers,	   employers	   and	  
capitalists	  with	   long	   term	   loans.	   In	   fact,	   real	  wages	   increased	  by	  35	  %	  between	  1881	   and	  
1896.84	   For	   people	   that	   could	   not	   lose	   their	   jobs	   during	   the	   crisis	   –	   such	   as	   state	   and	  
communal	   employees,	   civil	   servants	   and	   military	   officers	   –	   times	   were	   not	   too	   bad.	  
Rosenberg	  notes	   that	  “the	  Great	  depression	  was	  not	  at	  all	  a	  depression	  but	  much	  more	  a	  
time	   of	   increasing	   prosperity”.85	   Mass	   unemployment	   was	   not	   becoming	   a	   pressing	  
problem.86	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  „<<	  dass	  der	  enorme	  Gründungsschwindel	  …	  uns	  einer	  grossartigen	  allgemeinen	  Geschaeftskrisis	  zufuehren	  muss	  >>“	  Cited	  in	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1995)	  p.	  84.	  81	  “lange	  Depression”	  Rosenberg,	  H.	  (1976)	  p.	  235.	  82	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1995)	  p.	  104;	  for	  a	  good	  discussion	  of	  the	  crisis	  see	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1995)	  pp.	  100-­‐106.	  83	  Born	  calls	  it	  the	  “alleged	  “Great	  Depression”	  of	  Bismarckian	  times”;	  “Die	  vermeintliche	  “Große	  Depression”	  der	  Bismarck	  Zeit“	  Born,	  K.	  E.	  (1985)	  p.	  107.	  84	  Rosenberg,	  H.	  (1976)	  p.	  239.	  85	  “die	  Grosse	  Depression	  überhaupt	  keine	  Depression,	  sondern	  vielmehr	  ein	  Zeitalter	  steigender	  Prosperität“	  Rosenberg,	  H.	  (1976)	  p.	  236.	  86	  Though,	  as	  Rosenberg	  notes	  that	  sytematic	  data	  is	  lacking.	  Rosenberg,	  H.	  (1976)	  p.	  239.	  Wehler	  comments	  21	  years	  later	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  that	  jet	  no	  systematic	  assessment	  of	  unemployment	  and	  part	  time	  work	  in	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  exists.	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1976)	  p.	  560.	  
	   	   	   85	  
	   Wehler	   assesses	   a	  much	  more	   drastic	   impact	   of	   the	   crisis.	   He	   points	   out	   that	   Krupp	  
halved	   its	  employees	  between	  1873	  and	  187887	  and	  that	  wage	  cuts	  amounted	  to	  a	  drastic	  
30	  –	  50	  %.88	  On	  the	  social	  climate	  during	  the	  1870s	  he	  remarks	  that	  “The	  fear	  of	  dangerous	  
social	   tensions	   was	   spreading”.	   Wehler’s	   interpretation	   would	   support	   Power	   Resource	  
Approach	   and	   Bonapartist	   interpretations	   of	   welfare	   formation	   that	   emphasize	   the	   rising	  
power	   of	   the	   Left	   and	   the	  working	   class	   or	   the	   fear	   of	   them	   as	   the	   reason	   for	   the	   social	  
security	   legislation	   of	   the	   1880s.89	   Nevertheless,	   when	   he	   analyzes	   real	   wages	   he	   has	   to	  
admit	  that	  the	  wage	  drop	  was	  not	  drastic	  at	  all	  as	  they	  decreased	  form	  125	  in	  1873	  to	  112.5	  
in	   1879	   (1870	   =	   100).90	   Workers	   were	   afraid	   of	   losing	   their	   jobs,	   as	   is	   indicated	   by	   the	  
decrease	  in	  strikes	  from	  125	  in	  1873	  to	  3	  in	  1879,	  but	  whether	  revolution	  was	  looming	  as	  a	  
direct	  reaction	  to	  the	  crisis	  –	  as	  Marx	  was	  urging	  –	  seems	  doubtable.91	  Wehler	  himself	  puts	  
forward	  that	  “Generally	  speaking	  though,	  growth	  continued”.92	  Important	  for	  this	  thesis	  is,	  
however,	  that	  the	  crisis	  and	  the	  economic	  downturn	  of	  the	  1870s	  implies	  that	  social	  security	  
did	   not	   come	   as	   a	   prosperous	   boom	   phase.	   In	   fact,	   the	   social	   security	   legislation	   was	  
enacted	  against	   the	  backdrop	  of	   a	   yawningly	  empty	   state	   treasury.	   The	  Reich’s	  budgetary	  
deficit	  grew	  around	  3.9	  Billion	  Marks	  between	  1880	  and	  1890.93	  
	  
4.2.6 Political	  Implication	  of	  the	  Crisis	  
Despite	  his	  claim	  that	  the	  crisis	  did	  not	  drastically	  deteriorate	  social	  conditions,	  Rosenberg	  
nevertheless	   indirectly	   advocates	   a	   favorable	   impact	   of	   the	   crisis	   on	   social	   security.	   He	  
argues	   that	   it	   was	   exactly	   the	   amelioration	   in	   terms	   of	   real	   wages	   after	   the	   crisis	   that	  
sparked	  political	  expression	  and	  organization	  of	  the	  lower	  social	  stratus	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  
German	  history.	  He	  indicates	  that	  the	  improvement	  in	  social	  conditions,	  such	  as	  for	  example	  
the	   50%	   decrease	   in	   malnutrition	   cases	   after	   the	   1870s,	   gave	   room	   for	   the	   conscious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1995)	  p.	  559.	  88	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1995)	  p.	  560.	  89	  „Die	  Angst	  vor	  gefährlichen	  sozialen	  Spannungen	  breitete	  sich	  aus.“	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1995)	  p.	  561.	  Wehler	  derives	  this	  from	  a	  Prussian	  Police	  report	  that	  he	  cites	  on	  the	  very	  same	  page	  which	  indicates	  fear	  of	  an	  increasing	  drift	  of	  workers	  towards	  socialist	  ideas.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  a	  police	  report	  before	  the	  crisis	  or	  afterwards	  would	  have	  been	  much	  different.	  	  90	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1995)	  p.	  561.	  91	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1995)	  p.	  561.	  92	  „Auf	  das	  Ganze	  gesehen	  hielt	  jedoch	  das	  Wachstum	  an“	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1995)	  p.	  552.	  93	  Rosenberg,	  H.	  (1976)	  p.	  236.	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articulation	  of	  political	  demands	  of	  the	  lower	  classes	  that	  had	  before	  been	  occupied	  solely	  
with	   basic	   survival.	   He	   sees	   the	   real	   revolution	   not	   only	   in	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   political	  
system	  in	  the	  1870s	  but	  especially	  in	  the	  increasing	  mobilization	  from	  below	  as	  indicated	  in	  
the	  gradual	  and	  slowly	   increasing	   turnout.	  Elite	  politics	   started	   to	  become	  mass	  politics	   in	  
the	   sense	   that	   they	   increasingly	  had	   to	   cater	   to	  a	  mass	  electorate.	  Nobility	  parties	  had	   to	  
become	  people’s	  parties	  if	  they	  wanted	  to	  survive.	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐9	  Franchise	  extensions	  in	  Europe	  
Significant	  franchise	  extensions	  in	  Europe	  per	  country	  
	  
Data	  from	  Alber,	  J.	  (1982)	  p.	  39.	  
	  
I	  agree	  with	  Rosenberg,	  but	  I	  think	  he	  downplays	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  discrediting	  of	  the	  
Liberal	   worldview,	   its	   programmatic	   ideas	   and	   policy	   ideas	   that	   the	   crisis	   brought	   in	   the	  
Kaiser	   Reich.	   The	   crisis	   had	   a	   huge	   impact	   on	  Germany’s	   political	   economic	   thinking	   both	  
among	   practitioners	   (capitalists)	   and	   theorists.	   Torp	   notes	   that	   the	   “loss	   of	   prestige	   for	  
economic	   liberalism	  was	  drastic	  and	  all	  encompassing”.94	   It	   triggered	  an	   intrinsic	  desire	  of	  
German	   capitalists	   to	   control	   markets	   through	   cartelization	   and	   concentration	   in	   the	  
national	   economy	   and	   they	   pressed	   for	   protection	   from	   the	   globalizing	   economy	   through	  
tariffs.	   It	   is	  here	  that	  German	  non-­‐liberal	  capitalism	  has	  its	  roots.	  From	  the	  1870s	  onwards	  
the	  German	  elites	  were	  neither	  hostile	  to	  cartelization	  nor	  afraid	  of	  distorting	  the	  economy	  
with	   state	  aid	  and	  planning	  or	   through	  private-­‐public	  ownership	  of	  business.	  The	  Prussian	  
railways	   were	   nationalized	   (1880)	   which	   led	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   world’s	   biggest	  
enterprise	   and	   government	   started	   to	   plan	   and	   invest	   not	   only	   in	   infrastructure	   projects,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Torp,	  C.	  (2010)	  p.	  404.	  See	  also:	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  190.	  This	  was	  not	  the	  first	  crisis	  of	  capitalism	  in	  the	  19th	  century.	  There	  had	  been	  a	  global	  crisis	  with	  origins	  in	  the	  US	  in	  1857/59	  but	  it	  did	  not	  hit	  the	  Zollverein	  that	  much.	  There	  had	  been	  also	  a	  small	  growth	  rupture	  in	  1866	  but	  also	  this	  one	  was	  overcome	  rather	  quickly	  and	  had	  not	  such	  long-­‐lasting	  effects	  on	  the	  German	  economy	  as	  the	  crisis	  of	  the	  1870s.	  Furthermore	  the	  revolutions	  of	  1848/49	  had	  disrupted	  the	  early	  German	  growth	  patterns	  but	  not	  for	  longer	  than	  a	  year.	  See:	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1995)	  pp.	  95-­‐96.	  
Frnace	  1848	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such	  as	  major	  artificial	  watercourses	   for	   transportation,	  but	  also	   invested	   in	   local	  business	  
projects.95	  
	   Liberalism	  also	   lost	  out	  politically.	   In	  1877	  the	   liberal	  parties	   (Fortschritt	  and	  National	  
Liberals)	   lost	   the	   elections	   and	   Bismarck	   stopped	   relying	   on	   them	   for	   governing	   the	  
Reichstag.	   German	   Capitalism	   started	   to	   organize	   and	   tried	   to	   build	   an	  
“interestcommunitycartel”96	  to	  press	  for	  tariffs.	  This	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  famous	  “Rye	  
and	   Iron”	   coalition.	   It	   is	   the	   thesis	   of	   a	   powerful	   interest	   coalition	   between	   large	   land	  
holding	  East	  Prussian	  nobility	  (Junkers)	  and	  West	  German	  Industrialists	  (Schlotbarone)	  that,	  
through	   their	   protectionist	   interest	   politics,	   lead	   Germany	   directly	   into	   the	   disasters	   of	  
World	  War	   One	   and	   in	   the	   long	   run	   laid	   the	   foundations	   for	   National	   Socialism	   and	   the	  
Second	   World	   War.97	   It	   has	   been	   promoted	   by	   famous	   scholars	   such	   as	   Moore,	  
Gerschenkron,	  Wehler	  and	  Rosenberg	  since	  the	  1960s.	  In	  a	  critical	  review	  of	  the	  argument,	  
Torp	  comments	  on	  the	  academic	  impact	  of	  this	  coalition	  that	  “it	  has	  become	  an	  established	  
part	   of	   the	   accepted	   wisdom	   in	   political	   science	   and	   economics,	   part	   of	   the	   standard	  
repertoire	  of	  prominent	  historical	  examples	  that	  are	  repeatedly	  cited	  when	  there	  is	  need	  for	  
an	  example”.98	  
	   Contemporary	   historiography	   criticizes	   that	   the	   Rye	   and	   Iron	   thesis	   was	   too	   heavily	  
based	   on	   endogenous	   factors	   and	   that	   it	   does	   not	   sufficiently	   account	   for	   the	   rapid	  
globalization	   from	   the	   1870s	   onwards	   which	   also	   saw	   numerous	   international	   trade	  
agreements	  expire	  and	  countries	  like	  the	  US	  started	  to	  raise	  trade	  barriers	  in	  order	  to	  shield	  
themselves	  and	  thereby	  arguably	  triggered	  a	  global	  protectionist	  move.99	  Furthermore,	  the	  
interests	  within	  the	  Rye	  and	  Iron	  coalition	  were	  far	  more	  at	  odds	  then	  previously	  assumed.	  
This	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  other	  ideas	  and	  interests	  to	  influence	  policy	  and	  gave	  Bismarck	  a	  
central	   intermediation	   role	   in	   influencing	   policy	   during	   the	   protectionist	   phase	   of	   1877-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Abelshauser,	  W.	  (2005)	  p.	  30.	  96	  „Interessengemeinschaftskartell“	  Rosenberg,	  H.	  (1976)	  p.	  251.	  97	  This	  ‘negative’interpretation	  of	  the	  German	  “Sonderweg”	  was	  first	  advocated	  by	  Fritz	  Fischer,	  who	  triggered	  the	  famous	  ‘Fischer	  Controversy’in	  the	  1960s.	  See:	  Fischer,	  F.	  (1994	  [1961])	  98	  Torp,	  C.	  (2010)	  p.	  403.	  Also	  Peter	  Gourevitch	  uses	  the	  ‘Rye	  and	  Iron’	  coalition.	  99	  Werner	  Abelshauser	  points	  out	  that	  globalization	  in	  the	  last	  third	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  up	  to	  the	  eve	  of	  World	  War	  One	  was	  on	  a	  level	  comparable	  to	  the	  late	  twentieth	  century.	  “In	  1914	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (i.e.,	  without	  portfolio	  investments)	  amounted	  to	  no	  less	  than	  $45	  billion.	  This	  figure	  was	  the	  result	  of	  capital-­‐market	  integration	  almost	  unhindered	  by	  capital	  controls.	  That	  level	  of	  integration	  was	  not	  achieved	  again	  until	  1980,	  when	  restrictions	  on	  capital	  movements	  in	  most	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  were	  finally	  lifted.”	  Abelshauser,	  W.	  (2005)	  p.	  28.	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1878.	   Arguably,	   it	   also	   triggered	   the	   increasing	   strategic	   importance	   of	   the	   Center	   Party	  
after	  the	  anti-­‐liberal	  turn	  following	  the	  1873	  crash	  as	  it	  ousted	  the	  Liberal	  parties	  from	  the	  
governing	   coalition,	   a	   fact	   that	   is	   usually	   underrepresented	   in	   classic	   Rye	   and	   Iron	  
accounts.100	  
	  
4.2.7 Rye	  and	  Iron	  and	  Social	  Security	  
Rye	  and	  Iron	  implies	  that	  the	  socioeconomic	  and	  political	  elites	  of	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  reacted	  
to	   the	   crisis	   of	   1873	   through	   protectionism.	   The	   Polanyian	   double	   movement	   therefore	  
unfolds	   on	   foreign	   trade	   policy	   but,	   as	   the	   next	   chapter	   will	   show	   in	   greater	   detail,	  
industrialists	   and	   large	   estate	   holders	  were	   fiercely	   opposed	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   social	  
security	  in	  the	  1880s.	  The	  question	  that	  this	  evokes	  is:	  why	  were	  employers	  and	  large	  scale	  
farmers	   able	   to	   successfully	  press	   for	   their	   tariff	   demands	  while	  no	   such	   coalition	   formed	  
against	   the	   implementation	   of	   social	   security?	   If	   “Rye	   and	   Iron”	   was	   the	   dominant	  
economic,	  political	  and	  societal	   interest	  coalition	  of	  the	  1880s	  why	  did	  it	  not	  move	  against	  
welfare	  legislation?	  Rosenberg	  points	  to	  the	  sudden	  central	  role	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Center	  Party	  
after	  the	  anti-­‐liberal	  turn	  in	  German	  economy,	  state	  and	  politics	  after	  the	  crash	  of	  the	  early	  
1870s.	  The	  Center	  Party	  had	  been	  formed	  as	  a	  Catholic	  party	  in	  1871	  and	  was,	  by	  definition	  
of	  being	  a	  party	  founded	  on	  religious	  prerogatives,	  the	  first	  “real	  people’s	  party”.101	   It	  was	  
the	  one	  political	  player	  in	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  that	  could	  arguably	  capitalize	  the	  most	  from	  the	  
societal	   and	   economic	   upheavals	   of	   the	   1870s	   and	   the	   anti-­‐liberal	   turn	   thereafter.	   The	  
Catholic	   vote	   was	   concentrated	   in	   Silesia	   and	   West	   and	   South	   Germany	   so	   therefore	  
coincided	  with	   the	  mining	   regions	   and	   the	   iron	   and	   textile	   industry.	   Being	   an	   anti-­‐liberal	  
party	  with	  a	  distinct	  social	  policy	  profile	  and	  an	  explicit	  cross	  class	  appeal	  bestowed	  it	  with	  a	  
“glooming	   political	   boom,	   a	   downright	   enviable	   tactic	   key	   position”.102	   The	   small	   Catholic	  
party	   had	   therefore	   a	   prominent	   position	   at	   the	   verge	   towards	   the	   1880s,	   the	   decade	   of	  
Bismarckian	  social	   security	   reform.	  But	  how	  was	   it	   that	   this	  political	  outlet	  of	   the	  Catholic	  
minority	   in	   the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  came	  about	  and	  how	  did	   its	  program	  develop	  so	  that	   it	  could	  
achieve	  its	  utmost	  influential	  position	  during	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  An	  exception	  is	  certainly	  Rosenberg’s	  terrific	  account	  from	  1976.	  Rosenberg,	  H.	  (1976)	  pp.	  248-­‐252.	  101	  Rosenberg,	  H.	  (1976)	  p.	  252.	  102	  Rosenberg,	  H.	  (1976)	  p.	  253.	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4.3 Structure	  III:	  Church	  and	  State	  
	  
Going	  to	  Canossa	  won’t	  bring	  us	  any	  railroads	  
Supporter	  of	  the	  Culture	  War	  103	  
	  
German	   political	   Catholicism	  had	   a	   remarkable	   trajectory	   during	   the	   19th	   century.	   Finding	  
itself	   deeply	   paralyzed	   by	   the	   events	   of	   the	   French	   Revolution	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  
century,	   its	   first	   reaction	  was	   to	  withdraw	   from	   temporary	  matters	  of	  politics	   and	   society	  
and	  to	  emphasize	  the	  spiritual	  realm	  with	  a	  nostalgic	  connotation	  and	  longing	  for	  the	  times	  
prior	  to	  the	  French	  Revolution.	  The	  spirit	  that	  drove	  German	  Catholicism	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
century	   was	   fundamentally	   different.	   Catholicism	   was	   now	   probably	   the	   single	   most	  
powerful	   and	   well	   organized	   interest	   group	   in	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich	   with	   far-­‐reaching	  
organizational	   capacities.	   Even	   though	  Catholicism	  became	   increasingly	   reactionary	  during	  
the	   last	   third	   of	   the	   19th	   century,	   it	   nevertheless	   adapted	   to	   modern	   forms	   of	   political	  
organization.	  	  As	  Blackbourn	  assesses,	  “The	  machinery	  of	  the	  Church	  (Max	  Weber)	  showed	  
how	  Catholicism	  adapted	   the	   forms,	   if	   not	   the	   content,	   of	   the	   age	  of	   progress”104	   and	  he	  
concludes	   that	   “Catholic	   Germany	   boasted	   an	   array	   of	   lay	   associations	   without	   equal	   in	  
Europe”105.	  
	  
4.3.1 The	  Catholic	  Subculture	  
	   Catholics	   counted	   for	   roughly	   one	   third	   of	   the	   inhabitants	   of	   the	   Kaiserreich.	   The	  
“kleindeutsche	  Lösung”	  of	  a	  unification	  without	  Austria	  cemented	  the	  minority	  position	  of	  
Catholics.	  They	  were	  geographically	  concentrated	  in	  the	  West	  (Rhineland)	  the	  South	  (Baden	  
and	  Bavaria)	  and	  at	  the	  eastern	  border	  to	  Poland	  (Silesia).	  	  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Quoted	  from	  Kissling,	  Kulturkampf,	  Vol.	  2;	  p.	  295,	  IN:	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  283.	  104	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  298.	  105	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  301.	  
	   	   	   90	  
Figure	  4-­‐10	  Distribution	  of	  Catholics	  and	  Protestants	  
 




	   In	   “The	   Age	   of	   Progress”106	   (19th	   century),	   Catholics	   were	   regarded	   by	   Liberal	   and	  
Protestant	   state	   elites	   as	   a	   fundamentally	   anti-­‐modern	   development	   and	   as	   an	   inhibiting	  
and	  potentially	  obstructive	  group.	  The	  Catholic	  Church	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  transnational	  and	  
hostile	   enterprise.	   For	   Bismarck	   and	   his	   followers,	   Catholics	   could	   be	   reduced	   to	   three	  
things:	  backwardness,	  superstition	  and	  medievalism.	  It	  seemed	  that	  Catholicism	  simply	  did	  
not	   fit	   into	   the	   newly	   founded	  nation	   that	   forcefully	  made	   its	  way	   into	   the	   top-­‐league	   of	  
World	  Powers	   in	   less	   than	  a	  quarter	  of	  a	  century.	  The	  backwardness	  of	  Catholicism	   in	   the	  
Reich	   seemed	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   ‘Zeitgeist’	   and	   was	   perceived	   as	   being	   at	   odds	   with	   the	  
evolution	   of	   German	   society	   towards	   modernization.107	   Statements	   such	   as:	   “	   ‘Going	   to	  
Canossa	  will	   bring	   us	   no	   railways’	   ”	   from	  anticlerical	   opponents	   of	   compromises	  with	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Blackbourn	  refers	  here	  to	  the	  period	  from	  1849	  till	  1880.	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  175.	  	  107	  Smith,	  H.	  W.	  (1995)	  p.	  28.	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Vatican	  were	  frequent	  during	  the	  Culture	  War	  (Kulturkampf).108	  Catholics	  were	  “alien”	  or	  at	  
best	   “exotic”	   in	   Bismarck’s	   words.109	   Furthermore,	   Catholics	   were	   usually	   from	   the	   lower	  
social	   stratus	   and	   strongly	   under-­‐represented	   in	   state	   bureaucracy,	   governments,	  
universities	   and	   business.	   In	   the	   Prussian-­‐dominated	   Protestant	   Reich	   they	   were	  
discriminated	   against,	   especially	   in	   the	   higher	   ranks	   of	   the	   civil	   service	   and	   the	   officer	  
corps.110This	   fueled	   a	   constant	   Catholic	   inferiority	   complex	   throughout	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich.	  
Catholics	   reacted	   at	   first	   by	   retreating	   from	   the	   Protestant	  mainstream	   of	   the	   Reich	   and	  
building	  up	  a	  Catholic	  sub-­‐culture	  that	  would	  persist	  far	  into	  the	  late	  1960s.	  It	  nurtured	  this	  
Ghetto	  mentality	  that	  isolated	  it	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Reich	  up	  until	  the	  late	  1880s.111	  
	   Therefore,	  for	  the	  most	  part	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  two	  Germanys	  existed,	  one	  Protestant	  
and	   one	   Catholic,	   both	   deeply	   entrenched	   in	   their	   subcultures.112	   Protestant	   kids	   were	  
throwing	   stones	   at	   Catholic	   kids	   and	   vice	   versa.113	   One	   can	   derive	   from	   passages	   of	  
Bismarck’s	  memoirs	  how	  this	  tense	  relationship	  diffused	  to	  the	  highest	  political	  levels.	  In	  the	  
following,	   Bismarck	   describes	   how	   Catholicism	   and	   Catholics	   were	   perceived	   during	   his	  
childhood	  and	  how	  this	  radically	  changed	  later	  in	  the	  century:	  
	  
A	  Catholic	  classmate,	  was	  without	  any	  confessional	  ill	  will,	  regarded	  with	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  amazement	  like	  an	  
exotic	  appearance,	  and	  not	  without	  a	  certain	  satisfaction,	  that	  one	  could	  not	  see	  any	  marks	  on	  him	  that	  
indicated	  the	  St.	  Bartholomew’s	  Day	  massacre,	  the	  burning	  on	  the	  stake	  and	  the	  Thirty	  Years’	  War.	  114	  
	  
Not	  much	   later	  Bismarck	   indicates	   that	   this	  had	  changed	   throughout	   the	  19th	   century	  and	  
that	  now:	  
	  
These	  circumstances	  and	  sentiments	  have	  changed	  [...]	  Nowadays,	  indicating	  that	  one	  is	  Catholic	  neither	  causes	  
a	  sensation	  nor	  leaves	  an	  impression	  in	  any	  of	  the	  Berlin	  circles	  115	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Quoted	  by	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.283	  from	  Kissling,	  Kulturkampf,	  vol.	  2,	  p.	  295.	  109	  „fremd“,	  „exotisch“.	  Bismarck,	  O.	  (1999)	  Gedanken	  und	  Erinnerungen,	  München,	  Ullstein,	  Prophyläen,	  p.	  427.	  	  110	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  302.	  111	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  302;	  Ritter,	  G.A.	  (1976)	  p.14.	  112	  Hence,	  also	  German	  political	  life	  was	  divided	  along	  confessional	  lines.	  Smith,	  H.	  W.	  (1995)	  p.	  35.	  113Catholics	  and	  Protestants	  were	  divided	  on	  multiple	  levels,	  they	  drank	  different	  beers,	  wore	  different	  clothes,	  had	  a	  different	  fertility	  rate,	  educational	  status	  and	  preferred	  different	  names.	  Smith,	  M.W.	  (1995)	  p.	  80;	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  71.	  114	  “Ein	  Katholischer	  Mitschüler	  wurde	  ohne	  jedes	  confessionelle	  Übelwollen	  mit	  einer	  Art	  von	  Verwunderung	  wie	  eine	  exotische	  Erscheinung	  und	  nicht	  ohne	  Befriedigung	  darüber	  betrachtet,	  dass	  von	  der	  Bartholomaeusnacht,	  vom	  Scheiterhaufen	  und	  dem	  dreißigjährigem	  Krieg	  nichts	  anzumerken	  war.”	  Bismarck,	  O.	  (1999)	  pp.	  427-­‐428.	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The	   19th	   century	   was	   therefore	   not	   only	   a	   century	   of	   nation	   building,	   nationalism	   and	  
progress	  in	  Germany,	  but	  also	  one	  of	  deep	  religious	  conflict.116	  This	  conflict	  was	  not	  one	  of	  
religion	   against	   a	   secular	   state	   as	   in	   France	   or	   Italy.	   Rather,	   the	   split	   denominational	  
situation	   in	   Germany,	   and	   the	   unification	   process	   marshaled	   from	   above	   by	   Protestant	  
Prussia,	   resulted	   in	   the	   absorbance	  of	   Protestantism	  by	   the	  German	  Kaiser	  Reich.	  Despite	  
many	   contemporary	   interpretations	   during	   the	   19th	   century	   that	   saw	   religion	   heavily	  
challenged	  and	  substituted	  through	  ideologies	  such	  as	  Liberalism,	  Nationalism	  and	  Socialism	  
(God	  was	  declared	  dead	  by	  Nietsche	  in	  1882),	  Protestantism	  “continued	  to	  play	  an	  absolute	  
central	  role	  in	  German	  public	  debate”.	  Church	  attendance	  amongst	  Protestants,	  especially	  in	  
the	   middle	   class,	   decreased	   but	   German	   culture	   was	   explicitly	   interpreted	   as	   Protestant	  
culture117	   and	   Protestantism	  was	   not	   only	   the	   religion	   but	   also	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   ruling	  
class.	   Protestantism,	   though,	   was	   not	   a	   monolithic	   force.	   It	   was	   split	   into	   a	   liberal	   and	  
orthodox	   version	   in	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich.118	   Orthodox	   Protestantism	   was	   the	   spiritual	   bridge	  
between	  the	  new	  political	  and	  the	  old	  social	  order.	  It	  formed	  the	  patriarchic	  world	  view	  of	  
the	  Kaiser,	   the	  chancellor,	   the	  bureaucracy,	  the	  military,	   the	   large	  estate	  holders	   (Junkers)	  
and	  their	  former	  vassals	  and	  tied	  it	  to	  the	  new	  nationalist,	  and	  later	  imperial,	  project	  of	  the	  
empire.	   The	   Reich’s	   society	   and	   principal	   institutions	   became	   synonyms	   for	   “Cultural	  
Protestantism“,119	   a	   term	   that	   describes	   the	  merging	   of	   Orthodox	   Protestantism	  with	   the	  
Prussian,	  and	   later	   the	  German,	   state.	   In	  parliament	   the	  Conservatives	  were	   the	  orthodox	  
Protestant	  party	  par	  excellence.	  
	   In	  contrast,	  liberal	  Protestantism	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  Enlightenment	  and	  was	  deeply	  
influenced	   by	   the	   innovations	   in	   the	   natural	   sciences	   and	   by	   the	   advent	   of	   industrializing	  
capitalism	   during	   the	   19th	   century.	   It	   had	   its	   strongholds	   in	   the	   cities,	   was	   politically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  “diese	  Verhältnisse	  und	  Stimmungen	  haben	  sich	  geändert	  […]	  Heut	  zu	  Tage	  kann	  man	  durch	  die	  Kundgebung,	  katholisch	  zu	  sein,	  in	  keinem	  Berliner	  Kreise	  mehr	  Aufsehen	  erregen	  oder	  auch	  nur	  einen	  Eindruck	  machen.“	  Bismarck,	  O.	  (1999)	  pp.	  427-­‐428.	  116	  Smith	  writes	  about	  the	  identity	  forming	  power	  of	  the	  denominational	  split	  in	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  that	  “Few	  lines	  of	  division	  so	  clearly	  cut	  to	  the	  quick	  of	  people’s	  identities,	  so	  self-­‐evidently	  defined	  their	  cultural	  horizons,	  and	  so	  deeply	  determined	  their	  political	  loyalties	  as	  the	  line	  that	  separated	  the	  two	  major	  religious	  groups.”	  Smith,	  H.	  W.	  (1995)	  p.13.	  117	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  293.	  118	  This	  split	  found	  its	  manifestation	  in	  the	  party	  system	  where	  the	  liberal	  parties	  represented	  liberal	  Protestantism	  and	  the	  Conservatives	  Orthodox	  Protestantism.	  Protestantism	  was	  furthermore	  segmented	  into	  Pietism,	  Lutheranism	  and	  Calvinism	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  Reich.	  119	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  293.	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represented	   by	   the	   liberal	   parties	   and	   was	   “seeking	   to	   adapt	   Christianity	   to	   the	   modern	  
age”.120	  
	   While	   the	   liberal	   branch	   of	   Protestantism	   had	   “an	   underdeveloped	   sense	   of	   social	  
mission”121	  and	  a	  liberal	  and	  self-­‐help	  centered	  approach	  to	  welfare,	  “it	  was	  from	  the	  ranks	  
of	  the	  orthodox	  that	  anxiety	  over	  dechristianization	  produced	  a	  social	  program	  of	  missions,	  
rescue	   homes	   and	   poor	   schools”.122	   It	   is	   therefore	   no	   surprise	   that	   the	   first	   attempts	   for	  
coherent	  driven	  welfare	  came	  in	  Germany	  from	  the	  orthodox	  Protestant	  camp.123	  	  
	  
4.3.2 Culture	  War	  
After	   unification,	   the	   1870s	   saw	   an	   explosive	   escalation	   of	   the	   denominational	   cleavage	  
between	  Protestantism	  and	  Catholicism	  manifest	  itself	  in	  the	  Culture	  Wars	  (Kulturkampf).124	  
Bismarck	   triggered	   a	   large-­‐scale	   attack	   on	   Catholic	   Church	   prerogatives.125	   The	   souring	   of	  
the	   relation	   between	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   and	   the	   Prussian	   state	  was	   the	   result	   of	   a	   long	  
cumulating	  process	  of	  radicalization	  on	  both	  sides.	  Catholicism	  did	  not	  like	  Bismarck’s	  nation	  
building	   efforts	   –	   especially	   since	   they	   included	   cutting	   off	  most	   of	   the	   Catholic	   German-­‐
speaking	  population	  of	  Austria	  after	  the	  Prussian-­‐Austrian	  War	  of	  1866.	  Italian	  unification	  in	  
1861	   worsened	   the	   situation	   as	   the	   pope	   had	   lost	   all	   his	   temporal	   territory	   to	   the	   new	  
Italian	   liberal	   state.	   On	   the	   one	   side	   the	   German	   Catholics	   felt	   vulnerable	   through	   the	  
weakness	   of	   the	   papacy.	   On	   the	   other	   side,	   the	   syllabus	   of	   errors126	   that	   Pope	   Pius	   IX	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  292.	  121	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  292.	  122	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  292.	  123	  It	  is	  then	  also	  not	  too	  surprising	  that	  Bismarck’s	  first	  proposals	  for	  social	  security	  looked	  pretty	  much	  like	  modern	  Scandinavian	  welfare	  solutions.	  While	  Scandinavia	  had	  a	  real	  Protestant	  state	  church,	  Bismarck	  in	  a	  way	  was	  representing	  an	  orthodox	  Protestant	  pseudo	  state	  church.	  	  124	  The	  term	  Kulturkampf	  had	  been	  developed	  by	  the	  Left	  Liberal	  Rudolph	  von	  Virchow	  as	  a	  battle	  call	  against	  political	  Catholicism.	  Lönne,	  K.-­‐E.	  (1986);	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1981)	  Der	  Kulturkampf.	  IN:	  Rauscher,	  A.	  (ed.)	  Der	  Soziale	  und	  Politische	  Katholizismus,	  München-­‐Wien,	  Olzog,	  	  p.	  72.	  125	  Relations	  between	  Catholicism	  and	  the	  Protestant	  Prussian	  state	  elites	  had	  already	  turned	  sour	  before.	  The	  Kölner	  Mischehenstreit	  in	  1837	  about	  the	  competence	  of	  marriage	  jurisdiction	  was	  central	  in	  this	  respect.	  The	  Prussian	  state	  convicted	  the	  Bishop	  of	  Cologne	  of	  being	  steered	  by	  the	  Vatican	  and	  jailed	  him.	  This	  incident	  fueled	  the	  resentment	  of	  the	  Catholics	  towards	  the	  new	  nation	  building	  project	  but	  also	  the	  suspicion	  of	  Prussian	  state	  elites	  against	  a	  Catholicism	  accused	  of	  Ultramontanism.	  126	  The	  syllabus	  was	  published	  on	  the	  8th	  December	  1864	  as	  an	  amendment	  to	  the	  encyclical	  Quanta	  Cura.	  It	  listed	  80	  (more	  or	  less)	  prominent	  statements	  of	  secular	  philosophy,	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released	   in	   1864	   as	   a	   reaction	   to	   Italian	   unification	   cemented	   a	   radical	   anti-­‐liberal,	  
ultramontane127	   and	   Conservative	   political	   position	   of	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   that	   actively	  
challenged	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   secular	   and	  Protestant	  nation	   states	  and	   therefore	  enhanced	  
the	   suspicious	   feelings	   of	   German	   Protestantism	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   Catholics.	   The	   situation	  was	  
aggravated	  when	  Pius	  IX	  released	  the	  dogma	  of	  papal	  infallibility	  that	  extended	  his	  powers	  
over	  Catholic	  flock	  and	  church	  hierarchy	  in	  1870	  at	  the	  first	  Vatican	  Council.	  	  
	   Bismarck’s	  unification	  was	  driven	  by	  liberal	  and	  Protestant	  state	  bureaucrats	  and	  elites.	  
The	  Culture	  War	  was	  part	  of	  Bismarck’s	   internal	   furbishing	  of	   the	  Reich’s	   strategy	   (Innere	  
Reichsgründung).	   It	   aimed	   at	   drying	   out	   the	   fundaments	   of	   the	   Catholic	   subculture	   and	  
cutting	   German	   Catholicism	   loose	   from	   Rome.	   The	   Culture	   War	   was	   part	   of	   Bismarck’s	  
nation	  building	  concept.128	  National	  security	  issues	  also	  played	  a	  role	  as	  the	  Chancellor	  was	  
afraid	  of	  an	  ultramontane	  “revenge-­‐coalition”129	  of	  French,	  Austrian	  and	  Polish	  Catholicism	  
that	  could	  dismantle	  his	  Reich	  as	  quickly	  as	  he	  had	  built	   it	  up.	  The	  situation	  exploded	  with	  
the	  formation	  of	  the	  Center	  Party,	  first	  in	  the	  Prussian	  Parliament	  through	  the	  fusion	  of	  41	  
Catholic	  deputies	  into	  a	  parliamentary	  group	  and	  then	  in	  1871	  on	  the	  federal	  level	  with	  67	  
deputies	  in	  the	  Reichstag.	  
	   The	  Culture	  War	  was	  a	  series	  of	  laws	  of	  which	  the	  ‘Pulpit	  Paragraph’	  (Kanzelparagraph)	  
of	  the	  10th	  December	  1871	  was	  the	  first.130	  It	  aimed	  at	  breaking	  the	  political	  communication	  
and	  transmission	  power	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  by	  outlawing	  any	  political	  messages	  from	  the	  
pulpit.	   Education	   was	   next.	   On	   the	   11th	   March	   1872,	   Bismarck	   put	   forward	   the	   School	  
Supervision	   Law	   (Schulaufsichtsgesetz)	   which	   gave	   the	   state	   a	   monopoly	   on	   school	  
supervision.	  This	  led	  immediately	  to	  the	  demission	  of	  over	  a	  thousand	  clergymen	  and	  sisters	  
from	  the	  state	  education	  service.131	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  law	  was	  to	  dry	  out	  the	  fundament	  of	  the	  
Catholic	  subculture.	  Without	  any	  control	  over	  education,	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  was	  deprived	  
of	   the	   possibility	   to	   actively	   construct	   and	   nurture	   its	   subculture	   by	   transmitting	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  enlightenment,	  rationalism,	  Protestantism,	  liberal	  clericalism	  and	  Liberal	  thought	  in	  general	  and	  declared	  them	  as	  outright	  wrong.	  127	  Ultramontanism	  (referring	  literally	  to	  beyond	  the	  mountains)	  describes	  a	  segment	  of	  Catholic	  theology	  that	  emphasises	  strongly	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  Pope	  in	  Rome	  over	  all	  Catholics	  and	  local	  Catholic	  hierarchies	  in	  other	  countries.	  The	  term	  was	  used	  as	  a	  catchphrase	  in	  19th	  century	  Europe	  to	  accuse	  political	  Catholicism	  of	  being	  not	  loyal	  to	  their	  own	  nations	  and	  states	  and	  of	  being	  loyal	  to	  the	  Pope	  instead.	  This	  brand	  marked	  them	  in	  the	  age	  of	  Nationalism	  as	  traitors.	  128	  Smith,	  H.W.	  (1995)	  p.	  14.	  129	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1981)	  p.	  77.	  130	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1981)	  p.	  79.	  131	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1981)	  p.	  81.	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worldviews	  form	  a	  very	  early	  stage	  onwards.	  The	  ‘Jesuit	  Law’	  (Jesuitengesetz)	  from	  4th	  July	  
1872	  banned	   the	   Jesuit	  order	   from	  the	  Reich.	  Bismarck	  accelerated	  his	  endeavor	  with	   the	  
‘May	   Laws’	   (Mai	   Gesetze)	   of	   1873	   which	   enforced	   state	   control	   and	   jurisdiction	   over	  
Catholic	  Church	  institutions	  in	  Germany	  and	  eased	  the	  possibility	  for	  individuals	  to	  leave	  the	  
Catholic	  Church.132	  On	  the	  13th	   June	  1874	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  on	  Bismarck	   in	  Kissingen	  failed	  
but	  was	  publicly	  attributed	  to	  the	  Catholics.	  	  Bismarck	  pushed	  for	  further	  legislation	  and,	  in	  
1875,	  two	  laws	  cut	  state	  funding	  and	  finally	  erased	  all	  constitutionally	  guaranteed	  rights	  of	  
the	  Churches.	  
	   The	   result	   of	   a	   decade	   of	   Culture	  War	   was	   that	   five	   of	   the	   eleven	   German	   Catholic	  
Bishops	  were	  in	  jail	  and	  a	  total	  of	  296	  dependences	  of	  religious	  orders	  had	  been	  shut	  by	  the	  
authorities.	  A	  total	  of	  136	  Catholic	  newspapers	  had	  been	  closed	  only	  in	  the	  first	  four	  months	  
of	   1875.133	   In	   1881,	   the	   pastoral	   network	   of	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   in	   Germany	   had	   been	  
reduced	   by	   one	   fourth	   as	   1125	   parishes	   remained	   vacant	   and	   were	   not	   replaced	   due	   to	  
Bismarck’s	  legislative	  efforts.	  
	   Nevertheless,	   the	  Culture	  War	  was	   a	  disaster	   for	  Bismarck.	   Instead	  of	  weakening	   the	  
cohesion	   amongst	   Catholics,	   it	   strengthened	   it.	   Despite	   the	   repressive	   policies,	   the	   total	  
number	  of	  Catholic	  organizations	  and	  newspapers	   increased	  during	   the	  Culture	  Wars.	  The	  
concentration	   of	   the	   Catholic	   vote	   for	   the	   Center	   Party	   reached	   an	   all-­‐time	   high	   of	   80%	  
during	   the	   Culture	   War	   and	   it	   made	   the	   Center	   Party	   the	   second	   largest	   party	   in	   the	  
Reichstag.	  Disgruntled,	  Bismarck	  remarked	  on	  the	  8th	  May	  1880	  in	  the	  Reichstag	  that	  he	  had	  
become	  “deadly	  tired	  in	  this	  battle”.134	  Furthermore,	  Protestant	  and	  Conservative	  Prussian	  
religious	   authorities	   expressed	   ever	   more	   doubts	   about	   the	   Culture	   Wars	   as	   they	   were	  
experiencing	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  the	  general	  secularizing	  tendencies	  that	  it	  had	  brought	  
about.	  The	  Conservative	  and	  Protestant	  establishment	  became	   increasingly	  worried	  about	  
the	  rise	  of	  Socialism	  and	  feared	  that,	  with	  further	  alienation	  of	  the	  anti-­‐socialist	  Center	  Party	  
from	   the	   Reich,	   a	   potential	   ally	   for	   the	   upcoming	   battle	   against	   Socialism	  would	   be	   lost.	  
Smith	   comments:	   “Here	   was	   the	   crux	   of	   the	   matter.	   The	   Culture	   War	   was	   meant	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  four	  laws	  see	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1981)	  pp.	  84-­‐85.	  133	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1981)	  p.	  91.	  134	  “todmüde	  geworden	  in	  diesem	  Kampfe”	  Bismarck	  in	  the	  Reichstag	  on	  the	  8.5.1880,	  cited	  In:	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1981)	  p.	  93.	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culturally	   unify	   the	   new	   nation	   state	   but	   instead	   it	   aggravated	   the	   divisions	   between	  
Protestants	  and	  Catholics,	  it	  created	  not	  one	  nation	  but	  two”.135	  
	   A	  decisive	   factor	   in	  Bismarck’s	  decision	   to	  end	   the	  Culture	  War	  was	   the	  election	  of	  a	  
new	   Pope	   who	   succeeded	   the	   hardliner	   Pius	   IX	   in	   February	   1878.	   Leo	   XIII	   saw	   potential	  
diplomatic	   gains	   in	   coming	   to	   terms	  with	  Bismarck’s	  Reich	  because	  he	  was	  worried	  about	  
the	   increasingly	   independent	   political	   Catholicism	   and	   its	   strong	   electoral	   appeal	   in	  
Germany.	   The	   Pope	   offered	   to	   act	   as	   broker	   between	   German	   Catholicism	   and	   the	  
Chancellor.	  Bismarck	  accepted,	  also	  because	  he	  liked	  the	  idea	  of	  weakening	  the	  Center	  Party	  
by	  negotiating	  a	  settlement	  over	  its	  heads	  directly	  with	  the	  Vatican.	  The	  early	  1880s	  brought	  
a	  series	  of	  laws	  that	  relaxed	  the	  Kulturkampf	  legislation	  and	  the	  Culture	  Wars	  officially	  came	  
to	  an	  end	  with	  the	  ‘Peace	  Laws’	  (Friedensgesetze)	  of	  1886	  and	  1887.	  
	   The	  important	  point	  is	  that	  the	  Catholic	  Center	  Party	  shifted	  from	  being	  Bismarck’s	  arch	  
enemy	   towards	   becoming	   a	   legitimate	   political	   negotiation	   partner.	   Bismarck	   could	   not	  
eradicate	  Catholicism	  in	  the	  short	  run	  and	  other	  problems	  seemed	  more	  pressing.	  The	  rise	  
and	   threat	   of	   Socialism	   as	   a	   new	   political	   force	   and	   political	   subculture	   opened	   the	  
possibility	   of	   a	   political	   coalition	   between	   Protestantism	   and	   Catholicism.	   Without	   a	  
resolution	   of	   the	   Culture	   War,	   the	   strong	   influence	   of	   the	   Center	   Party	   on	   the	   Welfare	  
legislation	  of	  the	  1880s	  is	  basically	  unthinkable.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Culture	  Wars	  
also	   entailed	   a	   downside	   for	   German	   political	   Catholicism.	   The	   inter	   class	   party	   had	  
experienced	   a	   strong	   increase	   in	   cohesion	   through	   the	   Bismarckian	   attacks.	   The	   Center	  
Party	   historian	   Morsey	   goes	   even	   as	   far	   as	   to	   claim	   that	   “no	   one	   other	   than	   Bismarck	  
became	   in	   that	  way	   the	   stabilizer	  of	   this	  party”.136	  With	   the	   cohesive	   force	  of	   the	  Culture	  
War	  gone,	  the	  party	  saw	  a	  constant	  decline	   in	   its	  share	  of	  the	  vote	  from	  1884	  until	  World	  
War	  One.	  
	   The	  strong	  outside	  pressure	  through	  the	  Culture	  War	  on	  the	  Catholic	  milieu	  had,	  for	  the	  
first	  two	  decades	  after	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Reich,	  been	  the	  single	  most	  important	  collective	  
action	   resource.	   The	   constant	   “Church	   in	   danger”	   rhetoric	   allowed	   for	   the	   creating	   of	  
cohesion	   in	  the	  cross-­‐class	  spanning	  and	  geographically	  dispersed	  Catholic	  subculture.	  The	  
striving	   for	   parity	   in	   state	   and	   public	   life	   was	   one	   of	   the	  major	   points	   on	   the	   agenda	   of	  
Catholic	  politicians	  of	  the	  Center	  Party.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  Smith,	  H.	  W.	  (1995)	  p.	  48.	  136	  “kein	  anderer	  als	  Bismarck	  wurde	  so	  zum	  Stabilisator	  dieser	  Partei“	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1981)	  p.	  104.	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   However,	  social	  security	  was	  a	  potential	  way	  to	  compensate	  this.	  As	  the	  industrializing	  
areas	   lay	   primarily	   in	   Catholic	   regions	   of	   Germany	   (Rhineland,	   Silesia),	   Catholic	   workers	  
were	  often	  confronted	  with	  Protestant	  bosses.	  In	  general,	  Catholic	  workers	  tended	  to	  defect	  
in	   much	   smaller	   numbers	   from	   their	   subculture	   towards	   Socialism	   than	   the	   Protestant	  
workers.137	   Indeed	   for	   Protestantism	   the	  defection	  of	   urban	  working	   class	   and	   rural	   labor	  
Protestants	  was	  “bitter”.138	  Blackbourn	  calculates	  that	  among	  Protestants	  “only	  one	  percent	  
of	  nominal	  church	  members	  attended	  Sunday	  morning	  services	  in	  the	  working-­‐class	  parishes	  
in	  Berlin.”139	  
	   The	   Center	   was	   also	   able	   to	   leave	   its	   impression	   on	   social	   security	   legislation	   in	   the	  
1880s,	  despite	  the	  decline	   in	   its	  share	  of	  the	  vote,	  because	  it	  was	  advantaged	  through	  the	  
electoral	   institutions	   of	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich.	   The	   new	   election	   system	   of	   the	   unified	   Reich	  
granted	  each	  male	  citizen	  over	  25	  years	  an	  equal	  and	  secret	  vote	  and	  was	  organized	  using	  a	  
single	   member	   district	   system.	   The	   single	   member	   district	   situation	   guaranteed	   safe	  
mandates	  in	  the	  Catholic	  strongholds.	  As	  the	  election	  districts	  did	  not	  change	  until	  1918	  the	  
Center	  Party	  was	  never	  deprived	  of	  its	  secure	  strongholds.	  The	  effect	  was	  that	  for	  less	  and	  
less	   votes	   the	   Center	   Party	   could	   rely	   on	   a	   stable	   number	   of	   mandates	   throughout	   the	  
Kaiser	  Reich.	  At	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  the	  Culture	  War	  in	  1874,	  the	  party	  managed	  to	  secure	  28%	  
of	   all	   the	   votes	   which	   translated	   into	   91	   mandates	   in	   parliament.	   By	   1890	   the	   vote	   had	  
dropped	   to	  18%.	  Nevertheless,	   this	   resulted	   in	  106	  mandates.	   In	   the	  period	   from	  1874	   to	  
1914,	  between	  72	  and	  104	  seats	  went	  continuously	  to	  the	  Center	  Party.140	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐11	  Mandates	  Center	  Party	  1871-­‐1912	  
Year	   1871	   1874	   1877	   1878	   1881	   1884	   1887	   1890	   1893	   1898	   1903	   1907	   1912	  
Mandates	   63	   91	   93	   94	   100	   99	   98	   106	   96	   102	   100	   105	   91	  
Total	  
Mandates	  
382	   397	   397	   397	   397	   397	   397	   397	   397	   395	   	   	   	  
Data	  from	  database	  of	  the	  Konrad	  Adenauer	  Foundation	  and	  Lepsius,	  M.	  R.	  (1993)	  p.33.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  301.	  138	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  294.	  139	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1998)	  p.	  294.	  Reasons	  for	  the	  high	  defection	  rate	  among	  Protestants	  were	  the	  rapid	  urbanization	  with	  which	  the	  church	  could	  not	  keep	  up	  in	  terms	  of	  parish	  service	  provision	  (sometimes	  one	  Priest	  had	  to	  cater	  to	  50	  000	  followers),	  the	  association	  of	  Protestantism	  with	  the	  political	  authoritarian	  establishment	  and	  upper	  class	  of	  the	  Reich,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  were	  de	  facto	  a	  majority	  Protestant	  party	  according	  to	  its	  membership	  (albeit	  of	  course	  condemning	  any	  form	  of	  religion).	  140	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1981).	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Figure	  4-­‐12	  Vote	  decline	  and	  mandate	  increase	  Center	  1871-­‐1912	  
 
Vote decline of the Center Party and mandate percentage. Data from Lepsius, M.R. (1993) p.33. 
	  
To	  conclude,	  Bismarck	  knew	  that	  he	  needed	  to	  convince	  the	  people	  of	  the	  superiority	  and	  
dominance	  of	  his	  subculture	  if	  he	  wanted	  to	  consolidate	  his	  nation	  building	  project	  (Innere	  
Reichsgründung).	   His	   first	   attempt	   aimed	   at	   drying	   out	   the	   perceived	   fundaments	   of	  
Ultramontanism	  through	  the	  Culture	  War	  which	  aimed	  to	  weaken	  German	  Catholicism	  and	  
cut	  it	  off	  from	  Rome.	  The	  1870s	  saw	  the	  tremendous	  failure	  and	  backfiring	  of	  this	  strategy.	  
On	   top	   of	   it,	   a	   new	   potentially	   more	   dangerous	   threat	   evolved	   with	   the	   ascendance	   of	  
Socialism	   which	   manifested	   itself	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Socialist	   party	   in	   1876	   and	  
Bismarck’s	   formulation	   of	   the	   ‘Anti-­‐Socialist	   Laws’	   (Sozialistengesetze)	   two	   years	   later.141	  
The	  political	  battle	  and	  competition	  between	  worldviews	  and	  programmatic	   ideas	  was	  not	  
only	  about	  power	   in	  the	   institutions,	  but	  even	  more	  so	  about	  the	  cohesion	  within	  and	  the	  
penetration	  rate	  outside	  of	  the	  respective	  subcultures.	  To	  cut	  a	  long	  story	  short:	  there	  was	  a	  
battle,	   or	   at	   least	   a	   competition,	   unfolding	   during	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   19th	   century	  
between	  different	  worldviews	   and	   their	   subcultures	   in	  Germany	   that	   Bismarck	   could	   only	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of	   the	   19th	   century	   as	   the	   “old-­‐isms”	   (Protestantism	   and	   Catholicism)	   came	   increasingly	  
under	  pressure	  from	  the	  “new-­‐isms”	  (Liberalism,	  Nationalism	  and	  Socialism).	  This	  battle	  of	  
ideas	  unfolded	  not	  only	  on	  a	  macro	   level	  but	  also	   left	  a	  deep	   imprint	  on	   the	   formation	  of	  
programmatic	   beliefs	   in	  many	   other	   policy	   sub	   fields.142	   If	   one	  wanted	   to	   convince	   as	   an	  
“ism”	  one	  had	  to	  offer,	  alongside	  a	  coherent	  and	  appealing	  worldview,	  programmatic	  ideas	  
as	  responses	  to	  real	  world	  problems.	  The	  following	  will	  show	  how	  this	  competition	  impacted	  
and	   formed	   the	   evolution	   of	   Catholic	   programmatic	   ideas	   on	   welfare	   in	   19th	   century	  
Germany.	  
	  
4.4 Catholic	  Social	  Doctrine	  Development	  
Catholic	  Social	  teaching	  developed	  in	  Germany	  in	  three	  phases	  during	  the	  19th	  century.	  The	  
first	   stage	   is	   characterized	   by	   an	   ignoring	   of	   the	   societal	   and	   socioeconomic	   shifts	   that	  
industrialized	  capitalism	  triggered	   in	  Germany	  and	  by	  an	  encapsulation	  of	  Catholicism	  into	  
the	  spiritual	  realm.	  The	  second	  phase	  is	  marked	  by	  Catholic	  thinkers	  searching	  for	  solutions	  
that	  aimed	  at	  replacing	  liberal	  capitalism	  and	  industrialization,	  in	  other	  words	  for	  solutions	  
outside	   the	   system,	   such	  as	   a	   corporatist	   restructuring	  of	   society	   and	  economic	   relations.	  
The	  third	  phase	  marks	  a	  shift	  from	  seeking	  external	  solutions	  to	  looking	  for	  solutions	  from	  
within	   the	  capitalist	   system.	  This	   last	   shift,	  which	  developed	  many	  programmatic	   ideas	  on	  
how	  to	  embed	  organic	  corporatist	  organizational	  models	  within	  capitalism,	  is	  the	  step	  that	  
enabled	   the	   Catholic	   subculture	   and	   worldview	   to	   have	   a	   decisive	   impact	   on	   the	   social	  
security	  legislation	  of	  the	  1880s.	  
4.4.1 The	  negation	  of	  industrialization	  
The	  events	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution	  were	  a	  nightmarish	  experience	  for	  the	  Catholic	  Church.	  
Despite	   being	   of	   the	   major	   European	   countries	   with	   an	   almost	   homogenous	   Catholic	  
population,	  in	  one	  fell	  swoop	  France	  stripped	  the	  Church	  of	  most	  its	  former	  prerogatives	  in	  
the	  educational	  and	  welfare	  sector,	   sacked	   its	   fortune,	  executed	  about	  20,000	  priests	  and	  
exiled	  any	  clergymember	  that	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  swear	  loyalty	  to	  the	  French	  state.	  
	   The	  Church	  reacted	  to	  the	  revolution	   in	   two	  ways:	   first,	   it	  adopted	  a	   romantic	  stance	  
towards	   the	   past,	   rejecting	   outright	   anything	   that	   was	   connected	   to	   the	   ideals	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  Certainly	  pivotal	  was	  the	  ascendance	  of	  the	  Socialist	  Party	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich,	  as	  a	  new	  actor	  which	  had	  not	  existed	  in	  this	  form	  prior	  to	  unification.	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Enlightenment	  or	  the	  French	  Revolution	  while	  largely	  withdrawing	  from	  temporary	  political	  
matters	  by	  shifting	  its	  focus	  on	  a	  revival	  of	  the	  creed	  and	  its	  spiritual	  grip	  on	  its	  followers.143	  
A	  prime	  example	  of	  this	  was	  the	  strong	  resurgence	  of	  Mariology	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  
century,	  which	   centered	   around	   the	   Immaculate	   Conception	   of	  Mary	   and	  was	   formalized	  
with	  the	  papal	  bull	  Ineffabilis	  Deus	  in	  1854.144	  
	   As	  industrialized	  capitalism	  started	  to	  unfold,	  with	  all	   its	  consequences,	  from	  the	  mid-­‐
19th	   century	   onward,	   the	   Church	   shied	   away	   from	   engaging	   with	   the	   new	   social	  
phenomenon.	   Industrialization	   and	   capitalism	   were	   not	   analyzed	   and	   confronted	   on	   a	  
programmatic-­‐practical	   level	  but	   instead	  solely	   form	  a	  dogmatic-­‐religious	  point	  of	  view.	   In	  
other	  words,	  if	  the	  old	  social	  fabric	  was	  deteriorating	  and	  misery	  was	  increasing	  throughout	  
the	  19th	  century	  then	  this	  was	  not	  primarily	  seen	  as	  the	  fault	  of	  new	  modes	  of	  production	  
and	  economic	  exchange	  but	   instead	  due	  to	  a	  decrease	   in	  religiosity.	  People	  simply	  did	  not	  
attend	   church	   enough,	   no	   longer	   had	   sufficient	   faith,	   and	   had	   become	   sidetracked	   by	  
secular	  ideas.	  Hence	  the	  deteriorating	  social	  situation	  could	  even	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  divine	  
punishment.	  
	   Central	   to	   this	   reasoning	  was	  an	  embracing	  of	   the	  estate-­‐based	   society	  model	  of	   the	  
middle	  ages.	  Catholic	  clergy	  and	  episcopate	  romanticized	  and	  idealized	  the	  medieval	  as	  the	  
times	  when	  community	  had	  been	  the	  point	  of	  highest	  social	  reference.	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  
strong	  revival	  of	  medieval	  Aquinian	  social	  thinking.145	  	  
	   Adam	   Heinrich	   Mueller	   (1879-­‐1829),	   one	   of	   the	   leading	   romantic	   Catholic	   political	  
philosophers	  of	  the	  early	  19th	  century	  described	  the	  social	  fabric	  of	  the	  middle	  ages	  like	  this:	  
	  
The	   vast	  mass	   of	   the	   people	  was	   protected,	   through	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   countless	   natural	   and	   individual	  
associations,	  authorities,	  families,	  communities,	  estates	  that	  everyone	  belonged	  to,	  protected	  against	  the	  decay	  
of	  his	  own	  forcesand	  for	  the	  real	  abandoned,	  frail,	  displaced	  and	  for	  the	  few	  that	  are	  homeless,	  the	  Church	  took	  
care.146	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  This	  was	  formalized	  in	  the	  Syllabus	  of	  Errors	  (1864)	  and	  in	  the	  first	  Vatican	  Council	  (1870).	  144	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  cult	  of	  Mary	  on	  a	  resurgence	  of	  Catholicism	  was	  impressive.	  Pilgrimages	  became	  large	  scale	  mass	  events	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  In	  Germany	  alone	  four	  apparitions	  of	  Mary	  were	  reported.	  Smith,	  H.W.	  (1995)	  p.	  45.	  See	  also	  Balckbourn’s	  seminal	  account:	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1993)	  Marpingen:	  apparitions	  of	  the	  Virgin	  Mary	  in	  Bismarckian	  
Germany,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  145	  Loth,	  W.	  (1984)	  Katholiken	  im	  Kaiserreich:	  Der	  politische	  Katholizismus	  in	  der	  Krise	  des	  
wilhelminischen	  Deutschlands,	  Düsseldorf,	  Droste,	  p.	  20-­‐21.	  146„Die	  große	  Masse	  des	  Volkes	  war	  durch	  die	  Erhaltung	  der	  unzähligen	  natürlichen	  und	  einzelnen	  Körperschaften,	  Obrigkeiten,	  Familien,	  Gemeinden,	  Stände,	  denen	  jeder	  einzelne	  angehörte,	  gegen	  den	  Verfall	  seiner	  eigenen	  Kräfte	  geschützt	  und	  für	  die	  eigentlich	  Verlassenen,	  Gebrechlichen,	  Heimatlosen,	  für	  die	  wenigen,	  denen	  kein	  besonderes	  Obdach	  zuteil	  geworden	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On	   the	   early	   reasoning	  of	  German	  Catholic	   philosophy	   to	   the	   social	   questions	   of	   the	  day,	  
Langhorst	   and	   Stegmann	   comment	   that	   “The	   industrial	   social	   problems	   appear	   in	  
romanticism	  not	  as	  an	  urgent	  calling	  to	  search	  for	  adequate	  solutions	  to	  the	  economic	  and	  
technical	  requirements	  but	  mainly	  as	  a	  punishment,	  for	  not	  holding	  on	  to	  the	  old	  order.”147	  
From	  this	   it	   follows	  that	   it	  would	  have	  been	  sufficient	  to	  restore	  faith	  for	  all	  distortions	  to	  
vanish	  from	  the	  social	  fabric	  and	  for	  the	  atomized	  society	  to	  make	  way	  for	  a	  communitarian	  
corporate	  order.	  Measures	  aiming	   to	   restore	   the	   faith	  were	  discussed	   in	  German	  Catholic	  
journals	   and	   could	   take	   drastic	   and	   weird	   forms,	   such	   as	   for	   example	   the	   call	   for	   an	  
introduction	   of	   celibacy	   for	   most	   parts	   of	   German	   society	   or	   the	   calls	   for	   a	   re-­‐
masculinization	  of	  German	  Catholicism.148	  Individualism	  that	  created	  an	  “atomized	  society”	  
through	  rampant	  individual	  rationalism	  was	  the	  root	  cause	  for	  the	  breakup	  of	  the	  old	  social	  
fabric.	   As	   a	   consequence,	  most	   Catholic	   thinkers	   did	   not	   see	   the	   transformation	   towards	  
capitalized-­‐industrial	   society	  as	   the	   trigger	  of	  mass	  pauperization	  and	  misery.149	   Instead,	   it	  
was	  secularization	  and	  the	  gradual	  replacement	  of	  religion	  with	  an	  individualistic	  worldview	  
that	  was	  the	  root	  of	  all	  evil.	  
	   That	  said,	  things	  started	  to	  slightly	  change	  around	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  Even	  
though	   the	   social	   question	  was	   still	   regarded	  as	   a	   “moral	   problem”,	   it	   seemed	  ever	  more	  
connected	  to	  the	  process	  of	  industrialization	  that	  now	  started	  to	  unfold	  rapidly	  in	  Germany.	  
An	  indicator	  for	  this	  is	  that	  Catholic	  Journals	  like	  “Der	  Katholik”	  started	  to	  praise	  the	  relative	  
“economic	   passivity	   of	   the	   Catholic	   population”	   compared	   to	   other	   denominations.150	  
Industrialized	   capitalism	   became	   increasingly	   the	   target	   of	   Catholic	   critique.	   The	   Catholic	  
politician	  Franz	  Joseph	  Buβ	  argued	   in	  a	  speech	   in	  the	  parliament	  of	  Baden	  on	  the	  25	  April	  
1837	   that	   “The	   fabric	   system	   produces	   a	   new	   type	   of	   bondage.	   The	   fabric	   worker	   is	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  war,	  sorgte	  die	  Kirche.“	  Adam	  Mueller,	  Ausgewählte	  Abhandlungen,	  p.	  124.	  Cited	  from	  Stegmann,	  F.J.	  &	  Langhorst,	  P.	  (2005)	  Geschichte	  der	  Sozialen	  Ideen	  im	  Deutschen	  Katholizismus,	  IN:	  Grebing,	  H.	  (ed.)	  Geschichte	  der	  sozialen	  Ideen	  in	  Deutschland,	  Wiesbaden,	  Verlag	  für	  Sozialwissenschaften,	  p.	  619.	  147	  „Die	  industriellen	  Sozialprobleme	  erscheinen	  in	  der	  Romantik	  nicht	  vordringlich	  als	  Appell,	  den	  neuen	  wirtschaftlich-­‐technischen	  Erfordernissen	  entsprechend	  Lösungen	  zu	  suchen,	  sondern	  vor	  allem	  als	  Strafe	  dafür	  nicht	  an	  der	  alten	  Ordnung	  festzuhalten.“	  Stegmann,	  F.	  J.	  &	  Langhorst,	  P.	  (2005)	  p.	  619.	  148	  Stegmann,	  F.J.	  &	  Langhorst,	  P.	  (2005)	  p.	  620;	  Hastings,	  D.	  K.	  (2008)	  Fears	  of	  a	  Feminized	  Church:	  Catholics,	  Clerical	  Celibacy,	  and	  the	  Crisis	  of	  Masculinity	  in	  Wilhelmine	  Germany.	  European	  History	  Quaterly,	  Vol.	  38,	  No.	  1,	  pp.	  34-­‐65.	  149	  Stegmann,	  F.J.	  &	  Langhorst,	  P.	  (2005)	  pp.	  617,	  619.	  150	  Stegmann,	  F.J.	  &	  Langhorst,	  P.	  (2005)	  p.	  620.	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bond-­‐slave	  of	  his	  bread	  giver,	  who	  consumes	  him	  as	  profitable	   tool	  and	  dumps	  him	  away	  
once	  outworn”.151	  According	  to	  Buβ,	  this	  vicious	  circle	  of	  “wage	  slavery”	  had	  to	  be	  broken.	  
In	   fact	   he	   was	   one	   of	   the	   first	   who	   did	   not	   see	   this	   done	   through	   a	   rollback	   of	  
modernization.	  Instead	  he	  argued	  for	  reforms	  within	  the	  system.	  Buβ	  demanded	  something	  
revolutionary	   and	   new:	   contribution-­‐based	   social	   security.	   As	   early	   as	   1837	   he	   promoted	  
“that	   the	   worker	   should	   not	   become	   constrained	   through	   sickness	   or	   other	   temporary	  
accidents,	  to	  touch	  his	  savings,	  therefore	  special	  help	  funds	  should	  be	  established”.152	  Social	  
Security	   should	   be	   contribution	   based	   both	   by	   workers	   and	   employers,	   a	   constitutive	  
feature	   of	   later	   Christian	   Democratic	   welfare	   state	   models	   and	   van	   Kersbergen’s	   social	  
capitalism	   concept.153	  Nevertheless,	   Buβ	  was	   an	   exception	   and	  his	   callings	  went	   relatively	  
unheard	  during	  the	  1830s.154	  
	  
4.4.2 Solutions	  from	  outside	  
Pivotal	   in	  moving	  German	  Catholicism	  gradually	  away	   from	  romantic	   interpretation	  of	   the	  
repercussions	  of	  Capitalism	  was	  the	  “workers	  Bishop”	  (Arbeiterbischof)	  Wilhelm-­‐Emmanuel	  
von	  Ketteler,	   Bishop	  of	  Mainz	   (1811-­‐1877).	   	   At	   first,	   Ketteler	   also	   interpreted	   the	   societal	  
change	  in	  Germany	  during	  the	  19th	  century	  in	  pure	  theological	  terms	  but	  changed	  his	  mind	  
considerably	  towards	  the	  last	  third	  of	  the	  century.	  	  
	   Ketteler	  was	  the	  first	  of	  the	  higher	  clergy	  to	  mention	  the	  social	  question	  in	  his	  sermons.	  
The	   Bishop	   raised	   awareness	   through	   detailed	   descriptions	   of	   pauperism,	   social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  „Das	  Fabrikwesen	  erzeugt	  eine	  Hörigkeit	  neuer	  Art.	  Der	  Fabrikarbeiter	  ist	  der	  Leibeigen	  seine	  Brotherren,	  der	  ihn	  als	  nutzbringendes	  Werkzeug	  verbraucht	  und	  abgenutzt	  wegwirft“	  Franz	  Joseph	  Buss	  on	  the	  25.	  April	  1837	  speech	  in	  the	  Badischer	  Landtag.	  Printed	  IN:	  Rüther,	  G.	  (1986)	  
Geschichte	  der	  christlich-­‐demokratischen	  und	  christlich-­‐sozialen	  Bewegungen	  in	  Deutschland.	  
Grundlagen,	  Quellen,	  Unterrichtsmodelle	  Teil	  II,	  Köln,	  Verlag	  Wissenschaft	  und	  Politik,	  p.	  195.	  152	  “Damit	  aber	  nicht	  durch	  Krankheit	  und	  andere	  vorübergehende	  Unfälle	  der	  Arbeiter	  genötigt	  werde,	  sein	  Ersparnis	  anzugreifen,	  sollen	  besondere	  Hilfskassen	  errichtet	  werden.”	  Franz	  Joseph	  Buss	  on	  the	  25.	  April	  1837	  speech	  in	  the	  Badischer	  Landtag.	  Printed	  IN:	  Rüther,	  G.	  (1986)	  p.	  196.	  	  153	  “Der	  Fabrikherr	  selbst	  soll	  die	  Hälfte	  der	  Abzüge	  sämtlicher	  Arbeiter	  in	  die	  	  Hilfskasse	  beitragen“	  Franz	  Joseph	  Buss	  on	  the	  25.	  April	  1837	  speech	  in	  the	  Badischer	  Landtag.	  Printed	  IN:	  Rüther,	  G.	  (1986)	  p.	  196.	  154	  Another	  Catholic	  social	  thinker	  that	  was,	  like	  Buβ,	  ahead	  of	  his	  time	  was	  Peter	  Franz	  Reichensperger.	  Görner	  argues	  that	  the	  liberal	  revolutionary	  attempts	  of	  1848	  had	  deeply	  scared	  Catholicism	  which	  made	  it	  withdraw	  to	  its	  arch-­‐orthodox	  positions	  once	  again.	  Görner,	  R.	  (1986)	  Die	  Deutschen	  Katholiken	  und	  die	  soziale	  Frage	  im	  19.	  Jahrhundert.	  IN:	  Rüther,	  G.	  (ed.)	  
Geschichte	  der	  christlich-­‐demokratischen	  und	  christlich-­‐sozialen	  Bewegungen	  in	  Deutschland.	  
Grundlagen,	  Quellen,	  Unterrichtsmodelle	  Teil	  II,	  Köln,	  Verlag	  Wissenschaft	  und	  Politik,	  p.	  158.	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deterioration	   and	   the	   resulting	   atomization	  of	   society	   in	   his	   sermons	   and	   in	   his	   extensive	  
writings	   and	   publication	   activities.	   155	   	   In	   1848,	   Ketteler	   still	   analyzed	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	  
social	  question	  in	  theological	  terms	  when	  stating	  that	  “the	  apostatizing	  from	  Christianity	  has	  
brought	  mischief	  over	  us,	  only	  the	  return	  to	  Christianity	  can	  help	  us”.156	  	  
	   	   However,	   in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  century	  Ketteler	  was	  increasingly	  able	  to	  frame	  
the	   problem	   and	   was	   essential	   in	   pushing	   German	   Catholics	   out	   of	   the	   bedrock	   of	   their	  
idealist	   dreams	   by	   confronting	   them	   with	   the	   contemporary	   social	   realities.	   From	   the	  
beginnings	   of	   the	   1860s	   onwards,	   Ketteler	   increasingly	   scrutinized	   the	   social	   question	   as	  
being	   induced	   by	   industrialized	   capitalism.	   In	   his	   book	   of	   1864	   “The	   Labor	   Question	   and	  
Christianity”	  he	  states	  that	  	  
	  
There	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  any	  doubt	  that	  the	  whole	  material	  existence	  of	  almost	  the	  entire	  working	  classes,	  by	  far	  
the	  majority	  of	  all	  persons	  in	  the	  modern	  states,	  the	  existence	  of	  their	  families,	  their	  daily	  worries	  about	  the	  very	  
bread	  required	  for	  the	  subsistence	  of	  a	  man,	  his	  wife	  and	  children,	  is	  exposed	  to	  every	  fluctuation	  of	  the	  markets	  
and	  the	  market	  prices.	  I	  do	  not	  know	  of	  anything	  that	  is	  more	  lamentable	  than	  this	  fact.	  What	  feelings	  must	  this	  
invoke	   in	  these	  poor	  people	  who	  depend	  with	  everything	  they	  need,	  everything	  they	   love	  on	  the	  daily	  market	  
price!	   This	   is	   the	   slave	   market	   of	   our	   liberal	   Europe,	   cut	   out	   according	   to	   the	   pattern	   set	   by	   our	   humane,	  
enlightened,	  anti-­‐Christian	  liberalism	  and	  Free-­‐Masonry!157	  
	  
This	  reversed	  the	  causality	  in	  Catholic	  Social	  thought.	  No	  longer	  were	  individuals	  falling	  from	  
the	  creed	   responsible	   for	   liberal	   industrialized	  capitalist	  production	  and	  misery.	   Instead,	   it	  
was	   capitalist	   production	   and	   the	   misery	   it	   triggered	   that	   led	   to	   an	   atomized	   and	   de-­‐
spiritualized	   society.	   Nevertheless,	   even	   though	   German	   Catholicism	   started	   to	   slowly	  
diverge	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  social	  fabric	  could	  be	  only	  repaired	  through	  a	  
spiritual	  answer,	  the	  first	  conceptualizations	  of	  responses	  to	  the	  contemporary	  changes	  that	  
industrialized	   capitalism	   was	   bringing	   about	   were	   programmatically	   locked	   into	   past	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  Misner,	  P.	  (1991)	  ‘The	  Predecessors	  of	  “Rerum	  Novarum”	  Within	  Catholicism’	  Review	  of	  Social	  
Economy,	  Vol.	  45,	  No.	  4,	  pp.	  444-­‐464,	  p.	  447;	  Görner,	  R.;	  p.160.	  156	  Der	  Abfall	  vom	  Christentum	  habe	  das	  Verderben	  über	  uns	  gebracht,	  die	  Rückkehr	  zum	  christentum	  könne	  uns	  nur	  	  helfen“	  Ketteler,	  W.	  (1848)	  Die	  Katholische	  Lehre	  vom	  Eigentum.	  Printed	  in:	  Rüther,	  G.	  (1986)	  p.	  199.	  157	  „Es	  ist	  keine	  Täuschung	  darüber	  mehr	  möglich,	  dass	  die	  ganze	  materielle	  Existenz	  fast	  des	  ganzen	  Arbeiterstandes,	  also	  des	  weitaus	  größten	  Teils	  der	  Menschen	  in	  den	  modernen	  Staaten,	  die	  Existenz	  ihrer	  Familien	  die	  tägliche	  Frage	  um	  das	  notwendige	  Brot	  für	  Mann,	  Frau	  und	  Kinder,	  allen	  Schwankungen	  des	  Marktes	  und	  des	  Marktpreises	  ausgesetzt	  ist.	  Ich	  kenne	  nichts	  beklagenswerteres	  als	  diese	  Tatsache.	  Welche	  Empfindungen	  muss	  das	  in	  diesen	  armen	  Menschen	  hervorrufen	  die	  mit	  allem	  was	  sie	  nötig	  haben	  und	  was	  sie	  lieben	  täglich	  auf	  den	  Marktpreis	  angewiesen	  sind!	  Das	  ist	  der	  Sklavenmarkt	  unseres	  liberalen	  Europas	  zugeschnitten	  nach	  dem	  Muster	  unseres	  humanen,	  aufgeklärten,	  antichristlichen	  Liberalismus	  und	  Freimaurerthums.“	  	  Ketteler,	  W.	  E.	  (1864)	  Die	  Arbeiterfrage	  und	  das	  Christenthum	  Third	  Edition,	  	  Mainz,	  Verlag	  von	  Franz	  Kirchheim,	  p.	  20.	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romanticism.	   The	   early	   Catholic	   attempts	   to	   solve	   the	   social	   question	   outright	   rejected	  
solutions	  within	  a	  capitalist	  liberal	  system.	  They	  wanted	  to	  transform	  it	  by	  integrating	  it	  with	  
medieval,	   feudal	  and	  mercantilist	  conceptions	  of	  an	   integrated	  socioeconomic	  society.	  The	  
prime	  exponent	  of	  this	  branch	  of	  thought	  was	  Karl	  Freiherr	  von	  Vogelsang	  (1818-­‐1890).	  He	  
developed	  a	  hierarchical,	  organic,	  and	  estate-­‐based	  concept	  of	  corporatism	  that	  applied	  the	  
organizational	   principles	   of	   the	  medieval	   guild	   system	   to	   present	   times.	   Vogelsang	  was	   a	  
German	   converted	  Catholic	   social	   thinker	   that	  had	  moved	   to	  Vienna	   in	  1864	  and	   strongly	  
influenced	  the	  debate	  in	  German-­‐speaking	  Catholic	  Europe	  through	  his	  extensive	  publishing.	  
The	   revolutionary	   (or	   maybe	   utopian)	   idea	   to	   overthrow	   the	   existing	   system	   was	   also	  
inspired	   by	   Marx’s	   writings.	   Franz	   Hitze	   (1851-­‐1921),	   a	   student	   of	   Vogelsang	   who	   later	  
became	   a	   leading	   figure	   of	   German	   Social	   Catholicism,	   formed	   his	   ideas	   “after	   intense	  
reading	  of	  the	  ‘Kapital’	  from	  Karl	  Marx”.158	  	  	  
	   In	   general	   the	   affinities	   to	   the	   Left	   seemed	   much	   greater	   in	   Germany	   than	   any	  	  
Catholic	   would	   have	   openly	   admitted.	   Ketteler	   turned	   to	   estate-­‐based	   and	   corporative	  
solutions	   at	   first	   and	   searched	   for	   concrete	   organizational	   blueprints	   for	   them.	   He	   found	  
them	  on	  the	  Left.159	  The	  founder	  of	  the	  General	  German	  Worker’s	  Association	  (Allgemeiner	  
Deutscher	   Arbeiter	   Verein),	   the	   first	   Social	   Democratic	   association	   in	   Germany,	   Friedrich	  
Lassalle	  had	  sketched	  a	  similar	  approach	  to	  replace	   industrialized	  capitalism.	  He	  started	  to	  
exchange	  views	  with	  Lassalle	   (via	  anonymous	   letters)	   that	   inspired	  him	  to	   think	  about	   the	  
social	  developments	  in	  practical	  terms.	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  transform	  workers	  into	  owners	  and	  
employees	   so	   that	   antagonistic	   interests	   between	   different	   classes	   could	   be	   organically	  
resolved.	  This	  would	  not	  only	  restore	  the	  social	  fabric	  of	  the	  past	  but	  also	  put	  an	  end	  to	  class	  
conflict.	   In	   contrast	   to	   Lassalle’s	   concept	   where	   the	   state	   would	   play	   an	   active	   part,	  
Ketteler’s	  concept	  confined	  the	  state	  to	  a	  residual	  role.	  It	  is	  not	  too	  surprising	  that	  Ketteler’s	  
rather	   naive	   conception	   of	   the	   productive	   associations	   failed.	   The	   original	   idea	   was	   that	  
startup	  capital	  would	  be	  provided	  by	  wealthy	  Catholics.	  This	  capital	  never	  arrived,	  however.	  
This	  first	  harsh	  set	  back	  dragged	  Ketteler	  further	  away	  from	  the	  romantic	  backward	  looking	  
solutions	   and	   he	   even	   started	   to	   think	   about	   solutions	   that	  might	   include	   the	   state	   as	   a	  
major	  player.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  “nach	  intensive	  Lektuere	  des	  “Kapitals”	  von	  Karl	  Marx“	  Stegmann,	  F.	  J.	  &	  Langhorst,	  P.	  (2005)	  p.	  646.	  Hitze	  would,	  similarly	  to	  Ketteler,	  make	  a	  turn	  towards	  solutions	  from	  within	  the	  system	  during	  the	  latter	  stages	  of	  his	  career.	  	  159	  Stegmann,	  F.J.	  &	  Langhorst,	  P.	  (2005)	  p.	  621.	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   The	  failure	  of	  the	  productive	  associations	  and	  the	  death	  of	  Lassalle	  in	  a	  duel	  (1864)	  led	  
to	   an	   anti-­‐Catholic	   Protestant	   take	   over	   (at	   least	   according	   to	   Ketteler160)	   in	   the	   General	  
German	   Worker’s	   Association	   (Allgemeiner	   Deutscher	   Arbeiterverein).	   Ketteler	   distanced	  
himself	   from	  Social	  Democracy.	  Before	   Lassalle’s	  death	   the	  Catholic	  Church’s	  hostility	  had	  
mainly	   targeted	   Maximalist	   Marxist	   Socialism	   and	   viewed	   suspiciously,	   though	   not	  
necessarily	   with	   hostility,	   the	   revisionist	   and	   Social	   Democratic	   branch	   of	   the	   General	  
German	   Worker’s	   Association.	   From	   Lassalle’s	   death	   onwards,	   both	   branches	   were	  
increasingly	   declared	   incompatible	   with	   Christianity	   and	   their	   ideology	   was	   portrayed	   as	  
aggravating	   the	   situation.	   The	   Syllabus	   of	   Errors	   issued	   by	   Pope	   Pius	   IX	   in	   1864	   termed	  
Socialism	   and	   Communism	   as	   “pests”.161	   Peter	   Franz	   Reichensperger	   (1810-­‐1892),	   one	   of	  
the	   founding	   members	   of	   the	   Center	   Party,	   boasted	   at	   the	   German	   Catholic	   general	  
assembly	  in	  1858	  that	  “fleshly	  and	  mental	  bale	  are	  as	  old	  as	  humanity,	  new	  though	  are	  the	  
hate,	   rage,	   the	  anger,	   the	  outrage	  and	  desperation,	  which	   substitute	  Christian	  patience	   in	  
some	   parts	   of	   society.	   The	   poison	   of	   Socialism	   makes	   these	   wounds	   ten	   times	   more	  
dolorous.”162	  Ketteler	  followed	  suit	   in	  1871	  and	  proclaimed	  that	  Socialism	  was	  “One	  of	  the	  
most	   rotten	   obliquities	   of	   the	   human	  mind”.163	   The	   instrumental	   flirt	   with	   programmatic	  
ideas	  on	  the	  Left	  had	  ended	  and	  was	  forestalled	  for	  the	  coming	  decades.	  
	  
4.4.3 Solutions	  from	  within	  
The	  necessity	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  (perceived)	   increasing	  hostility	  of	  Socialism,	  
and	   its	   solutions	   to	   the	   worker’s	   crisis,	   marked	   the	   watershed	   in	   the	   development	   of	  
Catholic	  Social	  doctrine.	  By	  the	  late	  1860s,	  Ketteler	  was	  convinced	  that	  if	  Catholicism	  could	  
not	   find	   its	   own	   approach	   to	   the	   problem	   then	   it	   would	   lose	   the	   Catholic	   working	   class	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  Indeed,	  leaving	  the	  Church	  became	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  joining	  the	  General	  German	  Worker’s	  association	  in	  the	  post	  Lassalle	  era.	  	  161	  Syllabus	  of	  Errors	  (1864)	  p.	  IV.	  162	  „leibliches	  und	  geistiges	  Elend	  sei	  so	  alt	  wie	  das	  Menschengeschlecht,	  neu	  sei	  aber	  der	  Hass,	  der	  Ingrimm,	  die	  Wut	  und	  Verzweiflung,	  die	  anstelle	  der	  christlichen	  Geduld	  gewisse	  Gesellschaftskreise	  erfülle.	  Das	  Gift	  des	  Sozialismus	  mache	  diese	  Wunden	  zehnfach	  schmerzhafter“	  Peter	  Franz	  Reichensperger	  on	  the	  Katholikentag	  1858.	  Printed	  IN:	  Filthaut,	  P.E.	  (1960)	  Deutsche	  Katholikentage,	  1848-­‐1958	  und	  soziale	  Frage,	  Essen,	  p.	  36.	  Cited	  IN:	  Görner,	  R.	  (1986)	  p.	  161.	  	  163	  „Eine	  der	  verderblichsten	  Verirrungen	  des	  menschlichen	  Geistes“	  Filthaut,	  P.E.	  (1960)	  
Deutsche	  Katholikentage,	  1848-­‐1958	  und	  soziale	  Frage,	  Essen,	  p.	  66.	  Cited	  IN:	  Görner,	  R.	  (1986)	  p.	  162.	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either	  to	  the	  Left	  or	  to	  Bismarck,	  who	  had	  in	  the	  meantime	  also	  started	  to	  develop	  concrete	  
Protestant	  and	  state	  driven	  social	  security	  plans	  (and	  had	  also	  met	  with	  Lassalle).	  Marx	  and	  
Bismarck	   had	   unsettled	   a	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	   programmatic	   ideas	   on	   social	   security	   that	  
started	  to	  unfold	  amongst	  all	  subcultures.	   If	  Catholicism	  wanted	  to	  stay	  competitive	   it	  had	  
to	  open	  its	  own	  shop	  and	  offer	  something	  to	  the	  working	  class.	  	  
	   Ketteler	  stacked	  this	  shop	  with	  modern	  tools.164	  In	  a	  speech	  near	  Offenbach	  in	  1869	  he	  
actively	   demanded	   the	   opening	   of	   Catholic	   worker’s	   organizations	   (Unions)	   which	   he	  
deemed	   all	   of	   a	   sudden	   to	   be	   a	   “natural	   necessity”	   for	   Catholic	   workers.	   Strikes	   were	  
allowed	  as	  long	  as	  they	  were	  not	  used	  to	  further	  fuel	  class	  struggle.165	  Ketteler	  furthermore	  
demanded	  wage	  increases,	  work	  time	  reduction	  and	  a	  ban	  of	  female	  and	  child	  labor.	  In	  the	  
same	   year	   he	   lobbied	   the	   Catholic’s	   Day	   (Katholikentag),	   the	   annual	   rally	   of	   German	  
Catholics,	   to	  open	  a	   section	  dedicated	   to	   finding	  programmatic	   responses	   to	   the	  worker’s	  
question.166	  Ketteler	  also	   founded	  and	  edited	  a	  number	  of	  Catholic	   journals	   that	  aimed	  to	  
establish	   a	   forum	   for	   Catholic	   intellectuals	   to	   discuss	   Catholic	   solutions	   to	   the	   labor	  
question.167	   He	   actively	   lobbied	   for	   a	   reformation	   of	   clergy	   education	   which	   introduced	  
mandatory	  training	  in	  modern	  economic	  theory.	  His	  organizational	  efforts	  cumulated	  in	  the	  
formation	   of	   the	   Center	   Party	   (Zentrum)	   in	   1870.	   The	   foundational	   manifesto	   lists	   nine	  
bullet	   points,	   of	  which	   two	  are	  dedicated	   to	   social	   reform.168	  While	   the	   first	   one	  of	   these	  
enshrines	   the	  Center	  Party’s	   commitment	   to	   strive	   for	  mediation	  between	   capital,	   landed	  
estates	   and	   workers,	   the	   second	   one	   proclaims	   “Freedom	   for	   all	   lawful	   solutions	   of	   the	  
social	  tasks.	  Abolition	  of	  those	  mischiefs,	  which	  threaten	  the	  worker	  with	  moral	  or	  physical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164	  The	  turn	  towards	  programmatic	  and	  pragmatic	  ideas	  and	  solutions	  to	  the	  problem	  from	  within	  the	  system	  was	  facilitated	  through	  an	  increasing	  influence	  of	  liberal	  Catholic	  ideas	  diffused	  by	  Catholic	  entrepreneurs	  from	  France	  and	  Belgium	  in	  the	  Rhineland	  area	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  They	  saw	  the	  defects	  of	  modern	  capitalism	  not	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Adam	  Smith	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  deformation	  of	  an	  unregulated	  Manchester-­‐capitalism.	  This	  line	  was	  most	  prominently	  embodied	  by	  the	  philosopher	  and	  Center	  Party	  politician	  Georg	  von	  Hertling	  during	  the	  Wilhelmina	  era.	  Stegmann,	  F.J.	  &	  Langhorst,	  P.	  (2005),	  p.	  655.	  165	  Though	  this	  was	  from	  conservative	  Catholics	  decried	  as	  “socialist	  communistic	  preachments”	  Alexander,	  (1953)	  p.	  414.	  166	  Görner,	  R.	  (1986)	  p.	  165.	  167	  Most	  prominent	  among	  those	  were	  the	  Christlich	  Soziale	  Blätter	  and	  the	  Mainzer	  Journal.	  168	  Four	  (1-­‐4)	  of	  the	  remaining	  seven	  points	  are	  attributed	  to	  the	  defense	  of	  Catholicism	  in	  anticipation	  to	  the	  culture	  war	  and	  two	  (5-­‐7)	  emphasize	  the	  weakening	  of	  the	  Protestant	  central	  state	  with	  a	  pledge	  for	  decentralization.	  Das	  Soester	  Wahlprogramm	  des	  Zentrums,	  28.	  Oktober	  1870.	  Printed	  IN:	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1988)	  Quellentexte	  zur	  Geschichte	  des	  Katholizismus,	  Band	  1:	  
Katholizismus,	  Verfassungsstaat	  und	  Demokratie:	  Vom	  Vormärz	  bis	  1933,	  Paderborn,	  Ferdinand	  Schoeningh,	  p.	  56.	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ruin.”169	  The	  Soester	  program	  of	  the	  Center	  Party	  marked	  the	  end	  point	  of	  a	   long	  phase	  in	  
Catholic	   Social	   teaching	   throughout	   the	   19th	   century,	   from	   the	   spiritual	   to	   the	   corporatist	  
and	  estate-­‐based	  utopian	  overthrow	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  towards	  a	  search	  for	  programmatic	  
ideas	   and	   solutions	  within	   the	   system.	   The	  organizational	   and	   ideological	   transformations	  
within	   Catholicism	   did	   not	   go	   unnoticed	   by	   the	   ones	   that	   had	   triggered	   the	   turn	   through	  
starting	   programmatic	   ideational	   competition	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Marx	   wrote	   to	   Engels	   in	  
1869	  infuriated	  about	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Catholics	  that	  	  
	  
During	  this	  tour	  through	  Belgium,	  layover	  in	  Aachen	  and	  cruise	  up	  the	  Rhine,	  I	  convinced	  myself	  that	  especially	  in	  
the	  Catholic	  areas	  we	  have	  to	  go	  against	  the	  clerics.	  I	  will	  work	  through	  the	  International	  on	  these	  matters.	  The	  
dogs	   flirt	   with	   the	   labor	   question	   (e.g.	   Bishop	   Ketteler	   in	  Mainz,	   the	   clerics	   on	   the	   Düsseldorf	   congress	   etc.)	  
where	  it	  deems	  them	  appropriate.170	  
	  
Bismarck	  became	  equally	  worried	  about	  the	  Catholic	  efforts	  on	  the	  social	  security	  front	  and	  
equated	  the	  Catholics	  efforts	  on	  social	  security	  with	  the	  Socialists	  by	  calling	  them	  the	  “Black	  
Internationale”.	   The	   liberals	   responded	   to	   this	   by	   increasing	   their	   efforts	   to	   build	   up	   a	  
network	  of	  liberal	  workers	  unions	  on	  the	  bases	  of	  the	  “Hirsch	  Dunkerschen	  Gewerkvereine”.	  
	   Through	  the	  programmatic	  innovations	  of	  Ketteler’s	  transformation	  and	  organizational	  
innovations,	   German	   Catholicism	   was	   now	   ready	   to	   reform	   the	   system	   from	   within.	   The	  
main	   aim	  was	  no	   longer	   a	  wholesale	  overthrowing	  of	   the	  existing	   liberal-­‐capitalist	   system	  
and	   its	   replacement	   with	   a	   corporatist	   estate-­‐based	   hierarchical	   order.	   As	   a	   concrete	  
political	  zeal	  this	  may	  still	  have	  been	  possible	  in	  Vogelsang’s	  homogenously	  Catholic	  Austria	  
but	  it	  was	  a	  utopian	  endeavor	  in	  a	  German	  Kaiser	  Reich	  dominated	  by	  a	  Protestant	  political	  
elite	   in	   which	   Catholicism	   was	   in	   a	   minority	   position.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   legacies	   of	   the	  
estate-­‐based	  ideas	  still	  formed	  and	  informed	  Catholic	  Social	  ideas	  only	  that	  they	  were	  now	  
to	   apply	   from	  within	   the	   system	   instead	   of	   from	  without	   the	   system.	   This	   also	   becomes	  
evident	  when	  we	  look	  at	  how	  far	  Catholic	  Social	  ideas	  were	  influenced	  by	  German	  Catholics’	  
experiences	   as	   a	   minority	   in	   the	   run	   up	   to	   unification	   and	   during	   the	   Culture	   War.	   The	  
emphasize	   of	   Catholic	   Social	   programmatic	   ideas	   on	   decentralized	   and	   para-­‐statal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Das	  Soester	  Wahlprogramm	  des	  Zentrums,	  28.	  Oktober	  1870,	  printed	  IN:	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1988)	  p.	  56.	  170	  „Bei	  dieser	  Tour	  durch	  Belgien,	  Aufenthalt	  in	  Aachen	  und	  Fahrt	  den	  Rhein	  hinauf,	  habe	  ich	  mich	  überzeugt,	  dass,	  speziell	  in	  den	  katholischen	  Gegenden,	  gegen	  die	  Pfaffen	  losgegangen	  werden	  muss.	  Ich	  werde	  in	  diesem	  Sinne	  durch	  die	  Internationale	  wirken.	  Die	  Hunde	  kokettieren	  (z.B.	  Bischof	  Ketteler	  in	  Mainz,	  die	  Pfaffen	  auf	  dem	  Düsseldorfer	  Kongress	  usw.)	  wo	  es	  passend	  scheint,	  mit	  der	  Arbeiterfrage“	  Marx,	  K.	  und	  Engels,	  F.	  (1973	  [1870])	  Werke	  32:	  Briefe	  Januar	  1868-­‐Mitte	  Juli	  1870,	  Berlin-­‐Ost,	  p.	  371,	  cited	  IN:	  Görner,	  R.	  (1986)	  p.	  165.	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organization	  and	  the	  subsidiarity	  of	  welfare	  solutions	  and	  institutions	  was	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  
Catholicism’s	   suspicions	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   Bismarck’s	   Protestant	   central	   state.	   These	   experiences	  
made	  their	  way	  back	   into	  the	  overarching	   ideological	  container	  of	   the	  Catholic	  worldview.	  
The	   achievements	   in	   organization	   and	   institution	   building,	   together	   with	   the	   legislative	  
impact	   that	   German	   Catholicism	   managed	   to	   achieve	   during	   the	   1880s,	   “would	   make	  
German	  social	  Catholicism	  the	  pride	  of	  Catholic	  Europe”,	  as	  Misner	  writes.171	  
	  
4.5 Rerum	  Novarum:	  Going	  International	  
	  
At	  the	  time	  being	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  working	  classes	  is	  the	  pressing	  question	  of	  the	  hour	  
	  
Rerum	  Novarum	  1891172	  
	  
The	  encyclical	  Rerum	  Novarum,	   issued	  in	  1891	  by	  Pope	  Leo	  XIII,	  was	  the	  first	  official	  papal	  
document	  that	  addressed	  the	  Social	  Question.	  Rerum	  Novarum	  was	  strongly	   influenced	  by	  
the	   development	   of	   Catholic	   social	   teaching	   in	   Germany	   and	   the	   legislative	   impact	   it	  
managed	  to	  achieve.	  It	  marks	  the	  official	  endpoint	  of	  a	  century	  long	  doctrine	  development	  
and	   is	   a	   clear	   statement	   for	   a	   positioning	   of	   Catholic	   Social	   teaching	   as	   a	   doctrine	   that	  
searches	  for	  solutions	  from	  within	   liberal	  capitalism.	  The	  encyclical	   is	   important	  because	   it	  
became	  the	  major	  reference	  point	  for	  political	  and	  social	  Catholicism	  for	  the	  next	  forty	  years	  
until	  it	  was	  succeeded	  by	  the	  second	  social	  encyclical	  Quadragesimo	  Anno	  in	  1931.	  
	   The	   encyclical	   elaborates	   on	   five	   major	   points	   that	   that	   are	   identified	   as	   the	  
cornerstones	  of	  Catholic	  social	  and	  economic	  thought:	  the	  untouchability	  of	  property	  rights,	  
the	  family	  as	  the	  basic	  entity	  of	  society	  and	  economy,	  the	  concept	  of	  mediation	  as	  opposed	  
to	  class	  conflict,	  the	  ‘rights	  and	  duties	  of	  capital	  and	  labor’	  (hence	  the	  title)	  and	  the	  residual	  
but	  supervising	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  this	  framework.	  
	   The	   Encyclical	   is	   strongly	   influenced	   by	   the	   developments	   of	   German	   Catholic	   Social	  
teaching	   and	   Bishop	   Ketteler’s	   writings,	   whom	   Pope	   Leo	   XIII	   called	   “notre	   grand	  
predecesseur”173	   (our	   great	   predecessor),	   though	   of	   course	   it	   also	   draws	   heavily	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171	  Misner,	  P.	  (1991)	  p.	  448.	  172	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  60.	  173	  Leo	  XII	  cited	  from	  Misner,	  P.	  (1991)	  p.	  447.	  Misner’s	  1991	  article	  is	  an	  excellent	  summary	  on	  the	  	  yet	  to	  be	  fully	  explored	  archival	  origins	  of	  the	  Encyclical.	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developments	   in	   other	   countries.174	   Rerum	   Novarum	   is	   a	   hybrid.	   It	   stays	   with	   one	   foot	  
anchored	  in	  the	  nostalgic	  sentiments	  for	  an	  organic	  corporatist	  feudal	  order	  but	  also	  tries	  to	  
bridge	  this	   into	  a	  concept	  that	  responds	  to	  the	  challenges	  of	   industrial	  modernization.	  The	  
pessimistic	   assessment,	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   encyclical,	   of	   the	   changes	   in	   social	  
conditions	  that	  the	  19th	  century	  had	  brought	  about	  is	  contrasted	  with	  an	  idealistic	  picture	  of	  
the	  medieval	   and	   feudal	   times.	  Rerum	  Novarum	   therefore	   replicates	  parts	  of	   the	  German	  
evolution	  of	  Catholic	  Social	  teaching	  that	  oscillated	  between	  programmatic	  ideas	  within	  the	  
system	  (trade-­‐unionism,	  blueprint	  for	  neo-­‐corporatism)	  and	  an	  overarching	  ideal	  worldview	  
that	   could	   only	   be	   fulfilled	   outside	   of	   the	   system	   (organic,	   estate-­‐based,	   non-­‐liberal	  
corporatist	  socioeconomic	  order).	  The	  encyclical	  also	  walks	  another	  tightrope.	  Its	  main	  task	  
was	  to	  offer	  something	  new,	  a	  “third	  way”	  between	  Socialism	  and	  liberalism,	  by	  offering	  a	  
modern	  competitive	  Catholic	  Social	  doctrine	  that	  clearly	  delineates	  itself	  from	  the	  other	  two	  
ideologies.	  
	  
4.5.1 Private	  Property	  
Rerum	   Novarum	   puts	   private	   property	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   any	   socioeconomic	   order.	   The	  
encyclical	   derives	   this	   from	   a	   lengthy	   discussion	   of	   religious	   documents,	   natural	   law,	   and	  
Catholic	  philosophy.	  Going	  back	   to	   the	  Ten	  Commandments	   the	  encyclical	  postulates	   that	  
“Thou	  shalt	  not	  covet	  thy	  neighbour’s	  wife;	  nor	  his	  house,	  nor	  his	  field,	  nor	  his	  man-­‐servant,	  
nor	  his	  maid-­‐servant,	   nor	  his	  ox,	   nor	  his	   ass	  nor	   anything	   that	   is	   his”175	  which	   reveals	   the	  
underlying	  paternal	  principles	  in	  the	  Catholic	  property	  concept.	  According	  to	  the	  encyclical,	  
natural	   law	   provides	   man	   with	   soil	   on	   which	   to	   cultivate	   and	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   which	   to	  
accumulate	  one’s	  property.176	  The	  main	  connection	  of	  the	  encyclical	  to	  Catholic	  Philosophy	  
is	  Thomas	  of	  Aquin	  for	  whom	  ”	  “it	  is	  lawful”	  […]	  “for	  a	  man	  to	  hold	  private	  property”	  “177.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  The	  origins	  of	  the	  encyclical	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  fully	  explored.	  The	  archives	  on	  the	  Pontificate	  of	  Leo	  XIII	  were	  only	  partly	  opened	  to	  the	  scholarly	  community	  during	  the	  early	  1990s.	  Beside	  Misner’s	  1991	  article	  so	  far	  no	  extensive	  historical	  treatment	  that	  traces	  back	  the	  various	  influences	  on	  the	  Encyclical	  exists	  to	  my	  knowledge.	  175	  Rerum	  Novarum	  (1891)	  p.	  11	  (Page	  numbers	  Refer	  to	  the	  Paragraphs	  as	  indicated	  in	  the	  English	  translation	  provided	  on	  the	  official	  Vatican	  website).	  176	  This	  was	  to	  link	  the	  Vatican’s	  modern	  social	  concept	  to	  the	  ‘good	  old	  days’	  of	  a	  society	  prior	  to	  industrialized	  capitalism.	  It	  unveils	  a	  romantic	  craving	  for	  the	  past	  that	  stems	  from	  the	  traditional	  streams	  of	  Catholic	  Social	  teaching.	  177	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  22.	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   The	   encyclical	   needs	   to	   fortify	   private	   property	   in	   order	   to	   draw	   a	   clear	   boundary	  
towards	  socialist	  collectivism	  as	  “the	  main	  tenet	  of	  Socialism,	  community	  of	  goods	  must	  be	  
utterly	   rejected”.178	   This	   is	   the	   encyclical’s	   first	   step	   to	   welfare	   as	   “The	   first	   and	   most	  
fundamental	   principle	   therefore	   if	   one	  would	  undertake	   to	   alleviate	   the	   conditions	  of	   the	  
masses,	   must	   be	   the	   inviolability	   of	   private	   property.”179	   As	   this	   does	   not	   delineate	   the	  
concept	   from	   liberalism,	   the	   encyclical	   embeds	   the	   concept	   of	   private	   property	   deeply	  
within	   the	   family.	   According	   to	   the	   encyclical,	   private	   property	   is	   not	   individualistic	   but	  
family	  based.	  Nevertheless,	  within	  the	  family	  private	  property	  is	  allocated	  to	  the	  head	  of	  the	  
family	  as	  “Paternal	  authority	  can	  be	  neither	  abolished	  nor	  absorbed	  by	  the	  State;	  for	  it	  is	  the	  
source	  of	  human	  life	  itself.”180	  Private	  property	  was	  not	  central	  to	  the	  early	  corporatist	  and	  
organic	   conceptions	   of	   Social	   Catholicism	   in	   the	   worldviews	   of	   the	   early	   19th	   century.	  
Anchoring	  it	  signified	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  liberal	  capitalist	  order,	  while	  embedding	  it	  in	  the	  
family	  was	  a	  tribute	  to	  the	  older	  ideas	  of	  an	  organic	  society.	  
	  
4.5.2 Family	  
The	  encyclical	  defines	  the	  family	  as	  the	  nucleus	  building	  block	  of	  society.	  Within	  the	  family	  
the	  roles	  are	  clear	  cut.	  Thus,	  the	  encyclical	  states	  "That	  right	  to	  property,	  […],	  must	  likewise	  
belong	  to	  a	  man	  in	  his	  capacity	  of	  head	  and	  family.”181	  Women	  should	  not	  work	  in	  order	  to	  
have	  enough	  time	  for	  house-­‐holding	  and	  child	  rearing.	  Therefore,	  employers	  should	  employ	  
a	  worker	   in	  a	  way	  that	  he	  never	   is	  “led	  away	  to	  neglect	  his	  home	  and	   family”.182	   It	   is	  also	  
forbidden	   to	   “employ	   them	   in	   work	   unsuited	   to	   their	   sex	   and	   age”.183	   The	   encyclical	  
furthermore	   states	   at	   a	   later	   point	   that	   “a	   worker’s	   wages	   be	   sufficient	   to	   enable	   him	  
comfortably	   to	   support	   himself,	   his	   wife	   and	   his	   children”.184	   It	   is	   striking	   that	   Rerum	  
Novarum	  revolves	  around	  the	  male	  breadwinner,	  long	  before	  the	  male	  breadwinner	  model	  
became	   a	   tangible	   social	   reality	   in	   Western	   Europe	   during	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s.185	   By	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  15.	  179	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  15.	  180	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  14.	  181	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  13.	  182	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  20.	  183	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  13.	  184	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  46.	  185	  Pfau-­‐Effinger,	  B.	  (2004)	  Socio-­‐historical	  paths	  to	  male	  breadwinner	  model:	  an	  explanation	  of	  cross-­‐national	  differences,	  The	  British	  Journal	  for	  Sociology,	  Vol.	  55,	  No.	  3,	  pp.	  377-­‐399.	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building	   on	   the	   family	   the	   encyclical	   also	   manages	   to	   delineate	   itself	   from	   mainline	  
Conservative-­‐Protestant	   (state-­‐socialist)	   interpretations	   of	   society	   as	   it	   clearly	   sets	   the	  
boundaries	   for	   state	   intervention.	   The	   family,	   not	   the	   state,	   is	   the	   highest	   entity	   and	   the	  
state	  should	  not	   interfere	  with	  the	  paternal	  authority	  of	  the	  father	  over	  the	  family.	  This	   is	  
the	  lesson	  of	  the	  Culture	  War	  in	  Germany	  and	  the	  liberal	  attacks	  on	  the	  Church	  in	  Italy.	  The	  
family	  concept	  is	  also	  used	  to	  discredit	  Socialism	  which	  is	  suspected	  of	  wanting	  to	  set	  “aside	  
the	   parent	   and	   setting	   up	   State	   supervision,	   act	   against	   natural	   justice,	   and	   destroy	   the	  
structure	  of	  the	  home.”186	  	  	  
	  
4.5.3 Mediation	  
Rerum	  Novarum	  promotes	  class	  reconciliation	  instead	  of	  class	  conflict.	  Indeed	  it	  states	  that	  
it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  think	  that	  “class	  is	  naturally	  hostile	  to	  class,	  and	  that	  the	  wealthy	  and	  the	  
working	  men	   are	   intended	   by	   nature	   to	   live	   in	  mutual	   conflict”.187	   A	   system	   that	   aims	   at	  
leveling	   out	   or	   even	   abolishing	   class	   differences	   is	   not	   desirable.	   Instead,	   Catholic	   Social	  
teaching	  “tries	  to	  bind	  class	  to	  class	  in	  friendliness	  and	  good	  feeling”188	  and	  tries	  “to	  move	  
the	   former	   to	   be	   generous	   and	   the	   latter	   to	   be	  moderate	   in	   their	   desires.”189	   This	   is	   the	  
status-­‐upholding	  kernel	  that	  is	  so	  often	  attributed	  the	  role	  of	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  Catholic	  
social	  teaching.190	  The	  encyclical	  promotes	  an	  organic	  interpretation	  of	  society	  in	  which	  each	  
part	   cannot	   survive	   without	   the	   other.	   Nevertheless,	   a	   technical	   sketch	   for	   a	   mediation	  
system	  that	  could	  reconcile	  the	  class	  interests	  cannot	  be	  found	  in	  the	  encyclical.	  Instead,	  the	  
text	  refers	  to	  the	  mediating	  and	  conciliating	  power	  of	  religion	  and	  creed	  and	  states	  that	  “in	  
preventing	   such	   strife	   as	   this	   and	   in	   uprooting	   it,	   the	   efficacy	   of	   Christian	   institutions	   is	  
marvelous	   and	   manifold.”191	   This	   is	   certainly	   a	   tribute	   to	   the	   traditional	   Catholic	   Social	  
doctrine	  of	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  that	  saw	  the	  solution	  of	  the	  worker’s	  question	  in	  
the	   spiritual	   realm.	   Nevertheless,	   even	   though	   the	   encyclical	   does	   not	   provide	   specific	  
provisions	   for	   a	  mediation	   system	   it	   does	   so	   indirectly	   through	   a	   catalogue	   of	   rights	   and	  
duties	  of	  both	  sides	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  mediation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  14.	  187	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  19.	  188	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  21.	  189	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  24.	  190	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1999).	  191	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  19.	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4.5.4 Duties	  of	  Capital	  and	  Labor	  
Surprisingly	   the	  encyclical	  goes	  beyond	  moral	  appeals	   considering	   the	   rights	  and	  duties	  of	  
capital	  and	  labor	  and	  ascribes	  the	  state	  a	  central	  role	  in	  guarding	  them	  as	  it	  is	  “only	  by	  the	  
labor	  of	  working	  men	  that	  states	  grow	  rich.	  Justice	  therefore	  demands	  that	  the	  interest	  of	  
the	  working	  classes	  should	  be	  carefully	  watched	  over	  by	  the	  administration.”192	  If	  both	  sides	  
follow	  this	  canon,	  then	  industrial	  or	  class	  conflicts	  such	  as	  strikes	  or	  lock	  outs	  would	  become	  
obsolete.	  
	   Workers	   should	   follow	   a	   strict	   code	   of	   submissive	   conduct.	   They	   should	   “fully	   and	  
faithfully	   perform	   the	   work	   which	   has	   been	   freely	   and	   equitably	   agreed	   upon;	   never	   to	  
injure	  the	  property,	  nor	  to	  outrage	  the	  person	  of	  an	  employer;	  never	  resort	  to	  violence	   in	  
defending	   their	  own	  cause,	  nor	   to	  engage	   in	   riot	  and	  disorder”.193	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	  
encyclical	   obliged	   employers	   “not	   to	   look	   upon	   their	  workers	   as	   bondsmen”	   or	   “to	   value	  
them	  solely	  for	  their	  physical	  powers.”	  Furthermore,	  “the	  employer	  is	  bound	  to	  see	  that	  the	  
worker	  has	  time	  for	  his	  religious	  duties”	  and	  his	  “principle	  duty	  is	  to	  give	  everyone	  what	  is	  
just”.194	  Mediation	  and	  reconciliation	  between	  both	  parties	  should	  be	  organized	  not	  through	  
the	  state	  but	  through	  a	  network	  of	  mutual	  associations	  “which	  draw	  the	  two	  classes	  more	  
closely	  together.”195	  The	  encyclical	  remains	  vague	  on	  the	  precise	  organizational	  framework	  
of	   these	  associations	  and	   it	   remains	  unclear	   if	   these	  should	  be	  “working	  men’s	  unions”,196	  
“societies	  of	  mutual	  help“197	  or	  “mutual	  associations”.198	  What	  does	  become	  clear	  though	  is	  
that	  they	  should	  function	  like	  the	  former	  guild	  system	  which	  again	  displays	  a	  romanticizing	  
of	   the	   pre-­‐industrialized	   world	   “because	   the	   events	   of	   one	   century	   are	   wonderfully	   like	  
those	  of	  another”199	  and	  “it	  is	  not	  rah	  to	  conjecture	  the	  future	  from	  the	  past”.200	  
	   It	  remains	  blurry	  whether	  these	  associations	  should	  necessarily	  include	  both	  capital	  and	  
labor	   or	  whether	   also	  mono-­‐class	   associations	   should	   be	   allowed.	   “Catholics	   blessed	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  34.	  193	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  20.	  194	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  20.	  This	  part	  is	  a	  forerunner	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  “just	  wage”	  which	  is	  fully	  developed	  in	  the	  second	  social	  encyclical	  Quadragesimo	  Anno	  forty	  years	  later.	  195	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  48.	  196	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  49.	  197	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  49.	  198	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  58.	  The	  encyclical	  only	  puts	  forward	  that	  they	  should	  be	  adapted	  to	  the	  “national	  character”.	  199	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  59.	  200	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  59.	  
	   	   	   113	  
affluence”201	  should	  throw	  in	  their	   lot	  and	  common	  funds	  should	  be	  administered	  by	  both	  
sides	  “out	  of	  which	  the	  members	  may	  be	  effectually	  helped	  in	  their	  needs,	  not	  only	   in	  the	  
cases	   of	   accident,	   but	   also	   in	   sickness,	   old	   age	   and	   distress”.202	   This	   provision	   could	   be	  
interpreted	  as	  a	  call	  for	  a	  modern	  contribution-­‐based	  and	  bi-­‐partite	  financed	  social	  security	  
system.	  Nevertheless,	  some	  paragraphs	  before	  the	  encyclical	  orders	  that	  “Christian	  working	  
men	   must	   […]	   form	   associations	   among	   themselves.”203	   These	   associations	   should	   be	  
organized	  along	  denominational	  lines.	  Catholics	  should	  abstain	  from	  entering	  any	  other	  type	  
of	   organization,	   especially	   socialist	   or	   liberal	   ones,	   as	   they	   are	   “in	   the	   hands	   of	   secret	  
leaders,	  and	  are	  managed	  on	  principles	  ill	  –	  according	  with	  Christianity	  and	  the	  public	  well-­‐
being”.204	   However,	   it	   remains	   unclear	   whether	   these	   associations	   are	   allowed	   to	   be	  
interdenominational.	  The	  state	   is	  confined	   to	  a	   residual	   role	  as	   it	  has	  no	  right	   to	   interfere	  
with	  the	  inner	  functioning	  of	  these	  institutions	  and	  should	  only	  set	  their	  legal	  framework,	  a	  
probation	  derived	  from	  the	  experiences	  of	  Catholic	  associations	  and	  religious	  orders	  during	  
the	  Culture	  War.205	  
	  
4.5.5 Charity	  
The	  encyclical	  marks	  a	  major	  step	  towards	  a	  modern	  Catholic	  answer	  to	  the	  Social	  Question,	  
though	  central	  aspects	  of	  the	  older	  Catholic	  approaches	  to	  the	  social	  realm	  had	  to	  be	  kept.	  
This	  holds	  particularly	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  Charity.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  Protestant	  sects,	  where	  
there	   is	   a	   constant	   salvation	   crisis	   which	   can	   only	   be	   solved	   (if	   at	   all)	   through	  work,	   the	  
accumulation	  of	  wealth	  and	  an	  ascetic	   life,	  the	  accumulation	  of	  wealth	  does	  not	  make	  any	  
difference	   in	  Catholicism	  for	   the	  afterlife.206	  Again	  the	  encyclical	  cites	  St.	  Thomas	  Aquinas,	  
who	  points	  out	   that	  “Man	  should	  not	  consider	  his	  material	  possessions	  as	  his	  own,	  but	  as	  
common	   to	   all,	   so	   as	   to	   share	   them	  without	   hesitation	  when	   others	   are	   in	   need.”207	   For	  
Catholicism,	  it	  is	  good	  works	  that	  you	  do	  with	  your	  wealth,	  that	  determine	  the	  probability	  of	  
your	   ascendance.	   Poverty	   in	   this	   concept	   is	   not	   seen	   as	   a	   disgrace,	   as	   for	   example	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  201	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  55.	  202	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  58.	  203	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  54.	  204	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  54.	  205	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  58.	  206	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  21.	  207	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  22.	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Calvinism,	   but	   is	   conceptualized	   as	   being	   part	   of	   the	   natural	   God-­‐given	   social	   order.	  
Therefore,	   Catholic	   Social	   teaching	   does	   not	   strive	   for	   mechanisms	   or	   systems	   that	   help	  
individuals	   to	   free	   themselves	   from	  poverty	  and	   improve	  their	  status	  over	   the	   long	  run.208	  
The	   reasons	   are	   not	   only	   theological	   but	   also	   temporal.	   Rerum	   Novarum	   positions	   itself	  
against	   any	   state	   inference	   in	   the	   church’s	   prerogative	   of	   poor	   relief	   by	   dismissing	   those	  
that	  “would	  substitute	  in	  its	  stead	  a	  system	  of	  relief	  organized	  by	  the	  State.	  But	  no	  human	  
expedients	  will	  ever	  make	  up	  for	  the	  devotedness	  and	  self-­‐sacrifice	  of	  Christian	  charity.”209	  
This	   indicates	   that	   the	   Church	   wanted	   desperately	   to	   hold	   on	   to	   the	   almost	   monopoly	  
position	  of	  its	  charitable	  apparatus	  in	  many	  European	  countries.	  
	  
4.5.6 Conclusion	  
Rerum	  Novarum	  is	  of	  central	  importance	  for	  the	  development	  of	  Catholic	  Social	  teaching	  as	  
it	   marks	   the	   endpoint	   of	   a	   long	   developmental	   path	   of	   Catholic	   ideas	   and	   worldviews	  
throughout	   the	   19th	   century.	   This	   development	  was	   triggered	   in	  Germany	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	  
competition	   between	   different	   programmatic	   ideas.	   Rerum	   Novarum	   codified	   the	  
framework	   of	   frontrunner	   countries	   in	   Catholic	   Social	   teaching	   on	   an	   international	   and	  
universal	   level	   for	   all	   Catholics.	   As	   a	   guiding	   protocol	   it	   had	   a	   tremendous	   impact	   on	   the	  
Catholic	  Social	  movement	  and	  Catholic	  parties	  in	  Europe.	  Reflecting	  a	  century	  of	  ideational	  
evolution	   its	  provisions	  remain	   Janus	   faced.	  There	   is	   the	  romanticizing	  of	   the	  past	  and	  old	  
social	  order	  which	  should	  be	  transferred	  into,	  and	  conserved	  by,	  the	  contemporary	  situation	  
but	   this	   should	   not	   be	   done	   through	   a	   complete	   overhaul	   of	   the	   existing	   social	   order	  
through	  organic	   corporatism.	  Rather,	   this	   should	   come	  about	   through	   reform	   from	  within	  
the	  existing	  system	  through	  the	  adaptation	  of	  neo-­‐corporatist	  and	  estate-­‐based	  ideas	  as	  the	  
basis	   and	   organizational	   principles	   of	   modern	   socioeconomic	   life	   (and	   hence	   of	   modern	  
social	   security).	   That	   the	   encyclical	   reflected	   this	   was	   to	   a	   large	   part	   due	   to	   the	   specific	  
evolution	   of	   Catholic	   Social	   ideas	   in	   Germany	   throughout	   the	   19th	   century.	   The	   political	  
organization	   of	   the	   different	   German	   subcultures	   in	   the	   run	   up	   to	   unification,	   and	   their	  
mobilization	  through	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  electoral	  institutions	  in	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich,	  catapulted	  
the	   functional	   pressures	   of	   the	   social	   question	   onto	   the	   political	   stage.	   Programmatic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  208	  Cynically	  one	  could	  say	  that	  if	  there	  were	  no	  poor	  anymore	  then	  it	  would	  be	  harder	  for	  the	  upper	  segments	  of	  society	  to	  reach	  salvation	  as	  the	  possibilities	  for	  good	  works	  would	  be	  gone.	  209	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  30.	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responses	  and	  solutions	  to	  the	  social	  question	  became	  important	  political	  currency.	  The	  rise	  
of	  the	  socialist	  movement	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  triggered	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  of	  
ideational	   competition	   among	   the	   four	   different	   subcultures.	   Its	   dynamics	   led	   to	   the	  
development	  of	  modern	  social	  security	  ideas	  in	  each	  of	  them	  during	  the	  last	  third	  of	  the	  19th	  
century.	  
	   This	  chapter	  has	  shown	  how	  this	  process	  unfolded	  for	  the	  ideas	  on	  social	  security	  of	  the	  
Catholic	  subculture.	  The	  following	  will	  assess	  how	  the	  virtuous	  cycle	  affected	  and	  impacted	  
on	  the	  other	  major	  political	  players	   in	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  before	  assessing	  the	  real	   legislative	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5 Germany:	  Social	  Catholicism	  and	  Early	  Modern	  Welfare	  
Legislation	  
Laws	  are	  like	  sausages	  –	  it	  is	  best	  not	  to	  see	  them	  made	  




Welfare	  Germany:	  The	  Laws	  
	  
The	  following	  chapter	  will	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  social	  security	  in	  Imperial	  Germany.	  It	  will	  do	  
so	  with	  a	  special	   focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	   Imperial	  party	  system	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Center	  
Party.	  This	  will	  clarify	  a	  number	  of	  commonly	  held	  myths,	  especially	  on	  Bismarck’s	  and	  the	  Catholics’	  
role	   in	  the	  formation	  process	  of	  the	  early	  modern	  German	  welfare	  state.	  The	  empirical	  observation	  
reveals	   that	   Bismarck	   was	   central	   in	   igniting	   the	   social	   security	   project	   but	   that	   the	   institutional	  
results	  were	  heavily	  at	  odds	  with	  his	  original	  intensions.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  classic	  interpretation,	  the	  
following	  analysis	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  parliament	  and	  its	  parties	  had	  much	  more	  influence	  on	  the	  
formation	  process	  of	   the	  early	  social	   security	   laws	  than	   is	  commonly	  acknowledged.	  On	  theoretical	  
grounds	   the	  analysis	   yields	   the	   insight	   that	   the	   implementation	  of	   social	   security	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  
19th	   century	   was	   not	   driven	   by	   Power	   Resource	   mobilization,	   functional	   pressures	   or	   Employer	  
demands.	  Instead,	  actors	  saw	  social	  security	  as	  a	  political	  device	  to	  incorporate	  parts	  of	  the	  working	  
class	   into	  their	  own	  subcultures.	  Hence,	  each	  subculture	  developed	   its	  own	  programmatic	   ideas	  on	  
modern	   social	   security	   on	   the	  basis	   of	   its	  worldviews.	  Welfare	   state	   legislation	  became	  a	  battle	  of	  
programmatic	   ideas	  and	  worldviews.	  In	  this	  battle,	  social	  security	  legislation	  evolved	  neither	  from	  a	  
Rye	  and	  Iron	  nor	  an	  Iron	  and	  Labor	  coalition	  as	  second-­‐generation	  welfare	  state	  theories	  postulate.	  
Instead,	  a	  denominational	  Rye	  and	  Rome	  coalition	  between	  Protestant	  Conservatives	  and	  Catholics	  
formed	  and	  would	  leave	  the	  deepest	  footprint	  on	  the	  legislation	  of	  the	  1880s.	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  quote	  has	  been	  attributed	  to	  Bismarck	  from	  the	  1930s	  onwards	  though	  he	  never	  said	  anything	  of	  the	  like.	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  especially	  popular	  in	  Denmark	  as	  I	  observed	  that	  Danish	  friends	  repeatedly	  used	  it	  during	  lunch	  whenever	  the	  EUI	  Mensa	  served	  sausages.	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The	   German	   social	   security	   laws	   from	   the	   1880s	   are	   generally	   considered	   to	   mark	   the	  
beginning	   of	   the	   modern	   welfare	   state.	   Their	   mandatory	   and	   state	   induced	   nature	   is	  
fundamentally	   different	   to	   earlier	   poor	   relief,	   alms-­‐based	   or	   voluntary	   social	   security	  
arrangements.	   The	   traditional,	   often	   religion-­‐	   or	   municipality-­‐based	   welfare	   systems	  
collapsed	   facing	   the	  massive	   scale	   of	   societal	   dislocation	   brought	   about	   by	   industrialized	  
capitalism.	  Liberal	  approaches	  to	  social	  welfare,	  based	  on	  voluntary	  or	  market	  driven	  social	  
protection,	  had	  been	  implemented	  in	  the	  1870s	  but	  as	  they	  were	  not	  mandatory	  they	  failed	  
to	  include	  or	  cover	  any	  substantial	  amount	  of	  people.	  
	   Compared	   to	   prior	   arrangements,	   there	   were	   three	   new	   overarching	   features	   of	   the	  
German	   social	   security	   regime:	   it	  was	  mandatory,	   no	   longer	   limited	   to	   special	   risk	   groups	  
and	   financed	   through	  a	  variable	  mixture	  of	   contributions	   from	  employers,	  employees	  and	  
the	   state.	   This	   social	   security	   complex	   implemented	   in	   the	   1880s	   was	   bundled	   in	   three	  
major	  laws:	  Health	  Insurance	  (1983),	  Statutory	  Accident	  Insurance	  (1884)	  and	  Old	  Age	  and	  
Invalidity	  Insurance	  (1889).	  The	  logical	  difference	  regarding	  the	  older	  systems	  of	  poor	  relief	  
or	   market	   based	   insurance	   systems	   was	   that	   the	   new	   regime	   brought	   an	   entitlement	   in	  
codified	  Marshallian	  social	  rights	  that	  could	  be	  enforced	  by	  legal	  action.2	  
	   The	  laws	  of	  the	  1880s	  made	  Germany	  a	  “Pioneer”3	  in	  these	  fields	  of	  social	  security	  even	  
though	  it	  was	  very	  much	  a	  late	  comer	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  social	  policy	  such	  as	  work-­‐protection	  
(Arbeiterschutz)	   and	   collective	   workers’	   rights	   (Kollektives	   Arbeitsrecht).	   Here,	   other	  
countries	  such	  as	  Great	  Britain	  and	  Switzerland	  were	  far	  ahead	  of	  Germany.	  Nevertheless,	  
the	  introduction	  of	  the	  three	  social	  security	  laws	  in	  the	  1880s	  meant	  that	  Germany	  was	  the	  
country	   that	   made	   the	   first	   step	   towards	   the	   “Sozialstaat”	   –	   the	   “Welfare	   State”.4	  
“Compulsory,	  contributory	  and	  state-­‐controlled	  insurance	  was	  their	  invention”	  as	  the	  British	  
welfare	  historian	  E.P.	  Hennock	  puts	  it.5	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  T.H.	  Marshall	  describes	  the	  human	  political	  evolution	  from	  civil	  to	  political	  and	  at	  the	  last	  stage	  to	  social	  rights.	  See:	  Marshall,	  T.H.	  (1950)	  Citizenship	  and	  social	  class	  and	  other	  essays,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  3	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1997)	  p.	  684.	  4	  For	  a	  nice	  introduction	  on	  the	  semantics	  and	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘Sozialstaat’	  (social	  state)	  and	  ‘Sozialpolitik’	  (social	  policy),	  see:	  Kaufmann,	  F.-­‐X.	  (2001)	  Der	  Begriff	  Sozialpolitik	  und	  seine	  wissenschaftliche	  Deutung,	  In:	  Bundesministerium	  für	  Arbeit	  und	  Sozialordnung	  und	  Bundesarchiv	  (eds.)	  Geschichte	  der	  Sozialpolitik	  in	  Deutschland	  seit	  1945,	  
Band	  1,	  Grundlagen	  der	  Sozialpolitik,	  Baden-­‐Baden,	  Nomos.	  5	  Hennock,	  E.	  P.	  (2007)	  The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Welfare	  State	  in	  England	  and	  Germany,	  1850-­‐1914:	  Social	  
Policies	  Compared,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  p.	  6. 
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   The	   first	   part	   of	   the	   following	   chapter	   briefly	   sketches	   the	   historical	   debate	   on	   the	  
evolution	   of	   the	   German	   welfare	   state.	   The	   second	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	   maps	   out	   the	  
programmatic	   ideas	   and	   worldviews	   of	   the	   different	   political	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	  
formation	   of	   social	   security.	   The	   third	   part	   analyzes	   how	   these	   programmatic	   ideas	   and	  
worldviews	  played	  out	  in	  the	  legislative	  process.	  
	  
5.1 What	  has	  been	  said	  about	  German	  Social	  Security	  
Most	  historiographical	  accounts	  open	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  surprising	  lack	  of	  historical	  research	  
on	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  early	  German	  Social	  Security	  legislation.6	  Despite	  being	  classified	  as	  one	  
of	  Bismarck’s	  most	  fundamental	  contributions	  to	  modern	  German	  and	  European	  history,	  up	  
to	  the	  early	  1980s	  relatively	  little	  work	  had	  been	  published	  on	  how	  and	  why	  German	  social	  
policy	  came	  about.7	  
	   The	   early	   historical	   social	   policy	   research	   of	   Schmoller,8	   Rothfels9	   and	   Lützge10	   was	  
heavily	  centered	  on	  Bismarck.	  	  In	  their	  assessment,	  it	  was	  Bismarck	  who	  was	  the	  first	  one	  to	  
push	   for	   social	   security,	   who	   drafted	   the	   bills,	   and	   who	   implemented	   the	   projects.	   Their	  
research	   stood	   in	   line	  with	   the	   Conservative	   interpretation	   of	   German	   historism	   and	  was	  
partly	  aimed	  at	  gilding	  a	  Bismarck	  legacy.	  	  
	   From	  the	  1920s	  onwards	  the	  emphasis	  on	  Bismarck	  started	  to	  ease.	  The	  first	  alternative	  
interpretations	   emerged	   when	   Rothfels	   was	   commissioned	   to	   write	   a	  monograph	   by	   the	  
family	  of	  the	  former	  privy	  council	  Theodor	  Lohmann.	  Lohmann	  was	  Bismarck’s	  right	  hand	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1997)	  Sozialpolitik	  im	  Zeitalter	  Bismarcks.	  Ein	  Bericht	  über	  neue	  Quelleneditionen	  und	  neue	  Literatur,	  Historische	  Zeitschrift,	  Vol.	  265,	  No.3,	  pp.	  683-­‐720.	  Other	  Review	  articles:	  Hennock,	  E.P.	  (1998)	  Social	  Policy	  under	  the	  Empire-­‐Myths	  and	  Evidence,	  German	  History,	  Vol.	  16,	  No.	  1.	  ;	  Hennock,	  E.P.	  (2003)	  Social	  Policy	  in	  the	  Bismarck	  Era:	  A	  Progress	  Report,	  IN:	  German	  
History,	  Vol.	  21,	  No.	  2;	  Hockerts,	  H.	  G.	  (1983)	  Hundert	  Jahre	  Sozialversicherung	  in	  Deutschland:	  Ein	  Bericht	  über	  die	  Neuere	  Forschung,	  Historische	  Zeitschrift,	  Vol.	  237,	  No.	  2	  (Oct.,	  1983),	  pp.	  361-­‐384.	  7	  Ritter,	  G.A.	  (1997)	  p.	  684;	  Hennock	  E.P.	  (1998)	  pp.	  59-­‐62	  ;	  Hockerts,	  H.	  G.	  (1983)	  pp.	  362	  –	  364;	  Baldwin,	  P.	  (1992)	  The	  Welfare	  State	  for	  Historians:	  A	  Review	  Article:	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  
Society	  and	  History,	  Vol.	  34,	  No.	  4,	  pp.	  695-­‐707,	  p.	  695;	  Bladwin	  complains	  in	  his	  review	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  that	  the	  field	  of	  welfare	  research	  has	  been	  primarily	  left	  to	  the	  other	  social	  sciences	  with	  their	  tendency	  to	  “glass	  over	  particularity	  in	  search	  of	  regularity”	  Baldwin,	  P.	  (1992)	  p.	  696.	  8	  Schmoller,	  G.	  (1899)	  Vier	  Briefe	  über	  Bismarcks	  Socialpolitische	  und	  Volkswirtschaftliche	  
Stellung	  und	  Bedeutung,	  Leipzig.	  9	  Rothefels,	  H.	  (1929)	  Prinzipienfragen	  der	  Bismarckschen	  Sozialpolitik:	  Rede	  gehalten	  bei	  der	  Reichsgruendungs	  Feier	  am	  18.	  Januar	  1929,	  Königsberger	  Universitätsreden	  III,	  Königsberg,	  Graefe	  &	  Unzer.	  10	  	  Lützge,	  F.	  (1931)	  Die	  Grundprinzipien	  der	  Bismarckschen	  Sozialpolitik,	  IN:	  Jb.	  F.	  
Nationaloekonmie	  und	  Statistik,	  No.	  134,	  pp.	  580-­‐596. 
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the	   administration	   for	   the	   social	   security	   project	   until	   he	   was	   replaced	   due	   to	   a	   bitter	  
controversy	  with	  Bismarck	  in	  1883.	  Rothfels’	  work	  exaggerated	  Lohmann’s	  influence	  on	  the	  
legislation	   but	   opened	   up	   a	   branch	   of	   historical	   research	   that	   focused	   on	   the	   Weberian	  
influence	  of	   the	  bureaucracy	  on	  Bismarck’s	  social	   security	  efforts.	  This	  heavily	  skewed	  the	  
discussions	   on	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   German	   welfare	   state	   up	   until	   the	   1980s.	   The	   social	  
historian	  Florian	  Tennstedt	  commented	  in	  1994	  that	  the	  “scientific	  investment“	  	  undertaken	  
by	  the	  family	  has,	  “with	  the	  assistance	  of	  historians”,	  considerably	  paid	  off	  for	  the	  family”.11	  
	   The	  overstating	  of	  Lohmann’s,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  bureaucracy’s,	   influence	  was	   revised	  with	  
the	  structural	  turn	  of	  German	  historiography	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  Wehler	  was	  one	  of	  the	  
first	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  Reich’s	  aggressive	  foreign	  trade	  policy	  and	  imperialism,	  along	  with	  
the	   domestic	   industrial	   policy	   and	   Bismarck’s	   attempts	   to	   immunize	   the	   monarchic	  
institutions	   against	   revolutionary	  pressures,	   all	   have	   to	  be	   considered	  when	  analyzing	   the	  
advent	  of	   social	   security.12	  According	   to	  Wehler,	  Bismarck	  was	  very	  well	  able	   to	  make	   the	  
connection	   between	   depression	   cycles	   and	   radicalization	   of	   the	   workforce.13	   Welfare	   is	  
therefore	  the	  result	  of	  the	  Rye	  and	  Iron	  coalition.	  Bismarck’s	  social	  Security	  legislation	  was	  a	  
Bonapartist	   move	   motivated	   by	   raw	   power	   ambitions	   to	   bridge	   the	   structural	   friction	  
between	  an	  autocratic	  political	  system	  and	  a	  rapidly	  modernizing	  economy	  and	  society.	  The	  
social	   security	   legislation	   of	   the	   1880s	   is	   interpreted	   as	   the	   softer	   counterpart	   to	   the	  
repressive	   and	   harsh	   restrictions	   of	   the	   ‘Socialist	   Laws’	   (Sozialistengesetze)14	   which	   were	  
passed	   in	   1878	   and	   remained	   in	   force	   until	   1888.	  While	   the	   socialist	   laws	  were	   the	   stick,	  
social	   security	  was	   the	   carrot	   and	  even	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	   II	   described	  Bismarck’s	   strategy	   in	  
the	   1890s	   in	   retrospect	   as	   one	   of	   “Welfare	   on	   one	   side,	   the	   armored	   fist	   on	   the	   other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  „Jedenfalls	  hat	  sich	  die	  von	  der	  Familie	  seinerzeit	  nach	  Aktienverkauf	  getätigte	  „Wissenschaftsinvestition“	  unter	  Historikermitwirkung	  bis	  in	  unsere	  Tage	  hinein	  für	  die	  Familie	  als	  durchaus	  ertragreich	  erwiesen.“	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  (1994)	  Sozialreform	  als	  Mission:	  Anmerkungen	  zum	  politischen	  Handeln	  Theodor	  Lohmanns,	  p.	  555,	  IN:	  Kocka,	  J.,	  Puhle,	  H.-­‐J.	  &	  Tenfelde,	  K.	  (eds.)	  Von	  der	  Arbeiterbewegung	  zum	  modernen	  Sozialstaat:	  Festschrift	  für	  G.A.	  Ritter	  zum	  65.	  
Geburtstag,	  München,	  K.	  P.	  G.	  Saur,	  pp.	  538-­‐559.	  12	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1969	  [1972]),	  Bismarck	  und	  der	  Imperialismus,	  Cologne,	  Kiepenheuer	  und	  Witsch,	  3rd	  Edition,	  pp.	  123-­‐124.	  13	  Wehler,	  H.-­‐U.	  (1972	  [1969])	  p.	  189.	  14	  The	  socialist	  laws	  were,	  like	  the	  culture	  war	  legislation	  against	  the	  Catholics	  a	  decade	  earlier,	  a	  bundle	  of	  repressive	  measures	  designed	  to	  quash	  the	  rising	  power	  of	  the	  left	  and	  the	  workers	  movement.	  They	  did	  not	  ban	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  itself	  but	  tried	  to	  dry	  out	  its	  sub-­‐culture	  (milieu)	  by	  outlawing	  Social	  Democratic	  gatherings,	  banning	  unions	  and	  closing	  over	  45	  newspapers	  affiliated	  to	  Social	  Democracy.	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side”.15	   To	   conclude,	   historical	   research	   has,	   for	   most	   of	   the	   past	   century,	   interpreted	  
German	  Social	  Security	  of	  the	  1880s	  as	  a	  product	  of	  Bismarck	  or	  at	  least	  of	  the	  executive.	  
	   It	  is	  surprising,	  therefore,	  that	  Bismarck	  regarded	  health	  insurance	  as	  a	  "child	  foisted	  on	  
to	   him"	   whereas	   he	   described	   old	   age	   and	   invalidity	   pensions	   as	   a	   "parliamentarian	   and	  
privy	   councilor	   changeling".16	   Furthermore,	   Bismarck	   did	   not	   once	   mention	   “his”	   Social	  
Security	   policy	   in	   his	   memoirs.17	   Similarly,	   the	   bureaucrat	   Lohmann	   was	   far	   from	   happy	  
about	   the	   outcome	   of	   Accident	   Insurance.	   After	   his	   removal	   from	   the	   social	   security	  
bureaucracy	  he	  noted	  to	  a	  friend,	  when	  accident	  insurance	  finally	  passed	  parliament,	  that	  ”I	  
would	  have	  morally	  ruined	  myself	  internally,	  and	  most	  likely	  disgraced	  myself	  externally	  if	  I	  
would	  have	  had	  to	  defend	  such	  a	  sorry	  effort	  like	  the	  proposed	  draft	  legislation	  against	  my	  
inmost	  conviction.”18	  
	   In	   line	  with	  this,	  since	  the	  early	  1980s	  historians	  have	  readdressed	  the	  origins	  of	  Social	  
Security	  with	  less	  emphasis	  on	  Bismarck	  and	  the	  executive.	   In	  particular,	  the	  seminal	  1982	  
book	   of	   the	   social	   security	   historian	   Gerhardt	   A.	   Ritter19	   was	   of	   major	   importance	   in	  
relativizing	  Lohmann’s	  and	  Bismarck’s	  influence.	  The	  revision	  of	  the	  Bismarckian-­‐Bonapartist	  
and	   the	   Lohmann-­‐Weberian	   interpretation	   clarified	   a	   number	   of	   myths.20	   Similarly,	   the	  
active	  role	  and	  steering	  ability	  of	  Bismarck	  in	  the	  process	  been	  reassessed	  and	  significantly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  “Fürsorge	  auf	  der	  einen	  und	  Panzerfaust	  auf	  der	  anderen	  Seite“	  Cited	  IN:	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1982).	  16	  Bismarck	  quoted	  IN:	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1982)	  p.	  42.	  17	  Bismarck,	  O.	  (1999).	  18	  „Ich	  hätte	  mich	  innerlich	  moralisch	  ruiniert	  und	  wahrscheinlich	  auch	  äußerlich	  blamiert,	  wenn	  ich	  ein	  solches	  Machwerk,	  wie	  den	  vorliegenden	  Gesetzentwurf	  gegen	  meine	  innerste	  Überzeugung	  hätte	  verteidigen	  müssen.“	  Lohmann,	  T.	  (1884)	  Brief	  des	  Geheimen	  Oberregierungsrates	  Theodor	  Lohmann	  an	  den	  Schuldirektor	  Ernst	  Wyneken,	  1884	  Juli	  1,	  Printed	  IN:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995b)	  Quellensammlung	  zur	  Geschichte	  der	  deutschen	  
Sozialpolitik	  1867	  bis	  1914,	  II.	  	  Abteilung:	  Von	  der	  Kaiserlichen	  Sozialbotschaft	  bis	  zu	  den	  Februarerlassen	  Wilhelms	  II.	  (1881-­‐1890),	  Band	  2,	  1.	  Teil,	  Von	  der	  zweiten	  Unfallversicherungsvorlage	  bis	  zum	  Unfallversicherungsgesetz	  vom	  6.	  Juli	  1884,	  Darmstadt,	  Wissenschaftliche	  Buchgesellschaft,	  source	  No.	  184,	  p.	  632.	  	  19	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1982).	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  Ritter	  arrived	  at	  his	  revisionist	  conclusions	  especially	  by	  applying	  a	  comparative	  approach	  (his	  book	  is	  a	  comparison	  between	  Britain	  and	  Germany).	  The	  literature	  before	  was	  largely	  centred	  on	  the	  negative	  German	  Exceptionalism	  (Sonderweg)	  argument	  without	  ever	  comparing	  it	  to	  developments	  in	  other	  country.	  This	  is	  a	  major	  downside	  of	  historiography	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  20	  How	  successful	  this	  myth	  planting	  was	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  fact	  that,	  even	  today,	  most	  welfare	  state	  experts	  associate	  only	  Bismarck	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  social	  security	  legislation.	  This	  often	  becomes	  evident	  in	  the	  labeling	  the	  continental	  welfare	  states	  as	  Bismarckian	  welfare	  regimes.	  See:	  Palier,	  B.	  &	  Martin,	  C.	  (2007)	  Editorial	  Introduction.	  From	  a	  Frozen	  Landscapes	  to	  Structural	  Reforms:	  The	  Sequential	  Transformation	  of	  Bismarckian	  Welfare	  Systems,	  Social	  
Policy	  and	  Administration,	  Vol	  41,	  No.	  6,	  pp.	  535-­‐692. 
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downgraded.21	  Historians	  started	  to	  rethink	  the	  engineering	  of	  social	  policy	  in	  the	  1880s	  as	  a	  
political	   process	   between	   the	   dominant	   subcultures	   of	   the	   Reich	   represented	   by	   their	  
parties	  in	  the	  Reichstag,	  the	  interest	  associations	  of	  capital	  and	  labor,	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  
the	  executive	  consisting	  of	  Chancellor	  and	  Kaiser.22	  
	  
5.2 Worldviews	  and	  Programmatic	  positions	  on	  Social	  Security	  1880s	  
5.2.1 The	  Conservative	  Subculture	  
In	  order	   to	  capture	   the	  programmatic	   ideas	   that	  each	  subculture	  had	  on	  social	   security	  at	  
the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1880s	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  worldviews	  and	  interests	  of	  each	  sub-­‐
culture	   we	   need	   a	   framework	   that	   structures	   the	   comparison	   of	   programmatic	   welfare	  
ideas.	   As	   modern	   social	   security	   in	   the	   1880s	   was	   planned	   as	   a	   subsidiary,	   instead	   of	   a	  
substitution,	   it	   had	   a	   very	   limited	   de-­‐commodifying	   impact.	   The	   cornerstones	   of	   welfare	  
organization	   in	   the	   19th	   century	   are	   therefore	   less	   concerned	   with	   broad	   questions	   of	  
redistribution	   and	   decommodification.	   Instead,	   the	   formation	   of	   welfare	   legislation	   is	  
centered	  around	  the	  three	  central	  questions	  of	  segmentation,	  financing	  and	  administration.	  
	   Segmentation	  considers	  the	  central	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  system	  should	  be	  universal,	  
covering	   each	   and	  every	   citizen	   irrespectively	   of	   risk	   group	  or	  occupation	   through	  a	  basic	  
flat	   rate	   social	   security	   provision	   or	   whether,	   instead,	   one	   favors	   a	   contribution-­‐based	  
insurance	  system	  segmented	  along	  different	  risk	  categories	  and	  occupations.	  
	   Financing	   boils	   down	   to	   two	   options:	   either	   the	   system	   is	   financed	   through	   general	  
taxation	   or	   through	   contributions.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   contributions	   the	   mix	   is	   important.	   Do	  
employers,	  employees	  and	  state	  all	  pay	  a	  share	  or	  are	  one	  or	   two	  of	   them	  excluded	   from	  
financing?	  	  
	   Administration	   touches	   upon	   the	   control	   of	   the	   schemes.	   Who	   has	   a	   say	   in	   the	  
administration	   of	   the	   schemes?	   Is	   it	   the	   state	   alone	   or	   does	   the	   law	   foresee	   an	   equal	  
representation	  of	  employer	  and	  employees	  on	  the	  boards?	  
	   Whether	  a	  subculture	  tends	  to	  one	  or	  the	  other	  extreme	  on	  each	  of	  these	  dimensions	  is	  
defined	   by	   how	   each	   dimension	   best	   reflects	   its	   worldview.	   Compromise	   on	   these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1982).	  22	  Ullmann,	  H.-­‐P.	  (1979):	  Industrielle	  Interessen	  und	  die	  Entstehung	  der	  deutschen	  Sozialversicherung	  1880-­‐1889,	  pp.	  575-­‐577,	  IN:	  Historische	  Zeitschrift,	  Vol.	  229,	  No.	  3	  ,	  pp.	  574-­‐610. 
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organizational	   principles	   (policy	   ideas)	   is	   possible	   for	   different	   motivations.	   The	   liberal	  
subculture	  is,	  for	  example,	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  favor	  of	  keeping	  the	  state	  as	  far	  out	  of	  social	  policy	  
organization	   as	   possible	   due	   to	   its	   liberal	   market	   worldview,	   while	   Catholics	   dislike	   the	  
central	  state	  due	  to	  their	  bad	  experiences	  with	  the	  Protestant	  central	  state.	  This	  overlapping	  
of	  interests	  opens	  the	  space	  for	  political	  compromises.	  They	  remain	  blocked	  if	  the	  interests	  
of	  their	  worldviews	  are	  opposed	  to	  one	  another.	  
	  
5.2.2 Bismarck	  and	  State	  Socialism	  
Bismarck	  saw	  welfare	  as	  a	  political	  device,	  a	  formidable	  political	  tool	  to	  bind	  and	  integrate	  
the	   workers	   to	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich.23	   Following	   its	   external	   territorial	   consolidation	   through	  
war,	   Bismarck	   now	   aimed	   at	   the	   “internal	   furnishing	   of	   the	   Empire”24	   as	   he	   called	   it.	  
Alongside	  the	  repressive	   laws,	  against	  Catholics	  during	  the	  1870s	  and	  Socialists	  during	  the	  
1880s	  (the	  stick),	  welfare	  was	  the	  soft	  complementary	  (the	  carrot)	  that	  aimed	  at	  wooing	  the	  
workers	   away	   from	   the	   other	   subcultures.25	   This	   shines	   through	   in	   the	   Imperial	   Social	  
Message	   from	   17th	   November	   188126	   which	   purports:	   “that	   the	   healing	   of	   the	   social	  
damages	   can	  not	   only	   be	   reached	   through	   repression	  of	   Social	  Democratic	   riots,	   but	   that	  
simultaneously	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  worker	  has	  to	  be	  positively	  cultivated."	  27	   	   In	   line	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Ritter,	  G.A.	  (1982)	  p.	  28.	  24	  "Wenn	  danach	  auf	  dem	  Gebiet	  der	  inneren	  Reichseinrichtungen	  weitgreifende	  und	  schwierige	  Aufgaben	  bevorstehen"	  Bismarck	  on	  behalf	  of	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  I.	  1881	  November	  17.	  Allerhöchste	  Botschaft	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  I	  zur	  Eröffnung	  der	  I.	  Session	  des	  5.	  Reichstags	  mit	  Bericht	  über	  die	  Eröffnung,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  Quellensammlung	  zur	  
Geschichte	  der	  deutschen	  Sozialpolitik	  1867	  bis	  1914,	  II.	  	  Abteilung:	  Von	  der	  Kaiserlichen	  Sozialbotschaft	  bis	  zu	  den	  Februarerlassen	  Wilhelms	  II.	  (1881-­‐1890),	  Band	  1,	  Grundfragen	  der	  Sozialpolitik.	  Die	  Diskussion	  der	  Arbeiterfrage	  auf	  Regierungsseite	  und	  in	  der	  Öffentlichkeit,	  Darmstadt,	  Wissenschaftliche	  Buchgesellschaft,	  p.	  64.	  25	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1982)	  p.	  44.	  26	  Bismarck	  not	  only	  delivered	  but	  also	  heavily	  edited	  the	  speech.	  The	  best	  sources	  on	  this	  are	  two	  letters	  of	  Bismarck’s	  son	  that	  describe	  and	  complain	  about	  how	  their	  father	  sat	  until	  late	  at	  night	  revising	  the	  Imperial	  Message	  cursing	  loudly.	  	  “Papa	  sitzt	  seit	  1,5	  Stunden	  fürchterlich	  schimpfend	  über	  der	  Thronrede	  […]	  und	  war	  immer	  erbitterter	  über	  das	  “lederne	  Phrasengeklingel,	  den	  vollständigen	  Mangel	  an	  Logik	  und	  die	  Weglassung	  aller	  Hauptpunkte.“.	  Nun	  quälte	  er	  sich	  voller	  Ärger	  mit	  einer	  neuen	  Redaktion“.	  Source	  No.	  4;	  “Heute	  ist	  der	  ganze	  Abend	  der	  Thronrede	  gewidmet,	  die	  Papa	  vollständig	  neu	  redigieren	  musste.“	  Source	  No.	  5.	  Both	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003)	  p.	  11.	  27	  "	  dass	  die	  Heilung	  der	  sozialen	  Schäden	  nicht	  ausschließlich	  im	  Wege	  der	  Repression	  sozialdemokratischer	  Ausschreitungen,	  sondern	  gleichmäßig	  auf	  der	  positiven	  Förderung	  des	  Wohl	  der	  Arbeiter	  zu	  suchen	  sein	  werde."	  Bismarck	  on	  behalf	  of	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  I.	  1881	  November	  17.	  Allerhöchste	  Botschaft	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  I	  zur	  Eröffnung	  der	  I.	  Session	  des	  5.	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this,	  Stolleis	  remarks	  that	  “The	  workers	  were	  to	  be	  won	  over	  through	  the	  commitments	  of	  
the	  Empire	  for	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  Empire	  and	  should	  be	  shackled	  to	  it.”28	  
	   For	   this	   “Social	   Conservative	  Workers	   policy”29	   to	   work	   it	   was	   essential	   to	   inhibit	   the	  
emancipation	   of	   the	   workers	   while	   simultaneously	   improving	   their	   status.	   Therefore,	  
Bismarck	  fiercely	  opposed	  national	  codification	  of	  work	  protection	  and	  collective	  bargaining	  
rights	   while	   promoting	   patriachical	   welfare	   from	   above.30	   Patriarchy	   was	   central	   in	  
Bismarck’s	  programmatic	   ideas.	   In	  a	  Reichstag	  speech	   in	  1889,	  Bismarck	  puts	  forward	  that	  
“An	   old	  man,	   who	   cannot	   work,	   somehow	   has	   to	   live	   and	   be	   fed,	   if	   one	   can	   speak	   of	   a	  
patriarchic	   relationship	   at	   all.”31	   Bismarck	   wanted	   the	   workers	   to	   be	   integrated	   in	   the	  
dominant	  Conservative	  Protestant	  subculture	  and	  worldview	  as	  subjects,	  as	  ‘Untertanen’	  in	  
Heinrich	  Mann’s	  words32,	  not	  as	  uncomfortable	  junior	  partners.	  For	  Bismarck,	  social	  security	  
therefore	  had	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  worldviews	  of	  the	  dominant	  Christian-­‐Protestant-­‐
Paternalist	  subculture,	  without	  sparking	  emancipatory	  tendencies	  among	  the	  working	  class,	  
and	   allowing	   for	   a	  maximum	  of	   control	   of	   the	   new	   policy	   by	   the	   central	   state	  while	   also	  
making	   sure	   that	   the	  welfare	   recipients	   understood	   that	   they	   derived	   their	   benefits	   from	  
the	  benevolent	  leaders	  of	  the	  Protestant	  subculture.33	  
	   The	   main	   tool	   to	   combine	   all	   this	   was	   the	   programmatic	   idea	   of	   State	   Socialism.	  
Bismarck’s	  state	  Socialism	  concept	  was	  influenced	  by	  three	  key	  figures:	  Hermann	  Wagener,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Reichstags	  mit	  Bericht	  über	  die	  Eröffnung,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  p.	  63.	  28	   Stolleis,	   M.	   (2001)	   Historische	   Grundlagen	   –	   Sozialpolitik	   in	   Deutschland	   bis	   1945.	   In:	  
Geschichte	  der	  Sozialpolitik	  in	  Deutschland	  seit	  1945.	  Band	  1.	  Grundlagen	  der	  Sozialpolitik;	  p.	  246.	  Not	  only	   this,	   but	   some	  of	  Bismarck’s	  plans	  went	   even	   further:	   through	   the	  new	   regulations	   a	  coup	   from	   above	   that	   would	   have	   eliminated	   Parliament	   all	   together	   and	   replaced	   it	   with	   a	  corporatist	  general	  organization	  of	  society	  modeled	  after	  the	  old	  estate	  based	  “Ständestaat”.	  	  	  29	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003a)	  Introduction,	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (eds.)	  p.	  XXV.	  30	  See	  Bismarck’s	  speech	  in	  the	  Reichstag	  on	  the	  9th	  January	  1882.	  31	  „Ein	  alter	  Mann,	  der	  nicht	  arbeiten	  kann,	  muss	  doch	  irgendwie	  leben	  und	  durchgefüttert	  werden,	  wenn	  überhaupt	  von	  einem	  patriarchalischen	  Verhältnis	  die	  Rede	  ist“	  1889	  Mai	  18.	  Rede	  des	  Reichskanzlers	  Otto	  Fürst	  von	  Bismarck	  im	  Reichstag.	  Printed	  IN:	  Haerendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  (2004b)	  Quellensammlung	  zur	  Geschichte	  der	  deutschen	  Sozialpolitik	  1867	  bis	  1914,	  II.	  	  Abteilung:	  Von	  der	  Kaiserlichen	  Sozialbotschaft	  bis	  zu	  den	  Februarerlassen	  Wilhelms	  II.	  (1881-­‐1890),	  Band	  6,	  Die	  gesetzliche	  Invalidität	  und	  Altersversorgung	  und	  die	  Alternativen	  auf	  gewerkschaftlicher	  und	  betrieblicher	  Grundlage,	  Darmstadt,	  Wissenschaftliche	  Buchgesellschaft.	  Source	  No.	  143,	  p.	  674.	  32	  For	  an	  excellent	  analysis	  of	  the	  term	  “Untertan”:	  Mann,	  H.	  (1984	  [1918])	  Man	  of	  Straw,	  London,	  Penguin	  Books.	  33	  Besides	  this,	  Bismarck’s	  own	  entrepreneurial	  experiences	  as	  an	  owner	  of	  a	  number	  of	  paper	  mills	  on	  his	  estate	  in	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein	  also	  shaped	  his	  view	  on	  social	  security.	  Social	  security	  should	  not	  burden	  employers	  too	  much	  and	  not	  decrease	  German	  industrial	  competitiveness.	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Adolf	  Wagner	  and	  Albert	  Schäffle.	  Like	  Bismarck,	  all	  three	  key	  advisors	  were	  deeply	  rooted	  
in	   the	   Conservative	   Protestant	   subculture.	   Hermann	   Wagener	   was	   born	   the	   son	   of	   a	  
Protestant	   priest,	   Albert	   Schäffle	   had	   been	   educated	   in	   a	   Protestant	   theological	   seminary	  
and	  Adolf	  Wagner	  was	  one	  of	   the	  co-­‐founders	  of	   the	  Protestant-­‐Conservative	  anti-­‐Semitic	  
Christian	  Social	  Workers	  Party	   (Christilich	  Soziale	  Arbeiterpartei).	  This	  guaranteed	   that	   the	  
programmatic	   ideas	   they	   developed	  were	   in	   line	  with	   Bismarck’s	   Conservative	   Protestant	  
worldview.	  
	   All	   three	  were	   adherents	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   State	   Socialism	  which	   they	   had	   developed	  
from	  the	  teachings	  of	  the	  social	  philosopher	  Lorenz	  von	  Stein	  (1815-­‐1890).34	  Von	  Stein	  had	  
studied	   the	   mobilization	   process	   of	   the	   proletariat	   during	   the	   French	   Revolution.	   His	  
conclusion	   was	   that	   the	   current	   authoritarian	   status	   quo	   could	   only	   be	   upheld	   if	   the	  
workers,	  as	  the	  new	  fourth	  estate,	  could	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  contemporary	  social	  order.35	  
In	  contrast	  to	  Marx,	  von	  Stein	  was	  confident	  that	  revolution	  was	  not	  inevitable,	  but	  could	  be	  
circumvented	   by	   co-­‐opting	   and	   integrating	   workers	   through	   state	   driven	   social	   security	  
provisions.	   This	   would	   create	   a	   “social	   kingdom”	   that	   would	   balance	   and	   mediate	   class	  
contradictions.36	  
	   Wagener	  translated	  von	  Stein’s	   ideas	   into	  the	  programmatic	   idea	  of	  state	  Socialism,	  an	  
encompassing	   corporatist	   economic	   arrangement	   with	   the	   state	   as	   the	   central	   regulator.	  
The	   essence	  was	   a	   “corporative	   integration	   of	   the	   rising	   trade	   union	  movement	   into	   the	  
state	  as	  well	  as	  a	  complete	  organization	  of	   labor	  through	  the	  state	  through	  coexistence	  of	  
state	  industry,	  cooperative	  industry	  and	  private	  industry”.37	  
	   State	  Socialism	  resonated	  well	  with	  Bismarck	  as	  it	  seemed	  an	  optimal	  tool	  to	  achieve	  his	  
interests	   of	   integrating	   the	   workers	   into	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich	   in	   congruence	   with	   his	  
Conservative	  Protestant	  worldview.	  Due	  to	  his	  early	  resignation	  in	  the	  late	  1870s,	  Wagener	  
could	   not	   directly	   influence	   social	   policy38	   but	   Adolf	   Wagner,	   a	   prominent	   political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1997)	  Sozialpolitik	  im	  Zeitalter	  Bismarcks:	  Ein	  Bericht	  über	  neue	  Quelleneditionen	  und	  neue	  Literatur,	  Historische	  Zeitschrift,	  Vol.	  265,	  No.	  3,	  p.	  693.	  35	  Von	  Stein	  also	  transmitted	  his	  ideas	  as	  political	  advisor	  to	  Japan	  during	  the	  Meiji	  period.	  36	  Stolleis,	  M.	  (2001)	  p.	  235.	  37	  „Eine	  korporative	  Einbindung	  der	  aufkommenden	  Gewerkschaftsbewegung	  in	  den	  Staat	  sowie	  schließlich	  eine	  vollständige	  Organisation	  der	  Arbeit	  durch	  den	  Staat	  mit	  einem	  Nebeneinander	  von	  Staatsindustrie,	  genossenschaftlicher	  Industrie	  und	  Privatindustrie.“	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1997)	  p.	  694.	  38	  Wagner’s	  demise	  came	  after	  corruption	  allegations	  in	  1873.	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1997)	  p.	  693.	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economist	   and	   “Socialist	   of	   the	  Chair”	   (Kathedersozialist)39	   succeeded	  him.	  His	   counseling	  
on	   State	   Socialism	   provided	   Bismarck	   with	   an	   intellectual	   and	   scientific	   underpinning.	  
Convinced	   of	   State	   Socialism,	   in	   the	   early	   1880s	   Bismarck	   asked	   the	   political	   economist,	  
Viennese	  professor	  and	  leading	  state	  socialist	  Albert	  Schäffle	  to	  hammer	  out	  concrete	  policy	  
ideas	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   his	   programmatic	   ideas.	   Schäffle	   handed	   Bismarck	   a	  
“comprehensive	  opus,	  which	  contained	  a	  blueprint	  for	  German	  social	  reform	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
tax	  policy	  as	  well	  as	  in	  proper	  social	  legislation	  and	  the	  insurance	  system”	  40	  as	  revealed	  in	  a	  
cable	   from	   the	   Bavarian	   representative	   in	   Berlin.	   This	   was	   Bismarck’s	   blueprint	   for	   state	  
socialist	  social	  security.	  
	   Schaeffle	   and	  Bismarck’s	   plans	   envisaged	   a	   centralized,	  mandatory,	   state	   financed	   and	  
state	   administered	   social	   security	   regime.	   The	   centralization	   was	   to	   guarantee	   the	   the	  
central	  government’s	  control	  over	  the	  new	  institutional	  regime.	  Exclusive	  state	  financing	  of	  
the	  programs	  should	  eradicate	  any	  emancipatory	  spillovers	  that	  could	  have	  been	  triggered	  
through	  workers’	  contributions	  and	  entitlement	  claims.	  Welfare	  should	  be	  solely	  perceived	  
as	   coming	   from	   the	   “good”	   state.	   Similarly,	   exclusive	   state	   financing	   rendered	   it	   easier	   to	  
forestall	  workers’	  or	  employers’	  claims	  to	  have	  a	  say	   in	   the	  organization	  of	   these	  matters.	  
State	   administration	   was	   designed	   to	   allow	   for	   exclusive	   monitoring	   and	   control	   by	   the	  
empire.	  The	  system	  should	  therefore	  not	  be	  financed	  through	  contributions	  but	  via	  a	  new	  
tax	  on	   tobacco	   and	   alcohol.	   This	   had	   already	  been	   argued	   in	   the	   Imperial	   Social	  Message	  
announced	  that	  "The	  safest	  way	  lies	  [...]	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  tobacco	  monopoly"	  and	  
"in	   re-­‐launching	   earlier	   proposals	   on	   the	   heavier	   taxation	   of	   beverages."	   41	   Bismarck	   was	  
convinced	  of	   the	  potential	  of	   this	   formula	  and,	   in	  1889,	  he	  boasted	   in	  parliament	   that	  his	  
pension	   proposal	   would	   “teach	   the	   small	   man	   to	   perceive	   the	   Empire	   as	   a	   charitable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  The	  term	  “Socialist	  of	  the	  Chair”	  captures	  parts	  of	  the	  Historical	  school	  of	  German	  economics	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  century.	  See	  Streeck,	  W.	  (2012)	  E	  Pluribus	  Unum?	  Varieties	  and	  Communalities	  of	  Capitalism,	  MPIfG	  Discussion	  Paper	  1/12.	  40	  „ein	  umfangreiches	  Opus	  übergeben,	  welches	  ein	  Gesamtprogramm	  für	  eine	  Sozialreform	  Deutschlands	  sowohl	  auf	  dem	  Gebiet	  des	  Steuerwesens	  als	  auch	  auf	  dem	  Gebiete	  der	  eigentlichen	  Sozialgesetzgebung	  und	  dem	  Versicherungswesen	  bildet.“	  1882	  Januar	  15.	  Bericht	  des	  bayerischen	  Gesandten	  in	  Berlin	  Hugo	  Graf	  von	  und	  zu	  Lerchenfeld-­‐Koefering	  an	  den	  bayerischen	  Staatsminister	  des	  königlichen	  Hauses	  und	  Außenminister	  Krafft	  Freiherr	  von	  Craislheim.	  Printed	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003)	  Source	  No.	  38,	  p.	  	  153.	  41	  "Der	  sicherste	  Weg	  liegt	  [...]	  in	  der	  Einführung	  des	  Tabakmonopols"	  and	  "durch	  Wiederholung	  früherer	  Anträge	  auf	  stärkere	  Besteuerung	  der	  Getränke"	  Bismarck	  on	  behalf	  of	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  I.	  1881	  November	  17.	  Allerhöchste	  Botschaft	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  I	  zur	  Eröffnung	  der	  I.	  Session	  des	  5.	  Reichstags	  mit	  Bericht	  über	  die	  Eröffnung.	  Printed	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003)	  p.	  64.	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institution”.42	  The	  following	  figure	  shows	  how	  the	  policy	  ideas	  of	  State	  Socialism	  played	  out	  
in	  the	  three	  different	  organizational	  principles	  of	  State	  Socialism.	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐1	  Conservative	  subculture	  social	  policy	  preferences	  
43	  
	  
It	   is	   surprising	  how	   close	  Bismarck’s	   original	   programmatic	   ideas	  were	   to	   a	   contemporary	  
Scandinavian	   type	   of	   welfare	   regime.	   Centralization	   (Imperial	   insurance	   agency),	   state	  
financing	  through	  flat-­‐rate	  taxation	  (tobacco	  monopoly),	  their	  mandatory	  nature	  and	  state	  
administration	   are,	   according	   to	   Esping-­‐Andersen,44	   all	   essential	   cornerstones	   of	   the	  
Scandinavian	  system.	  Bismarck’s	  propositions	  were	  therefore	  not	  only	  socialist	  by	  name	  but,	  
as	   long	   as	   these	   policies	   served	   the	   interest	   of	   eradicating	   the	   Socialist	   subculture,	  
collaboration	  between	  Socialists	  and	  Bismarck	  was	  off	  limits.	  
	  
5.2.3 State	  Socialism	  and	  the	  Conservatives	  
The	  Conservative	  parties	   fully	   embraced	   State	   Socialism.45	  Adolf	   Stöcker,	   one	  of	   the	  most	  
prominent	   exponents	   of	   the	   Conservative	   camp,	   expressed	   at	   a	   party	   rally	   that	   “Free	  
concurrence	   of	   forces,	   unlimited	   competition	   for	   existence,	   the	   cold	   law	   of	   supply	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42„den	  gemeinen	  Mann	  das	  Reich	  als	  eine	  wohltätige	  Institution	  anzusehen	  lehren	  werden.“	  1889	  Mai	  18.	  Rede	  des	  Reichskanzlers	  Otto	  Fürst	  von	  Bismarck	  im	  Reichstag.	  Printed	  IN:	  Haerendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  Source	  No.	  143,	  p.	  676.	  43	  These	  plans	  changed	  considerably	  once	  Bismarck	  had	  to	  compromise	  with	  the	  Catholics	  on	  Accident	  Insurance.	  44	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1990).	  45	  Though	  while	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  Conservatives	  adopted	  Bismarck’s	  version	  of	  state	  Socialism	  there	  was	  a	  smaller	  fraction	  that	  was	  more	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  ideas	  of	  Lutheran	  Protestantism	  and	  sided	  with	  Lohmann	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  individual	  self-­‐help	  promoting	  concepts	  in	  social	  security.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  split	  only	  became	  salient	  in	  the	  controversies	  around	  old	  age	  and	  invalidity	  in	  1889.	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003a)	  p.	  XXV.	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demand,	  the	  disdainful	  axiom	  that	  labor	  is	  a	  commodity:	  These	  are	  the	  fraternal	  ideas,	  with	  
which	  a	  false	  liberalism	  dehumanizes	  economic	  life	  and	  destroyed	  the	  social	  community.”46	  
This	  stringent	  anti-­‐liberalism	  was	  typical	  of	  the	  Conservatives	  and	  was	  complemented	  by	  a	  
deep-­‐rooted	  anti-­‐Socialism.	  Stöcker	  remarks	  for	  the	  Conservative	  subculture	  “That	  we	  stand	  
under	  the	  full	   impression	  of	  the	  danger,	  that	  lies	  in	  the	  socialist	  revolutionary	  	  movements	  
of	   all	   cultured	   countries”.47	   Both	   “isms”	   had	   pressed	   Conservative	   Protestantism	   into	  
ideational	  competition.	  Bismarck’s	  programmatic	  idea	  of	  State	  Socialism	  was	  the	  answer	  to	  
both	  the	  revolutionary	  potential	  of	  the	  Socialist	  subculture	  and	  the	  market	  fetishism	  of	  the	  
liberal	   subculture.	   For	   the	   Conservatives,	   Bismarck’s	   state	   socialist	   social	   security	   plans,	  
announced	   in	   the	   1881	   Reichstag’s	   message,	   were	   therefore	   a	   “like	   when	   a	   clear	   light	  
appears	   in	   a	   hazy	   fog.”48	   Confidence	   that	   the	   State	   Socialist	   programmatic	   ideas	   would	  
stabilize	   the	   hegemony	   of	   the	   Protestant	   Conservative	   culture	   in	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich	  was	   so	  
high	  that	  they	  proclaimed	  that	  “when	  a	  later	  time	  looks	  back	  on	  the	  development	  of	  social	  
ideas,	  then	  these	  words	  of	  the	  Kaiser	  will	  be	  one	  of	  the	  lucid	  points	  which	  world	  history	  will	  
not	  be	  able	  to	  forget.”49	  
	  
5.2.4 State	  Socialism	  and	  the	  Bureaucracy	  
Theodor	  Lohmann	  was	  arguably	  the	  most	  important	  social	  policy	  figure	  in	  the	  bureaucracy	  
until	   1883.	   A	   liberal	   with	   a	   very	   strong	   Protestant	   Lutheran	   background,	   he	   had	   been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46„Freie	  Konkurrenz	  der	  Kräfte,	  unbeschränkter	  Kampf	  ums	  Dasein,	  das	  kalte	  Gesetz	  von	  Angebot	  und	  Nachfrage,	  der	  schnöde	  Grundsatz,	  dass	  Arbeit	  eine	  Ware	  ist:	  Das	  sind	  die	  brüderlichen	  Ideen,	  mit	  welchen	  ein	  falscher	  Liberalismus	  das	  Wirtschaftsleben	  entseelt,	  die	  soziale	  Gemeinschaft	  vernichtet	  hat.“	  Rede	  des	  Reichstagsabgeordneten	  Adolf	  Stöcker	  on	  the	  weekly	  Friday	  rally	  of	  the	  Christian	  Social	  party	  of	  2	  December	  1881.	  The	  Christian	  Socialist	  party	  was	  during	  most	  the	  1880s	  firmly	  integrated	  into	  the	  Conservative	  Camp	  and,	  for	  a	  certain	  period,	  even	  merged	  with	  the	  Conservative	  Party.	  Quote	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003)	  Source	  No.	  24,	  p.	  	  98.	  47	  „Wir	  stehen	  unter	  dem	  vollen	  Eindruck	  der	  Gefahr,	  welche	  in	  den	  sozialistischen	  Umsturzbewegungen	  aller	  Kulturländer	  liegt.“	  Rede	  des	  Reichstagsabgeordneten	  Adolf	  Stoecker.	  December	  2.	  1881,	  printen	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  24,	  p.	  	  103.	  48	  „wie	  wenn	  aus	  trüben	  Nebeln	  ein	  klares	  Licht	  aufgeht.“	  Rede	  des	  Reichstagsabgeordneten	  Adolf	  Stöcker,	  Note	  though	  that	  the	  “words	  of	  the	  Kaiser”	  were	  formulated	  and	  spelled	  out	  by	  Bismarck,	  2.	  December	  1881,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  24,	  p.	  100.	  49	  „wenn	  eine	  spätere	  Zeit	  auf	  die	  Entwicklung	  der	  sozialen	  Gedanken	  zurückschaut,	  dann	  wird	  dies	  kaiserliche	  Wort	  einer	  der	  leuchtenden	  Punkte	  sein,	  welche	  die	  Weltgeschichte	  nicht	  vergessen	  kann.“	  Rede	  des	  Reichstagsabgeordneten	  Adolf	  Stoecker.	  December	  2.	  1881,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  24,	  p.	  105.	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assigned	   to	   draft	   a	   legislative	   proposal	   for	   state	   socialist	   ideas.50	   The	   problem	   was	   that	  
Lohmann	   favored	   limited	   state	   intervention	   and	   institutions	   that	   promoted	   self-­‐help	   and	  
self-­‐organization.51	  Lohmann	  was	  fiercely	  opposed	  to	  financing	  the	  social	  security	  complex	  
through	   the	   Imperial	   budget52	   and	   dismissed	   Bismarck’s	   state	   socialist	   plans	   as	   “totally	  
stupid	  stuff.”53	  According	  to	  Lohmann,	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  socialist	  subculture	  and	  revolution	  
should	  be	  forestalled	  through	  fostering	  institutions	  that	  encourage	  self-­‐help	  and	  individual	  
responsibility,	   not	   through	   State	   Socialism.54	   This	   classic	   left	   liberal	   programmatic	   idea	  
would	   lead	   to	   a	   self-­‐conscious	   social	   emancipation	   of	   the	   working	   class.	   Instead	   of	  
Bismarck’s	   patriachical	   social	   state	   (Sozialstaat)	   Lohmann	   wanted	   a	   social	   society	  
(Sozialgesellschaft).	  	  
	   Lohmann	   tried	   to	   dilute	   the	  Bismarckian	   plans	  whenever	   he	   could.	   The	   clash	   between	  
Lohmann’s	   ideas	   to	   organize	   accident	   insurance	   through	   free	   insurance	   cooperations	  
(Versicherungsgenossenschaften)	  and	  Bismarck’s	  favoring	  of	  mandatory	  cooperations	  along	  
vocational	   groups	   (Berufsgenossenschaften)	   as	   the	   carriers	   of	   accident	   insurance	   (after	  
compromising	  to	  the	  Catholics)	  was	  therefore	  not	  a	  fight	  about	  technical	  details	  but	  a	  clash	  
of	  world	  views	  and	  the	  interest	  embodied	  in	  them.55	  
	   However,	   in	   contrast	   to	  earlier	   accounts	   centered	  on	   Lohmann,	   recent	   research	   shows	  
that	  he	  did	  not	  get	  very	  far	  with	  his	  efforts.	  	  The	  only	  bill	  where	  he	  left	  an	  impression	  on	  the	  
final	  outcome	  was	   that	  on	  Sickness	   Insurance.	  By	   the	   time	  of	   the	  Accident	   Insurance	   Law	  
Lohmann	  was	  not	  able	  to	  push	  his	  ideas	  beyond	  the	  legislative	  drafts.	  Lohmann	  is	  nowadays	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  (1994)	  Sozialreform	  als	  Mission,	  Anmerkungen	  zum	  politischen	  Handeln	  Theodor	  Lohmanns.	  In:	  Kocka,	  J.	  ,	  Puhle,	  H.-­‐J.,	  &	  Tenfelde,	  K.	  (eds.)	  Von	  der	  Arbeiterbewegung	  zum	  
modernen	  Sozialstaat:	  Festschrift	  für	  Gerhard,	  A.	  Ritter	  zum	  65.	  Geburtstag.	  München,	  K.G.	  Sauer.	  51	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  	  (1982)	  p.	  47;	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1997)	  Sozialpolitik	  im	  Zeitalter	  Bismarcks.	  Ein	  Bericht	  über	  neue	  Quelleneditionen	  und	  neue	  Literatur.	  Historische	  Zeitschrift,	  Vol.	  265,	  No.	  3,	  p.	  695.	  52	  See	  Lohmann’s	  memo	  to	  the	  state	  secretary	  of	  the	  interior	  Karl	  Heinrich	  Boetticher.	  Especially	  the	  pages	  5-­‐8.	  Printed	  IN:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995b)	  Source	  No	  1,	  pp.	  1-­‐12.	  53	  Lohmann	  cited	  IN:	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (2006)	  p.	  101.	  54For	  a	  lenghty	  argument	  about	  why	  his	  idea	  of	  a	  ‘Versicherungsgenossenschaft’	  was	  better	  than	  Bismarck’s	  ‘Berufsgenossenschaft’	  see	  Lohmann’s	  memo	  to	  the	  statesecretary	  of	  the	  interior	  Karl	  Heinrich	  Boetticher.	  Especially	  the	  pages	  8-­‐12.	  1881	  Juni	  27.	  Denkschrift	  des	  Geheimen	  Oberregierungsrates	  Theodor	  Lohmann	  fuer	  den	  Staatssekretaer	  des	  Inneren	  Karl	  Heinrich	  von	  Boetticher,	  printed	  IN:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995)	  Source	  No	  1,	  pp.	  1-­‐12.	  55	  „Die	  materielle	  Substanz	  des	  Konflikts	  lag	  dabei	  in	  organisatorischen	  Überlegungen,	  die	  nachträglich	  marginal	  erscheinen	  können,	  es	  aber	  nicht	  nur	  –	  wie	  allgemein	  bekannt	  –	  Bismarck	  mit	  seinen	  Berufsgenossenschaften	  über	  die	  Unfallversicherung	  hinausgehende	  verfassungspolitische	  Absichten	  verband,	  sondern	  auch	  	  -­‐	  weniger	  bekannt	  –	  Lohmann	  mit	  seinen	  Versicherungsgesellschaften	  weitgehend	  gesellschaftspolitische	  Ziele	  verfolgte.“	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  (1994)	  IN:	  	  Kocka,	  J.,	  Puhle,	  H.-­‐J.,	  &	  Tenfelde,	  K.	  (eds.)	  footnote	  16,	  p.	  556.	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interpreted	   as	   someone	   who	   restlessly	   developed	   concepts	   and	   ideas	   in	   a	   “missionary	  
fervor”56	   on	   social	   policy	   but	   who	   had	   only	   limited	   impact	   on	   the	   final	   product.	  
Nevertheless,	  he	  remains	  an	  important	  figure	  when	  analyzing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  bureaucracy	  in	  
the	  formation	  of	  social	  security	  as	  he	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  repeated	  delaying	  of	  the	  bills	  
which	  gave	  political	  opponents	  more	  time	  to	  prepare	  their	  legislative	  attacks.	  
5.2.5 The	  Liberal	  Subculture	  
In	   the	   1880s,	   Liberalism	   descended	   into	   a	   general	   crisis	   during	   the	   run	   up	   to	   the	  
introduction	   of	   social	   security.	   The	   prolonged	   economic	   downturn	   following	   the	   crash	   of	  
1873	  had	  disgraced	  baseline	  liberal	  economic	  credentials	  and	  the	  overall	  political	  climate	  in	  
the	   Reich	   had	   prompted	   a	   turn	   towards	   Conservatism	  with	   Bismarck’s	   protectionist	   tariff	  
policies	   of	   1878/1879	   and	   the	   anti-­‐socialist	   laws	   in	   the	   same	   year.	   In	   addition,	   Liberalism	  
was	  disadvantaged	  through	  its	  organizational	  bifurcation.	  Since	  the	  1860s	  two	  liberal	  parties	  
existed,	   the	   left-­‐liberals	   (Fortschritts	  Partei	  –	   later	  Freisinningen	  Party)	   fiercely	  opposed	  to	  
Bismarck’s	  plans	  and	  the	  national-­‐liberals	  (Nationalliberale	  Partei)	  that	  supported	  Bismarck	  
later,	  after	  their	  National-­‐Conservative	  party	  realignment	  in	  1884.	  
	   The	   left-­‐liberals	   (Progress	   Party,	   Free-­‐minded	   Party)	  were	   opposed	   to	   Bismarck’s	   state	  
socialist	   plans	   not	   only	   due	   to	   their	  market-­‐liberal	  worldviews	   but	   also	   because	   they	   saw	  
early	  on,	   like	   the	   Social	  Democrats,	   that	  Bismarck's	   original	   plans	   threatened	   the	   ideas	  of	  
liberal	   democracy	   as	   such.	   A	   prominent	   exponent	   of	   the	   party,	   Hintze,	   judged	   Bismarck’s	  
social	   security	   proposals	   as	   the	   “direct	   way	   to	   communism”.57	   Instead,	   the	   left-­‐liberals	  
advocated	   a	   British	   approach58	   to	   social	   security	   based	   on	   voluntarism,	   private	   market	  
insurance	   and	   self-­‐help	   associations.59	   For	   the	   liberals	   pointed	   out	   that	   “This	   is	   the	  
difference	  in	  the	  concept,	  that	  separates	  us	  from	  the	  chancellor:	  we	  do	  not	  want	  the	  feeling	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Tennsetdt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995a)	  p.	  XXVIII.	  57	  “Die	  Zwangskasse	  ist	  der	  direkte	  Weg	  zum	  Kommunismus“	  Hintze	  cited	  IN:	  Stolleis,	  M.	  (2001)	  p.	  241.	  58	  The	  printed	  speech	  of	  the	  left	  Liberal	  Max	  Hirsch	  in	  the	  Haager	  Zeitung	  puts	  forward	  that	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  British	  legislations	  shows	  that	  liberal	  welfare	  approaches	  had	  so	  far	  in	  Germany	  only	  not	  worked	  because	  they	  had	  been	  distorted	  by	  the	  legal	  framework	  of	  the	  Bismarck	  government.	  See:	  Hagener	  Zeitung	  Nr.	  253.	  Vortrag	  des	  Reichstagsabgeordneten	  Dr.	  Max	  Hirsch.	  1883	  Oktober	  30,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  40,	  pp.	  154-­‐155.	  59	  A	  similar	  praise	  of	  the	  British	  model	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  plenary	  speech	  of	  the	  Left-­‐Liberal	  Reichstags	  deputy	  Eugen	  Richter.	  See:	  Rede	  des	  Abgeordneten	  Eugen	  Richter	  im	  Reichstag.	  1881	  November	  24.	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  	  source	  No.	  22,	  p.	  90.	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of	  self-­‐responsibility	  of	  the	  individual	  to	  be	  touched	  on.”60	  This	  meant	  that	  left-­‐liberals	  were	  
fiercely	  opposed	   to	   any	   compulsory	   and	   state-­‐centered	   solutions.	   In	   the	  Reichstag,	   Eugen	  
Richter,	  a	  prominent	  liberal,	  expressed	  strong	  concerns	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  Imperial	  Social	  
Message	  about	  “the	  overly	  powerful	   Imperial-­‐Insurance	  agency	  will	   soon	  crush	  competing	  
associations”61	  and	  the	  system’s	  partial	  financing	  through	  an	  imperial-­‐contribution	  which	  “	  I	  
see	  to	  my	  regret	  still	  to	  be	  upheld	  in	  the	  message“	  from	  the	  Kaiser.62	  During	  a	  liberal	  union	  
rally,	  the	   left-­‐liberal	  parliamentarian	  Hirsch	  put	  forward	  that,	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  working	  
class,	   "there	   is	   no	  worse	   instrument	   than	   this	   compulsory	   insurance”.63	   The	   problem	  was	  
only	   that	   the	   left-­‐liberal	   critique	   of	   Bismarck’s	   plans	   did	   not	   gain	  much	   traction	   as	   liberal	  
solutions	   to	   social	   security	   had	   already	   been	   implemented.	   The	   non-­‐mandatory	   Imperial	  
Liability	  Insurance	  Law	  (Reichshaftpflichtgesetz)64	  from	  the	  1870s	  had	  failed	  disastrously.65	  	  
	   The	  position	  of	  the	  National	  Liberals	  moved	  from	  opposition	  to	  Bismarck’s	  social	  security	  
plans	   towards	   collaboration	   during	   the	   1880s.	   The	   early	   reaction	   of	   the	   National	   Liberals	  
was	   disfavored	   not	   only	   out	   of	   liberal	   economic	   free-­‐market	   creed	   but	   also	   because	  
Bismarck	   largely	   ignored	  the	  Reichstag’s	  resistance	  to	  the	  first	  Accident	   Insurance	  Bill.	  The	  
positive	  public	  reaction	  to	  the	  Reichstag’s	  resistance	  to	  Bismarck’s	  plans	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  
1881	  election	   results,	   in	  which	   the	  Bismarck	  camp	   lost	  heavily,	  which	   fostered	   this	   feeling	  
even	  more.	  National	  Liberals	  (rightly)	  perceived	  Bismarck’s	  state	  socialist	  plans	  as	  part	  of	  an	  
antidemocratic	   and	   anti-­‐liberal	   campaign.	   Thus,	   the	   National	   Liberal	   newspaper,	   the	  
Hamburgerische	  Correspondent,	  in	  1881	  published	  an	  article	  under	  the	  title	  “The	  absolutist	  
aspects	  of	  the	  Accident	  Insurance	  Bill”	  which	  nails	  down	  the	  clash	  of	  Bismarck’s	  Protestant	  
Conservatism	   and	   the	   Liberal’s	  worldviews	   by	   putting	   forward	   that	   “there	   exists	   rather	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  “Das	  ist	  der	  Unterschied	  in	  der	  Auffassung,	  die	  uns	  vom	  Kanzler	  trennt:	  Wir	  wollen	  das	  Gefühl	  der	  Selbstverantwortlichkeit	  des	  einzelnen	  nicht	  angetastet	  sehen.“	  Eugen	  Richter.	  1881	  November	  24.	  Rede	  des	  Abgeordneten	  Eugen	  Richter	  im	  Reichstag,	  source	  No.	  22,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  p.	  93.	  61	  „die	  übermächtige	  Reichsanstalt	  wird	  diese	  konkurrierenden	  Gesellschaften	  alsbald	  erdrücken.“	  Eugen	  Richter.	  1881	  November	  24.	  Rede	  des	  Abgeordneten	  Eugen	  Richter	  im	  Reichstag,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  22,	  p.	  92.	  62	  “Meine	  Herren	  was	  uns	  trennt	  in	  dieser	  Frage	  von	  der	  Reichsregierung	  ist	  der	  Staatszuschuss.	  Auch	  diese	  Forderung	  sehe	  ich	  zu	  meinem	  Bedauern	  in	  der	  Botschaft	  aufrechterhalten.“	  Eugen	  Richter.	  1881	  November	  24.	  Rede	  des	  Abgeordneten	  Eugen	  Richter	  im	  Reichstag,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  22,	  p.	  92.	  63	  "so	  gibt	  es	  kein	  schlechteres	  Mittel	  als	  gerade	  diese	  Zwangsversicherung	  für	  eine	  einzige	  Klasse."	  Hagener	  Zeitung	  Nr.	  253.	  Vortrag	  des	  Reichstagsabgeordneten	  Dr.	  Max	  Hirsch,	  1883	  Oktober	  30,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  40,	  p.	  155.	  64	  Here	  should	  especially	  be	  mentioned	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  ‘Haftpflichtgesetz’	  from	  1871	  and	  the	  two	  ‘Hilfskassengesetze’	  from	  1876.	  See	  also:	  Ullmann,	  H.-­‐P.	  (1979)	  p.	  578.	  65Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003a)	  p.	  	  XXIII.	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broad	   and	   deep	   contradiction	   of	   two	   world	   views,	   here,	   the	   absolutist	   one,	   even	   if	  
enlightened	  and	  benevolent,	  on	  the	  one	  side,	  and	  the	  modern	  conception	  of	  statehood	  on	  
the	  other	  side.”66	  The	  National	  Zeitung,	  the	  main	  National	  Liberal	  newspaper,	  adds	  to	  this	  by	  
commenting	  on	   the	   announcement,	   as	   part	   of	   the	   Imperial	   Social	  Message,	   of	   Bismarck’s	  
plans	  for	  an	  increase	  in	  state	  responsibilities	  that	  “We	  are	  afraid	  that	  the	  German	  Reich	  and	  
the	  Kingdom	  of	  Prussia	   in	  their	  present	  organizational	  state	  cannot	  be	  the	  carriers	  of	  such	  
organizational	  tasks.”	  67	  	  
	   Nevertheless,	   after	   their	   nationalist	   conservative	   realignment	   at	   the	   Heidelberg	   party	  
congregation	  in	  1884,	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  National	  Liberals	  changed.	  Henceforth	  they	  sided	  
openly	   with	   Bismarck	   on	   social	   security.	   The	   Heidelberger	   program	   states	   that	   they	  
“support,	   though	   only	   after	   being	   subject	   to	   thorough	   scrutinizing	   of	   the	   individual	  
measures,	   the	   Imperial	   government	   in	   its	   endeavor	   to	   better	   the	   social	   conditions	   of	   the	  
working	   classes.”68	   Riding	   on	   a	  National	  wave,	   from	   1884	   the	  National	   Liberals	   showed	   a	  
willingness	   to	   support	   parts	   of	   Bismarck’s	   concept	   of	   State	   Socialism	   and	   supported	   his	  
centralized,	  mandatory,	  state	  financed	  and	  state	  run	  social	  security	  solution.	  
	   To	   conclude,	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   left-­‐liberals	   and	   national	   liberals	   on	   social	   security	  
widened	   from	   1884	   onwards.	   This	   split	   further	   weakened	   liberal	   influence	   because	   the	  
National	   Liberals,	   who	   began	   to	   vote	   with	   Bismarck	   on	   Social	   Security,	   no	   longer	  
represented	  liberal	  programmatic	  ideas	  on	  social	  security.	  Moreover,	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  took	  a	  
general	  turn	  against	  liberal	  ideas	  during	  the	  late	  1870s.	  Not	  only	  had	  the	  economic	  crisis	  of	  
1873	   shaken	   the	   confidence	   in	   the	   liberal	   worldview	   but	   Bismarck	   also	   ceased	   his	  
collaboration	  with	  the	  left	  liberals	  in	  parliament	  after	  1878.	  The	  following	  graph	  summarizes	  
the	   programmatic	   ideas	   and	   policy	   ideas	   of	   both	   liberal	   parties	   in	   the	   period	   before	   and	  
after	  1884.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  „Es	  liegt	  vielmehr	  der	  breite	  und	  tiefe	  Gegensatz	  zweier	  Weltanschauungen	  vor,	  des	  absolutistischen,	  wenn	  auch	  aufgeklärten	  und	  wohlwollenden	  einer-­‐,	  des	  modernen	  Staatsbegriffes	  andererseits.“	  1881	  Oktober	  13.	  Hamburgerischer	  Correspondent	  Nr.	  284.	  Die	  Absolutistischen	  Momente	  im	  Unfallversicherungsgesetz,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  11,	  p.	  30.	  	  67	  „Wir	  fürchten,	  dass	  das	  Deutsche	  Reich	  und	  das	  Königreich	  Preußen	  in	  ihrer	  heutigen	  Organisation	  die	  Träger	  solcher	  Einrichtungen	  nicht	  sein	  können.“	  Die	  Kaiserliche	  Botschaft.	  1881	  November	  20,	  National-­‐Zeitung	  Nr.	  546,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  	  source	  No.	  18,	  p.	  78.	  68	  „unterstützen,	  vorbehaltlich	  einer	  sorgfältigen	  Prüfung	  der	  einzelnen	  Maßregeln,	  die	  Reichsregierung	  in	  ihren	  Bemühungen,	  die	  soziale	  Lage	  der	  arbeitenden	  Klassen	  zu	  verbessern.“	  1884	  März	  23.	  Erklärung	  süddeutscher	  Nationalliberaler	  (sog.	  Heidelberger	  Programm)	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  	  Source	  No.	  151,	  p.	  545.	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Figure	  5-­‐2	  Liberal	  subculture	  social	  policy	  preferences	  
	  
	  
5.2.6 The	  Socialist	  Subculture	  
Similarly	  to	  the	  Liberals,	  Social	  Democracy	  had	  realized	  early	  on	  that	  the	  new	  legislation	  was	  
directed	   against	   them	   and	   showed	   no	   desire	   to	   fall	   into	   Bismarck’s	   carrot	   and	   stick	   trap.	  
Their	  party	  congregation	   in	  1883,	  held	   in	  Copenhagen	  due	  to	  the	  socialist	   laws,	  concluded	  
with	   the	   statement	   that	   "The	   congress	   declares	   that,	   considering	   the	   so	   called	   social	  
reforms	  in	  the	  German	  Empire,	  it	  neither	  believes	  in	  the	  honest	  intensions	  nor	  in	  the	  skills	  of	  
the	  ruling	  classes	  [...]	  but	  that	  it	  is	  of	  the	  conviction	  that	  the	  so	  called	  social	  reform	  is	  being	  
used	  only	  as	  a	  tactical	  means,	  in	  order	  to	  dissuade	  the	  workers	  from	  their	  righteous	  path.”69	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  "Der	  Kongress	  erklärt,	  dass	  er	  in	  Bezug	  auf	  die	  sogenannte	  Sozialreform	  im	  Deutschen	  Reich	  weder	  an	  die	  ehrlichen	  Absichten	  noch	  an	  die	  Fähigkeit	  der	  herrschenden	  Klassen	  nach	  deren	  bisherigem	  Verhalten	  glaubt,	  sondern	  der	  Überzeugung	  ist,	  dass	  die	  sogenannte	  Sozialreform	  nur	  als	  taktisches	  Mittel	  benutzt	  wird,	  um	  den	  Arbeiter	  vom	  wahren	  Weg	  abzulenken."	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Furthermore,	  the	  orthodox	  Marxist	  wing	  revolving	  around	  Bebel	  and	  Kautsky	  was	  opposed	  
outright	   to	   any	   form	  of	   social	   security	   arrangement	   that	   could	   have	   softened	   the	   friction	  
between	  capital	  and	  labor	  and	  would	  have	  inhibited	  a	  Marxist	  revolution	  in	  the	  long	  run.70	  
The	   leading	   Social	   Democratic	   party	   newspaper	   Der	   Sozialdemokrat	   consequently	  
announced	  that	  
	  
Never	  will	  we,	  for	  a	  lentil	  dish	  of	  an	  accident	  and	  invalidity	  insurance	  of	  highly	  dubious	  value,	  give	  up	  the	  right	  of	  
the	   people	   to	   work	   and	   existence	   nor	   the	   right	   and	   the	   duty	   of	   the	   people	   to	   enforce	   their	   claims	   in	   an	  
emergency	  situation	  through	  violence.	  This	   is	   the	  proud	  answer	  of	  Social	  Democracy	  to	  the	  message	  from	  the	  
Kaiser.71	  
	  
	   In	   contrast,	   the	   pragmatic	  wing	   around	   Lasalle	   and	   Bernstein	   did	   not	   reject	   the	   social	  
security	   legislation	   outright.	   Though	   aware	   of	   Bismarck’s	   Bonapartist	   intentions	   they	   saw	  
the	   fields	   of	   work	   protection	   and	   collective	   bargaining	   rights	   as	   their	   priority	   instead	   of	  
Bismarck’s	   State	   Socialism.	   In	   their	   eyes,	   only	   collective	   bargaining	   rights	   and	   work	  
protection	   legislation	   could	   serve	   as	   institutional	   and	   collective	   action	   resources	   for	   the	  
socialist	  subculture.	  As	  Bismarck	  successfully	  obstructed	  most	  attempts	  of	  the	  Reichstag	  to	  
launch	  initiatives	  in	  these	  fields,	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  were	  hostile	  to	  all	  social	  security	  laws	  
in	  the	  Reichstag	  during	  the	  1880s.	  If	  ever	  Social	  Democrats	  proposed	  legislation	  then	  it	  went	  
far	   beyond	   Bismarck’s	   plans.	   	   The	   liberal	   Union	   leader	  Max	   Hirsch	   pointed	   to	   this	   Social	  
Democratic	   ambiguity	   by	   claiming	   that	   the	   Social	   Democratic	   plans	   regarding	   compulsion	  
went	  even	  beyond	  Bismarck's	  state	  socialist	  plans.72	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  funny	  twist	  that	  
Social	  Democratic	  MPs	  claimed	  in	  their	  Reichstag	  speeches	  that	  Social	  Security	  would	  never	  
have	  come	  about	  without	  Social	  Democracy	  pushing	  for	  it.73	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Entschließung	  des	  Parteitags	  der	  deutschen	  Sozialdemokratie	  in	  Kopenhagen,	  1883	  April	  1,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  34,	  p.	  127.	  70Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003a)	  p.	  	  XXII.	  71	  "Niemals	  werden	  wir	  um	  das	  Linsengericht	  einer	  Unfall-­‐	  und	  Invalidenversicherung	  von	  höchst	  zweifelhaftem	  Wert	  das	  Recht	  des	  Volkes	  auf	  Arbeit	  und	  Existenz,	  niemals	  das	  Recht	  und	  die	  Pflicht	  des	  Volkes,	  seinen	  Forderungen	  im	  Notfall	  mit	  Gewalt	  durchzusetzen,	  preisgeben.	  Das	  ist	  die	  Stolze	  Antwort	  der	  Sozialdemokratie	  auf	  die	  Kaiserliche	  Botschaft."	  Der	  Sozialdemokrat	  Nr.	  48.	  1881	  November	  24,	  Eine	  Kaiserliche	  Botschaft	  und	  eine	  sozialdemokratische	  Antwort,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  p.	  88.	  72	  "Überhaupt	  sei	  die	  Stellung	  der	  Sozialdemokraten	  in	  der	  jetzigen	  Bewegung	  eine	  etwas	  eigentümliche,	  merkwürdige.	  Sie	  erklärten,	  daß	  sie	  grundsätzlich	  Anhänger	  des	  Zwangs	  seien,	  daß	  sie	  noch	  hinausgehen	  über	  die	  Pläne	  der	  Regierung."	  Hagener	  Zeitung	  Nr.	  253,	  Vortrag	  des	  Reichstagsabgeordneten	  Dr.	  Max	  Hirsch,	  1883	  Oktober	  30,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  40,	  p.	  159.	  73	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (2006)	  Sozialpolitik	  im	  Deutschen	  Kaiserreich,	  IN:	  Historische	  Zeitschrift,	  Vol.	  282,	  pp.	  97-­‐147,	  especially	  p.	  101	  and	  also:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  pp.	  224-­‐226.	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5.2.7 The	  Catholic	  Subculture	  
The	   political	   contestations	   around	   social	   security	   during	   the	   1880s	   were	   perceived	   as	   a	  
denominational	   battle.	   Contemporary	   commentators	   speculated	   that	   “on	   the	   social	  
question	   the	   history	   of	   the	   churches	   will	   be	   decided.”74	   The	   paradox	   was	   that	   at	   the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  decade	  Catholicism	  seemed	  to	  be	  better	  positioned	  than	  Protestantism	  to	  
tackle	   the	   quest	   for	   social	   security.	   Protestantism,	   as	   the	   religion	   of	   state	   elites,	  
administration	   and	   the	   majority	   denomination,	   was	   split	   into	   two	   separate	   subcultures	  
represented	  by	  different	  political	  organizations.	  On	  one	  side,	  there	  was	  the	  paternalist	  and	  
state	   socialist	   interpretation	   of	   Protestantism	   of	   Bismarck	   and	   the	   Conservatives,	   On	   the	  
other	   side	   stood	   the	  Protestant	   liberals,	  with	  allies	   like	   Lohmann	   in	   the	  bureaucracy,	  who	  
advocated	   a	   liberal	   form	   of	   Lutheran	   welfare	   based	   on	   self-­‐help	   and	   individual	  
responsibility.	  
	   Catholicism	   had,	   through	   the	   Center	   Party	   and	   its	   subculture,	   a	   congruent	   and	   robust	  
political	  carrier.	  Furthermore,	   the	  Catholic	  worldview	  was,	  by	  the	  1880s,	  also	  unified	   in	   its	  
programmatic	  ideas.	  The	  pragmatic-­‐modern	  currents	  that	  advocated	  a	  reform	  “from	  within”	  
capitalism	   had	   won	   the	   upper	   hand	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   Vogelsang’s	   hierarchical	   estate-­‐
oriented	   idea	   of	   socioeconomic	   organization	   that	   wanted	   to	   replace	   industrialized	  
capitalism	  with	  organic	  corporatism.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74"An	  der	  Sozialen	  Frage	  werde	  sich	  die	  Geschichte	  der	  Kirchen	  entscheiden."	  Cited	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003a)	  p.	  XXVII.	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   The	  Center	  Party	  favored	  social	  security	  organized	  through	  cooperations	  along	  vocational	  
lines	   (Berufsgenossenschaften)	   which	   translated	   the	   medieval	   corporatist	   logic	   of	  
organization	   into	   modern	   capitalism.	   Only	   in	   the	   long	   run	   should	   this	   lead	   to	   a	  
"reorganisation	  of	  society	  on	  the	  foundations	  of	  corporatist	  institutions,	  [...],	  and	  to	  prepare	  
the	  restauration	  of	  the	  Christian	  world	  order"75	  as	  a	  congregation	  of	  the	  leading	  social	  policy	  
experts	  in	  the	  Center	  Party	  concluded.	  Catholic	  Social	  policy	  experts	  like	  Hertling,	  argued	  for	  
mutual	   organizations	   with	   compulsory	   membership	   as	   carriers	   for	   social	   security	  
(Berufsgenossenschaften)	  because	  they	  were	  based	  on	  "organically	  grown"76	  forms	  of	  social	  
security	   organizations	   like	   the	   Knappschaften	   for	  miners	   or	   the	  Guilds	   for	   craftsmen.	   The	  
organization	   should	   be	   completely	   decoupled	   from	   the	   state	   through	   "total	   self-­‐
administration"	  by	  "the	  insured	  and	  the	  contributing	  employers”.	  The	  state	  instead,	  should	  
"confine	   itself	   to	   the	   necessary	   surveillance"77	   of	   the	   insurance	   bodies.	   The	   Center	   Party	  
wanted	  social	   security	   to	  be	   financed	  equally	  by	  employers	  and	  employees	  as	   "It	   is	   in	   the	  
very	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   employers	   and	   employees	   that	   the	   former	  
contribute	  to	  the	  insurances	  of	  the	  latter"78	  as	  the	  Germania,	  the	  major	  Catholic	  newspaper,	  
summarized.	  The	  following	  figure	  sketches	  the	  programmatic	  ideas	  of	  the	  Center	  Party.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  "Reorganisation	  der	  Gesellschaft	  auf	  Grundlage	  korporativer	  Institutionen	  zu	  fördern	  und	  die	  Wiederherstellung	  der	  christlichen	  Weltordnung	  anzubahnen;"	  1885	  Juli	  9.	  Germania	  Nr.	  152,	  Versammlung	  katholischer	  Sozialpolitiker,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  65,	  p.	  271.	  76	  "Meiner	  Ansicht,	  die	  ich	  durch	  Hinweis	  auf	  die	  verschiedenen	  Zweige	  des	  Bergbaus	  begründete,	  daß	  nicht	  genügend	  auf	  das	  organische	  Wachstum	  der	  Berufsgenossenschaften	  Rücksicht	  genommen	  sei,	  trat	  der	  Fürst	  in	  einer	  kurzen	  Zwischenbemerkung	  bei."	  1883	  April	  8,	  Aufzeichnungen	  des	  Reichstagsabgeordneten	  Dr.	  Georg	  Freiherr	  von	  Hertling	  über	  ein	  Gespräch	  mit	  Kanzler	  Otto	  Fürst	  von	  Bismarck,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  	  Source	  No.	  35,	  p.	  131.	  77	  "Den	  Versicherungsanstalten	  muss	  volle	  Selbstverwaltung	  zustehen,	  an	  welcher	  die	  Versicherten	  sowie	  eventuell	  die	  beitragspflichtigen	  Arbeitgeber	  einen	  entsprechenden	  Anteil	  haben;	  die	  Staatsgewalt	  soll	  ihre	  Tätigkeit	  auf	  eine	  gewisse	  notwendige	  Überwachung	  der	  Versicherungsanstalten,	  [...]	  beschränken."	  1885	  Juli	  9.	  Germania	  Nr.	  152,	  Versammlung	  katholischer	  Sozialpolitiker,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  Source	  No.	  65,	  p.	  273.	  78	  "Es	  entspricht	  der	  Natur	  des	  Verhältnisses	  der	  Arbeitgeber	  zu	  den	  Arbeitern,	  dass	  die	  ersteren	  zu	  den	  Versicherungen	  der	  letzteren	  Beiträge	  leisten."	  1885	  Juli	  9.	  Germania	  Nr.	  152.	  Versammlung	  katholischer	  Sozialpolitiker,	  rinted	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  65,	  p.	  273.	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Figure	  5-­‐4	  Catholic	  subculture	  social	  policy	  preferences	  
	  
	  
From	   these	   basic	   premises	   it	   follows	   that	   the	   Center	   Party	   advocated	   a	   decentralized	  
organization	   of	   social	   security	   that	   was	   auto-­‐administered	   and	   not	   based	   on	   state	  
contributions.	  This	   implied	  a	  strong	  opposition	  to	  any	  plans	  of	  a	  centralized	  social	  security	  
administration,	   as	   foreseen	   in	   Bismarck’s	   State	   Socialism.79	   	   Regarding	   the	   compulsory	  
nature	   of	   the	   Social	   Insurance	   schemes,	   the	   Center	   Party	   was,	   at	   first,	   ambivalent	   as	   it	  
regarded	  most	  direct	  interference	  in	  organic	  society	  by	  the	  state	  as	  problematic.	  In	  the	  end,	  
the	   leading	   social	   security	   experts	   of	   the	   party	   issued	   a	   positive	   statement	   regarding	  
compulsion,	  arguing	  that	  society	  was	  atomized	  in	  any	  case	  and	  that	  only	  major	  interference	  
of	  the	  state	  could	  lead	  to	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	  original	  organic	  order	  of	  society	  again.80	  
	   The	  party	  was	  delighted	  that	  the	  Imperial	  Social	  Message	  delivered	  by	  Bismarck	  in	  1881	  
included	  a	   call	   for	  organizing	   the	   future	   social	   security	  programs	  on	  a	   cooperative	  basis.81	  
Bismarck	   revealed	   to	  Hertling,	   in	  a	  private	   conversation	   in	  April	   1883,	   that	   this	  move	  was	  
indeed	  a	  concession	  to	  the	  Catholics	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  their	  support	  for	  the	  legislation.82	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Lönne,	  K.	  E.	  (1986)	  p.	  175.	  80	  "Unter	  Umständen	  aber,	  insbesondere	  mit	  Rücksicht	  auf	  die	  heutige	  atomisierte	  Gesellschaft	  ist	  die	  Staatsgewalt	  berufen,	  Bestimmungen	  auch	  mit	  Zwangscharakter	  zu	  treffen"	  1885	  Juli	  9.	  Germania	  Nr.	  152,	  Versammlung	  katholischer	  Sozialpolitiker,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  65,	  p.	  273.	  81	  “enthielten	  von	  genossenschaftlicher	  Organisation	  nichts,	  sondern	  waren	  nur	  von	  einer	  zentralistischen	  Staatstätigkeit	  zu	  verstehen.	  Erst	  die	  weitere	  Diskussion	  brachte	  die	  berufsständischen	  Organisationen	  mehr	  zur	  Geltung,	  und	  zu	  unserer	  großen	  Freude	  fordert	  nun	  auch	  die	  Kaiserliche	  Botschaft	  „den	  engeren	  Anschluss	  an	  die	  realen	  Kräfte	  des	  christlichen	  Volkslebens	  und	  das	  zusammenfassen	  der	  letzteren	  in	  der	  Form	  korporativer	  Genossenschaften	  unter	  staatlichem	  Schutz	  und	  staatlicher	  Förderung“.	  Das	  Regierungsprogramm.	  Germania	  Nr.	  264.	  1881	  November	  18,	  Germania	  was	  the	  main	  newspaper	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Party,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  17,	  p.	  78.	  82	  "Nunmehr	  sei	  der	  Entwurf	  in	  einer	  Richtung	  verändert,	  welche	  diese	  Bedenken	  beseitige	  und	  die	  Durchführung	  der	  Unfallversicherung	  in	  direkter	  Annäherung	  an	  die	  Wünsche	  des	  Zentrums	  mittels	  kooperativer	  Bildung	  erstrebe."	  1883	  April	  8.	  Aufzeichnungen	  des	  Reichstagsabgeordneten	  Dr.	  Georg	  Freiherr	  von	  Hertling	  über	  ein	  Gespräch	  mit	  Kanzler	  Otto	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5.3 Making	  Social	  Security:	  Battle	  of	  Ideas	  or	  Ideational	  Compatibility?	  
Bismarck's	  plans	  to	  introduce	  Social	  Security	  included	  not	  only	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  welfare	  
system	  as	   such	  but	   also	   brought	   about	   a	  massive	   expansion	  of	   the	  powers	   of	   the	   central	  
state	  into	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sphere.	  The	  "qualitative	  jump	  of	  state	  responsibility"83	  was	  
intertwined	  with	   Bismarck’s	   political	   aims	   of	   using	   Social	   Security	   as	   a	   political	  means	   to	  
break	  into	  the	  cohesive	  power	  of	  the	  other	  subcultures.84	  The	  following	  will	  show	  how	  the	  
different	  worldviews	  and	  their	  programmatic	   ideas	  clashed	  on	  social	  security	  and	  will	  then	  
chronologically	   analyze	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  major	   social	   security	  
legislation	  of	  the	  1880s.	  The	  first	  major	  social	  security	  laws	  were	  sickness,	  accident	  and	  old	  
age	   and	   invalidity	   insurance.	   Sickness	   insurance	   materialized	   first	   and	   was	   approved	   by	  
parliament	   on	   the	   31st	  May	   1883.	   Accident	   insurance	   came	   second	   on	   the	   6th	   July	   1884	  
whereas	   old	   age	   and	   invalidity	   followed	   with	   a	   considerable	   time	   lag,	   on	   the	   22nd	   June	  
1889.	   Bismarck’s	   original	   intention	   was	   to	   implement	   accident	   insurance	   first,	   which	   he	  
prioritized	   over	   sickness	   insurance,	   but	   the	   project	   was	   repeatedly	   blocked	   at	   the	  
parliamentary	  committee	  stage.85	  	  
	  
5.3.1 The	  Law	  on	  Sickness	  Insurance	  of	  1883	  
Sickness	   insurance	   was	   the	   first	   disappointment	   that	   Bismarck’s	   Conservative	   Protestant	  
State	  Socialism	  project	  encountered	  during	  the	  1880s.	  Bismarck’s	  original	  plan	  envisaged	  a	  
centralized	   sickness	   insurance	   administered	   and	   financed	   through	   the	   central	   state.	   The	  
man	   in	   the	   bureaucracy	   responsible	   for	   hammering	   out	   such	   a	   legislative	   framework	  was	  
the	   Protestant	   liberal	   Privy	   Council	   (Geheimrat)	   Theodor	   Lohmann.	   Lohmann	  was	   heavily	  
opposed	  to	  any	  State	  Socialist	  plans	  and	  tried	  to	  dilute	  Bismarck’s	  plan	  whenever	  he	  could.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Fürst	  von	  Bismarck.	  Printed	  IN:	  Ayaβ,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  35,	  pp.	  128-­‐129.	  83	  Tennsetdt	  F.	  &	  Winter	  H.	  (1995a)	  p.	  XX.	  84	  Tennsetdt	  F.	  &	  Winter	  H.	  (1995a)	  p.	  	  XX.	  85	  The	  third	  government	  draft	  on	  accident	  insurance	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  Reichstag	  on	  the	  6th	  July	  1884	  and	  came	  into	  force	  on	  the	  1st	  October	  1885.	  Sickness	  Insurance	  passed	  the	  Reichstag	  on	  the	  31st	  May	  1883	  and	  came	  into	  force	  on	  the	  1st	  December	  1883	  although	  some	  parts	  only	  became	  law	  in	  December	  1884.	  The	  government	  had	  initially	  attached	  the	  second	  accident	  insurance	  draft	  to	  the	  sickness	  insurance	  draft	  put	  before	  the	  Reichstag.	  Much	  to	  Bismarck's	  disapproval	  the	  Reichstag	  decoupled	  the	  two	  draft	  bills	  at	  the	  committee	  stage.	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He	   favored	   a	   decentralized,	   market-­‐based	   system	   without	   any	   imperial	   contribution	   to	  
financing.	  	  
	   Bismarck’s	   and	   Lohmann’s	   diverging	   ideas	   on	   sickness	   insurance	   were	   the	   first	  
manifestation	   of	   a	   clash	   between	   two	   world	   views	   (orthodox	   Protestant	   vs.	   liberal	  
Protestant)	  on	  welfare	  legislation.	  In	  general,	  Bismarck	  had	  not	  primarily	  been	  interested	  in	  
sickness	   insurance	  which	  he	  described	  as	  “All	  good	  and	  useful	  but	  not	  so	  urgent”86	  but	  he	  
was	   convinced	   that	   Lohmann’s	   draft	   was	   “making	   too	   far	   reaching	   concessions	   to	  
voluntarism”.87	   Bismarck	   feared	   that	   Lohmann’s	   proposal	   would	   strengthen	   the	   other	  
subculture’s	   worker’s	   movements	   instead	   of	   weakening	   them	   as	   the	   idea	   of	   private	  
insurance	  providers	  (Freie	  Hilfskassen)	  might	  be	  abused	  to	  open	  insurance	  schemes	  within	  
each	  subculture.88	  
	   Despite	   the	   chancellor’s	   reservations,	   Lohmann	   used	   a	   window	   of	   opportunity	   when	  
Bismarck	  was	   repeatedly	   ill	   in	   1883	   to	   introduce	   his	   sickness	   insurance	   amendments	   into	  
the	   Reichstag.	   Originally	   Sickness	   insurance	   had	   been	   attached	   to	   the	   second	   accident	  
insurance	  draft,	   but	   the	  Reichstag	   committee	  decoupled	   them	  and	  decided	   to	   treat	   them	  
separately	  on	  the	  3rd	  June	  1882	  (Bismarck	  had	  favored	  a	  package	  deal	  and	  was	  in	  any	  case	  
more	   interested	   in	  accident	   insurance	  so	  he	  subsequently	   lost	   the	   impetus	  on	  his	  sickness	  
legislation).	  
	   The	   law	  was	  passed	  on	  the	  31st	  May	  1883	  with	  216	  against	  99	  votes	   in	  the	  Reichstag.89	  
Only	   Social	   Democrats,	   left	   liberals	   (Fortschritt)	   and	   some	   of	   the	   secessionist	   minority	  
parties	  voted	  against	   it.	   The	  Center	  Party	  voted	   for	   the	  bill	  because	  Lohmann’s	   legislation	  
avoided	  Bismarck’s	  centralizing	  Imperial	  insurance	  agency	  and	  the	  Reich	  was	  kept	  at	  bay	  in	  
the	  financing	  of	   the	  schemes.90	   	  The	   left	   liberals	   (Fortschritt)	  voted	  against	   the	  bill	  as	   they	  
opposed	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	  mandatory	   component.	   The	   Socialists	   saw	   no	   reason	   to	  
vote	  for	  a	  market	  based	  solution.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  „Alles	  gut	  und	  nützlich,	  aber	  nicht	  so	  dringend“	  Bismarck	  cited	  IN:	  Hänlein,	  A.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2009)	  Einleitung,	  IN:	  Hänlein,	  A.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2009)	  Quellensammlung	  
zur	  Geschichte	  der	  deutschen	  Sozialpolitik	  1867	  bis	  1914,	  II.	  	  Abteilung:	  Von	  der	  Kaiserlichen	  Sozialbotschaft	  bis	  zu	  den	  Februarerlassen	  Wilhelms	  II.	  (1881-­‐1890),	  Die	  Gesetzliche	  Krankenversicherung	  und	  die	  eingeschriebenen	  Hilfskassen,	  Band	  	  5,	  p.	  XV.	  87	  “dem	  Voluntarismus	  zu	  weite	  Konzessionen	  gemacht	  wurden“	  Hänlein	  A.,	  Tennstedt	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2009)	  p.	  XXXIII.	  88	  Albert	  Schaeffle,	  Bismarck’s	  economic	  advisor	  at	  that	  time	  had	  similar	  concerns.	  Hänlein	  A.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2009)	  p.	  XXXIII.	  	  89	  Hänlein	  A.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2009)	  p.	  XV.	  90	  Lönne,	  K.E.	  (1986)	  p.	  175.	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   The	  law	  introduced	  treatment	  by	  doctors	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  pharmaceuticals	  without	  
any	   supplementary	   costs	   for	   the	   insured.	   The	   ill	   person	   was	   eligible	   for	   a	   50%	   income	  
compensation	   calculated	   on	   the	   median	   income	   after	   the	   third	   day	   of	   sick	   leave.	   The	  
contributions	  were	   technically	   transferred	   into	   the	   insurance	   fund	  by	   the	  employer	  but	   in	  
reality	  two	  thirds	  of	  them	  were	  deducted	  from	  the	  employee’s	  pay.	  
	   The	  private	  organization	  of	  the	  insurance	  scheme	  had	  (apart	  from	  its	  mandatory	  nature)	  
not	  much	   resemblance	   to	   Bismarck’s	   programmatic	   concept	   of	   State	   Socialism	   and	   could	  
hardly	   contribute	   to	  Bismarck’s	   interests	  of	  establishing	  hegemony	   for	  his	   subculture.	  The	  
difference	  with	   the	  existing	  private	   insurance	  market	  was	   that	   the	  new	   system	   should	  be	  
brought	  under	  state	  supervision	  and	  would	  be	  mandatory	   for	  every	  worker.91	   	   In	   the	  end,	  
Bismarck	   "condoned"92	   Lohmann's	   actions	   on	   Sickness	   insurance	   because	   he	   could	   not	  
alienate	   the	   liberals	   and	   he	   did	   not	   perceive	   Sickness	   insurance	   as	   being	   a	   central	  
component	   of	   his	   insurance	   regime.	   Nevertheless,	   Bismarck	   would	   refer	   to	   sickness	  
insurance	  as	  a	  "Child	  foisted	  on	  to	  him"	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  life.93	  
5.3.2 Accident	  Insurance:	  1884	  
If	   Sickness	   insurance	   was	   an	   unpleasant	   outcome	   for	   Bismarck,	   accident	   insurance	   must	  
have	   been	   a	   nightmarish	   experience.	   Bismarck	   reacted	   to	   the	   quarrels	   on	   sickness	   by	  
announcing	   far	   reaching	   changes	   to	   the	   accident	   insurance	   bill	   in	   the	   Imperial	   Social	  
Message	   in	   the	  Reichstag	  on	   the	  17th	  November	  1881.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   second	  draft	   bill	  
also	   failed	   and	   this	   led	   to	   a	   heavily	   compromised	   and	   amended	   third	   bill	   based	   on	   a	  
Catholic-­‐Conservative	   (Protestant)	   compromise.	   Accident	   Insurance	   would	   finally	   pass	  
parliament	  on	  the	  6th	  July	  1884.	  
	  
5.3.3 Try	  once:	  	  The	  first	  Accident	  insurance	  draft	  
Bismarck’s	   idea	   was	   to	   structure	   accident	   insurance	   around	   a	   highly	   centralized	   imperial	  
insurance	   agency	   (Reichsversicherungsanstalt).	   It	   should	   enforce	   and	   administer	   a	  
compulsory	  accident	  insurance	  exclusively	  financed	  by	  the	  Reich.	  As	  one	  of	  Bismarck’s	  most	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Hänlein,	  A.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2009)	  p.	  XVII.	  92Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995a)	  p.	  	  XVI.	  93	  Bismarck	  quoted	  IN:	  Ritter,	  G.	  A.	  (1982)	  Sozialversicherung	  in	  Deutschland	  und	  England:	  Entstehung	  und	  Grundzüge	  im	  Vergleich,	  München,	  C.H.	  Beck,	  p.	  42. 
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notorious	  worries	  had	  always	  been	  the	  poor	  fiscal	  situation	  of	  the	  Empire,	  he	  envisaged	  the	  
introduction	  of	   a	  new	   tax	   regime	   (tobacco	  monopoly)94	   in	  order	   to	   finance	   the	   insurance.	  
The	   idea	  was	  to	  raise	  a	  new	  tax	  on	  tobacco	  and	  liquor.	  A	  central	  premise	  of	  Bismarck	  was	  
that	  workers	  would	  not	  have	  to	  pay	  into	  the	  scheme.	  Instead,	  they	  were	  meant	  to	  perceive	  
Accident	  Insurance	  as	  a	  free	  and	  benevolent	  donation	  from	  the	  Empire.	   	  The	  first	  draft	  set	  
out	   for	   the	   financing	   to	   come	   through	   a	   two-­‐thirds	   contribution	   from	   the	   employers,	  
matched	  by	  a	  one-­‐third	  contribution	  from	  the	  Empire.	  The	  draft	  bill	  entered	  the	  Reichstag	  
on	   the	   8th	   March	   1881	   where	   it	   was	   heavily	   criticized.	   The	   Center	   Party	   leader	   Hertling	  
commented	   in	   a	   newspaper	   article	   that	   all	   parties	   except	   the	   Social	   Democrats	   raised	  
concerns	  against	   the	   Imperial	  contribution.95	  Bismarck	  was	  very	   reluctant	   to	  give	   in	  on	  his	  
state	   socialist	   proposals.	   The	   chancellor	   opted	   for	   a	   ‘charismatic	   authority’	   strategy,	  
dissolved	  the	  Reichstag,	  and	  tried	  to	  gather	  widespread	  public	  support	  for	  his	  social	  security	  
project	  through	  elections.	  
	   Bismarck	  campaigned	  on	  his	  state	  socialist	  insurance	  plans	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  Reichstag	  
elections	   held	   on	   the	   27th	   October	   1881.	   His	   strategy	   failed	   tremendously.	   The	   results	  
yielded	   “the	   most	   disastrous	   election	   for	   Bismarck	   since	   the	   birth	   of	   the	   Empire.”96	   This	  
meant	   that	   most	   of	   Bismarck’s	   ideas	   had	   now	   also	   been	   publicly	   rejected.	   The	   election	  
results	   were	   not	   only	   a	   public	   verdict	   against	   a	   tax	   on	   goods	   as	   popular	   as	   tobacco	   and	  
liquor97	  but,	  with	  the	  spike	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Party,	  also	  constituted	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  general	  
uneasiness	   about	   the	   state-­‐socialist	   boosting	   of	   centralized	   state	   powers.	   The	   liberals	  
demanded	   a	   contribution	   from	   the	   employees.	   In	   contrast,	   employers	   attacked	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  "Der	  sicherste	  Weg	  liegt	  [...]	  in	  der	  Einführung	  des	  Tabakmonopols"	  and	  "durch	  Wiederholung	  früherer	  Anträge	  auf	  stärkere	  Besteuerung	  der	  Getränke"	  Bismarck	  on	  behalf	  of	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  I.	  1881	  November	  17.	  Allerhöchste	  Botschaft	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  I	  zur	  Eröffnung	  der	  I.	  Session	  des	  5.	  Reichstags	  mit	  Bericht	  über	  die	  Eröffnung.	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H	  .	  (2003)	  p.	  64.	  	  95	  “Gegen	  eine	  solche	  Heranziehung	  von	  Reichsmitteln	  sprachen	  sich	  bei	  Gelegenheit	  der	  ersten	  Beratung	  Redner	  aus	  allen	  Parteien	  mit	  Ausnahme	  der	  sozialdemokratischen	  aus.“	  1889	  Februar	  6.	  Kölnische	  Volkszeitung	  und	  Handelsblatt	  Nr.	  36,	  Erstes	  Blatt	  (Morgenausgabe),	  Eine	  ernste	  Entscheidung,	  printed	  IN:	  Haerendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004)	  source	  No.	  106,	  p.	  584.	  After	  being	  debated	  in	  the	  Reichstag	  the	  draft	  bill	  got	  successively	  rejected	  by	  the	  Bundesrat,	  the	  federal	  chamber.	  96	  Hennock	  E.	  P.	  (2007)	  p.	  90.	  97	  Hennock,	  E.	  P.	  (2007)	  p.	  90.	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consequences	  of	  the	  bill	  as	  one	  where	  “all	  accident	  expenses	  that	  were	  caused	  by	  workers,	  
would	  be	  included	  into	  the	  production	  cost“.98	  	  
	   The	  electoral	  defeat	  meant	  for	  Bismarck	  the	  death	  of	  the	  tobacco	  and	  alcohol	  tax	  which	  
forestalled	   exclusive	   imperial	   funding.	   Bismarck	   could	   only	   hope	   to	   keep	   the	   state	  
contribution	  in	  an	  insurance	  system	  as	  high	  as	  possible	   in	  order	  to	  preserve	  some	  of	  State	  
Socialism	  ideas.	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  his	  economic	  advisor,	  Albert	  Schäffle,	  he	  wrote	  that	  “Without	  
contributions	   from	   Empire	   and	   State	   I	   do	   not	   believe	   that	  much	  more	   could	   be	   achieved	  
than	  a	  maybe	  improved	  but	  much	  more	  expensive	  poor	  relief”.99	  
	   On	  the	  political	  side,	  Bismarck	  was	  left	  with	  two	  options	  if	  he	  did	  not	  want	  to	  completely	  
cede	  control	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  social	  security.	  The	  first	  implied	  concessions	  to	  the	  liberals	  
that	   had	   gained	   substantially	   in	   the	   elections.	   This	   would	   have	   meant	   dropping	   the	  
compulsory	  nature	  of	  the	  schemes	  and	  opening	  the	  system	  for	  market	  centered	  insurance	  
provisions.100	  Siding	  with	  the	  liberals	  would	  also	  have	  meant	  giving	  in	  to	  demands	  for	  more	  
democracy.	   This	  might	   have	   resulted	   in	   even	   further	   democratization	   of	   the	   Reich	  which	  
was	  exactly	  what	  Bismarck	  originally	  wanted	  to	  counteract	  with	  the	  social	  security	  project.	  
Bismarck	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  a	  move	  to	  a	  more	  market-­‐based	  social	  security	  system	  was	  not	  
for	   him.	   In	   a	   letter	   to	   a	   friend	   in	   September	   1881,	   Theodor	   Lohmann	   remarked	   about	  
Bismarck’s	   intentions	   that	   “Considering	   an	   abandoning	   of	   the	   State	   contribution	   and	   the	  
accreditation	  of	  Private	  associations	  he	  did	  not	  want	  to	  hear	  a	  thing.”101	  After	  the	  election	  
Bismarck	  reasoned	  that,	  if	  he	  wanted	  to	  uphold	  some	  of	  the	  antiparliamentarian	  aims	  that	  
the	   Insurance	   programs	   originally	   embodied,	   then	   he	   had	   to	   go	   even	   harder	   against	   the	  
liberals	  with	  his	  next	  proposal.	  Any	  collaboration	  with	  Social	  Democracy	  was	  a	  no	  go.	  The	  
Emperor	  vetoed	  any	  collaboration	  after	  the	  two	  assassination	  attempts	  on	  him	  in	  1878	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  “dass	  alle	  Unfallasten,	  auch	  diejenigen,	  welche	  durch	  Verschulden	  der	  Arbeiter	  herbeigeführt	  wurden,	  zu	  den	  Produktionskosten	  gehören“	  1882	  Januar	  17.	  Norddeutsche	  Allgemeine	  Zeitung	  Nr.	  28.	  IN:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995b)	  source	  No.	  39,	  p.	  156.	  99	  “Ohne	  Zuschüsse	  von	  Reich	  und	  Staat	  glaube	  ich	  allerdings	  nicht,	  dass	  sich	  etwas	  anderes	  erreichen	  lässt	  als	  eine	  verbesserte,	  aber	  auch	  entsprechend	  verteuerte	  Armenpflege“	  1881	  Oktober	  16,	  Brief	  des	  Reichskanzlers	  Otto	  Fürst	  von	  Bismarck	  an	  den	  Staatsminister	  a.D.	  Dr.	  Albert	  Schaeffle,	  printed	  IN:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995b)	  source	  No.	  12,	  p.	  31.	  100	  Similar	  to	  the	  draft	  law	  that	  the	  Liberals	  had	  themselves	  brought	  into	  the	  Reichstag	  in	  1881	  but	  which	  had	  not	  obtained	  a	  majority.	  101	  „Von	  Aufgeben	  des	  Staatszuschusses	  und	  Zulassung	  der	  Privatanstalten	  hatte	  er	  nichts	  wissen	  wollen.“	  Theodor	  Lohmann	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  his	  friend	  the	  school	  principal	  Dr.	  Ernst	  Wyneken.	  1881	  Septemeber	  18.	  Brief	  des	  Geheimen	  Oberregierungsrates	  Theodor	  Lohmann	  an	  den	  Schuldirektor	  Dr.	  Ernst	  Wyneken,	  printed	  IN:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995b)	  source	  No.	  7,	  pp.	  22-­‐23.	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were	  attributed	   to	   the	   Social	  Democratic	   subculture.	  Bismarck’s	  only	   choice	  was	   to	   try	   to	  
win	   over	   his	   arch	   enemy,	   the	   Catholic	   subculture	   and	   the	   Catholic	   Center	   Party,	   for	   the	  
social	  security	  project.	  
	   In	  order	  to	  signal	  compliance	  to	  the	  Center	  Party,	  Bismarck	  included	  a	  vow	  for	  an	  organic	  
estate-­‐based	   organization	   of	   society	   in	   the	   Imperial	   Social	  Message	   that	   he	   gave	   on	   17th	  
November	  of	  1881	  in	  the	  Reichstag	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Kaiser.	  The	  announcement	  “to	  find	  for	  
the	  public	  welfare	  the	  right	  means	  and	  ways,	  is	  a	  difficult	  but	  also	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  tasks	  of	  
the	  community,	  which	  stands	  on	   the	  moral	   fundament	  of	  Christian	  national	   life	   […]	   in	   the	  
form	   of	   corporative	   productive	   associations”102	   was	   especially	   designed	   to	   cater	   to	   the	  
Conservative	   faction	   of	   the	   Center	   Party.	   After	   the	   hostile	   reactions	   of	   Reichstag	   and	  
Bundesrat	   to	   the	   first	   draft	   bill,	   Bismarck	   had	   already	  mentioned	   in	  October	   1881	   to	   Karl	  
Heinrich	   Boetticher,	   the	   state	   secretary	   in	   the	   ministry	   of	   interior,	   that	   the	   new	  
organizational	   basis	   for	   the	   insurance	   scheme	   would	   be	   corporatist,	   mandatory	   and	  
organized	   along	   vocational	   risk	   groups.103	   This	   effectively	   meant	   that	   Bismarck	   had	  
abandoned	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  Imperial	  Insurance	  Agency	  (Reichsversicherungsanstalt).	  Bismarck	  
confirmed	  these	  plans	  again	  in	  a	  speech	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Reichstag	  on	  the	  9th	  January	  1882.104	  
A	  corporatist	  organization,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  mutual	  associations	  with	  compulsory	  membership	  
(Berufsgenossenschaften)	  was	  the	  new	  programmatic	  idea.	  
	   Behind	  Bismarck’s	   concessions	   on	   a	   corporatist	   organization	  were	  his	   intensions	   to	   kill	  
two	   birds	   with	   one	   stone.	   It	   was	   an	   attempt	   to	   shift	   his	   programmatic	   ideas	   on	   social	  
security	   in	   order	   to	   bring	   them	   once	   again	   in	   line	   with	   the	   interests	   of	   his	   worldview.	   It	  
opened	   the	   possibility	   to	   pass	   his	   social	   security	   legislation	   without	   having	   to	   make	  
concessions	  to	  the	  liberals	  or	  Social	  Democrats	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  brought	  with	  it	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  „Für	  die	  Fürsorge	  die	  rechten	  Mittel	  und	  Wege	  zu	  finden,	  ist	  eine	  schwierige,	  aber	  auch	  eine	  der	  höchsten	  Aufgaben	  des	  Gemeinwesens,	  welches	  auf	  dem	  sittlichen	  Fundament	  des	  Christlichen	  Volkslebens	  steht.	  Der	  engere	  Anschluss	  an	  die	  realen	  Kräfte	  des	  Volksleben	  und	  das	  zusammenfassen	  der	  letzteren	  in	  der	  Form	  korporativer	  Genossenschaften	  unter	  staatlichem	  Schutz	  und	  staatlicher	  Förderung“	  1881	  November	  17,	  Allerhöchste	  Botschaft	  Kaiser	  Wilhelms	  I	  zur	  Eröffnung	  der	  I	  Session	  des	  5.	  Reichstags	  mit	  Bericht	  über	  die	  Eröffnung,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  9,	  p.	  64.	  103	  „Die	  Bildung	  von	  Korporationen	  nach	  den	  Berufsarten	  nach	  Maßgabe	  der	  Gefährlichkeit	  derselben“	  1881	  Oktober	  10.	  Erlass	  des	  Reichskanzlers	  Otto	  Fürst	  von	  Bismarck	  an	  den	  Staatssekretär	  des	  Inneren	  Karl	  Heinrich	  von	  Boetticher,	  printed	  IN:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995b)	  source	  No.	  10,	  pp.	  27-­‐28.	  104	  Rede	  des	  Reichskanzlers	  Otto	  Fürst	  von	  Bismarck	  im	  Deutschen	  Reichstag.	  Printed	  IN:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995b)	  source	  No.	  36,	  pp.	  141-­‐142.	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possibility	   of	   deviating	   in	   the	   long	   run	   from	   the	   annoying	   democratic	   features	   of	   the	  
constitutional	  monarchy.	  Corporatist	   organization	  was	   to	   allow	  him	   to	  move	   the	  empire’s	  
institutions	   towards	   an	   estate-­‐based	   political	   system.105	   Corporatist	   organization	   was	   a	  
match	   of	   worldviews	   and	   interest	   for	   both	   sides.	   For	   the	   Catholics	   it	   meant	   the	  
implementation	  of	  their	  world	  views,	  for	  Bismarck	  it	  was	  a	  way	  to	  reduce	  the	  parliament’s	  
influence	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  his	  worldviews	  on	  protestant	  State	  Socialism	  at	  a	  later	  point	  in	  
time.	   In	   addition,	   he	   knew	   that	   an	   estate	   based	   society	   was	   also	   compatible	   with	   the	  
Conservative	  party’s	  landed	  elite	  based	  members.	  	  
5.3.4 Try	  twice:	  The	  second	  accident	  insurance	  draft	  
The	   second	   accident	   insurance	   proposal	   was	   brought	   into	   the	   Reichstag	   on	   the	   8th	   May	  
1882.	  It	  had	  been	  preceded	  by	  a	  lengthy	  and	  vigorous	  struggle	  on	  accident	  insurance	  within	  
the	   executive	   that	   had	   started	   five	   months	   earlier	   with	   an	   internal	   proposal	   drafted	   by	  
Theodor	   Lohmann	   following	   the	   Reichstag	   elections	   in	   December	   1881.	   Even	   though	   the	  
draft	   bill	   already	   included	   corporative	   organizational	   elements	   in	   the	   form	   of	   productive	  
associations	  it	  still	  retained	  the	  heavily	  criticized	  Imperial	  contribution.	  
	   The	   bill	   held	   further	   dynamite.	   Theodor	   Lohmann	   had	   used	   his	   capacities	   as	   a	   privy	  
council	  to	  include	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  his	  own	  liberal	  social	  security	  ideas	  (like	  a	  prolongation	  of	  
the	  deferment	  period)	   in	  the	  draft.	  Bismarck	  therefore	  heavily	  revised	  the	   internal	  version	  
on	   the	  17th	  February	  1882	  and	   trimmed	  the	  proposal	  again	  according	   to	  his	   state	  socialist	  
views.	   He	   especially	   reduced	   the	   deferment	   period	   (Karenzzeit)	   to	   eight	   days	  which	   gave	  
workers	   a	   better	   position	   to	   apply	   for	   accident	   insurance.	   	   Bismarck	   was	   subsequently	  
occupied	  with	  foreign	  policy	  and	  illness	  so	  therefore	  lost	  track	  of	  further	  developments.	  This	  
gave	   Lohmann	   the	   chance	   to	   once	   again	   change	   the	   proposal	   in	   his	   favor.	   The	   second	  
accident	   insurance	   bill	   that	   Lohmann	   brought	   into	   the	   Reichstag	   had	   a	   heavy	   left-­‐liberal-­‐
Protestant	   bias,	   though	   Lohmann	   did	   not	   dare	   to	   undertake	   changes	   on	   Bismarck’s	   core	  
state	   socialistic	   issues	  of	  Compulsion	  and	   Imperial	   Contribution	   (though	  he	   limited	   this	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Hennock	  E.	  P.	  (2007)	  p.	  93.	  Bismarck	  did	  not	  have	  to	  pursue	  the	  plan	  further	  when	  the	  national	  liberals	  sided	  with	  him	  after	  their	  Heidelberg	  congregation.	  However,	  the	  realignment	  of	  the	  national	  liberals	  in	  1884	  that	  brought	  them	  into	  the	  Bismarckian	  camp	  made	  such	  plans	  obsolete.	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one	  quarter).106	  Nevertheless,	   Lohmann	   included	   a	   provision	  on	   self-­‐organized	  mandatory	  
accident	   prevention	   and	   provided	   for	   the	   self-­‐organization	   of	   the	   schemes	   through	  
employer	   and	   employee	   committees.	   He	   also	   drastically	   extended	   the	   deferment	   period	  
(Karenzzeit)	  from	  eight	  days	  (Bismarck’s	  proposal)	  to	  thirteen	  weeks.	  This	  would	  have	  made	  
Accident	   insurance	   very	   difficult	   to	   access	   and	   gave	  more	   power	   to	   the	  Health	   insurance	  
which	   Lohmann	   preferred.	   The	   “missionary”107	   frenzy	   with	   which	   Lohmann	   changed	   the	  
draft	  of	   course	   isolated	   Lohmann	  within	   the	  bureaucracy	  and	  made	  him	  unacceptable	   for	  
Bismarck.108	  After	  his	  return	  from	  the	  sickbed,	  Bismarck	  removed	  him.109	  
	   However,	  even	  Bismarck	  could	  not	  rescue	  the	  bill	  anymore.	  The	  Imperial	  contribution	  of	  
25	  percent	  and	  the	  employer’s	  contribution	  of	  75	  %	  were	  especially	  unpopular.	  A	  Bavarian	  
representative	   in	   Berlin	   cabled	   back	   home	   from	   the	   second	   committee	   meeting	   in	   the	  
Reichstag	  	  that	  “The	  Imperial	  contribution	  did	  not	  appeal	  to	  any	  side”.110	  The	  parliamentary	  
committee,	   under	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   Conservative	   aristocratic	   Bavarian	   Center	   Party	  
member	   Freiherr	   von	   Franckenstein,	   consequently	   reacted	   to	   the	   proposal,	   after	   16	  
sessions,	  by	  proposing	  such	  a	  massive	  list	  of	  amendments	  that	  Bismarck	  thought	  it	  better	  to	  
withdraw	  the	  bill.111	  	  This	  was	  the	  end	  of	  the	  second	  draft	  accident	  insurance	  bill.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  The	  letter	  further	  indicates	  that	  Schäffle	  was	  also	  against	  the	  Imperial	  contribution	  but	  that	  he	  nevertheless	  had	  to	  include	  it	  “because	  Bismarck	  does	  not	  want	  it	  in	  any	  other	  way”.	  „Den	  Staatszuschuss	  lässt	  er	  sich	  nur	  gefallen	  weil	  Bismarck	  nicht	  anders	  will	  “	  1882	  Februar	  1.	  Brief	  des	  Geheimen	  Oberregierungsrates	  Theodor	  Lohmann	  an	  den	  Schuldirektor	  Dr.	  Ernst	  Wyneken.	  Printed	  IN:	  Ayass,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  40,	  p.	  158.	  107	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995a)	  p.	  XXVIII.	  108	  Bismarck’s	  final	  break	  with	  Lohmann	  happened	  in	  November	  1883	  as	  a	  cable	  from	  the	  Bavarian	  state	  representative	  in	  Berlin	  unveils:	  „Geheimer	  Oberregierungsrat	  Lohmann	  hat	  sich	  an	  diesen	  Arbeiten	  nicht	  beteiligt	  und	  ist	  bei	  dem	  Reichskanzler	  entgueltig	  in	  Ungnade	  gefallen.“	  1883	  November	  26.	  Bericht	  des	  bayerischen	  Gesandten	  in	  Berlin	  Hugo	  Graf	  von	  und	  zu	  Lerchenfeld-­‐Koefering	  an	  den	  bayerischen	  Staatsminister	  des	  königlichen	  Hauses	  und	  Außenminister	  Krafft	  Freiherr	  von	  Crailsheim,	  printed	  IN:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995b)	  Source	  No.	  128,	  p.	  442.	  109	  To	  assess	  this	  quickly:	  Lohmann	  had	  an	  influence	  on	  early	  social	  security	  but	  only	  on	  the	  Sickness	  insurance	  law	  and	  on	  early	  drafts	  of	  accident	  insurance.	  He	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  anymore	  with	  the	  actual	  voted	  on	  proposals	  of	  the	  three	  later	  welfare	  laws	  as	  he	  had	  long	  been	  dismissed	  and	  sidelined	  when	  they	  were	  negotiated.	  110	  “Der	  Reichszuschuss	  fand	  auf	  keiner	  Seite	  Anklang,	  “1883	  April	  17.	  Bericht	  des	  stellv.	  bayerischen	  Bundesratsbevollmächtigten	  Joseph	  Herrmann	  an	  das	  bayerische	  Ministerium	  des	  Innern.	  Printed	  IN:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995b)	  source	  No.	  78,	  p.	  280.	  111	  Hennock	  E.	  P.	  (2007)	  p.	  90.	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5.3.5 Third	  time	  is	  a	  charm:	  The	  third	  Accident	  Insurance	  draft	  
Being	  considerably	  annoyed	  with	  the	  mess	  around	  accident	  insurance,	  Bismarck	  gave	  Robert	  
Bosse,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  social	  security	  division	  in	  the	  department	  of	  interior,	  a	  free	  hand	  to	  
hammer	   out	   a	   compromise	   via	   secret	   negotiations	   between	   Conservatives,	   Free	  
Conservatives	  and	  the	  Center	  Party,	  a	  move	  which	  would	  also	  diverge	  further	  from	  his	  State	  
Socialist	   programmatic	   ideas.112	   This	   “Clerical-­‐Conservative	   compromise”113	   led	   to	   a	   third	  
draft	   bill,	   which	   was	   finally	   implemented	   as	   accident	   insurance	   in	   Germany.	   Accident	  
insurance	   was	   approved	   with	   the	   votes	   of	   the	   Conservatives,	   the	   Center	   Party	   and	   the	  
National	  Liberals.	  Social-­‐Democrats	  and	  liberals	  proposed	  numerous	  amendments,	  none	  of	  
which	   was	   taken	   into	   consideration,	   and	   therefore	   voted	   against	   the	   bill.114	   The	   Center	  
Party,	   that	  had	  still	   fiercely	  opposed	   the	   first	  draft	   legislation	  due	   to	   the	  planned	   imperial	  
insurance	  agency	  (Reichsversicherungsanstalt)	  and	  the	  state	  financing,	  was	  appeased	  by	  far	  
reaching	   concessions.	   The	   Catholics	   were	   granted	   the	   corporative	   organization,	   the	  
complete	   withdrawal	   of	   the	   State	   from	   financing	   and	   the	   decentralization	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  The	  Social	  Security	  Division	  was	  founded	  in	  1881	  within	  the	  Department	  of	  the	  Interior.	  It	  is	  in	  general	  telling	  for	  the	  early	  function	  of	  social	  security	  that	  it	  was	  always	  placed	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  the	  Interior.	  113	  Tennstedt	  and	  Winter	  note,	  however,	  that	  almost	  no	  detailed	  research	  has	  so	  far	  been	  done	  on	  how	  this	  compromise	  was	  brought	  about.	  They	  remark	  that	  documentation	  of	  the	  accident	  insurance	  commissions	  is	  extremely	  scarce	  and	  that	  it	  is	  missing	  or	  lost	  on	  the	  Clerical-­‐Conservative	  Compromise.	  See:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995a)	  p.	  XXXI.	  114	  Figures	  on	  the	  final	  vote	  on	  accident	  insurance	  are	  very	  hard	  to	  locate.	  To	  my	  knowledge	  no	  roll	  call	  listing	  of	  the	  votes	  exist.	  None	  of	  the	  secondary	  accounts	  features	  a	  list	  of	  the	  party	  voting	  patterns,	  nor	  do	  the	  eight	  volumes	  of	  the	  source	  collections.	  As	  far	  as	  I	  could	  investigate	  from	  my	  own	  primary	  sources,	  during	  the	  vote	  the	  speaker	  of	  the	  Reichstag	  called	  out	  the	  names	  in	  the	  respective	  session	  of	  the	  parliamentarians	  in	  alphabetic	  order	  and	  the	  MPs	  could	  either	  remain	  seated	  (if	  they	  were	  against)	  or	  stand	  up	  (if	  they	  were	  for)	  the	  bill.	  The	  protocol	  from	  the	  session	  of	  the	  6th	  July	  1884	  then	  only	  remarks	  that	  the	  law	  was	  passed	  but	  does	  not	  indicate	  by	  whom.	  That	  the	  Conservatives,	  National	  Liberals	  and	  the	  Center	  Party	  all	  voted	  for	  the	  bill	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  newspaper	  articles	  that	  appeared	  in	  the	  subsequent	  week	  and	  from	  personal	  correspondence	  from	  members	  of	  the	  administration.	  See:	  Brief	  des	  Geheimen	  Oberregierungsrates	  Theodor	  Lohmann	  an	  den	  Schuldirektor	  Dr.	  Ernst	  Wyneken,	  1.	  Juli	  1884,	  	  printed	  IN:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995b)	  source	  No.	  184,	  pp.	  632-­‐633.	  OR:	  „Konservative,	  Ultramontane	  und	  Nationalliberale	  gönnten	  den	  Arbeitern	  die	  kläglichen	  Zugeständnisse	  nicht.“	  Deutsche	  Metallarbeiter-­‐Zeitung	  Nr.	  19-­‐21,	  Das	  Unfallversicherungsgesetz,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  47,	  p.	  199.	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administration	   into	   State	   Insurance	   Agencies	   (Landesversicherungsanstalten).115	   Lohmann,	  
already	  sidelined	  by	  this	  stage,	  described	  the	  draft	  bill	  as	  “monstrous”.116	  
	   The	   heavily	   amended	   bill,	   representing	   a	   Rye	   and	   Rome	   compromise	   pact	   between	  
Catholicsm	  and	  Protestant	   Conservatives,	   had	   almost	   nothing	   in	   common	  with	  Bismarck’s	  
original	  state-­‐socialist	  plans.	  What	  had	  been	  planned	  as	  a	  centralized	  Imperial	  institution,	  in	  
which	   the	  state	  would	  be	   the	  key	  player,	  became	  a	  system	   in	  which	  capital	  and	   labor	   ran	  
and	   financed	   the	   schemes	  without	   the	   state.	   The	   organization	  was	   put	   into	   the	   hands	   of	  
cooperative	   associations	   formed	   along	   vocational	   lines.	   The	   schemes	   were	   financed	  
exclusively	  by	  employers	  without	  any	  contribution	  from	  the	  Reich	  or	  the	  employees.117	  The	  
state	   was	   confined	   to	   a	   marginal	   position	   as	   a	   supervising	   controller.	   The	   British	   social	  
historian	  E.	  P.	  Hennock	  summarized	  this	  outcome	  with	  the	  statement	  that	  “The	  role	  of	  the	  
Reich	  as	  a	  provider	  had	  been	  replaced	  by	  that	  of	  the	  Reich	  as	  an	  enforcer.”118	  
	  
5.3.6 The	  Center	  Party	  and	  Accident	  Insurance	  
According	   to	   the	  social	   security	  historians	  Tennsted	  and	  Winter,	   it	  was	   the	  realignment	  of	  
the	   National	   Liberals	   towards	   Bismarck	   that	   made	   the	   Clerical-­‐Conservative	   compromise	  
possible.	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  shift	  of	  the	  National	  Liberals	  into	  the	  Bismarck	  camp,	  after	  the	  
famous	   Heidelberg	   party	   congregation	   in	   1884,	   led	   the	   Center	   Party	   to	   fear	   of	   another	  
episode	  of	  reprisal	  through	  further	  Kulturkampf	  legislation,	  initiated	  by	  the	  new	  Bismarckian	  
coalition	  of	  National	  Liberals	  and	  Conservatives.	  For	   this	   reason	  the	  Center	  Party	  “tried	   to	  
overtake	  the	  National	  Liberals	  in	  their	  loyalty	  to	  Bismarck	  and	  the	  Reich	  by	  compromising	  on	  
accident	   insurance”.	   This	   interpretation	   was	   somewhat	   reflected	   in	   a	   cable	   from	   the	  
Bavarian	   representative	   in	   Berlin	   to	   the	   Bavarian	   state	   minister	   shortly	   after	   the	   1881	  
elections.	  He	  points	   to	  the	  dilemma	  whereby,	  due	  to	  the	  election	  results,	   te	  support	   from	  
the	  Center	  Party	  had	  become	  more	  indispensable	  than	  ever	  before.	  Conversely,	  the	  position	  
of	   the	   party	   had	   worsened	   through	   the	   strong	   increase	   of	   the	   liberal	   parties.	   As	   the	  
Catholics	   are	   “not	   likely	   to	   expect	   any	   good	   from	   them	   either	   in	   church	   or	   in	   political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Lönne,	  K.	  E.	  (1986)	  pp.	  175-­‐176.	  116	  „Dass	  Schäffle	  hier	  einen	  monströsen	  Gesetzentwurf	  eingeschickt	  hatte“	  1882	  Februar	  1.	  Brief	  des	  Geheimen	  Oberregierungsrates	  Theodor	  Lohmann	  an	  den	  Schuldirektor	  Dr.	  Ernst	  Wyneken,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  40,	  p.	  185.	  	  117	  Lönne,	  K.	  E.	  (1986)	  p.	  175.	  118	  Hennock	  E.	  P.	  (2007)	  p.	  93.	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matters”,	  the	  Center	  Party	  was	  pushed	   into	  the	  arms	  of	  the	  government.119	   	  Crown	  prince	  
Friedrich	  Wilhelm	  captures	   this	  ambiguity	   in	  a	  note	   in	  his	  diary	  where	  he	   remarks	   that	  he	  
was	  astonished	  “how	  big	  the	  distrust	  was	  against	  Bismarck	  concerning	  the	  possibility	  of	  him	  
making	  too	  far	  reaching	  concessions	  to	  Rome.”120	  
	   Tennstedt	   and	   Winter’s	   assessment	   underscores	   the	   Center	   Party’s	   own	   interest	   in	  
advancing	  social	  security	  legislation	  and	  the	  far	  reaching	  modifications	  that	  had	  been	  made	  
in	  the	  original	  proposals	  so	  that	  the	  bill	  was	  congruent	  to	  the	  Center	  Party’s	  world	  views	  and	  
programmatic	  position	  on	  social	  policy.	  Tennstedt	  and	  Winter	  themselves	  point	  out	  that	  the	  
announcement	   of	   corporatist	   elements	   in	   the	   Imperial	   Social	  Message	   on	   17th	   November	  
1881	  were	  included	  as	  a	  signal	  to	  the	  Center	  Party	  that	  Bismarck	  was	  ready	  for	  discussions.	  
The	   political	   constellation	   around	   accident	   and	   sickness	   insurance	   opened	   a	   window	   of	  
opportunity	  for	  the	  Center	  Party	  to	  press	  for	  the	  full	  satisfication	  of	  their	  demands	  on	  social	  
security.	  Bismarck’s	   two	  main	  objectives	  on	  social	  security,	   the	  preservation	  of	  power	  and	  
the	  weakening	  of	  the	  two	  other	  subcultures,	   forbade	  a	  coalition	  with	  the	   liberals	  or	  Social	  
Democracy.	   Ironically,	  his	  own	  world	  views	  and	  programmatic	   ideas	  came	  closest	  to	  those	  
of	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  –	  precisely	  the	  group	  he	  wanted	  to	  target	  with	  his	  legislation.	  This	  
was	  a	  Catch-­‐22	   situation	   that	   forced	  Bismarck	   to	  weigh	  his	   interests	   (consolidation	  of	   the	  
national	  autocratic	  system)	  with	  his	  programmatic	  ideas	  (State	  Socialism).	  Bismarck	  chose	  to	  
strategically	   modify	   his	   programmatic	   ideas	   on	   welfare	   form	   in	   order	   to	   safeguard	   his	  
interests.	  The	  Center	  Party	  and	  the	  Catholics	  were	  the	  only	  remaining	  subculture	  with	  no	  far	  
reaching	   democratic	   or	   liberal	   ambitions	   and	   were	   thus	   transformed,	   in	   light	   of	   the	   two	  
disastrous	   attempts	   at	   passing	   social	   security	   legislation,	   from	   an	   obstructive	   arch	   enemy	  
into	   a	   heralded	   potential	   partner.	   This	   interpretation	   is	   backed	   by	   a	   report	   that	   Freiherr	  
Georg	   von	   Hertling,	   one	   of	   the	   Center	   Party	   leaders,	   filed	   on	   the	   content	   of	   a	   private	  
conversation	   he	   had	   with	   Bismarck	   in	   1881.	   In	   this	   report,	   Hertling	   describes	   Bismarck’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  “Von	  diesen	  kann	  sie	  voraussichtlich	  weder	  in	  kirchlichen	  noch	  in	  politischen	  Fragen	  jemals	  Gutes	  für	  sich	  erwarten“	  1881	  November	  17.	  Bericht	  des	  bayerischen	  Gesandten	  in	  Berlin	  Hugo	  Graf	  von	  und	  zu	  Lerchenfeld-­‐Koefering	  an	  den	  bayerischen	  Staatsminister	  des	  königlichen	  Hauses	  und	  Außenminister	  Krafft	  Freiherr	  von	  Crailsheim.	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995b)	  source	  No.	  21,	  pp.	  77-­‐78.	  120	  “wie	  groß	  das	  Misstrauen	  gegen	  Bismarck	  in	  Bezug	  auf	  die	  Möglichkeit	  seiner	  Nachgiebigkeit	  gegen	  Rom	  geworden	  ist.“	  Crown	  prince	  Friedrich	  Wilhelm	  in	  his	  diary	  of	  27.12.1881.	  Cited	  from	  footnote	  No	  9	  of	  Source	  No.	  21,	  17	  November	  1881.	  Bericht	  des	  bayerischen	  Gesandten	  in	  Berlin	  Hugo	  Graf	  von	  und	  zu	  Lerchenfeld-­‐Koefering	  an	  den	  bayerischen	  Staatsminister	  des	  königlichen	  Hauses	  und	  Außenminister	  Krafft	  Freiherr	  von	  Crailsheim.	  Printed	  IN:	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (1995b)	  source	  No.	  21,	  p.	  77.	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concession	   strategy	  by	  noting	   that	  Bismarck	   remarked	   to	  him	   that	  by	   “now	   the	  draft	   had	  
been	  altered	  into	  a	  direction	  that	  eradicates	  these	  doubts	  and	  that	  strives	  to	  enact	  accident	  
insurance	   by	   directly	   incorporating	   the	   Center’s	   wishes	   by	   basing	   it	   on	   corporatism“.121	  
Evidence	  that	  the	  Center	  Party’s	  programmatic	  ideas	  were	  closer	  than	  those	  of	  the	  National	  
Liberals	   to	   Bismarck’s	   third	   accident	   insurance	   proposal	   also	   comes	   from	   reports	   on	   the	  
debate	   of	   the	   third	   Accident	   insurance	   bill	   in	   the	   Reichstag.	   The	   National	   Liberals	   rallied	  
heavily	   against	   the	   mutual	   associations	   with	   compulsory	   membership	  
(Berufsgenossenschaften),	   demanded	  a	   further	   limitation	  of	   the	  qualifying	  period	   and	   the	  
admissibility	   of	   private	   insurance	   providers	   as	   well	   as	   the	   dropping	   of	   the	   pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go	  
aspects	   of	   the	   system.122	   	   In	   contrast,	   the	   “Center	   Party	   took	   a	   comparatively	   friendly	  
position,	   whose	   ideals	   the	   draft	   already	   incorporated	   through	   the	   associations	   with	  
compulsory	  membership”123	   as	   a	   parliamentary	   report	   indicates.	   In	   a	   cable	   reporting	   the	  
content	   of	   his	   conversations	   with	   the	   Center	   Party	   parliamentarians	   Hertling	   and	  
Franckenstein,	   the	   Bavarian	   representative	   to	   the	   Federal	   Chamber	   (Bundesrat),	   Joseph	  
Hermann,	   suggested	   that	   the	   Center	   Party	   would	   not	   make	   the	   minor	   concerns	   it	   had	  
expressed	  to	  the	  bill	  a	  “condition	  sine	  qua	  non”124	  for	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  bill.	  	  
	   If	  the	  Center	  Party’s	  agreement	  to	  the	  Rye	  and	  Rome	  compromise	  was	  indeed	  based	  on	  
its	  rallying	  around	  Bismarck	  at	  any	  price,	  then	  it	   is	  not	  clear	  why	  Bismarck	  did	  not	  use	  this	  
more	  to	  his	  own	  advantage.	   If	  Tennstedt	  and	  Winter	  were	  right	  then	  Bismarck	  could	  have	  
easily	  leveraged	  the	  Center	  Party	  into	  programmatic	  concessions.	  Instead,	  the	  outcome	  was	  
a	   victory	   for	   the	   Center	   Party’s	   programmatic	   ideas	   and	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   Catholic	  
worldviews.	  After	  the	  vote,	  the	  Center	  Party’s	  social	  policy	  spokesperson	  Hertling	  assessed,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  "Nunmehr	  sei	  der	  Entwurf	  in	  einer	  Richtung	  verändert,	  welche	  diese	  Bedenken	  beseitige	  und	  die	  Durchführung	  der	  Unfallversicherung	  in	  direkter	  Annäherung	  an	  die	  Wünsche	  des	  Zentrums	  mittels	  kooperativer	  Bildung	  erstrebe."	  1883	  April	  8.	  Aufzeichnungen	  des	  Reichstagsabgeordneten	  Dr.	  Georg	  Freiherr	  von	  Hertling	  über	  ein	  Gespräch	  mit	  Kanzler	  Otto	  Fürst	  von	  Bismarck.	  Printed	  IN:	  Ayass,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  35,	  pp.	  128-­‐129.	  122	  1884	  März	  17.	  Bericht	  über	  die	  erste	  Lesung	  der	  dritten	  Unfallversicherungsvorlage	  im	  Deutschen	  Reichstag.	  Zeitschrift	  für	  Versicherungswesen,	  8.	  Jg.	  1884,	  S.	  123,	  printed	  IN:	  :	  Ayass,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  149,	  p.	  541.	  123	  “Eine	  verhältnismäßig	  freundliche	  Haltung	  nahm	  das	  Zentrum	  ein,	  dessen	  Ideale	  die	  Vorlage	  ja	  bereits	  in	  den	  Berufsgenossenschaften	  verwirklichen	  will.“	  1884	  März	  17,	  Bericht	  über	  die	  erste	  Lesung	  der	  dritten	  Unfallversicherungsvorlage	  im	  Deutschen	  Reichstag,	  Zeitschrift	  für	  Versicherungswesen,	  8.	  Jg.	  1884,	  S.	  123,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayass,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  Source	  No.	  149,	  p.	  542.	  124	  1884	  März	  18.	  Bericht	  des	  stellvertretenden	  bayerischen	  Bundesratsbevollmächtigten	  Joseph	  Herrmann	  an	  den	  bayerischen	  Minister	  des	  Inneren	  Max	  Freiherr	  von	  Feilitzsch,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayass,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003b)	  source	  No.	  150,	  p.	  543	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in	   the	   Kölnische	   Volkszeitung,	   that	   “The	   accident	   insurance	   law	   from	   1884	   was	   in	   its	  
cornerstones	   congruent	  with	   the	   social	   policy	   ideas	   of	   the	   Center	   Party.”125	   Furthermore,	  
Bismarck	  had	  abolished	  most	  of	  the	  culture	  war	  legislation	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  vote	  and	  had	  
also	   agreed	   on	   a	   further	   federalization	   of	   the	   Reich’s	   institutional	   structures	   thereby	  
granting	   the	   Catholics	   more	   protection	   from	   the	   central	   government.	   This	   shows	   that	  
compromise	   does	   not	   only	   work	   on	   the	   perceived	   left-­‐right	   vicinity	   of	   the	   worldviews.	  
Agreement	  can	  also	  be	  reached	  through	  matching	  converging	  interests.	  Bismarck’s	  interest	  
lay	   in	   fighting	   the	  other	   sub-­‐cultures	   by	   employing	  programmatic	   ideas	   for	   social	   security	  
(State	   Socialism)	   that	  were	   in	   line	  with	  his	  Conservative	  Protestant	  worldviews.	  After	   two	  
failed	  attempts	  at	  passing	  social	  security	  legislation,	  he	  realized	  that	  he	  could	  not	  reach	  this	  
immediately	  so	  he	  shifted	  his	  programmatic	   ideas	   in	  a	  way	  that	  would,	  over	   the	   long	  run,	  
allow	   him	   to	   further	   pursue	   his	   interests	   and	   gradually	   implement	   his	   worldviews.	   This	  
shows	   that	   ideas,	   worldviews	   and	   interests	   are	   heavily	   intertwined.	   Only	   if	   they	   strongly	  
diverge	   does	   it	   become	   easy	   to	   trace	   them	   as	   empirically	   distinguishable	   phenomena.	  
Employers	   did	   certainly	   not	   support	   the	   accident	   insurance	  project	   as	   Employer	   Centered	  
approaches	  to	  the	  origins	  of	  welfare	  would	  argue.	  Nevertheless,	  Bismarck	  did	  not	  care	  much	  
about	   their	   opposition	   and	   commented	   regarding	   the	   final	   draft	   of	   the	   law	   that	   “the	  
objections	  of	  the	  Industrialists	  should	  no	  longer	  be	  considered”.126	  
	  
5.3.7 The	  laggard:	  Old	  Age	  and	  Invalidity	  Pensions	  
Bismarck	  had	  announced	   in	   the	   Imperial	  Social	  Message	   in	  1881	   that	  “those	  who	  become	  
unable	  to	  earn	  a	   living	  through	  old	  age	  or	   invalidity	  also	  have	  a	  well-­‐founded	  claim	  on	  the	  
community	  for	  a	  higher	  measure	  of	  care	  from	  the	  state	  than	  they	  have	  so	  far	  received.”127	  It	  
still	  took	  eight	  years	  before	  a	  law	  on	  old	  age	  and	  invalidity	  insurance	  would	  be	  enacted	  on	  
the	  22nd	  June	  1889.	  Until	  the	  first	  draft	  bill	  in	  1887,	  the	  project	  had	  never	  gone	  beyond	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  “Das	  Unfallversicherungsgesetz	  vom	  Jahre	  1884	  entsprach	  in	  seinem	  leitendem	  Gedanken	  den	  sozialpolitischen	  Grundsätzen	  der	  Zentrumspartei.“	  1889	  Februar	  6,	  Kölnische	  Volkszeitung	  und	  Handelsblatt	  Nr.	  36,	  Erstes	  Blatt	  (Morgenausgabe)	  Eine	  ernste	  Entscheidung,	  printed	  IN:	  Haerendel,	  U.	  	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  source	  No.	  106,	  p.	  583.	  126	  “daβ	  die	  Einwände	  der	  Industriellen	  nicht	  weiter	  zu	  berücksichtigen	  seien“	  Bismarck	  cited	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003a)	  	  p.	  XXXIII.	  127	  Bismarck:	  Imperial	  Message	  1881.	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stage	  of	   internal	  memos	   in	   the	   administration.128	   	   This	  was	  not	  only	   due	   to	   the	  workload	  
that	   the	   Reichstag	   had	   with	   sickness	   and	   accident	   insurance	   plan,	   but	   also	   because	   the	  
functional	  pressure	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  old	  age	  security	  was	  relatively	  low.	  In	  the	  1880s,	  
age	  was	  not	  conceived	  as	  pressing	  a	  risk	  as	  accident,	  sickness	  or	  invalidity.	  Leading	  members	  
of	   the	   social	   security	   bureaucracy	   like	   Theodor	   Lohmann	   thought	   that	   “compulsory	  
invalidity	   and	   pension	   fund	   was	   nonsense	   and	   their	   introduction	   a	   social	   political	  
mistake.”129	  
	   The	  reason	  why	  old	  age	  and	  invalidity	  insurance	  was	  revived	  as	  a	  political	  issue	  was	  the	  
landslide	   victory	   of	   the	   new	   Bismarckian	   camp	   in	   1887.	   Building	   on	   a	   majority	   of	  
Conservatives	   and	   National	   Liberals,	   Bismarck	   felt	   comfortable	   in	   being	   able	   to	   avoid	   a	  
repetition	   of	   the	   bitter	   defeats	   of	   the	   early	   1880s.	   This	   time	   Bismarck	   was	   confident	   of	  
pushing	   through	   his	   original	   state-­‐socialist	   program	   without	   seeing	   them	   being	   diluted	  
through	  concessions	  to	  Catholics	  or	  Left-­‐Liberals.130	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐5	  Mandates	  by	  Party	  1887	  Reichstag	  
	  
Data	  by	  the	  author.	  Data	  from	  Archive	  Konrad	  Adenauer	  Stiftung.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Härendel	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004a)	  p.	  XLII.	  129	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004a)	  p.	  XXII.	  130	  For	  Bismarck’s	  intensions	  on	  Old	  Age	  and	  Invalidity	  see:	  1887	  September	  11.	  Votum	  des	  preußischen	  Ministerpräsidenten	  Otto	  Fürst	  von	  Bismarck	  für	  das	  Staatsministerium,	  printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  source	  No.	  43,	  p.	  206.	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   Bismarck	  wanted	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  “every	  German	  could	  receive	  the	  good	  deeds	  from	  
the	  Reich”131	  and	  would	  therefore	  associate	  benevolent	  welfare	  with	  the	  Empire.	  As	  early	  as	  
1881,	  Albert	  Schäffle,	  Bismarck’s	  political	  economy	  advisor,	  had	  worked	  out	  concrete	  plans	  
for	   the	   collection	   of	   Accident	   and	   Pension	   funds	   financed	   through	   additional	   taxation.132	  
Bismarck	   argued	   that	   “The	   old	   age	   and	   invalidity	   insurance	   is	   a	   common	   national	   need	  
which	   therefore	   should	   also	   be	   satisfied	   through	   the	   national	   wealth.”133	   It	   should	   be	  
avoided	  that	  workers	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  risk	  hedging.	  The	  payments	  were	  envisaged	  as	  
a	  flat	  rate	  and	  supplementary,	  and	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  limited	  to	  workers	  but	  should	  
include	   also	   other	   occupational	   groups.134	   The	   money	   should	   come	   directly	   from	   the	  
imperial	  budget.135	   In	  that	  way	  the	  central	  state	  could	  step	  up	  as	  a	  social	  provider	  and	  dry	  
up	  the	  fundaments	  of	  Social	  Democratic	  agitation	  as	  well	  as	  forestalling	  liberal	  and	  Catholic	  
attempts	   to	   dilute	   state-­‐power	   through	   privatized	   or	   corporatist	  models	   of	  welfare.	   Little	  
did	  Bismarck	  know	  that	  his	  original	  plans	  would	  once	  again	  be	  significantly	  diluted.	  
	  
5.3.8 Bureaucrats	  
Robert	  Bosse	  and	  Richard	  Woedke,	  the	  administrative	  heads	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  project,	  made	  
it	  clear	  early	  on	  to	  Bismarck	  that	  a	  solution	  based	  exclusively	  on	   imperial	   funding	  was	  not	  
possible.	   Instead,	   they	   convinced	   Bismarck	   that	   an	   insurance	   solution	   based	   on	   mutual	  
funding	  by	  employers	  and	  employees,	  but	  supplemented	  by	  an	   Imperial	  contribution,	  was	  
financially	  more	  feasible	  and	  politically	  much	  easier	  to	  achieve.136	  
	   Bosse	  and	  Woedke	  insisted	  that	  the	  States,	  which	  held	  strong	  veto	  powers	  in	  the	  Federal	  
Chamber	   (Bundesrat),	   would	   have	   had	   problems	   with	   the	   centralized	   social	   security	  
administration	   that	   would	   have	   inevitably	   come	   with	   a	   tax-­‐financed	   regime.	   Bosse	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  I	  am	  very	  sorry	  that	  I	  lost	  this	  citation.	  132	  Hennock,	  E.	  P.	  (2007)	  p.	  183.	  133	  “Die	  Alters	  und	  Invalidenversicherung	  ist	  ein	  allgemeines	  und	  nationales	  Bedürfnis,	  welches	  daher	  aus	  dem	  Nationalvermögen	  befriedigt	  werden	  sollte.“	  1887	  September	  11,	  Votum	  des	  preußischen	  Ministerpräsidenten	  Otto	  Fürst	  von	  Bismarck	  für	  das	  Staatsministerium,	  printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  source	  No.	  43,	  p.	  206.	  134	  Hennock,	  E.	  P.	  (2007)	  p.	  183.	  135	  Hennock,	  E.	  P.	  (2007)	  p.	  185.	  136	  The	  leading	  British	  historian	  on	  Bismarckian	  Social	  security,	  E.	  P.	  Hennock	  (Hennock,	  	  E.P.	  (2007)	  pp.	  186-­‐188.)	  argues	  in	  his	  latest	  book	  that	  the	  new	  and	  widely	  circulated	  draft	  law	  from	  17	  November	  1887	  that	  coincided	  with	  the	  6th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Imperial	  message	  was	  part	  of	  a	  myth	  construction	  by	  Bosse	  in	  order	  to	  break	  Bismarck’s	  resistance	  to	  the	  bill.	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calculated	   that	   the	   pension	   costs	   would	   make	   up	   about	   one	   fifth	   of	   the	   total	   imperial	  
budget	  if	  financed	  according	  to	  Bismarck’s	  plans	  and	  backed	  up	  his	  arguments	  by	  pointing	  to	  
the	  positive	  experiences	  from	  the	  financing	  schemes	  of	  the	  previous	  insurances.137	  Bismarck	  
gave	   in	   to	   Bosse’s	   and	  Woedke’s	   arguments.	   The	   final	   executive	   draft	   proposal	   therefore	  
included	   a	   compulsory	   insurance	   organized	   along	   cooperative	   associations	   similar	   to	   the	  
models	   used	   in	   accident	   insurance.	   The	   proposal	   dropped	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   Pay	   as	   you	   Go	  
system	   as	   the	  method	   of	   financing.	   Instead,	   a	   solution	   based	   on	   insurance	   funds	  with	   an	  
Imperial	   contribution	   was	   drawn	   up.	   The	   envisioned	   payments	   were	   very	   low	   and	  
conceptualized	  as	  an	  old	  age	  supplement	  rather	  than	  a	  pension.138	  
	   Even	  though	  Bismarck’s	  original	  vision	  had	  been	  once	  again	  downgraded	  substantially	  in	  
the	  administration,	   the	   result	  was	   still	  much	   less	  diluted	   than	  had	  been	   the	  case	  with	   the	  
other	   laws.	   Bismarck	   could	   still	   point	   to	   the	   mandatory	   nature	   of	   the	   schemes	   and	   a	  
significant	  imperial	  contribution	  as	  aspects	  of	  State	  Socialism	  in	  the	  bill.	  The	  compromise	  on	  
a	   dropping	   of	   the	   imperial	   insurance	   agency	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   mutual	   associations	   with	  
compulsory	   membership	   was	   bearable	   for	   Bismarck	   as	   this	   estate-­‐based	   model	   of	  
organization	  was	  compatible	  with	  the	  Protestant-­‐Patriarchic	  worldview	  of	  large	  parts	  of	  the	  
Protestant	  Conservative	  subculture.	  	  
	  
5.3.9 The	  legislative	  process	  on	  Pension	  and	  Invalidity	  
The	  draft	  bill	  for	  the	  pension	  and	  invalidity	  law	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  Federal	  Chamber	  (Bundesrat)	  
in	   June	   1887.	   Contrary	   to	   under	   the	   sickness	   and	   accident	   insurance	   bills,	   the	   Imperial	  
government	   was	   not	   able	   to	   construct	   a	   majority	   around	   the	   State	   of	   Prussia.	   Instead,	  
Prussia	   saw	   itself	   outmaneuvered	   by	   a	   coalition	   of	   mid-­‐sized	   states,	   formed	   around	   the	  
federalist	   state	   of	   Bavaria,	  which	  managed	   to	   dictate	   substantial	   amendments	   to	   the	   bill.	  
The	   first	   victim	   was	   the	   idea	   of	   mutual	   associations	   with	   compulsory	   membership	  
(Berufsgenossenschaften).	  Instead,	  the	  Bundesrat	  proposed	  and	  negotiated	  an	  organization	  
on	   the	   State	   level	   through	   a	   network	   of	   newly-­‐founded	   State	   Insurance	   Agencies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  Hennock,	  E.	  P.	  (2007)	  p.	  185.	  A	  strong	  degree	  of	  organizational	  path	  dependency	  therefore	  existed	  that	  span	  from	  the	  first	  to	  the	  second	  package	  of	  Social	  Security	  laws.	  The	  insurance	  principle	  dominated	  the	  organizational	  principles	  already	  from	  the	  very	  beginning.	  Härendel	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004)	  p.	  XXXII.	  138	  It	  was	  to	  be	  around	  120	  Reichsmark	  annually	  whereas	  the	  annual	  worker’s	  wage	  was	  around	  450	  Reichsmark.	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(Landesversicherungsanstalten).	  This	  was	  pure	  interest	  politics	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  states	  that	  
benefited	  none	  of	  the	  competing	  subcultures,	  but	  it	  was	  another	  bitter	  defeat	  for	  Bismarck	  
as	  neither	  his	  Imperial	   Insurance	  Agency	  (Reichsverischerungsanstalt)	  nor	  the	  estate-­‐based	  
mutual	   organizations	   with	   compulsory	   membership	   would	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   social	  
security	   organization.	  After	   these	   changes	   the	   law	  was	   successively	   passed	  over	   from	   the	  
federal	  chamber	  (Bundesrat)	  to	  the	  Reichstag.	  
	   The	   proposal,	   already	   watered	   down	   substantially	   by	   the	   administration	   and	   the	  
Bundesrat,	  now	  ran	  into	  troubles	  in	  the	  Reichstag.	  The	  governmental	  camp	  was,	  contrary	  to	  
the	   executive’s	   expectations,	   not	   entirely	   unified	   on	   the	   issue	   as	   parts	   of	   the	   National	  
Liberals	   were	   reluctant	   to	   vote	   for	   the	   bill.139	   They	   demanded	   that	   unified	   insurance	  
schemes	  would	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  prior	  earnings	  of	  the	  insured	  party	  and	  that	  the	  mandatory	  
aspect	  should	  be	   limited	   to	  workers.	   	  The	  Conservatives,	  meanwhile,	  were	  not	  pleased	  by	  
the	   axing	   of	   the	   mutual	   associations	   with	   compulsory	   membership	  
(Berufsgenossenschaften)	   by	   the	   Bundesrat.	   An	   article	   in	   the	   Frankfurter	   Zeitung	   gave	   an	  
insight	  into	  how	  alarming	  the	  situation	  was	  for	  Bismarck	  by	  commenting	  that	  “As	  with	  each	  
day	   the	   numbers	   of	   the	   renegades	   became	   more	   numerous	   in	   the	   two	   Conservative	  
parliamentary	   groups”.140	   Bismarck’s	   Rye	   and	   Iron	   coalition,	   represented	   in	   parliament	   by	  
the	   coalition	   of	   National	   Liberals	   and	   Conservatives,	   was	   endangered	   as	   the	   aristocratic	  
landed	  elites	  and	   large	  estate-­‐holders	   from	  east	  Prussia	  were	  heavily	  opposed	   the	   idea	  of	  
compulsion	   and	   the	   inclusion	   of	   farm	   workers	   in	   the	   schemes	   and	   claimed	   that	   their	  
workers	  were	  well	   taken	  care	  of	   through	  the	  traditional	  patriarchic	  arrangements	  on	  their	  
estates.141	  Most	  of	  the	  Conservatives,	  though,	  declared	  that	  they	  would	  nevertheless	  vote	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  See	  the	  Cable	  from	  the	  Bavarian	  Representative	  to	  the	  Bundes	  Rat	  in	  Berlin	  to	  the	  Bavarian	  Minister	  of	  the	  interior,	  printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  (2004)	  source	  No.	  121,	  	  p.	  628.	  Also:	  „	  die	  laue	  Haltung	  [...],	  die	  bis	  in	  die	  Reihen	  der	  Nationalliberalen	  hinein	  ihre	  Wirkung	  übte“	  1889	  Mai	  24.	  Frankfurter	  Zeitung	  und	  Handelsblatt	  Nr.	  144,	  Abendausgabe	  Politische	  Übersicht,	  printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  Source	  No.	  144,	  p.	  679.	  140	  „Denn	  von	  Tag	  zu	  Tag	  mehrte	  sich	  die	  Zahl	  der	  Abtrünnigen	  aus	  den	  beiden	  konservativen	  Fraktionen“	  1889	  Mai	  24,	  Frankfurter	  Zeitung	  und	  Handelsblatt	  Nr.	  144,	  Abendausgabe	  Politische	  Übersicht,	  printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  Source	  No.144,	  p.	  678.	  141	  In	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  political	  constellation	  around	  the	  Old	  Age	  and	  Invalidity	  Bill,	  the	  Frankfurter	  Zeitung	  opines	  that	  the	  discontent	  of	  the	  “Large	  estate	  holders	  and	  Big	  capitalists”	  was	  more	  rooted	  in	  their	  fear	  that	  they	  would	  have	  to	  contribute	  financially.	  “Dieses	  “Etwas”	  ist	  die	  Altersversicherung,	  welche	  den	  Großgrundbesitzern	  und	  Großkapitalisten	  allerdings	  einige	  Opfer	  zumutet.”	  1889	  Mai	  24,	  Frankfurter	  Zeitung	  und	  Handelsblatt	  Nr.	  144,	  Abendausgabe	  Politische	  Übersicht,	  printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  source	  No.144,	  p.	  680.	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favor	  of	  the	  bill	  not	  so	  much	  because	  they	  were	  loyal	  to	  Bismarck	  but	  because	  they	  deemed	  
it	  to	  be	  the	  “the	  wish	  of	  the	  Emperor”.142	  	  
	   Social	   Democrats	   and	   the	   Left	   Liberals	   were	   against	   the	   accident	   insurance	   bill.	   The	  
Social	   Democrats	   called	   for	   a	   centralized	   Imperial	   insurance	   agency	   as	   sketched	   out	   in	  
Bismarck’s	   original	   State	   Socialist	   plans	   for	   sickness	   and	   accident	   insurance.	   Furthermore,	  
they	   wanted	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   benefit	   levels,	   a	   tax	   financing	   of	   the	   system,	   a	   flat	   rate	  
payment	   in	   order	   to	   reach	   a	   progressive	   redistribution	   effect	   (hence	   everything	   that	  
Bismarck	  originally	  wanted),	  to	  open	  the	  benefits	  for	  widows	  and	  orphans,	  and	  less	  policing	  
and	  bureaucracy	   in	   the	   schemes	  overall.143	   Social	  Democrats	  had	   to	  walk	   the	  difficult	   line	  
between	  trying	   to	  pragmatically	   influence	  the	  political	   situation	  while	  also	  defending	  their	  
rhetorical	   positions	   in	   light	   of	   Bismarck’s	   repressive	   socialist	   laws.	   However,	   due	   to	   the	  
socialist	  laws	  that	  had	  reduced	  their	  parliamentary	  group	  substantially,	  they	  did	  not	  have	  a	  
seat	  in	  the	  relevant	  committee.	  This	  deprived	  them	  from	  an	  important	  means	  of	  influencing	  
the	   legislation.	   Their	   input	  was	   reduced	   to	  amendment	   requests	   in	   the	  plenum	   that	  were	  
not	  included	  into	  the	  legislation.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  nine	  remaining	  Social	  Democratic	  deputies	  
voted	  against	  the	  bill.	  
	   The	  Left	  Liberals	  (Fortschritt)	  were	  opposed	  to	  the	  new	  draft	  proposal.	  Their	  position	  had	  
not	  changed	  much	   from	  their	  approach	   to	  accident	  and	  sickness	   insurance.	  Their	  baseline	  
liberal	   creed	  made	   them	   oppose	   any	   compulsory	   aspects	   of	   the	   legislation.	   Furthermore,	  
they	   were	   against	   any	   bureaucratic-­‐statist	   element	   that	   would	   have	   strengthened	   the	  
control	   of	   the	   central	   government.144	   Due	   to	   their	   poor	   electoral	   performance	   in	   the	  
elections	  of	  1887	  they	  had	  only	  three	  seats	  on	  the	  committee.	  This	  reduced	  their	  influence	  
on	  the	  formulation	  of	  legislation	  and	  resulted	  in	  their	  rejection	  of	  the	  bill.	  
	   The	   majority	   of	   the	   Center	   Party	   did	   not	   diverge	   much	   from	   the	   preferences	   it	   had	  
already	   expressed	   in	   the	   early	   1880s	   on	   sickness	   and	   accident	   insurance.	   However,	   in	  
contrast	   to	   the	   third	  accident	   insurance	  proposal,	   these	  preferences	  now	  diverged	  greatly	  
from	  the	  bill	  proposed	  in	  the	  Reichstag.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  Center	  Party	  gathered	  around	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  „würden	  zwar	  mit	  Ja	  stimmen	  „weil	  es	  der	  Wunsch	  des	  Kaisers	  sei“,	  aber	  sie	  seien	  im	  Grunde	  genommen	  Gegner	  des	  Gesetzes.“	  1889	  Mai	  24.	  Frankfurter	  Zeitung	  und	  Handelsblatt	  Nr.	  144,	  Abendausgabe	  Politische	  Übersicht.	  Printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  	  (2004b)	  Source	  No.144,	  p.	  	  679.	  143	  See	  the	  police	  report	  about	  a	  social	  democratic	  workers	  rally.	  1888	  August	  7.	  Bericht	  des	  Polizeileutnats	  Max	  Encke	  an	  den	  Berliner	  Polizeipräsidenten	  Bernhard	  Freiherr	  von	  Richthofen.	  Printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  Source	  No.	  81,	  p.	  	  427.	  144	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  p.	  	  XLI.	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the	   chaplain	   Franz	   Hitze	   and	   their	   social	   policy	   spokesman	   Freiherr	   von	   Hertling	   by	  
rigorously	   demanding	   a	   non-­‐compulsory	   status	   for	   the	   insurance,	   a	   cancellation	   of	   the	  
Imperial	  contribution	  to	  the	  schemes	  and	  a	  stronger	  inclusion	  of	  the	  subsidiary	  principle	  in	  
the	   law.	   But	   a	  minority	   of	  mainly	   aristocratic	   party	  members	   did	   not	   want	   to	   follow	   the	  
programmatic	   ideas	   of	   the	  majority.	   The	   “Hitze-­‐proposal”,	  which	   aimed	   at	   organizing	   the	  
invalidity	   schemes	   through	   the	   reintroduction	   of	   mutual	   associations	   with	   compulsory	  
membership,	   failed	   in	   the	   respective	   committee	  by	   receiving	   fewer	  votes	   than	   the	  Center	  
Party	  had.145	  The	  party	  was	  thus	  split	  and	  the	  two	  opposed	  Catholics	  factions	  waged	  a	  bitter	  
verbal	  battle	  through	  anonymous	  contributions	  in	  newspapers,	   letters	  and	  speeches	  in	  the	  
Reichstag.	   The	   fight	   pitted	   the	   advocates	   of	   the	   programmatic	   ideas	   of	   Catholic	   social	  
teaching	   (called	   “doctrinists”	   by	   their	   rivals)	   against	   a	   small	   but	   influential	   group	   of	  
aristocratic	  Catholic	  monarchists	   led	  by	  Freiherr	  von	  Franckenstein.	  A	  cable	   from	  Berlin	   to	  
the	  Bavarian	  government	  puts	  forward	  that	  “The	  noble	  large	  estate	  holding	  element	  seems	  
anyhow	  against	  it,	  whereas	  the	  civic	  and	  clerical	  members	  of	  the	  Center	  seem	  to	  be	  in	  favor	  
of	  it”.146	  
	   The	   final	   showdown	  came	   in	   the	  Reichstags	  debate	  of	   the	  29th	   of	  March	  1889.	   Letters	  
that	  Franckenstein	  and	  Hertling	  sent	  home	  to	  their	  wives	  the	  next	  day	  reflect	  the	  tensions.	  
Franckenstein	  wrote	  that	  
	  
Hertling	  opened	  the	  debate	  with	  a	  beautiful	  speech	  representing	  the	  doctrinal	  point	  of	  view,	  for	  which	  he	  got	  
the	  applause	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  our	  people.	   I	  spoke	  two	  hours	  after	  Hertling	  and	  fought	  Hertling	  with	  a	   longer	  
speech	   to	   the	   applause	   of	   the	   few	   Center	   people	   that	   shared	   my	   point	   of	   view,	   but	   to	   the	   cheers	   of	   the	  
Conservatives.	  That’s	  how	  things	  stand,	   it’s	  not	  pleasant,	  but	   I	  cannot	  and	  am	  not	  allowed	  to	  act	   in	  any	  other	  
way.147	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  See:	  Bericht	  des	  Stellvertretenden	  Bundesratsbevollmaechtigten	  Robert	  Landmann	  an	  den	  bayerischen	  Innenminister	  Max	  Freiherr	  von	  Feilitzsch,	  printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  	  (2004b)	  source	  No.	  108,	  p.	  593.	  146	  „Das	  adelige	  Gutsbesitzerelement	  ist	  überhaupt	  gegen	  denselben,	  während	  die	  bürgerlichen	  und	  klerikalen	  Mitglieder	  des	  Zentrums	  demselben	  zugeneigt	  scheinen.“	  	  Bericht	  des	  Stellvertretenden	  Bundesratsbevollmaechtigten	  Robert	  Landmann	  an	  den	  bayerischen	  Innenminister	  Max	  Freiherr	  von	  Feilitzsch,	  printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  source	  No.	  108,	  p.	  593.	  	  147	  „Hertling	  eröffnete	  die	  Debatte	  mit	  einer	  sehr	  schönen,	  den	  doktrinären	  Standpunkt	  vertretenden	  Rede	  unter	  dem	  Applaus	  der	  Mehrzahl	  unserer	  Leute.	  Zwei	  Stunden	  nach	  Hertling	  sprach	  ich	  und	  bekämpfte	  Hertling	  in	  einer	  längeren	  Rede	  unter	  dem	  Applaus	  der	  wenigen	  meine	  Ansicht	  teilenden	  Zentrumsleute,	  aber	  unter	  den	  Beifallsrufen	  der	  Konservativen.	  So	  stehen	  die	  Dinge,	  angenehm	  ist	  das	  nicht,	  aber	  ich	  kann	  und	  darf	  nicht	  anders	  handeln.“	  1889	  März	  30,	  Brief	  des	  Reichstagsabgeordneten	  und	  Präsidenten	  der	  bayerischen	  Kammer	  der	  Reichsräte	  Georg	  Freiherr	  von	  und	  zu	  Franckenstein	  an	  seine	  Frau	  Marie,	  printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  source	  No.122,	  p.	  629.	  
	   	   	   157	  
	  
Hertling	  instead,	  wrote	  home	  that	  
	  
It	  was	  a	  fatal	  day	  for	  the	  Center.	  I	  spoke	  first	  […]	  but	  expressed	  my	  decisive	  protest	  against	  the	  state	  socialist	  era.	  
The	  speech	   left	  an	   impression	  on	  the	  House.	  All	   the	   frightened	  people	   that	  do	  not	  want	   the	   law	   ,	  but	  did	  not	  
want	  to	  say	  this	  out	  loud	  ,	  got	  encouraged	  ,	  that	  it	  would	  maybe	  still	  fail.	  [then	  came	  Frankenstein’s	  speech]	  	  The	  
effect	  of	  my	  speech	  was	  gone.148	  	  
	  
Both	   letters	   reveal	   the	   massive	   split	   between	   the	   ideationally	   driven	   majority	   in	   the	  
parliament	  group	   that	  was	   reluctant	   to	  accept	  any	  State	  Socialism	  and	   the	   small	   group	  of	  
Catholic	   Imperial	   loyalists	   (impressed	   by	   the	   strong	   nationalist	   turn	   under	   the	   new	  Kaiser	  
Wilhelm	  II)	  within	  the	  party	  that	  did	  not	  want	  the	  government	  to	  fall.149	  
	   The	   situation	   was	   exacerbated	   by	   the	   strong	   disarray	   amongst	   the	   parties	   of	   the	  
government	  camp.	  Even	  though	  the	  draft	  bill	  had	  already	  been	  significantly	  watered	  down	  
by	   the	  bureaucracy	  and	   the	  Bundesrat	   so	  as	   to	   retreat	   from	  some	  of	  Bismarck’s	  demands	  
and	  increase	  the	  chances	  of	  getting	  the	  bill	  through	  the	  Reichstag,	  the	  Chancellor’s	  majority	  
seemed	  less	  than	  certain.	  Parts	  of	  the	  government	  camp	  had	  expressed	  serious	  doubts	  and	  
concerns	  about	  the	  bill	  in	  the	  preceding	  plenary	  discussions.	  This	  was	  especially	  true	  for	  the	  
National	   Liberals	   and	   the	   Conservatives.	   In	   the	   run	   up	   to	   the	   vote	   on	   the	   old	   age	   and	  
invalidity	   insurance	   bill	   the	   government	   became	   ever	   more	   nervous.	   Bismarck	   tried	   to	  
appease	   his	   coalition	   partners	  with	   a	   last	  minute	   speech	   in	   the	   Reichstag	  where	   he	   even	  
played	   for	   the	  votes	  of	   the	  Center	  Party	   knowing	  about	   its	  ongoing	   internal	  quarrels.	   The	  
speech	   was	   judged	   by	   the	   press	   as	   having	   had	   considerable	   success	   “as	   he	   [Bismarck]	  
managed	  to	  rescue	  the	  Pact	  from	  falling	  apart”.150	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  „Es	  war	  ein	  Unglückstag	  für	  das	  Zentrum.	  Ich	  sprach	  zuerst,	  […]	  gab	  aber	  meinem	  entschiedenen	  Protest	  gegen	  die	  staatssozialistische	  Ära	  bestimmten	  Ausdruck.	  Die	  Rede	  machte	  im	  Hause	  sichtbar	  Eindruck.	  Alle	  die	  furchtsamen	  Leute,	  die	  das	  Gesetz	  nicht	  wollen,	  aber	  es	  nicht	  laut	  sagen	  wagen,	  bekamen	  Courage	  und	  begannen	  zu	  hoffen,	  es	  möge	  nun	  doch	  noch	  vielleicht	  zu	  Fall	  kommen.	  [Dann	  kam	  Franckensteins	  Rede]	  Der	  Effekt	  meiner	  Rede	  war	  aber	  hin;…“	  Freiherr	  von	  Hertling	  zitiert	  in	  den	  „Erinnerungen	  aus	  meinem	  Leben“	  (Bd.2,	  S.102-­‐104)	  einen	  Brief	  den	  er	  im	  Verlauf	  des	  29.	  März	  nach	  Hause	  geschrieben	  hatte	  (am	  30.3.),	  printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  source	  No.	  122,	  p.	  630.	  149	  For	  a	  surprisingly	  accurate	  prediction	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  vote	  of	  the	  Center	  Party	  in	  the	  upcoming	  Reichstag	  session	  see	  an	  article	  in	  the	  left	  liberal	  Posener	  Zeitung.	  1889	  April	  13.	  Posener	  Zeitung	  Nr	  262,	  Morgenausgabe	  Eine	  Aufgabe	  für	  die	  Parlamentsferien,	  printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  Source	  No.128,	  p.	  640.	  150	  „Jedenfalls	  aber	  ist	  es	  ihm	  gelungen	  das	  Kartell	  vor	  dem	  Auseinanderfallen	  zu	  bewahren	  und	  die	  Zahl	  der	  für	  das	  Gesetz	  Stimmenden	  bedeutend	  zu	  verstärken.“	  1889	  Mai	  24,	  Frankfurter	  Zeitung	  und	  Handelsblatt	  Nr.	  144,	  Abendausgabe	  Politische	  Übersicht,	  printed	  IN:	  Härendel,	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004b)	  Source	  No.144,	  p.	  680.	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   In	  reality,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  roll	  call	  votes	  were	  more	  than	  shaky.	  As	  the	  following	  	  table	  
indicates,	  more	  than	  22	  members	  of	  the	  governing	  coalition	  voted	  against	  the	  bill.	  The	  bill	  
went	  nevertheless	  successfully	   through	  parliament,	   largely	  with	  the	  help	  of	   the	  renegades	  
form	  the	  Center	  Party.151	  Franckenstein	  and	  twelve	  other	  Center	  Party	  MPs	  voted	  for	  the	  bill	  
and	  contributed	  to	  the	  unexpected	  slim	  majority	  of	  twenty	  votes	  (185	  to	  165)	  that	  the	  law	  
got	  in	  the	  Reichstag.152	  Were	  it	  not	  for	  the	  support	  of	  the	  small	  group	  of	  renegades	  from	  the	  
Center	  Party,	  the	  secessionists	  from	  Alsace-­‐Loraine	  and	  one	  Left	  Liberal,	  the	  law	  would	  not	  
have	  passed	  the	  Reichstag.	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐6	  Voting	  by	  subculture	  and	  party,	  old	  age	  and	  invalidity	  1889,	  Reichstag.	  
	  
Table	  by	  the	  author.	  Data	  from	  Härendel	  U.&	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004a)	  p.	  XLVI.	  
	  
	  
In	   the	  end	   the	   results	  were	  once	  again	  a	   far	   cry	   from	  Bismarck’s	   initial	   intentions	  but	   the	  
chancellor	  managed	  to	  preserve	  much	  more	  than	  he	  had	  in	  the	  case	  of	  accident	  insurance	  
project	  five	  years	  before.	  The	  Empire	  had	  finally	  managed	  to	  cement	  its	  role	  in	  contributing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151Lönne,	  K.	  E.	  (1986)	  p.	  176.	  152	  Härendel	  U.	  &	  Peterle,	  M.	  (2004a)	  p.	  XLIII.	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to	  the	  financing	  of	  the	  schemes,	  even	  though	  it	  could	  only	  do	  so	  by	  paying	  the	  same	  amount	  
as	   employers	   and	   employees.	   Furthermore,	   Bismarck	   managed	   to	   preserve	   a	   role,	   albeit	  
watered	   down,	   for	   the	   state	   in	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   schemes.	   Even	   though	   this	  was	  
delegated	   to	   the	   state	   level,	   the	   protestant	   dominant	   subculture	   could	   still	   claim	   strong	  
influence	  through	  the	  massive	  size	  and	  impact	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Prussia	  within	  the	  empire.153	  
	  
5.4 Conclusion	  
This	   chapter	   reassessed	   the	   formation	   process	   of	   early	   German	   social	   security	   legislation	  
with	   a	   special	   focus	   on	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   Reichstag	   and	   the	   Imperial	   party	   system.	   It	  
confirms	  that	  historical	  research	  has	  been	  on	  the	  right	  track	  in	  recent	  years	  in	  its	  movement	  
away	   from	   Bismarck-­‐	   or	   bureaucracy-­‐centered	   analytic	   approaches	   to	   19th	   century	   social	  
security.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  not	  much	  of	  what	  Bismarck	  originally	  had	   in	  mind	  for	  his	  social	  
security	   project	  was	   still	   intact	   by	   the	   time	   the	   laws	   finally	  made	   it	   through	  bureaucracy,	  
Bundesrat	   and	   Reichstag.	   It	   is	   not	   doubted	   that	   Bismarck	   was	   the	   single	  most	   important	  
political	  driving	   force	   in	  pushing	   for	   the	   legislation,	  but	  at	   the	  same	   time	  he	   triggered	   the	  
formation	   of	   a	   social	   security	   complex	   that	   was	   completely	   at	   odds	   with	   his	   original	  
programmatic	   ideas	  and	  the	   interests	  of	  his	  worldview.	  For	  Bismarck,	  social	  security	  was	  a	  
political	   device	   for	   his	   nation-­‐building	   efforts	   with	   which	   he	   could	   dry	   out	   the	   other	  
subcultures	   and	   expand	   his	   own	   Conservative,	   patriachical	   and	   Bonapartist	   Protestant	  
model	  of	   society	   throughout	   the	  Kaiser	  Reich.	  The	   social	   security	   institutions	   that	  were	   in	  
place	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1880s	  were	  useless	  for	  this	  political	  zeal.	  Only	  in	  the	  case	  of	  old	  age	  
and	   invalidity	   he	   was	   able	   to	   uphold	   some	   of	   his	   original	   programmatic	   ideas	   of	   State	  
Socialism	  whereas	  the	  sickness	  and	  especially	  the	  accident	  insurance	  projects	  turned	  out	  to	  
be	  nightmarish	  disasters	  for	  him.	  
	   Accident	  insurance	  was	  brought	  about	  by	  a	  Rye	  and	  Rome	  compromise	  in	  1884	  of	  which	  
the	   precondition	   was	   that	   the	   Conservatives	   and	   Bismarck	   shifted	   their	   ideas	   on	   social	  
security	  much	   closer	   to	   those	   of	   the	   Catholics.	   Bismarck	   and	   the	   Conservatives	   felt	  more	  
comfortable	  in	  1887	  as	  the	  National	  Liberals	  had	  made	  a	  Conservative	  programmatic	  turn	  in	  
1887	  and	  had	  joined	  the	  Bismarckian	  camp.	  Concessions	  to	  the	  Catholics	  did	  not	  therefore	  
seem	  necessary	  for	  the	  old	  age	  and	  invalidity	  legislation	  of	  1889.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  numbers	  
for	   Bismarck’s	   Conservative-­‐National	   Liberal	   coalition	   did	   not	   add	   up	   (due	   to	   too	   many	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  Lönne,	  K.E.	  (1986)	  p.	  175.	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defections	   from	  the	   liberals)	  and	  so	   the	   law	  was	  only	   successful	  because	  a	   small	  group	  of	  
Center	  Party	  members	  defected	  from	  the	  stance	  of	  their	  party	  precisely	  they	  wanted	  to	  go	  
against	  the	  programmatic	  ideas	  and	  worldviews	  of	  their	  own	  movement.	  
	   If	  the	  influence	  of	  Catholic	  Social	  teaching	  was	  less	  linear	  and	  much	  messier	  than	  most	  of	  
the	  literature	  on	  Catholic	  Social	  teaching	  and	  the	  welfare	  state	  has	  assumed	  so	  far,	  one	  can	  
say	   the	   same	  about	  Bismarck’s	   influence.	  Bismarck	  has	   to	  be	   granted	   the	  merit	   of	   having	  
gotten	  the	  ball	  rolling	  on	  social	  security.	  	  He	  was	  the	  first	  one	  that	  understood	  that	  modern	  
social	  security	  was	  a	  political	  device,	  a	  weapon	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  break	  the	  resistance	  
and	   opposition	   of	   the	   other	   subcultures	   within	   the	   Reich.	   His	   intentions	   were	   therefore	  
largely	  Bonapartist	  but,	  as	  this	  chapter	  shows,	  he	  was	  not	  able	  to	  implement	  his	  Bonapartist	  
aspirations.	   This	  was	  party	  down	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  other	   subcultures	   and	   their	   political	  
representations	  soon	  also	  understood	  that	  welfare	  was	  a	  tool	  to	  woo	  parts	  of	  the	  working	  
class	   into	   their	   own	   camp.	   The	   term	   “Bismarckian	   Welfare	   state”	   should	   therefore	   be	  
handled	   and	   applied	   with	   care.	   That	   said,	   let	   us	   now	   turn	   to	   traditional	   explanatory	  
frameworks	  of	  the	  welfare	  state.	  
	   Functional	  pressures	  through	  industrialization	  certainly	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  
German	   social	   security	   but	   only	   as	   industrialization	   brought	   about	   a	   new	   socioeconomic	  
class,	   the	   urban	   proletariat.	   The	   advent,	   increase	   and	   widespread	   misery	   of	   this	   class	  
offered	  significant	  political	  potential,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  the	  open	  electoral	  institutions	  of	  
the	   Kaiser	   Reich,	   and	   this	   triggered	   a	   virtuous	   cycle	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   competition	   for	  
programmatic	  ideas	  on	  welfare	  among	  the	  existing	  subcultures.	  
	   In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  orthodox	  applications	  of	  Power	  Resource	  theory	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  
German	   legislative	   efforts	   of	   the	   1880s	   as	   welfare	   came	   about	   without	   a	   single	   Social	  
Democratic	  vote.	  If	  one	  relaxes	  the	  orthodox	  assumptions	  of	  PRA,	  then	  one	  can	  argue	  that	  
the	   power	   resources	   of	   labor	   influenced	   German	   social	   security	   indirectly	   as	   the	   fear	   of	  
revolution	   brought	   about	   Lorenz	   von	   Stein’s	   idea	   of	   a	   ‘Social	   Kingdom’,	   which	   was	   the	  
cornerstone	  of	  Bismarck’s	  state-­‐socialist	  strategy.	  
	   However,	  this	  is	  a	  very	  long	  causal	  chain	  which	  would	  not	  be	  measurable	  using	  the	  usual	  
power	  resource	   indicators	  of	  German	   labor	  or	   left	  party	  strength.	  The	  political	  economists	  
who	  helped	  to	  formulate	  State	  Socialism	  were	  forming	  their	  ideas	  not	  with	  the	  experiences	  
of	   Germany	   in	  mind	   but	   against	   the	   background	   of	   the	   French	   Revolution	   and	   the	  more	  
recent	  events	  of	  the	  Paris	  commune	  in	  1870.	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   Furthermore,	   no	   evidence	   could	   be	   found	   for	   the	   claims	   of	   Employer	   Centered	  
Approaches	   (ECAs)	   that	   welfare	   was	   brought	   about	   through	   active	   demand	   of	   capital.	  
Instead,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   legislative	   process	   has	   shown	   quite	   the	   contrary.	   Employers	  
opposed	  welfare	  legislation	  and	  only	  jumped	  on	  the	  bandwagon	  once	  they	  could	  no	  longer	  
stop	  it.	  
	   Today,	   a	   fusion	   of	   both	   approaches	   has	   become	   popular	   whereby	   cross-­‐class	   welfare	  
state	  theories	  see	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  as	  a	  result	  of	  political	  coalitions	  between	  
labor	   and	   capital	   (Iversen),	   or	   between	   labor	   and	   large	   landholding	   elites,	   due	   to	   shared	  
risks.	  However,	   these	   too	   find	   it	  hard	   to	  make	  stand	   firm	  on	   the	  empirical	  grounds	  of	   the	  
German	  case.	  No	   such	   coalition	   formed	  on	  any	  of	   the	   social	   security	   laws	  of	   the	   late	  19th	  
century.	   This	   was	   impossible	   because	   the	   Social	   Democratic	   party,	   the	   traditional	  
representative	  of	  labor,	  never	  exceeded	  35	  mandates	  (1881,	  12	  mandates;	  1884,	  24;	  1887,	  
11;	   1890,	   35)	   in	   the	   397	   seat	   strong	   Reichstag	   in	   the	   1880s	   and	   also	   never	   managed	   to	  
mobilize	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  workers’	  votes	  during	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich.154	  
	   Since	   the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  mainstream	  Historiography	  has	  emphasized	  a	  Rye	  and	   Iron	  
coalition	   between	   large	   estate-­‐holders	   (Junker)	   and	   industrialists	   (Schlotbarone),	  
represented	  by	  the	  Conservatives	  and	  National	  Liberals,	  as	  essential	  for	  Germany’s	  political	  
development	  throughout	   the	  Kaiser	  Reich.	   It	   seems	  that	   this	  coalition	   found	   it	  particularly	  
difficult	   to	  prevail	  on	   social	   security.	  Only	  on	  old	  age	  and	   invalidity	  did	   it	   come	  close	   to	  a	  
successful	  Rye	  and	  Iron	  compromise,	  and	  even	  this	  failed	  at	  the	  last	  minute.	  
	   What	  can	  be	  observed	  instead	  of	  a	  Rye	  and	  Iron	  coalition	  is	  a	  Rye	  and	  Rome	  coalition.	  In	  
a	  way	  this	  was	  even	  a	  first	  inter-­‐confessional	  compromise	  between	  Conservative	  Protestant	  
Junkers	  and	  the	  Catholic	  Center.	  Many	  factors,	  from	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  the	  Bundesrat	  to	  
the	   liberals	   in	   parliament,	   had	   a	   share	   in	   diluting	   Bismarck’s	   state	   socialist	   plans,	  
nevertheless	   it	   was	   the	   catholic	   Center	   Party	   that	   became	   the	   most	   involved	   in	   social	  
security.155	   Once	   Bismarck	   saw	   that	   he	   could	   not	   fulfill	   his	   state	   socialist	   worldview	   as	  
planned,	  he	  opted	  for	  a	  pact	  with	  the	  lesser	  evil.	  Compromising	  with	  the	  Catholics	  seemed	  
the	   far	  better	  way	   to	   reach	   the	  Bonapartist	   interest	   for	  his	  worldview	   than	  compromising	  
with	  the	  democracy	  promoting	  liberals.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  Lepsius,	  M.R.	  (1993)	  pp.	  45-­‐46.	  155	  This	  is	  certainly	  also	  a	  function	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  the	  only	  other	  subculture	  in	  the	  Reich	  next	  to	  the	  conservative	  one	  that	  was	  not	  too	  eagerly	  promoting	  democratization.	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   To	  sum	  up,	  the	  story	  that	  the	  two	  preceding	  chapters	  tells	  about	  the	  social	  question	  and	  
social	   security	   diverges	   from	  most	   traditional	   explanations.	   The	   starting	   point	   is	   that	   the	  
advent	   of	   a	   new	   social	   class	   during	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   meant	   that	   the	  
existing	  subcultures	  (Conservative,	  Liberal,	  Catholic)	  had	  to	  offer	  something	  to	  this	  class	  that	  
would	   inhibit	   it	   from	   fully	   joining	   the	   new	   emerging	   subculture	   of	   the	   Reich	   (Socialist).	  
Modern	  state	  driven	  welfare	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  Bismarck	  was	  one	  of	  the	  
first	  to	  understand	  this.	  Once	  Bismarck	  moved,	  he	  triggered	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  of	  competition	  
between	   all	   subcultures	   in	   which	   they	   each	   started	   to	   develop	   their	   own	   programmatic	  
ideas	  of	   social	   security	   in	  order	  not	   to	  get	   sidelined	   in	   the	   legislative	  process.	  These	   ideas	  
had	   to	   be	   strictly	   in	   line	   with	   the	   worldviews	   of	   the	   respective	   subcultures,	   though,	   as	  
otherwise	   they	  would	   not	   fulfill	   the	   ultimate	   zeal	   of	   incorporating	   the	   new	   class	   into	   the	  
worldviews	  of	   the	   underlying	   subculture.	   Thus	   Catholics	   developed	  Catholic	  welfare	   ideas	  
and	   liberals	  developed	  solutions	   that	  were	  compatible	  with	   liberalism.	   Ideas	  and	   interests	  
fused	   in	   the	   formulation	   of	   the	   respective	   programmatic	   ideas.	   	   This	   also	   explains	   the	  
passivity	  of	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  in	  parliament	  when	  it	  came	  to	  welfare.	  Voting	  for,	  or	  even	  
proposing,	  solutions	  for	  reform	  within	  the	  existing	  system	  was	  simply	  not	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  
their	   (at	   that	   time	   orthodox)	   worldview.	   Welfare	   was	   then	   subsequently	   shaped	   in	   the	  
Kaiser	   Reich’s	   law-­‐making	   institutional	   arena,	   i.e.	   in	   parliament,	   and	   the	   outcome	   was	  
primarily	  a	  result	  of	  the	   ideational	  coalitions	  that	  were	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  compatibility	  
between	  the	  different	  groups’	  programmatic	  ideas	  and	  incorporated	  interests.	  
	  
5.5 A	  Counterfactual	  
The	   similarities	   between	  Bismarck’s	   original	   state	   socialist	   social	   security	   intentions	  based	  
on	   State	   Socialism	   and	   the	   Scandinavian	   concept	   of	   welfare	   open	   up	   space	   for	   some	  
additional	  remarks	  with	  which	  I	  want	  to	  conclude.	  In	  fact,	  regarding	  his	  programmatic	  ideas,	  
Bismarck’s	  favorite	  coalition	  partner	  besides	  the	  Conservatives	  would	  have	  been	  the	  Social	  
Democrats.156	   The	   crux	  was	   that	   this	  was	  precisely	   the	  party	  whose	   fundaments	  Bismarck	  
wanted	  to	  dry	  up	  with	  the	  legislation.	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  I	  begged	  Bismarck,	  in	  a	  letter	  of	  the	  9th	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  Yet	  another	  theoretical	  insight	  spins	  off	  from	  the	  fact	  that,	  due	  to	  the	  political	  constellation	  in	  the	   Empire	   in	   the	   1880s,	   coalitions	   were	   inevitable	   if	   one	   wanted	   to	   successfully	   pass	   social	  policy	   legislation.	  What	   the	   empirical	   story	   unveils	   is	   that	   these	   coalitions	  were	   only	   possible	  when	   there	  was	   considerable	   ideational	   overlap	   on	   the	   issue	   at	   stake.	   This	   ideational	   overlap	  had	   to	   happen	   on	   both	   the	   political	   power	   dimension	   as	   well	   as	   the	   ideational	   societal	  dimension.	  If	  the	  overlap	  was	  not	  in	  place,	  a	  coalition	  would	  not	  come	  about.	  	  
	   	   	   163	  
November	   1881,157	   not	   to	   repeal	   the	   socialist	   laws.	   This	   implicitly	   indicates	   that	   Bismarck	  
had	   ,	   sometime	   in	   the	   early	   1880s,	   played	   with	   the	   thought	   of	   doing	   so.	   Due	   to	   the	  
ideational	  affinities,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  Bismarck	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  
collaborate	  with	   the	   Social	   Democrats	   in	   order	   to	   get	  most	   of	   his	   ideas	   on	   state	   socialist	  
social	   security	   through	   the	   Reichstag	   once	   the	   party	   would	   have	   gained	   enough	   seats	  
through	  a	  lifting	  of	  the	  socialist	  laws.	  Bismarck	  sensed	  that	  he	  needed	  programmatic	  allies	  if	  
he	   did	   not	   want	   to	   risk	   ending	   up	   with	   a	   social	   security	   system	   very	   different	   from	   his	  
intentions.	   If	   the	  Emperor,	  who	  had	  survived	  two	  assassination	  attempts	  attributed	  to	  the	  
social	   democratic	   milieu,	   had	   not	   forbidden	   Bismarck	   to	   lift	   the	   socialist	   laws,	   would	   a	  
different	   outcome	   of	   German	   social	   security	   have	   been	   likely?	   It	   would	   appear	   so,	   as	   a	  
Conservative-­‐Social	  Democratic	  coalition	  on	  social	  security	  would	  have	  enabled	  Bismarck	  to	  
come	  closer	   to	  State	  Socialism.	  The	  outcome	  of	   social	   security	  would	  have	  been	  closer	   to	  
Scandinavian	  social	  security	  than	  it	  is	  the	  case	  today.	  It	  is	  proven	  that	  Bismarck	  met	  with	  the	  
labor	  leader	  and	  co-­‐founder	  of	  the	  Social	  Democrats,	  Ferdinand	  Lasalle,	  a	  couple	  of	  times	  to	  
have	  conversations	  on	  the	  workers	  question.	  We	  also	  know	  that	  the	  Scandinavian	  welfare	  
states	  were	   largely	   brought	   about	   through	   red-­‐green	   coalitions	  between	   the	   landed	   large	  
estate-­‐holding	  elites	  and	  Social	  Democracy.	  The	  question	  is	  then:	  why	  Rye	  and	  Iron	  and	  not	  
Rye	  and	  Labor?	  Considering	  that	  the	  social	  basis	  of	  the	  Conservatives	  in	  Germany	  was	  also	  
formed	   of	   landed	   large	   estate-­‐holding	   elites,	   a	   Conservative-­‐Social	   Democratic	   coalition	  
would	   have	   essentially	   been	   a	   red-­‐green	   coalition	   in	   the	   same	   vein	   as	   the	   Scandinavian	  
agreements.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  Protestant	  Kaiser	  Reich	  was	  much	  closer	  to	  this	  scenario	  than	  
welfare	  state	  research	  in	  political	  science	  and	  history	  has	  acknowledged	  so	  far.158	  
	   Nevertheless,	  we	  also	  know	  that	  it	  did	  not	  happen.	  Bismarck	  could	  not	  form	  a	  coalition	  
with	   the	   Social	   Democrats	   and	   had	   to	   turn	   to	   the	   Catholics	   as	   an	   alternative	   coalition	  
partner.	  The	  resulting	  coalition	  with	  the	  Center	  Party	  came	  at	  a	  high	  price.	  First,	  Bismarck	  
had	  to	  lift	  the	  restrictive	  measures	  on	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  through	  an	  easing	  of	  the	  Culture	  
War	   (Kulturkampf)	  and,	  second,	  he	  had	  to	  reach	  a	  compromise	  on	  welfare	   legislation	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  1881	  November	  9.	  Handschreiben	  des	  Deutschen	  Kaisers	  und	  preußischen	  Königs	  Wilhelm	  I.	  an	  den	  Reichskanzler	  Otto	  Fürst	  von	  Bismarck,	  printed	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  f.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003)	  source	  No.	  3,	  p.	  8.	  158	  But	  also	  far	  from	  it	  if	  one	  considers	  the	  small	  share	  of	  mandates	  of	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  in	  the	  Reichstag	  during	  the	  1880s	  (max	  35	  seats	  out	  of	  397).	  Though,	  they	  could	  have	  experienced	  a	  considerable	  boost	  if	  Bismarck	  had	  actively	  embraced	  them	  early	  on	  and	  not	  employed	  restrictive	  legislation	  on	  them.	  Potential	  for	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  was	  huge.	  In	  1912	  they	  became	  the	  strongest	  group	  in	  parliament	  with	  110	  out	  of	  397	  mandates.	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led	  to	  the	  famous	  distortions	  of	  the	  Continental	  Welfare	  state	  system.	  To	  round	  it	  off,	  this	  
failure	  to	  design	  German	  welfare	  institutions	  according	  to	  the	  premises	  of	  Bismarckian	  State	  
Socialism	  also	   led	  to	  a	   failure	  of	  Bismarck’s	  overall	  political	  project.	  The	  working	  class	  was	  
not	  brought	  ‘home’	  into	  the	  Reich	  and	  Social	  Democracy	  as	  a	  movement	  started	  to	  grow	  as	  
never	  before.	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6 Structuring	  Politics	  in	  Italy:	  Vicious	  Cycles	  of	  Ideational	  
competition	  





This	   Chapter	   paves	   the	  way	   for	   the	   analysis	   of	  modern	   social	   security	   development	   in	   Italy	   in	   the	  
subsequent	   Chapter.	   The	   claim	   is	   that	   the	   special	   circumstances	   under	   which	   Italian	   unification	  
unfolded	  led	  to	  an	  ideational	  stalemate	  between	  the	  Vatican	  and	  liberals,	  the	  two	  dominant	  political	  
forces	  in	  post-­‐unification	  Italy.	  This	  stalemate	  inhibited	  the	  unfolding	  of	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  of	  ideational	  
competition	  with	   retarding	   effects	   for	   the	  development	  of	   programmatic	   ideas	  on	  both	   sides.	   This	  
forestalled	   Italy’s	   development	   in	   the	   last	   third	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   in	   three	   key	   eras:	   politics,	  
industrialization	  and	  social	   rights.	  The	   first	  part	  of	   the	  chapter	  will	  analyze	   the	   Italian	  Risorgimento	  
(Resurgence),	   and	   the	   subsequent	  political	   attempts	   that	   aimed	  at	   consolidating	   the	  young	  nation.	  
Light	  will	  be	  shed	  on	  the	  predominance	  of	  political	  liberalism	  as	  an	  ideology,	  the	  institutional	  choices	  
that	   this	   implied	   and	   the	   persistent	   hegemony	   of	   elites	   and	   their	   abuse	   of	   certain	   governance	  
practice.	   Second,	   Italy’s	   development	   as	   a	   late	   industrializer	   will	   be	   analyzed	   by	   paying	   special	  
attention	   to	   the	   particularity	   of	   a	   huge	   rural	   proletariat	   and	   the	   development	   of	   an	   extreme	  
imbalance	   between	   North	   and	   South.	   The	   last	   block	   will	   analyze	   the	   particularities	   of	   the	   conflict	  
between	  the	  Vatican	  and	  the	  newly	  founded	  Italian	  nation-­‐state.	  Due	  to	  the	  geographic	  overlapping	  
of	   their	   territory,	   and	   the	   monolithic	   prevalence	   of	   liberalism	   within	   the	   state,	   this	   state-­‐church	  
conflict	  became	  much	  fiercer	  then	  in	  most	  other	  European	  countries	  and	  posed	  a	  heavier	  burden	  on	  
the	  development	  of	   the	  new	  state	   than	   in	  most	  other	  countries.	  Understanding	   these	   three	  blocks	  
which	   formed	   during	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   is	   not	   only	   key	   for	   understanding	   the	  
development	  of	  Italian	  social	  security	  but	  it	  is	  also	  the	  fundamental	  starting	  point	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  
understand	  the	  functioning	  of	  Italy	  throughout	  the	  20th	  century.	  Much	  of	  the	  pathologies	  of	  today’s	  
Italy	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  this	  period.2	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Gramsci,	  A.	  (1971)	  Cited	  in:	  Hoare,	  Q.	  &	  Smith,	  G.	  N.	  (eds.)	  Selections	  of	  the	  Prison	  Notebooks	  of	  
Antonio	  Gramsci,	  London,	  Lawrence	  &	  Wishart,	  p.	  90,	  cited	  IN:	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  Modern	  Italy	  in	  
Historical	  Perspective,	  London,	  Bloomsbury	  Academic,	  p.	  1.	  2	  So,	  for	  example,	  Berlusconi’s	  style	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2011	  is	  similar	  to	  Depreti’s	  and	  Crispis’s	  governance	  style	  of	  Transformism	  (transformismo)	  in	  the	  19th	  century. 
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6.1 Structure	  I	  -­‐	  Politics	  
6.1.1 Unification	  (Risorgimento)	  
As	  the	  process	  developed,	  it	  looked	  increasingly	  like	  a	  political	  struggle	  between	  Piedmont-­‐Sardinia	  and	  the	  
papacy,	  between	  Prime	  Minister	  Cavour	  and	  Pope	  Pius	  IX.3	  
	  
John	  Pollard	  on	  the	  Unification	  of	  Italy	  
	  
	  
After	   the	   decline	   of	   the	   Renaissance	   (14th-­‐17th	   century),	   Italian	   history	  was	  mainly	   one	   of	  
foreign	   powers	   dominating	   and	   struggling	   on	   and	  over	   the	   peninsula.	   Like	  Germany,	   Italy	  
was	  a	  patchwork,	  a	  territorial	  entity	  made	  up	  of	  many	  different	  heterogeneous	  states,	  city	  
states	  and	  influence	  spheres	  of	  foreign	  countries.	  Only	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Bourbon	  Kingdom	  
of	   the	   two	   Sicilies	   in	   the	   South	  was	   there	   a	   comprehensive	  political	   entity,	   but	   the	   South	  
was	   regarded	   by	   the	  Northern	   elites	   “as	   different	   order	   of	   civilization,	  more	  African	   than	  
European”.4	   Neither	   an	   Italian	   nation	   nor	   an	   Italian	   state	   existed.	   In	   particular,	   the	   three	  
major	  Catholic	  powers	  of	  France,	  Austria	  and	  Spain	  were	  battling	  each	  other	  on	  what	  would	  
become	  the	  Italian	  territory.	  This	  was	  an	  advantage	  for	  the	  Church	  as	  the	  papacy,	  located	  in	  
the	   middle	   of	   the	   boot,	   could	   always	   easily	   find	   one	   party	   that	   guaranteed	   military	  
protection.	   Davis	   notes	   that	   “Thanks	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   powerful	   foreign	   patrons	   the	  
popes	  could	  afford	  to	  have	  the	  best	  dressed	  army	  in	  Italy	  since	  it	  served	  mainly	  for	  show.”5	  
Therefore,	   even	   if	  most	   of	   the	   peninsula	  was	   exposed	   to	   perpetual	   political	   conflicts	   and	  
territorial	  shifts	  between	  rivaling	  local,	  regional	  and	  foreign	  power	  centers	  since	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  Renaissance,	  there	  seemed	  to	  be	  one	  eternal	  constant	  on	  the	  peninsula	  in	  the	  political,	  
temporal	  and	  spiritual	  power	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  hierarchy.	  In	  fact	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  17th	  
century	   large	  parts	  of	   Italy	  were	  ruled	  by	  a	  theocracy	  whose	  territory	  covered	  most	  of	  the	  
middle	  part	  of	  the	  peninsula.	  To	  sum	  up,	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  Italy	  was	  far	  
from	  being	  a	  nation	  or	  a	  state	  and	  politics	   in	   Italy	  can	  be	  summarized	  under	  three	  points:	  
political	   fragmentation	   in	   the	   North,	   a	   Catholic	   theocracy	   in	   the	   middle	   and	   an	   extreme	  
mental	  and	  physical	  disconnection	  of	  the	  North	  from	  the	  South.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Pollard,	  J.	  (2008)	  Catholicism	  in	  Modern	  Italy.	  Religion,	  Society	  and	  Politics	  since	  1861,	  London,	  Rutledge,	  p.	  23.	  4	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2007)	  The	  Force	  of	  Destiny:	  A	  History	  of	  Italy	  since	  1796,	  London,	  Penguin,	  p.	  195.	  	  5	  Davis,	  J.	  A.	  (2000)	  p.	  2.	  
	   	   	   167	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐1	  Map	  of	  Italy	  from	  Renaissance	  to	  French	  Revolution	  
	  
Map	  from	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2007)	  p.xxiv.	  
	  
Only	   Napoleon	   was	   able	   to	   break	   this	   pattern	   for	   a	   short	   period	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   18th	  
century	  but	  had	  to	  retreat	  after	  the	  old	  order	  had	  been	  restored	  by	  the	  Congress	  of	  Vienna	  
	   	   	   168	  
(1814-­‐1815).	  The	  temporal	  power	  of	   the	  papacy	  was	  reinstalled	  with	  Austria	  guaranteeing	  
its	  security.	  
	   In	   the	   mid-­‐19th	   century,	   like	   in	   most	   countries	   in	   Continental	   Europe,	   a	   number	   of	  
liberal-­‐democratic	   revolutions	  occurred	   in	   1848-­‐1849	   in	   different	   Italian	   states.	   The	   result	  
was	   a	   series	   of	   short	   lived	   republics	   and	   constitutional	   monarchies	   that	   sprawled	  
throughout	   Italy.	   Most	   prominent	   was	   Mazzini’s	   attempt	   who	   managed	   to	   temporarily	  
remove	  the	  pope	  from	  Rome.	  Nevertheless,	  reactionary	  backlashes	  soon	  reestablished	  the	  
old	  order,	  like	  elsewhere	  in	  Europe.	  However,	  the	  failed	  revolutions	  had	  two	  consequences	  
that	  would	  haunt	  Italy	  for	  a	  long	  time	  to	  come:	  first,	  the	  temporal	  powers	  of	  the	  Pope	  were	  
reinstalled	  and	  he	  could	  keep	  most	  of	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  papal	  state.	  Second,	  the	  Kingdom	  
of	   Piedmont-­‐Sardinia,	   in	   the	   north-­‐west	   of	   the	   country,	   saw	   its	   position	   strengthened	  
through	  revolution	  and	  counterrevolution.	  Piedmont-­‐Sardinia	  was	  the	  only	  Italian	  state	  that	  
did	   not	   abolish	   its	   constitution,	   the	   Statuto	   Albertino,	   after	   1848.6	   Even	   though	   this	  
constitution	   was	   far	   from	   liberal,	   it	   made	   Piedmont	   a	   constitutional	   monarchy	   with	   an	  
elected	   parliament	   and	   constitutionally	   guaranteed	   civil	   rights.7	   The	   symbolic	   political	  
modernization	   that	   the	   constitution	   ascribed	   effectively	   laid	   the	   foundations	   for	   the	  
leadership	  role	  that	  Piedmont	  would	  later	  take	  in	  the	  unification	  process.	  Under	  the	  Statuto	  
Albertino,	   and	   the	   skillful	   prime	   minister	   Count	   Cavour,8	   Piedmont	   started	   a	   process	   of	  
agricultural,	   industrial,	   infrastructural,	   educational	   and	   administrative	   modernization	   that	  
put	   it	  on	  a	  path	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  ascendance	  among	   the	   Italian	   states.	  Piedmont	  
became	  in	  Italy	  a	  synonym	  for	  progress	  and	  liberalism.	  
	   Cavour	  knew	  that	  in	  order	  to	  cultivate	  the	  liberal	  image	  further,	  he	  had	  to	  cut	  back	  the	  
power	  of	  the	  Church.	  In	  the	  1850s	  he	  launched	  a	  small	  culture	  war.	  Like	  Bismarck,	  the	  prime	  
minister	   wanted	   to	   introduce	   civil-­‐marriage,	   reduce	   the	   Church’s	   legal	   authority	   and	   ban	  
religious	   orders.9	   Catholics	   mobilized	   and	   got	   60	   of	   their	   deputies	   elected	   in	   the	   1857	  
elections	  to	  the	  Piedmont	  parliament.	   In	  order	  to	  block	  legislation,	  the	  liberals	  and	  Cavour	  
accused	   the	   Church	   of	   illicit	   indoctrination	   of	   voters,	   and	   cancelled	  many	   of	   the	   Catholic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Lönne,	  K.	  E.	  (1986)	  p.145.	  7	  Mack-­‐Smith,	  D.	  (1989)	  Italy	  and	  its	  Monarchy,	  New	  Haven,	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  8	  “Cavour,	  the	  first	  Italian	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  one	  of	  the	  first	  European	  politicians	  of	  the	  century,	  combined	  liberal	  beliefs	  with	  a	  talent	  for	  diplomacy	  and	  politics	  that	  equalled	  Bismarck’s”,	  Mack-­‐Smith,	  D.	  (1994)	  Mazzini,	  New	  Haven,	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  p.	  1.	  9	  Lönne,	  K.	  E.	  (1986)	  p.	  146.	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mandates.10	  Nevertheless,	   the	  Catholics	  managed	  to	  water	  down	  most	  of	  Cavour’s	  culture	  
war	   legislation.	   Cavour’s	   failed	   Culture	  War	   in	   Piedmont	   showed	   him	   the	   limits	   of	   liberal	  
policies	  in	  a	  predominantly	  Catholic	  country.	  The	  failed	  Culture	  War	  also	  provides	  a	  glimpse	  
of	   something	   would	   haunt	   post-­‐unification	   Italy	   for	   a	   long	   time	   to	   come,	   namely	   the	  
constant	   conflict	   and	   partial	   stalemate	   between	   Church	   and	   liberal	   nation-­‐building	   elites	  
during	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  	  	  	  
6.1.2 The	  house	  of	  Savoy	  and	  Unification	  
The	  revolutions	  of	  1848	  had	  been	  conducted	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  the	  Risorgimento	  (literally	  
resurrection).	   The	   Risorgimento	   was	   an	   idealist-­‐driven	   liberal	   movement	   that	   aimed	   to	  
enable	  Italy	  to	  regain	  the	  mystical	  glory	  of	  ancient	  Rome	  and	  the	  Renaissance	  after	  all	  the	  
years	   of	   turmoil,	   backwardness	   and	   foreign	   domination.	   It	   was	   a	  moment	   that	   aimed	   to	  
“eradicate	   the	   vices	   that	   centuries	   of	   despotism	   and	   clerical	   rule	   had	   allegedly	  
engendered”.11	   There	   were	   two	   major	   strands	   of	   how	   to	   go	   about	   this	   within	   the	  
Risorgimento	   movement.	   The	   Mazzinian	   republican	   branch	   emphasized	   a	   strategy	   from	  
below,	  which	   sought	   the	   toppling	  of	   the	  old	  order	   through	   constant	  popular	   insurrection,	  
the	   education	   of	   the	  masses	   and	   a	   replacement	   of	   the	   overarching	   power	   of	   Catholicism	  
through	  a	  religiously	  spiritualized	  notion	  of	  the	  nation.	  12	  	  This	  was	  the	  vision	  and	  strategy	  of	  
the	  Mazzinian	   revolutionaries	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	   historic	   left	   (sinistra	   storica).	   The	   second	  
current	  was	  embodied	  by	  Cavour	  and	  the	  historic	  right	  (destra	  storica).	   It	   favored	  a	   liberal	  
national	  revolution	  from	  above	  through	  high	  politics,	  clever	  diplomacy	  and	  war,	  steered	  by	  
Piedmont	  and	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  its	  Kings	  (House	  of	  Savoy).	  
	   The	  reactionary	  backlash	  that	  quelled	  the	  revolutions	  of	  1848	  were	  a	  decisive	  blow	  for	  
the	   historic	   left	   and	   further	   contributed	   to	   its	   fragmentation	   into	   different	   political	  wings	  
and	   sub	  movements	   such	   as	   Socialism,	   Anarchism	   and	   federalism.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   the	  
destra	  storica,	  which	  had	  found	  a	  home	  in	  Piedmontese	  Liberalism,	  could	  capitalize	  on	  the	  
strong	   expansionist	   ambitions	   of	   the	   Piedmontese	   Kings.	   Even	   if	   neither	   of	   Piedmont’s	  
dynastic	  rulers	  from	  the	  House	  of	  Savoy,	  Carlo	  Alberto,	  and	  later	  Vittorio	  Emmanuele,	  were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  This	  experience	  would	  be	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  later	  boycott	  strategy	  of	  the	  Vatican	  which	  entailed	  ordering	  all	  Catholics	  not	  to	  vote	  at	  all	  in	  the	  new	  Italian	  nation	  state.	  11	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2007)	  p.	  xvii.	  12	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2007)	  p.	  xviii.	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liberals,	  they	  knew	  that	  they	  had	  to	  form	  a	  pact	  with	  liberal	  forces	  if	  they	  wanted	  to	  become	  
kings	  of	  Italy.	  The	  monarchy’s	  traditional	  allies	  in	  parliament	  were	  the	  Conservative	  Catholic	  
deputies,	  though	  these	  were	  reluctant	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  conflict	  with	  the	  papacy.	  As	  the	  papal	  
territories	  split	  the	  peninsula	  in	  half,	  however,	  it	  became	  inevitable	  that	  the	  papal	  territories	  
be	  circumscribed	  in	  order	  to	  unify	  Italy.13	  The	  political	  and	  economic	  progressiveness14	  and	  
the	   expansionist	   zeal	   of	   its	   dynasty	   made	   Turin	   a	   hotbed	   for	   Liberals	   from	   all	   over	   the	  
country.	   The	   openness	   of	   the	   dynasty	   to	   the	   new	  worldview	  of	   Liberalism	  paid	   off:	   Davis	  
remarks	  that	  it	  "transformed	  the	  house	  of	  Savoy	  into	  a	  national	  monarchy	  even	  before	  the	  
war	  of	  1859."15	  	  
	   In	  fact,	  Piedmont	  was	  pushing	  for	  expansion	  whenever	  possible	  and	  it	  was	  convenient	  
that	  France	  and	  Napoleon	  III	  were	  actively	  seeking	  to	  further	  diminish	  Austria’s	  influence	  on	  
the	  Peninsula.	  Piedmont	   formed	  a	   secret	  alliance	  with	  France	  and	   together	   they	  defeated	  
Austria	  in	  1859.16	  The	  deal	  foresaw	  that,	  in	  case	  of	  victory,	  the	  Italian	  territories	  of	  Nice	  and	  
Savoy	   went	   to	   France	   while	   Italy	   would	   take	   Lombardy	   from	   Austria	   in	   exchange.	   The	  
strengthened	   Piedmont	   continued	   with	   its	   expansion	   plans	   and	   a	   year	   later	   Tuscany,	  
Romagna	   and	   Parma	   were	   annexed.	   In	   September	   1860,	   the	   Papal	   States	   were	   invaded	  
resulting	   in	   the	   addition	   of	   the	   Marches	   and	   Umbria	   to	   Piedmont’s	   territory	   on	   the	   4th	  
November	  1860.	  By	  now,	  Piedmont's	  territory	  encompassed	  almost	  the	  entire	  upper	  half	  of	  
the	  peninsula	  including	  Lombardy	  and	  the	  central	  Italian	  duchies,	  Tuscany	  and	  the	  northern	  
parts	   of	   the	   Papal	   state.	   However,	   Italian	   unification	   was	   still	   far	   from	   being	   completed.	  
Venice	   and	   the	   Veneto	   were	   still	   under	   Austrian	   control	   while	   Rome	   and	   some	   of	   the	  
surrounding	   territories	   were	   under	   the	   temporal	   power	   of	   the	   Pope.	   In	   the	   South	   the	  
Kingdom	  of	  the	  two	  Sicilies	  was	  still	  in	  place	  under	  Bourbon	  rule.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  An	  additional	  factor	  that	  helped	  Piedmont	  to	  take	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  Italian	  unification	  was	  its	  special	  geo-­‐strategic	  position	  in	  the	  ‘European	  Concert’.	  It	  was	  a	  buffer	  state	  between	  the	  two	  major	  rivaling	  powers	  France	  and	  Austria.	  Piedmont	  could	  therefore,	  more	  than	  any	  other	  Italian	  state,	  risk	  war	  without	  fearing	  to	  loose	  territory	  in	  defeat.	  In	  fact,	  Piedmont	  could	  always	  play	  the	  two	  other	  major	  countries	  off	  against	  one	  another.	  It	  could	  count	  on	  being	  restored	  in	  its	  old	  boundaries	  by	  either	  France	  or	  Austria	  after	  any	  lost	  war.	  14	  Such	  as,	  for	  example,	  the	  railroad	  and	  industrialization	  program	  of	  Cavour.	  15	  Davis,	  J.	  (2000)	  p.	  13.	  16	  Piedmont	  had	  already	  before	  lost	  two	  successive	  wars	  against	  Austria.	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Figure	  6-­‐2	  Map	  of	  the	  Unification	  of	  Italy	  1815-­‐1870	  
	  
	  
Map	  from	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2007)	  p.	  xxvi.	  
	  
	   Nevertheless,	  things	  started	  to	  accelerate.	  Garibaldi	  had	  already	  some	  months	  earlier,	  
on	  the	  5th	  of	  May,	  started	  his	  epic	  Spedizione	  dei	  Mille	   (Expedition	  of	   the	  Thousand)	  that	  
aimed	  at	   steering	   the	  Mazzinian	   revolt	   in	   the	  Kingdom	  of	   the	   two	  Sicilies.	  When	  Garibaldi	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had	  conquered	  the	  Bourbon’s	  territory	  and	  was	  preparing	  his	  final	  march	  on	  Rome,	  Cavour	  
decided	   that	   –	   with	   France	   still	   in	   play	   as	   the	   protector	   of	   the	   papacy	   –	   the	   “Roman	  
Question”17	   was	   still	   too	   delicate	   to	   be	   tackled.	   In	   a	   move	   that	   risked	   civil	   war,	   Cavour	  
decided	  to	  send	  Piedmont's	  Army	  through	  the	  papal	   territories	   in	  order	   to	  block	  Garibaldi	  
from	   taking	   Rome.	   Garibaldi	   surrendered	   his	   command	   loyally	   to	   the	   King,	   thereby	  
quenching	   the	   last	   hopes	   of	   the	   Italian	   Left	   for	   a	   Mazzinian	   unification.	   It	   was	   not	   the	  
revolutionary	   liberals	   from	   the	   Left	   around	   Garibaldi	   that	   had	   unified	   Italy,	   but	   the	  
Conservative	  Liberals	  around	  Cavour.	   	  Subsequently	  Vittorio	  Emmanuele	  II	  was	  proclaimed	  
King	   of	   Italy	   on	   the	   17th	   March	   1861	   with	   Turin	   as	   capital.	   The	   Statuto	   Albertino,	   the	  
Piedtmontese	   constitution,	   became	   the	   new	   Italian	   constitution.	   Italy	   became	   a	  
constitutional	  monarchy	  with	  two	  parliamentary	  chambers	  and	  guaranteed	  civil	  rights.	  The	  
King	   was	   the	   head	   of	   state	   and	   had	   free	   reign	   to	   dismiss	   the	   executive	   and	   the	  
parliamentary	   chambers,	   of	   which	   only	   one	   was	   elected	   in	   any	   case.	   However,	   as	   in	   the	  
German	   empire,	   he	   needed	   parliament’s	   cooperation	   to	   pass	   legislation.	   The	   Italian	  
territories	  now	  encompassed	  most	  of	  the	  mainland	  and	  the	  islands.	  Missing	  were	  only	  the	  
surrounded	  remains	  of	  the	  papal	  state	  with	  Rome	  at	  the	  center	  and	  the	  Venetian	  territories	  
which	  were	  still	  under	  Austrian	  control.	  
	   Cavour’s	  blocking	  of	  Garibaldi	  at	  the	  gates	  of	  Rome	  cemented	  the	  predominance	  of	  the	  
Northern	  Piedmont	  system	  over	  the	  southern	  part	  of	  the	  peninsula.	  Similarly,	  the	  victory	  of	  
the	   aristocratic	   large	   estate-­‐holding	   Cavour	   over	   Garibaldi,	   the	   popular	   Mazzinian	  
revolutionary	   democrat,	   also	   symbolized	   the	   prevalence	   of	   a	   heavily	   restricted	  
constitutionally	   based	   elite	   politics	   from	   above	   instead	   of	   mass	   based	   democracy	   from	  
below.18	  Gramsci	  was	  not	  surprised	  by	  this	  failed	  “Jacobin”	  revolution	  but	  was	  puzzled	  why	  
“passive	  revolution”19	  also	  seemed	  to	  have	  failed	  in	  Italy.	  Even	  though	  Gramsci’s	  main	  line	  
of	  argumentation	  is	  that	  the	  Italian	  bourgeoisie	  had	  been	  too	  weak	  (due	  to	  too	  low	  a	  level	  
of	   industrialization)	   for	   a	   successful	   “passive	   revolution”	   and	   therefore	   did	   not	   create	   an	  
“extensive	  and	  energetic	  ruling	  class”20	  as	  was	  the	  case	  (at	  least	  as	  Gramsci	  interpreted	  it)	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  The	  Roman	  Question	  refers	  to	  the	  status	  of	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  Papal	  state	  within	  the	  Italian	  state.	  	  18	  Mack-­‐Smith,	  D.	  (1989)	  p.	  3,	  p.	  5.	  19	  Gramsci,	  cited	  IN:	  Carter	  (2010)	  p.	  10.	  Historians	  writing	  in	  the	  Gramscian	  tradition	  have	  made	  similar	  arguments	  in	  many	  variations.	  See	  for	  example:	  Sereni,	  E.	  (1968	  [1948])	  Il	  capitalismo	  
nelle	  campagne	  (1860-­‐1900),	  Torino,	  Piccola	  Biblioteca	  Einaudi.	  20	  Gramsci,	  cited	  IN:	  Carter	  (2010)	  p.	  10.	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Germany,	   he	   also	   points	   out	   that	   the	   destra	   storica	   “did	   not	   succeed;	   at	   integrating	   the	  
people	  into	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  new	  state”.21	   Indeed,	  as	  D’Azeglio	  famously	  put	   it:	  “Italy	  
had	  been	  made,	  but	  the	  task	  of	  making	  Italians	  had	  still	  to	  be	  accomplished.”22	  I	  would	  take	  
this	  even	  further	  and	  argue	  that	   in	  Italy	  the	  primary	  problem	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  
that	   the	   people	   were	   not	   integrated	   into	   the	   state.	   Rather,	   the	   new	   ruling	   elites	   of	   the	  
destra	   storica	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   care	   about	   integrating	   the	   people	   under	   their	   liberal	  
Conservative	  worldview	  or	  thereby	  dragging	  them	  away	  from	  the	  paramount	  influence	  and	  
hegemony	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church.23	  This	  was	  problematic	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  Mazzini	  had	  been	  
well	  aware	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Church	  and	  had	  admitted	  in	  1848,	  when	  observing	  a	  mass	  in	  
front	   of	   St	   Peter’s,	   that	   “This	   religion	   is	   strong,	   and	  will	   remain	   strong	   for	   a	   long	   time	   to	  
come,	   because	   it	   is	   so	   beautiful	   to	   the	   eye.”24	   Therefore,	  Mazzini’s	   revolutionary	   concept	  
foresaw	  also	  a	  gradual	  replacement	  of	  Catholicism	  with	  a	  religiously	  spiritualized	  idea	  of	  the	  
nation.	  Mazzini’s	  aim	  was	  to	  build	  a	  national	  liberal	  subculture	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  such	  a	  
spiritualized	  national	  worldview.	  One	  step	  was	  certainly	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  Action	  Party	  
(Partito	  d’Azione,	  1853-­‐1867).	  The	  destra	  storica	  and	  the	  Savoyans	  had	  no	  such	  concept	  for	  
a	   formation	   of	   the	   nation	   from	   below.	   Cavour	   had	   ideas	   about	   a	   great	   society	   project,	  
inspired	   from	  his	   journeys	   to	   Britain,	   but	   had	   already	   died	   by	   1861.25	   The	   Savoyans	  were	  
largely	  indifferent	  to	  any	  such	  project	  while	  the	  destra	  storica	  did	  not	  grasp	  the	  necessity	  of	  
what	   Bismarck	   had	   called	   in	   Germany	   the	   “internal	   furbishing	   of	   the	   Reich”	   (innere	  
Reichsgruendung).	  Therefore,	  the	  destra	  storica	  engaged	  in	  little	  more	  than	  mere	  symbolical	  
modernization-­‐oriented	   state-­‐	   and	   nation-­‐building.	   It	   neither	   fostered	   the	   building	   of	   a	  
liberal	   subculture	   nor	   of	   a	   liberal	   party.	   Furthermore,	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Vatican	   was	  
significantly	   weakened	   but	   not	   entirely	   broken.	   	   The	   Pope	   lost	   his	   territory	   but	   not	   his	  
spiritual	   power.	   During	   the	   coming	   decade,	   the	   Vatican	   would	   embark	   on	   a	   series	   of	  
doctrinal	  reforms	   in	  order	  to	  compensate	  for	   its	   loss	  of	  temporal	   territory	  and	  power	  that	  
would	  restore	  the	  Pope	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  figures	  on	  the	  Italian	  political	  scene.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Gramsci,	  cited	  IN:	  Carter	  (2010)	  p.	  10.	  22	  D’Azeglio	  quoted	  IN:	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2007)	  p.	  xviii.	  23	  I	  build	  this	  argument	  also	  in	  large	  parts	  on	  the	  wonderful	  works	  of	  scholars	  such	  as	  Mack	  Smith	  and	  Romanelli	  who	  founded	  the	  “revisionist”	  tradition	  of	  Italian	  historiography	  that	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  the	  degeneration	  of	  Italian	  liberalism	  itself	  that	  led	  to	  the	  degeneration	  of	  the	  Italian	  polity	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century. Mack	  Smith,	  D.	  (1969)	  Italy:	  A	  Modern	  History,	  Ann	  Arbor,	  Michigan	  University	  Press;	  Romanelli,	  R.	  (1988)	  Il	  commando	  impossibile:	  Stato	  e	  società	  nel	  
Italia	  liberale,	  Bologna,	  Il	  Mulino.	  24	  Mazzini,	  cited	  IN:	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2007)	  p.132.	  	  25	  Mack-­‐Smith,	  D.	  (1989)	  p.	  6	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Italian	  unification	  had	  therefore	  produced	  and	  altered	  the	  political	  power	  balance	  between	  
the	   different	   prominent	   worldviews	   on	   the	   peninsula	   (liberalism	   on	   left	   and	   right,	  
Catholicism)	  but	  none	  of	  them,	  not	  even	  the	  Catholic	  one	  had	  produced	  subcultures	  like	  the	  
dense	  webs	  of	   societal	  organization	   that	  had	   sprawled	  and	   segmented	   society	   in	   imperial	  
Germany.	   Subsequently,	   post-­‐unification	   19th	   century	   Italy	   would	   also	   not	   see	   the	  
emergence	  of	  modern	  mass	  parties.	  
	  
6.1.3 The	  conquest	  of	  Rome	  
Bismarck's	  wars	  against	  Austria	  and	  France	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  German	  unification	  crippled	  the	  
two	  major	  Catholic	  continental	  powers.	  In	  1866,	  the	  Venetian	  territories	  went	  to	  Italy	  after	  
Prussia	   defeated	   Austria	   and	   the	   third	   war	   of	   Italian	   independence	   ended	   with	   a	   partial	  
victory	  for	  Piedmont.	  Four	  years	  later	  the	  Prussian	  victory	  in	  Sedan	  weakened	  the	  French	  to	  
an	   extent	   that	   they	   could	   no	   longer	   guarantee	   the	   security	   of	   the	   papacy	   in	   Rome.	   As	   a	  
consequence,	   Italian	   troops	   broke	   through	   the	   walls	   of	   the	   eternal	   city	   on	   the	   20th	  
September	  of	  1870	  and	  ended	  a	  Millennium	  of	  temporal	  papal	  power.	  Italian	  unification	  had	  
finally	   been	   achieved	   geographically,	   some	   ten	   years	   after	   the	   Italian	   state	  had	   first	   been	  
proclaimed.	  
	   The	  taking	  of	  Rome	  and	  the	  final	  dismantling	  of	  the	  temporal	  power	  of	  the	  Pope	  made	  
Italy	   the	   embodiment	   of	   new	   secular	   values	   in	   Europe.	   Liberals	   all	   across	   Europe,	   and	  
especially	  Protestants,	  heralded	   the	  alleged	   secular	  progressiveness	  of	   the	  country.	   	  Davis	  
comments	   that	   “For	   that	   reason,	   many	   saw	   in	   Italy’s	   unification	   both	   the	   close	   of	   the	  
European	  ancient	  regime	  and	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Europe.”26	  
	   However,	  the	  outside	  world	  had	  not	  fully	  accounted	  for	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  traditional	  
sociopolitical	   institutions	   in	   Italy.	  The	  sacking	  of	  Rome	  and	   the	  confinement	  of	   the	  Pope’s	  
temporal	   powers	   (worldly	   powers	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   spiritual	   powers)	   to	   within	   the	   walls	   of	   the	  
Vatican	  had	  only	  patched	  over	  the	  old	  power	  constellations	   in	   Italy.	  Even	  after	  unification,	  
politics	   remained	  dominated	  by	   the	  North	  and	  the	  Piedmont	  oligarchy.	   It	  was	  a	   top	  down	  
elite	  business	  based	  on	  an	  extremely	  curtailed	  franchise,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  democrats	   like	  
Mazzini	   called	  unification	  a	   “conservative	  betrayal”.27	   The	  new	   liberal	   ruling	   class	  was	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Davis,	  J.	  A.	  (2000)	  p.	  2.	  27	  Davis,	  J.	  A.	  (2000)	  p.	  19;	  Duggan,	  S.	  (2007)	  p.	  xix.	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only	  too	  elitist	  but	  also	  far	  too	  afraid	  to	  extend	  suffrage	  further	  as	  it	  feared	  the	  grip	  of	  the	  
Church	   on	   the	   illiterate	   masses	   and	   the	   potential	   power	   of	   the	   new	   subcultures	   and	  
worldviews	   of	   anarchists	   and	   socialists.28	   Furthermore,	   the	   completion	   of	   unification	  
through	  the	  conquest	  of	  Rome	  had	  ultimately	  infuriated	  the	  Vatican.	  Pope	  Pius	  IX	  withdrew	  
into	   the	   Vatican	   City	   and	   highly	   symbolically	   declared	   himself	   a	   prisoner	   of	   the	   liberal	  
state.29	   Nevertheless,	   despite	   its	   temporal	   defeat	   the	   Vatican	  was	   far	   from	   giving	   up	   and	  
during	   the	   course	  of	   the	   decade	   it	   remodeled	   its	   strategy	   and	   shifted	   its	   power	   from	   the	  
temporal	   to	   the	   spiritual.	   In	   1866,	   Pius	   XI	   issued	   the	   anti-­‐liberal	   Syllabus	   of	   Errors	   and	  
proclaimed	   papal	   infallibility	   on	   the	   first	   Vatican	   Council	   in	   1870.30	   The	   two	   documents	  
greatly	  enhanced	  the	  Pope’s	  grip	  on	  the	  Church	  hierarchy	  and	  believers	  and,	  by	  highlighting	  
the	   distinctions	   between	   the	   liberal	   and	   the	   Catholic	  worldviews,	   they	   resulted	   in	   a	   clear	  
statement	   of	   their	   incompatibility.	   On	   the	   19th	   February	   1868,	   the	   apostolic	   penitentiary	  
issued	   the	  Non	   Expedite.31	  Under	   the	   formula	   “neither	   elector	   nor	   elected”	   it	   ordered	   all	  
Italian	  Catholics	  to	  abstain	  from	  either	  voting	  or	  running	  for	  any	  national	  public	  office.32	  
	   The	   Pope’s	   actions	   aimed	   directly	   at	   sabotaging	   the	   nation-­‐building	   project	   of	   the	  
destra	  storica.	  Cavour’s	  dream	  of	  a	  “free	  church	  in	  a	  free	  state”33	  remained	  a	  utopia.	  What	  
unfolded	   instead	  was	   an	   extremely	   long	   and	  deleterious	   state-­‐church	   conflict	   that	   should	  
last	  for	  over	  sixty	  years	  until	  it	  came	  to	  an	  end	  with	  the	  Lateran	  treaty	  in	  1929.34	  	  
	   Its	   consequences	   were	   devastating.	   The	   Bi-­‐Polar	   stalemate	   between	   the	   two	   major	  
political	  and	  social	  forces	  in	  Italy	  led	  to	  them	  retreating	  to	  their	  arch-­‐orthodox	  positions	  and	  
the	   programmatic	   non-­‐development	   of	   both	   camps.	   Given	   the	   peculiarity	   of	   both	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Davis,	  J.	  A.	  (2000)	  p.	  19.	  29	  He	  would	  not	  leave	  the	  Vatican	  city	  anymore	  till	  he	  died.	  30	  Through	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Syllabus	  of	  Errors,	  papal	  infallibility	  and	  the	  Non	  Expedite.	  31	  The	  apostolic	  penitentiary	  is	  the	  highest	  Catholic	  court	  of	  appeal.	  32	  Lönne,	  K.	  E.	  (1986)	  p.	  203.	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  Non	  Expedite	  was	  in	  general	  stronger	  in	  the	  north	  than	  in	  the	  South	  where	  clerical	  supervision	  was	  lower.	  Besides	  heavily	  de-­‐legitimizing	  the	  state,	  the	  immediate	  effects	  were	  a	  suppression	  of	  turnout	  and	  the	  non-­‐formation	  of	  a	  Catholic	  party	  as	  well	  as	  a	  great	  retardation	  in	  the	  diffusion	  of	  Catholic	  associations.	  	  	  33	  Lönne,	  K.	  E.	  (1986)	  p.146.	  34	  Though	  there	  were	  signs	  of	  a	  general	  relaxation	  between	  both	  sides	  during	  the	  Giolitti	  ear	  after	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century.	  The	  upcoming	  of	  Socialism	  and	  Anarchism	  as	  new	  political	  forces	  made	  like	  in	  Italy	  a	  collaboration	  between	  the	  old	  “isms”	  much	  more	  feasible.	  Non	  expedite	  was	  relaxed	  and	  the	  brief	  “spring”	  in	  the	  cold	  war	  between	  state	  and	  Vatican	  saw	  as	  a	  side	  effect	  the	  slow	  unfolding	  of	  the	  	  Christian	  Democratic	  movement	  around	  personalities	  such	  as	  Don	  Luigi	  Sturzo	  and	  Romolo	  Murri.	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worldviews,	  this	  resulted	  in	  what	  I	  call	  here	  a	  perverse	  fit	  or	  a	  “good	  trick”.35	  While	  Italian	  
Liberalism	   could	   fall	   back	   on	   its	   18th	   century	   programmatic	   positions	   of	   laissez	   faire,	   the	  
Catholic	   Church	  was	   happy	   to	  protect	   its	   own	  backyard	  by	   referring	   to	   the	  programmatic	  
idea	  of	   subsidiarity.	  Both	  solutions	  were	  acceptable	  within	  each	  worldview	  and	   they	  were	  
perversely	   compatible	  with	  one	  another.	  The	  programmatic	   ideational	   stalemate	  between	  
Church	   and	   destra	   storica	   Liberals	   led,	   in	   the	   last	   quarter	   of	   the	   19th	   century,	   to	   a	  
retardation	   of	   Italy’s	   development	   and	   veiled	   a	   limited	   stateness	   that	   haunts	   Italy	   to	   this	  
day.	  
	   The	  effects	  on	  the	  political	  level	  were	  that	  the	  extension	  of	  franchise	  and	  the	  opening	  
of	  the	  political	  institutions	  was	  postponed	  until	  well	  into	  the	  20th	  century	  (full	  male	  suffrage	  
1910	   –	   40	   years	   after	   Germany,	   female	   suffrage	   1945	   –	   17	   years	   after	   Germany).36	  
Meanwhile,	  on	  the	  economic	  level,	  Italy	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  advance	  without	  a	  state-­‐driven	  
and	  coordinated	  Import	  Substitution	  Strategy	  which	  postponed	  industrialization	  to	  the	  20th	  
century.	  Finally,	  on	  the	  social	  level,	  social	  right	  in	  terms	  of	  social	  security	  were	  not	  granted	  
up	  till	  to	  the	  1920s.	  
	   Despite	  the	  euphoria	  that	  emerged	  around	  unification,	  the	  Risorgimento	  had	  produced	  
several	   strong	   historical	   trajectories	   that	  would	   be	   hard	   to	   escape	   in	   the	   post-­‐unification	  
development.37	   In	   the	  next	   section	  we	  will	   take	  a	  closer	   look	  on	  how	  these	  pitfalls	  played	  
out	  in	  the	  further	  evolution	  of	  Italy.	  
	  
	  
6.1.4 Politics:	  Post-­‐Unification	  Liberal	  Italy	  
The	  period	  from	  unification	  up	  to	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  can	  roughly	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  
phases:	  the	  time	  of	  the	  historic	  right	  (destra	  storica,	  1849-­‐1876),	  the	  period	  of	  the	  historic	  
left	  (sinistra	  storica,	  1876-­‐1896)	  and	  then	  the	  era	  of	  Giolitti.	  
The	   destra	   storica	   was	   not	   a	   party	   in	   the	   modern	   sense	   but	   rather	   a	   loose	  
agglomeration	  of	  deputies.	  They	  were	  mainly	  aristocratic	   landowners,	   followers	  of	  Cavour	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Dennett’s	  point	  is	  that	  design	  might	  not	  necessarily	  need	  a	  designer.	  Instead,	  natural	  selection	  is	  a	  blind	  process	  which	  is	  sufficient	  enough	  to	  explain	  evolution.	  Dennett,	  D.	  C.	  (1995)	  Darwin’s	  
dangerous	  Idea:	  evolution	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  life,	  New	  York,	  Simon	  &	  Schuster.	  36	  Not	  to	  mention	  the	  female	  suffrage	  which	  was	  introduced	  in	  Germany	  in	  1918	  and	  in	  Italy	  only	  after	  worldwar	  two.	  37	  Romanelli,	  R.	  (1979)	  L’Italia	  Liberale,	  Bologna,	  Il	  Mulino,	  pp.	  87-­‐114.	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and	   supporters	  of	   the	  house	  of	   Savoy.	   	  As	   they	  had	  no	   common	  program	  beyond	   that	  of	  
unification,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   grasp	   their	   programmatic	   ideas.	   Their	   political	   worldview	   was	  
closely	   linked	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   night	   watch	   state.	   They	   advocated	   limited	   state	  
intervention,	  a	  reduced	  foreign	  policy	  profile	  and	  a	  quick	  consolidation	  of	  the	  debt	  inherited	  
from	   the	   pre-­‐unification	   states.	   Their	   idea	   of	   the	   state	  was	   one	   that	   guaranteed	   law	   and	  
order	   inside	  the	  territory	  and	  provided	  protection	  from	  outside	  threats.	  The	  destra	  storica	  
was	  suspicious	  of	  both	  “‘black’	  intrigues	  sponsored	  by	  the	  Vatican	  and	  republican	  agitation	  
encouraged	  by	  the	  heirs	  of	  Mazzini”.38	  It	  was,	  in	  a	  way,	  ideologically	  squeezed	  between	  the	  
republican	  left	  and	  the	  Church.	  Clark	  describes	  their	  deputies	  as	  “admirably	  competent	  and	  
disinterested”39	  which	  meant	  that	  they	  were	  usually	  disgusted	  by	  the	  rampant	  favoritism	  in	  
parliament	  but	  also	  not	  very	  active	  in	  fighting	  it.	  	  
Once	  the	  unification	  euphoria	  had	  dissipated,	  it	  became	  ever	  more	  obvious	  that	  the	  
new	  born	  state	  found	  itself	  confronted	  with	  enormous	  problems	  of	  societal	  dislocation	  and	  
economic	   backwardness	   in	   the	   South.	   The	   unwillingness	   of	   the	   northern	   liberal	   political	  
establishment	  to	  deal	  with	  this,	  along	  with	  the	  reluctance	  to	  deliver	  on	  key	  liberal	  issues	  of	  
democratization,	  led	  to	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  right	  parliamentary	  majority	  during	  the	  1880s.	  In	  
fact,	   no	   social	   reforms	   aimed	   at	   alleviating	   the	   situation	   in	   the	   South	  were	   enacted.	   The	  
credo	   of	   the	   destra	   storica	   had	   been	   a	   blind	   liberalism	   that	   proclaimed	   social	   problems	  
would	  vanish	  through	  progress	  –	  but	  progress	  simply	  did	  not	  come	  about,	  especially	  not	  in	  
rural	  southern	  Italy.40	  The	  right	  lost	  its	  majority	  as	  early	  as	  1874.	  By	  1878	  the	  Left	  was	  able	  
to	  install	  the	  former	  Mazzinian,	  Augustino	  Depretis,	  as	  prime	  minister	  with	  promises	  of	  far	  
reaching	   liberal	  and	  democratic	   reforms,	  especially	  an	  extension	  of	   the	   franchise	   that	  had	  
not	   been	   significantly	   extended	   since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   Risorgimento.	   Before	   the	   first	  
reform	  in	  1882,	  in	  order	  to	  vote	  one	  had	  to	  be	  male,	  over	  25,	  literate	  and	  paying	  at	  least	  40	  
lire	  in	  taxes	  annually.	  This	  meant	  that	  in	  1870	  only	  approximately	  500	  000	  men	  had	  the	  right	  
to	  vote	  out	  of	  a	  total	  population	  of	  25	  Million.	  
As	  the	  republican	  current	  in	  the	  liberal	  movement,	  the	  historic	  left	  were	  the	  heirs	  of	  
Garibaldi	   and	   Mazzini,	   while	   the	   right	   stood	   in	   the	   tradition	   of	   the	   liberal	   Conservative	  
Cavour.	   That	   said,	   the	  historic	   liberal	   left,	   like	   the	   right,	  was	   not	   a	  modern	  programmatic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  Modern	  Italy	  in	  Historical	  Perspective,	  London,	  Bloomsbury	  Academic,	  p.	  3.	  39	  Clark,	  M.	  (1984)	  p.	  62.	  40	  Romanelli,	  R.	  (1979)	  pp.	  183-­‐198.	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party	   but	   rather	   a	   loose	   coalition	   of	   deputies.41	   It	   could	   also	   not	   draw	   on	   any	   organized	  
subculture.	   Deputies	   from	   the	   sinistra	   storica	  were	   left	   liberals,	  middle	   class,	   and	   usually	  
lawyers.	  They	  were	  against	   the	  house	  of	   Savoy	  and	   indulged	   in	  a	   stronger	  anti	   clericalism	  
than	  the	  destra	  storica.	  A	  significant	  group	  of	   them	  represented	  the	  southern	   large	  estate	  
landholders.	   They	   saw	   the	   state	   as	   a	   cash	   cow,	   and	   wanted	   to	   extract	   public	   works	   and	  
public	   jobs	   from	   it.	   Salvemini	   might	   have	   been	   too	   drastic	   in	   describing	   them	   as	  
“‘unscrupulous	   manipulators	   and	   common	   fixers,	   with	   no	   personal	   conviction	   and	   no	  
dignity’”42	   but	   their	   behavior	   certainly	   went	   in	   that	   direction.	   The	   rent-­‐seeking	   and	  
patronage	  constituency	  that	  these	  deputies	  fostered	  had	  a	  deleterious	  long-­‐term	  effect	  on	  
the	  political	  culture	  of	  the	  South.	  
Despite	  having	  run	  on	  a	  Mazzinian	  platform	  that	  argued	  for	  suffrage	  extension,	  once	  
in	   office	   the	   new	   Prime	   Minister	   Depretis	   continued	   business	   as	   usual	   and	   enacted	   no	  
immediate	  democratic	  reforms.43	  The	  economic	  situation	  in	  the	  South	  further	  deteriorated	  
due	   to	   the	   impact	   of	   a	   crisis	   in	   the	   world	   grain	   markets	   in	   the	   1880s.44	   Riots	   and	   civil	  
disobedience	  spread	  across	  the	  South.	  The	  first	  strikes	  of	  land	  labor	  in	  the	  Po-­‐valley	  and	  the	  
assassination	   attempt	   by	   an	   anarchist	   cook	   on	   the	   King	   in	   November	   1878	   brought	   the	  
historic	   left	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   Italians	  were	  not	   yet	   ready	   for	   democracy.	   In	   fact,	   the	  
liberal	   political	   establishment	   became	   deeply	   afraid	   of	   a	   potential	   radicalization	   of	   the	  
electorate.	   	   Not	   only	   did	   they	   fear	   the	   extreme	   left	   but	   they	   also	   hypothesized	   that	   an	  
extension	   of	   suffrage	   would	   allow	   the	   Church	   to	   guide	   the	   votes	   of	   millions	   of	   illiterate	  
Italians	   against	   the	   liberal	   state.	   Carter	   remarks	   that	   the	   “perceived	   threat	   to	   the	   liberal	  
state	   posed	   by	   Socialism	   and	   Catholicism,	  meant	   that	   the	   politicization	   of	   the	   nation	   […]	  
could	  not	  be	  considered.”45	  	  
The	  new	  election	  law	  enacted	  by	  the	  historic	  left	  therefore	  still	  resulted	  in	  a	  heavily	  
curtailed	  franchise.	  Wealth	  was	  removed	  as	  primary	  source	  of	   the	  eligibility	   to	  vote	   in	  the	  
election	  law	  from	  1881	  but	  its	  replacement	  with	  literacy	  only	  led	  to	  suffrage	  extension	  from	  
620,000	   to	   two	   million	   voters	   out	   of	   a	   total	   of	   25	   Million	   inhabitants.	   Furthermore,	  
“organized	   political	   parties	   were	   regarded	   as	   politically	   threatening	   the	   liberal	   state”.46	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2000)	  p.	  161.	  42	  Cited	  from	  Clark,	  M.	  (1984)	  p.	  63.	  43	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.	  4.	  44	  Torp,	  C.	  (2010).	  45	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.	  20.	  46	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.20.	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Depretis	  developed	  a	  new	  tool	  of	  governance,	   the	  so-­‐called	  transformismo	  (transformism)	  
which	  would	  have	  a	  dire	  long-­‐lasting	  impression	  on	  the	  Italian	  polity.47	  Transformismo48	  is	  a	  
technique	   of	   governance	   that	   is	   based	   on	   alternating	   ad	   hoc	   parliamentary	   coalitions.49	  
Depretis	  and	  his	  successor	  as	  Prime	  Minister,	  Francesco	  Crispi,	  fully	  based	  their	  governance	  
on	   this	   technique.	   There	   were	   two	   main	   effects:	   on	   the	   one	   side	   the	   already	   murky	  
distinction	  between	   left	   and	   right	  parliamentarians	   further	  deteriorated,	  which	  effectively	  
put	  an	  end	  to	  competition	  on	  programmatic	  ideas	  that	  had	  existed	  between	  sinistra	  storica	  
and	   destra	   storica.	   Furthermore,	   transformism	   disabled	   one	   of	   the	   most	   fundamental	  
mechanisms	   of	   democracy,	   namely	   the	   possibility	   to	   vote	   a	   government	   out	   of	   office.	  
Transformismo	   was	   based	   on	   loose	   ad-­‐hoc	   majorities	   of	   single	   deputies,	   which	   made	   it	  
almost	  impossible	  to	  affect	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  the	  government	  through	  elections.	  	  
The	   election	   system	   worsened	   the	   effect	   of	   transformism.	   The	   single	   member	  
districts	   with	   a	   second	   round	   run-­‐off	   established	   a	   very	   tight	   connection	   between	   the	  
politician	  and	  his	  constituency.50	  Coupled	  with	  the	  heavy	  franchise	  restrictions	  the	  election	  
system	   guaranteed	   that	   the	   old	   liberal	   establishment	   would	   find	   its	   way	   into	   parliament	  
without	   being	   exposed	   to	   competition.	   In	   addition,	   the	   Pope’s	   Non	   Expedite	   from	   1868,	  
which	   forbid	   Catholics	   to	   vote	   or	   to	   run	   for	   public	   office	   in	   the	   Italian	   polity,51	   only	  
exacerbated	  the	  situation.	  These	  factors	  together	  meant	  that	  in	  1874	  a	  successful	  candidate	  
had	  on	  average	  only	  to	  secure	  426	  votes.	  In	  other	  words	  a	  politician	  in	  post-­‐unification	  Italy	  
only	  needed	  to	  patronize	  426	  people	   in	  his	  constituency	  to	  become	  perpetually	  reelected.	  
He	   had	   little	   worry	   for	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   strong	   population.	   Programmatic	   ideas	   were	   not	  
needed	   to	   rally	   this	   small	   amount	   of	   votes.	   Instead,	   the	   lack	   of	   cohesion	   of	   government	  
majorities	  meant	  that	  ministers	  could	  be	  easily	  put	  under	  pressure	  to	  transfer	  certain	  goods	  
to	  certain	  constituencies	  in	  order	  to	  stabilize	  government.	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  Crispi,	  the	  prime	  minister	  following	  Depretis	  in	  office,	  decried	  Crispi’s	  transformismo	  governance	  as	  “parliamentary	  incest”	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  to	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  it	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  Minister.	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	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  48	  Mack	  Smith,	  D.	  (1969)	  p.	  110.	  49	  Salvadori,	  M.L.	  (1994)	  Storia	  d’Italia	  e	  Crisi	  di	  Regime,	  Bologna,	  Il	  Mulino,	  pp.	  30-­‐32.	  	  50	  Steinmo	  describes	  a	  similar	  effect	  for	  the	  US	  system.	  Steinmo,	  S.	  (1993).	  51	  ‘Non	  Expedite’	  was	  the	  Pope’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  conquering	  of	  Rome	  by	  the	  Liberal	  Italian	  state.	  It	  implied	  that	  every	  Italian	  Catholic	  should	  abstain	  from	  any	  form	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  new	  state.	  Catholics	  should	  not	  vote	  nor	  should	  they	  run	  for	  office.	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  sabotage	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  new	  state.	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Clark	   describes	   19th	   century	   parliament	   in	   Italy	   as	   a	   place	   “where	   favors	   were	  
traded”.52	   Deputies	  would	   pressure	  ministers	   for	   favors	   for	   their	   constituency	   in	   order	   to	  
secure	  re-­‐election.53	  The	  Prime	  Minister’s	  job,	  meanwhile,	  was	  one	  “of	  creating	  and	  holding	  
together	  a	  shifting	  coalition	  of	  support	  by	  persuasion	  and	  patronage.”54	  The	  pre-­‐republican	  
roots	   of	   patronage	   and	   clientelist	   vote	   connections	   in	   Western	   European	   highly	  
industrialized	  countries,	  that	  scholars	  like	  Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson55	  are	  puzzled	  about,	  were	  
established	  in	  this	  period.	  
The	  immediate	  results	  of	  transformismo	  governance	  were	  very	  short-­‐lived	  cabinets	  
that	  usually	  consisted	  of	  the	  same	  people56	  who	  rotated	  between	  ministerial	  portfolios.	  Like	  
after	  World	  War	  Two,	  Liberal	   Italy	  displayed	  extraordinarily	  high	  frequency	  of	  government	  
turnover.57	  The	  first	  32	  years	  following	  unification	  saw	  28	  different	  governments	  come	  and	  
go.	   If	   the	   government	   went	   into	   crisis,	   as	   it	   frequently	   did,	   the	   King	   consulted	   with	   the	  
leaders	  of	  the	  strongest	  groups	  in	  parliament	  and	  appointed	  a	  new	  Prime	  Minister.	  Only	   if	  
the	   parliament	   became	   totally	   unmanageable,	   did	   the	   King	   dissolve	   it	   and	   call	   for	   new	  
elections.	   These	   ever	   shifting	   ad	   hoc	   coalitions	   made	   stable	   and	   farsighted	   governance	  
impossible.	   Instead,	   “parliament	   came,	   in	   the	   1880s	  more	   and	  more	   to	   resemble	   a	   cattle	  
market”58	   as	  Duggan	  notes	  before	   citing	  a	  parliamentarian	   that	  describes	   the	  Chamber	  of	  
deputies	  in	  1880:	  	  
	  
You	   should	   see	   the	   pandemonium	   in	  Montecitorio	   [the	   seat	   of	   the	   Chamber	   of	   Deputies]	  when	   the	  moment	  
approaches	   for	   a	   solemn	   vote.	   The	   government’s	   agents	   run	   through	   the	   rooms	   and	   corridors	   trying	   to	   win	  
support.	  Subsidies,	  decorations,	  canals,	  bridges,	  roads	  –	  everything	  is	  promised;	  and	  sometimes	  an	  act	  of	  justice,	  
long	  denied,	  is	  the	  price	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  vote.59	  
	  
Needless	   to	   say,	   single	   canals	   or	   decorations	   could	   not	   replace	   a	   cohesive	   program	   that	  
would	  have	  tackled	  the	  heavy	  socioeconomic	  problems	  in	  the	  South.	  Some	  historians	  argue	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Clark,	  M.	  (1984)	  p.	  61.	  53	  For	  an	  excellent	  description	  of	  the	  clientelist	  practices	  and	  election	  rigging	  in	  the	  Italian	  Parliament	  during	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  see	  Mac	  Smith,	  D.	  (1969)	  pp.	  220-­‐221.	  54	  Clark,	  M.	  (1984)	  p.	  61.	  55	  Kitschelt,	  H.	  &	  Wilkinson,	  S.	  (2007).	  56	  Usually	  no	  more	  than	  one	  or	  two	  ministers	  were	  substituted	  when	  a	  government	  fell	  and	  a	  new	  one	  formed.	  57	  The	  First	  Republic	  is	  usually	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  after-­‐war	  period	  from	  1945	  up	  to	  the	  early	  1990s,	  an	  era	  characterized	  by	  virulent	  government	  instability.	  58	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2000)	  p.	  164.	  59	  F.	  Crispi,	  Discorsi	  elettorali	  1865-­‐1886	  (Rome,	  1887),	  p.	  230.	  Cited	  IN:	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2000)	  p.	  165.	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that	   transformismo	   was	   “not	   necessarily	   deleterious”60	   while	   some	   proponents	   of	   Italian	  
historism,	  such	  as	  Benedetto	  Croce61	  and	  Federico	  Chabod,62	  even	  interpreted	  transformism	  
and	   the	   restriction	   of	   the	   franchise	   as	   the	  masterly	   rescue	   of	   the	   Italian	   nation	   state	   by	  
liberlaism	  from	  the	  destructive	  forces	  of	  the	  Church,	  Radicals	  and	  Socialists.63	  	  I	  rather	  side	  
with	   the	   interpretation	  of	   Italian	  citizens	  who	   labeled	   their	  parliament	   in	  1880	  “a	   term	  of	  
abuse,	   a	   synonym	   for	   opportunism	   and	   corruption.”64	   The	   very	   special	   vote	   connection	  
between	  the	  politician	  and	  his	  constituency	  enabled	  the	  facile	  sliding	  from	  the	  provision	  of	  
club	  goods,	  to	  a	  spoils	  system	  and	  in	  the	  end	  to	  blatent	  corruption.	  The	  decision	  to	  fortify	  
the	  political	  system	  against	  any	  influence	  from	  below	  constituted	  the	  final	  selling	  out	  of	  the	  
independent	  liberal	  (democratic)	  worldview.	  The	  consequences	  were	  huge.	  Neither	  Liberals	  
nor	  Catholics	  built	  up	  parties	  or	  modern	  mass	  political	  organizations.	  In	  the	  dawning	  age	  of	  
mass	  politics,	  where	  such	  organizations	  were	  emerging	  all	  over	  Europe	  as	  a	  response	  to	  ever	  
increasing	  political	  input	  and	  demands	  from	  below,	  the	  non-­‐development	  of	  these	  forms	  of	  
political	  organization	  resulted	  not	  only	  in	  the	  stunted	  growth	  of	  the	  Italian	  political	  system	  
but	   also	   to	   the	   absence	   of	  many	   integrative	   channels	   and	   buffers.	  More	   openness	   in	   the	  
political	   system	   could,	   for	   example,	   have	   allowed	   that	   arena	   be	   used	   to	   integrate	   and	  
dissolve	   parts	   of	   the	   friction	   between	   Church	   and	   State.	   Yet	   the	   liberal	   elites	   were	   too	  
scared	   to	   do	   so.	   The	   price	   was	   high.	   The	   political	   system	   degenerated	   ever	   more	   into	  
clientelism	  and	  corruption.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2000)	  p.	  163.	  61	  Croce,	  B.	  (1977	  [1928])	  62	  Chabod,	  F.	  (1976)	  63	  Whether	  the	  curtailing	  of	  the	  franchise	  and	  the	  armouring	  of	  the	  political	  system	  by	  the	  post-­‐unification	  Liberal	  elites	  in	  Italy	  was	  good	  or	  bad	  is	  a	  central	  subject	  in	  Italian	  historiography.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Croce	  and	  Chabod,	  historians	  from	  the	  Gramscian	  or	  Marxist	  tradition,	  like	  Sereni,	  have	  interpreted	  it	  as	  the	  inescapable	  result	  of	  the	  incomplete	  Italian	  revolution	  which	  retained	  too	  many	  elements	  of	  the	  old	  feudal	  order.	  The	  revisionists	  instead	  interpret	  the	  franchise	  restriction,	  similar	  to	  Croce	  and	  Chabod,	  as	  one	  born	  out	  of	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  Catholics	  and	  Socialists.	  However,	  the	  conclusion	  of	  revisionists	  like	  Mack	  Smith	  and	  Romanelli	  differs	  as	  they	  see	  it	  as	  a	  fundamental	  programmatic	  and	  organizational	  degeneration	  of	  the	  Liberal	  movement	  itself	  which	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  a	  long	  line	  of	  autocratic	  rulers	  starting	  with	  Crispi	  and	  ending	  with	  Mussolini.	  See:	  Chabod,	  F.	  (1976)	  Storia	  della	  politica	  estera	  italiana	  dal	  1870	  al	  1890,	  Bari,	  Universale	  Laterza;	  Croce,	  B.	  (1977	  [	  1928	  ])	  Storia	  d’Italia	  dal	  1871	  al	  1915,	  Bari,	  Laterza;	  Sereni,	  E.	  (1968	  [1948]);	  Mack	  Smith,	  D.	  (1969);	  Romanelli,	  R.	  (1988).	  64Duggan	  ,	  C.	  (2000)	  p.	  164.	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6.1.5 And	  yet	  it	  moves?	  From	  Depretis	  to	  Crispi	  
The	   type	  of	  politics	   that	   this	   system	  produced,	   in	  which	  all	  pressing	   social	  problems	  went	  
virtually	   untouched,	   found	   its	   personification	   in	   Prime	  Minister	   Agostino	   Depretis.	   Facing	  
strong	  public	  pressure	  generated	  by	   the	  European	  race	   for	  colonies,	  Depretis	   launched	  an	  
ill-­‐advised	   and	   very	   badly	   equipped	   Italian	   colonial	   experiment	   in	   Ethiopia	   in	   1885	   that	  
ended	  in	  utter	  failure.	  Dennis	  Mac	  Smith	  notes	  that	  “Bismarck’s	  comment	  was	  that	  Italy	  had	  
a	   large	   appetite	   but	   poor	   teeth.”65	   Depretis	   died	   shortly	   thereafter	   and	   the	   young	   and	  
aspiring	  Crispi,	  who	  was	  known	  for	  his	  agitation	  on	  the	  rampant	  clientelism	   in	  parliament,	  
became	  Prime	  Minister	  in	  July	  1887.	  
	   Crispi’s	  charisma	  made	  him	  the	  long	  awaited	  ‘messianic’	  politician	  that	  could	  finally	  
translate	  the	  promises	  of	  the	  ‘Risorgimento’	  into	  reality.66	  He	  was	  the	  first	  Italian	  politician	  
that	  enjoyed	  support	  both	  from	  the	  public	  and	  parliament.67	  Crispi	  wanted	  to	  build	  a	  strong	  
nation	  state	  and	  turned	  to	  Bismarck’s	  nation	  building	  strategy	  across	  the	  Alps	  for	  inspiration	  
(Crispi	  even	  started	  to	  cut	  his	  beard	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Bismarck).68	  His	  first	  term	  in	  office	  
from	  1887-­‐1891	  was	  therefore	  characterized	  by	  an	  accelerated	  pace	  of	  reform	  that	  tried	  to	  
deal	  with	  the	  pressing	  social	  and	  economic	  needs	  that	  had	  gone	  untackled	  during	  the	  “years	  
of	  inertia”69	  under	  the	  Depretis	  governments.	  Crispi	  reformed	  the	  penal	  code,	  which	  yielded	  
better	   protection	   for	   labor	   from	   capital.	   Furthermore,	   Bismarck’s	   policies	   of	   the	   1880s	  
suggested	   to	  Crispi	   that	  welfare	  was	  key	   for	   internal	   consolidation.	  Therefore,	  he	  brought	  
the	   mostly	   Church-­‐run	   welfare	   system	   of	   Operé	   Pie,	   on	   which	   approximately	   six	   million	  
Italians	  relied	  during	  the	  1880s,	  under	  state	  control.70	  He	  was	  the	  first	  to	  tackle	  the	  issue	  of	  
welfare,	  but	  the	  reforms	  were	  more	  cosmetic	  than	  real	  reforms	  of	  Bismarckian	  dimensions.	  
It	  was	  a	  classic	  Italian	  discrepancy	  between	  “paese	  legale”	  and	  “paese	  reale”	  (between	  rules	  
and	   realities)	   as,	   in	   reality,	   the	   Church	   kept	   most	   of	   its	   control.	   He	   pushed	   for	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Mack	  Smith,	  D.	  (1969)	  p.	  181.	  66	  Ganci,	  S.M.	  (1980)	  Il	  decennio	  crispino,	  IN:	  Cherubini,	  G.,	  Della	  Peruta,	  F.,	  Lepore,	  E.,	  Mazza,	  M.	  Mori,	  G.	  Procacci,	  G.	  &	  Villari,	  R.	  (eds.)	  Storia	  della	  Società	  Italiana,	  Vol.	  19,	  La	  crisi	  di	  fine	  secolo	  (1880-­‐1900),	  Milano,	  Teti,	  pp.	  139-­‐196.	  67	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2000)	  pp.	  172-­‐173.	  68	  For	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  beards	  see	  Illustration	  No.	  14	  between	  pp.	  192-­‐193	  IN:	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2007).	  Crispi	  was	  the	  first	  to	  advocate	  a	  strong	  state.	  This	  is	  why	  he	  is,	  for	  most	  liberal	  historians	  from	  the	  historism	  branch	  like	  Croce,	  Chabod	  and	  Romanelli,	  the	  person	  after	  whom	  the	  liberal	  nation	  building	  project	  took	  the	  wrong	  turn	  that	  brought	  Italy	  in	  the	  end	  a	  fascist	  regime	  in	  the	  1920s.	  69	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2000)	  p.	  174.	  70	  Duggan,	  C.	  (2000)	  p.	  174.	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democracy	   in	   order	   to	   bring	   the	   state	   closer	   to	   the	   people	   and	   introduced	   municipal	  
elections,	  especially	  of	  mayors,	  which	  had	  theretofore	  been	  appointed	  by	  the	  government.	  
This	  doubled	  the	  franchise	  to	  four	  million	  voters	  for	  local	  elections.	  Crispi	  tried	  to	  construct	  
the	   Italian	   nation	   (patria)	   by	   introducing	   numerous	   national	   celebrations	   and	   by	  
commissioning	   pompous	   monuments	   such	   as	   the	   typewriter	   (Monumento	   Nazionale	   a	  
Vittorio	  Emanuele	  II)	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  Rome.	  He	  even	  aimed	  for	  a	  war	  with	  France	  in	  order	  to	  
boost	   Italian	  nationalism.	  Crispi’s	  dream	  was	  an	  alliance	  with	  Germany	  and	  a	   victory	  over	  
France	   which	   would	   result	   in	   a	   Continental	   Europe	   dominated	   by	   Germany	   and	   a	  
Mediterranean	  under	   Italian	  control.	   	  Bismarck,	  however,	  was	   reluctant	   to	  play	  along	  and	  
did	  not	  want	   to	   join	   this	  adventure.	  Crispi	   tried	   several	   times	   to	  provoke	  France	  but	  after	  
three	   years	   of	   heavy	  military	   spending	   and	   an	   ever	   growing	   budget	   deficit	   not	  much	   had	  
happened.71	  
	   His	   record	   on	  welfare	   and	   the	   economy	  was	   not	  much	   better.	   The	   economic	   and	  
social	   situation	  deteriorated	   further	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  1890s.	   In	   the	   South,	   an	  open	  
rebellion	   of	   leftist	   farm	  workers,	   urban	   proletariat	   and	  minors	   (Fasci	   siciliani)	   had	   broken	  
out.72	   The	   rise	   of	   the	   labor	   movement	   worried	   the	   liberal	   elites,	   while	   anarchist	   bomb	  
attacks	  were	  also	  frequent	  and	  the	  state	  was	  basically	  bankrupt.	  Crispi	  managed	  to	  suppress	  
the	   Fasci	   uprising	   in	   Sicily,	   but	   was	   eventually	   crushed	   by	   a	   huge	   banking	   scandal	   which	  
spread	   into	   a	   political	   scandal	   that	   implicated	   most	   of	   the	   parliament,	   even	   allegedly	  
including	   the	   King	   and	   Crispi	   himself.	   In	   this	  moment	   of	   crisis,	   Crispi	   desperately	   needed	  
political	   success.	   He	   opted	   for	   a	   colonial	   adventure.	   The	   result	   was	   the	   extremely	  
humiliating	  defeat	  of	  Italian	  troops	  in	  Ethiopia,	  which	  was	  in	  fact	  the	  biggest	  defeat	  of	  any	  
European	  nation	  on	  the	  African	  continent.	  The	  historian	  Dennis	  Mack	  Smith	  remarks	  that	  “In	  
one	   single	  day,	   as	  many	   Italians	   lost	   their	   lives	   as	   in	   all	   the	  wars	  of	   the	  Risorgimento	  put	  
together.”73	  This	  was	  the	  last	  nail	  in	  the	  coffin	  of	  Crispi’s	  political	  career.	  The	  last	  decade	  of	  
the	  century	  saw	  Giovanni	  Giolitti	  take	  over	  as	  Prime	  Minister.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  A	  court-­‐organized	  plot	  ousted	  Crispi	  in	  1891	  but	  he	  was	  soon	  reappointed	  to	  help	  solve	  the	  insurgency	  of	  the	  Fasci	  in	  the	  South.	  72	  The	  Fasci	  siciliani	  were	  a	  socialist	  mass	  movement	  that	  came	  to	  light	  between	  1891	  and	  1893	  and	  was	  brutally	  supressed	  by	  Crispi.	  73	  Mack	  Smith,	  D.	  (1969)	  p.	  185.	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   Giolitti	  became	  finance	  minister	  in	  1889	  under	  Crispi	  and	  for	  then	  Prime	  Minister	  for	  
first	  time	  in	  1892.74	  His	  role	  was	  interrupted	  by	  the	  Conservative	  governments	  of	  Antonio	  di	  
Rudini	  (1891-­‐1892	  and	  1896-­‐1898)	  and	  General	  Luigi	  Pelloux	  (1898-­‐1900).	  Crispi	  had	  tried	  to	  
form	   the	   patria	   (the	   nation)	   through	   symbolic	   construction	   projects	   and	   a	   high	   profile	  
foreign	   policy,	   but	   his	   economic	   and	   social	   reforms	   remained	  halfhearted.	  Giolitti,	   on	   the	  
other	  hand,	  was	  convinced	  that	  only	  by	  solving	  the	  social	  and	  the	  southern	  questions	  could	  
Italy	  take	  its	  much	  sought	  after	  seat	  at	  the	  top	  table	  of	  the	  European	  nations.	  Dennis	  Mack	  
Smith	   sums	   up	   these	   differences	  when	   commenting	   that	   “Few	   politicians	   since	   1861	   had	  
ever	  had	  time	  to	  wonder	  how	  far	  a	  regime	  of	  liberty	  was	  possible	  while	  some	  people	  were	  
on	   the	   point	   of	   starvation”.75	   Similarly	   to	   Bismarck,	   Giolitti	   perceived	   social	   security	   as	   a	  
political	  device	  that	  could	  help	  him	  to	  bind	  the	  precarious	   to	   the	  new	  nation	  by	  means	  of	  
social	  welfare	  provision.	   Though,	  his	   approach	  was	   slightly	   less	  Bonapartist.	   In	   September	  
1900	  he	  declared:	  
	  	  
Sonnino	  is	  right	  in	  saying	  that	  the	  country	  is	  sick	  politically	  and	  morally,	  but	  the	  principal	  cause	  of	  its	  sickness	  is	  
that	  the	  classes	  in	  power	  have	  been	  spending	  enormous	  sums	  on	  themselves	  and	  their	  own	  interests,	  and	  have	  
obtained	  the	  money	  almost	  entirely	  from	  the	  poorer	  sections	  of	  society.	  We	  have	  a	  large	  number	  of	  taxes	  paid	  
predominantly	  by	  the	  poor,	  on	  salt,	  on	  gambling,	  the	  dazio	  on	  grain	  and	  so	  forth,	  but	  we	  have	  not	  a	  single	  tax	  
which	  is	  exclusively	  on	  wealth	  as	  such.	  When	  in	  the	  financial	  emergency	  of	  1893	  I	  had	  to	  call	  on	  the	  rich	  to	  make	  
a	   small	   sacrifice,	   they	   began	   a	   rebellion	   against	   the	   government	   even	  more	   effective	   than	   the	   contemporary	  
revolt	  of	  the	  poor	  Sicilian	  peasantry	  and	  Sonnino	  who	  took	  over	  from	  me	  had	  to	  find	  the	  money	  by	  increasing	  
the	  price	   for	  salt	  and	   the	  excise	  on	  cereals.	   I	  deplore	  as	  much	  as	  anyone	  the	  struggle	  between	  classes,	  but	  at	  
least	  let	  us	  be	  fair	  and	  ask	  who	  started	  it.76	  
	  
How	   strongly	  Giolitti	   differed	   from	  Depretis’	   and	  Crispi’s	   approaches	   can	  be	  derived	   from	  
another	  quote:	  
	  
If	  you	  wish	  to	  defend	  our	  present	  institutions,	  you	  will	  have	  to	  persuade	  these	  new	  classes	  that	  they	  have	  more	  
to	  gain	  from	  these	  institutions	  than	  from	  utopian	  dreams	  of	  violent	  change	  […]	  It	  depends	  on	  us	  whether	  they	  
will	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   a	   conservative	   force,	   a	   new	   element	   in	   the	   greatness	   and	   prosperity	   of	   the	   country,	   or	   a	  
revolutionary	  force	  for	  its	  ruin.77	  
	  
	   This	   quote	   exemplifies	   how	   close	   some	  of	  Giolitti’s	   and	  Bismarck’s	   perceptions	   of	  
social	   policy	   were,	   but	   it	   also	   shows	   how	   they	   diverged	   on	   others.	   Both	   men	   saw	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Though,	  his	  real	  career	  should	  only	  start	  a	  decade	  later.	  His	  almost	  uninterrupted	  time	  as	  prime	  minister	  from	  1901	  till	  1914	  is	  labeled	  the	  Giolittian	  Age.	  75	  Mack	  Smith,	  D.	  (1969)	  p.	  189.	  	  76	  Giolitti	  in	  a	  speech	  in	  September	  1900.	  Cited	  IN:	  Mack	  Smith,	  D.	  (1969)	  pp.	  214-­‐215.	  Sonnino	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  Italian	  politicians	  that	  carried	  out	  empirical	  research	  to	  solve	  the	  “Southern	  Question”.	  77	  Giolitti	  cited	  IN:	  Mack	  Smith,	  D.	  (1969)	  p.	  215.	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revolution	   could	   only	   be	   forestalled	   through	   preemptive	   etatist	   social	   welfare	   measures.	  
However,	  Bismarck	  had	   long	  since	  developed	  programmatic	   ideas	   like	  State	  Socialism	  that	  
guided	  him	  on	  how	  to	  do	  this	  while	  such	  efforts	  were	  absent	  in	  Giolitti’s	  thinking.	  
	   To	   sum	   up:	   The	   stalemate	   between	   the	   Italian	   liberal	   state	   and	   the	   Vatican	   that	  
arose	  from	  the	  specific	  conditions	  of	  the	  unification	  process	  led	  to	  the	  stunted	  development	  
of	   the	   Italian	  political	   system.	   Full	  male	   suffrage	  was	  only	   introduced	   in	   1910,	   forty	   years	  
later	  than	  in	  Germany.	  Transformismo	  governance	  saw	  liberal	  politics	  systematically	  exclude	  
the	   masses.	   But	   this	   short-­‐circuiting	   of	   the	   political	   system	   had	   dire	   consequences.	   The	  
absence	   of	   a	   mechanism	   that	   allowed	   for	   voting	   the	   political	   elites	   out	   of	   office	   led	   to	  
rampant	   favoritism	   and	   corruption	   within	   the	   system	   and	   a	   further	   deterioration	   of	   its	  
legitimacy.	   The	   first	   politician	   who	   wanted	   to	   break	   the	   stalemate	   between	   Church	   and	  
State	  and	  eradicate	  corruption	  and	  clientelism	  in	  parliament	  was	  Crispi.	  He	  broke	  the	  truce	  
between	  Church	  and	  Liberalism	  and	  actively	  went	  against	  the	  Vatican	  especially	  in	  the	  field	  
of	  welfare,	  yet	  with	  little	  tangible	  success.	  Even	  worse,	  Crisipi	  became	  quickly	  coopted	  into	  
the	  system	  he	  was	  fighting.	  Having	  campaigned	  against	  his	  predecessor	  Depretis	  by	  decrying	  
transformism	  as	   “parliamentary	   incest”78	   he	   soon	  was	   to	   become	  one	  of	   the	  most	   skillful	  
masters	  of	  transformismo	  himself.	  
	  
6.2 Structure	  II:	  Capitalist	  Industrialization	  
Compared	   to	   the	   leading	  European	  countries,	   Italy	  was	  a	  very	  poor	   society	  at	   the	   time	  of	  
unification.	  The	  peninsula’s	  GDP	  per	  capita	  was	  half	  that	  of	  Britain79	  and	  the	  average	  Italian	  
was	   less	  well-­‐off	   then	  he	  had	  been	   in	   the	  16th	   century.	  The	  mortality	   rate	  of	  23%	   in	  1870	  
was	  higher	  than	  in	  Romania	  and	  Spain	  and	  life	  expectancy	  at	  birth	  was,	  at	  32	  years,	   lower	  
than	  the	  British	  and	  German	  rate.80	  Access	  to	  education	  was	  limited	  which	  resulted	  in	  60%	  
males	   over	   the	   age	   of	   six,	   and	   75%	   of	   females,	   being	   illiterate.	   Nevertheless,	   aggregated	  
figures	  do	  not	   tell	  us	  much	  about	   reality	  as	   they	  patch	  over	   the	  huge	   regional	  differences	  
within	  the	  country,	  between	  North	  and	  South	  but	  also	  between	  the	  north-­‐east,	  the	  north-­‐
west	  and	  the	  islands.	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  economic	  development	  of	   Italy	   in	  the	  19th	  century	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Crispi	  cited	  IN:	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.	  4.	  79	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  Modern	  Italy,	  London,	  Bloomsbury	  Academic,	  p.	  28.	  80	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.	  28.	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has	  to	  start	  with	  two	  important	  insights:	  the	  conditions	  for	  agriculture	  were	  very	  difficult	  in	  
most	  parts	  of	  the	  peninsula	  and	  raw	  materials	  were	  basically	  absent.81	  
6.2.1 Agriculture	  and	  the	  Southern	  Question	  
Two	  thirds	  of	  Italy’s	  working	  population	  was	  employed	  in	  agriculture	  in	  1870	  but	  the	  sector	  
was	  hardly	  one	  that	  could	  alone	  catapult	  Italy	  among	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  nations.82Clark	  
dryly	  notes	  that	  “The	  myth	  of	  Italy	  as	  ‘the	  garden	  of	  Europe’	  was	  a	  myth,	  no	  more.”83	  Two	  
thirds	   of	   Italy’s	   surface	   was	   mountainous	   or	   hilly	   and	   therefore	   hard	   to	   cultivate.	  
Furthermore,	  most	  of	   the	   valleys	   in	   the	   South	  were	  uninhabitable	  due	   to	   the	  widespread	  
presence	   of	   malaria.	   Agriculture	   was	   heavily	   fragmented	   between	   different	   regions,	   not	  
only	  due	  to	  differences	   in	  soil	  quality	  but	  also	  as	  a	   result	  of	  different	   land-­‐tenure	  systems	  
and	  methods	  of	  cultivation.	  
In	   the	   fertile	   northern	   plains	   capital	   investment	   (and	   return)	  was	   high.	   The	   farms	  
were	   run	   by	   professional	   farmers	   who	   had	   long	   term	   lease	   contracts	   and	   therefore	   also	  
long-­‐term	  perspectives.	  The	  use	  of	  waged	  agricultural	  laborers,	  modern	  irrigation	  methods,	  
specialization	  in	  particular	  products	  such	  as	  rice	  or	  cheese,	  and	  bonus	  systems	  for	  increases	  
in	  productivity	  made	  the	  northern	  plains	  the	  most	  productive	  zone	  of	  Italian	  agriculture.	  
The	   ‘mezzadria’,	   a	   special	   type	   of	   share	   cropping	   system	   was	   dominant	   in	   the	  
central-­‐upper	   Italian	   regions	  of	  Tuscany	  and	  Umbria.84	  This	   system	  guaranteed	  a	  parcel	  of	  
land	   to	   the	   farmer	   who	   had	   to	   give	   half	   of	   his	   production	   to	   his	   landlord	   in	   return.	   The	  
landholding	  elites	  in	  Tuscany	  saw	  this	  model	  as	  a	  guarantee	  for	  social	  peace.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	   it	   inhibited	   the	  modernization	  of	  agriculture	  and	  kept	  production	   low,	  also	  because	  
loans	  to	  sharecroppers	  to	  modernize	  means	  of	  production	  were	  nonexistent.	  
	  In	   the	   South,	   including	   Lazio	   and	   Campania,	   the	   famous	   ‘latifundium’	   were	  
predominant.85	   These	  were	  huge	  and	  vast	   stretches	  of	   land	  belonging	   to	  mostly	  absentee	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  This	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  point	  especially	  stressed	  by	  historians	  like	  to	  stress	  who	  write	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  historism	  like	  Benedetto	  Croce.	  They	  do	  not	  see	  the	  late	  economic	  development	  as	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  liberal	  policies	  of	  the	  Destra	  Storica	  but	  instead	  as	  the	  natural	  outcome	  of	  Italy’s	  unfavourable	  starting	  conditions.	  82	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.	  28.	  83	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  12.	  84	  Zamagni,	  V.	  (1993)	  The	  economic	  history	  of	  Italy	  1860-­‐1990,	  Oxford,	  Claredon	  Press,	  p.	  19.	  85	  Zamagni,	  V.	  (1993)	  pp.	  21-­‐25.	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feudal	  landowners	  that	  were	  used	  as	  grazing	  land	  or	  for	  inefficient	  grain	  production.86	  They	  
were	   usually	   leased	   to	   wealthy	   middle	   men	   that	   relied	   on	   precarious	   day-­‐laborers	   to	  
cultivate	   them.	   As	   geographic	   and	   climatic	   conditions	   were	   harsh	   (drought,	   soil	   erosion,	  
swamps),	   there	   was	   a	   constant	   oversupply	   of	   labor	   that	   eventually	   only	   eased	   with	   the	  
beginning	   of	   the	   big	   exodus	   overseas	   and	   the	   migration	   movement	   to	   the	   North	   once	  
industrialization	   took	   off.	   As	   a	   general	   rule,	   these	   peasants	   did	   not	   live	   on	   the	   land	   but	  
mostly	   in	   small	   hill-­‐villages	   and	   hill	   towns	   to	   escape	   malaria	   so	   often	   had	   long	   marches	  
before	   they	   reached	   the	   fields.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  quasi-­‐feudal	   land	   tenure	  system	  at	   least	  
guaranteed	  fire	  wood	  gathering	  and	  grazing	  rights	  to	  every	  peasant	  which	  was	  essential	  for	  
survival.	  This	  segmentation	  in	  Italy’s	  dominant	  production	  sector	  had	  a	  strong	  impact	  on	  the	  
prevalence	  of	  certain	  subcultures.87	  	  
	  
6.2.2 Land	  Reform	  as	  Liberal	  Social	  Policy?	  
This	  snapshot	  of	   Italian	  agriculture	  as	  the	  dominant	  economic	  sector	  of	  the	  country	  at	  the	  
time	   of	   unification	   started	   to	   change	   from	   the	   1870s	   onwards.	   The	   anti-­‐feudal	   and	   anti-­‐
clerical	   legislation	   of	   the	   Liberal	   regime	   tried	   to	   break	   the	   old	   patterns	   of	   lend	   tenure,	  
especially	   in	   the	  South.	  Between	  1861	  and	  1877,	   tens	  of	   thousands	  of	  hectares	  of	  private	  
and	  former	  Church	  property	  were	  auctioned	  and	  the	  succession	  system	  was	  altered.88	  
The	   reform	  was	   yet	   another	   liberal	   failure.89	   If	   the	   situation	   for	   the	   landless	   rural	  
population	  was	   already	  bad	  before	   the	   reform	   then	   this	   position	   deteriorated	   even	  more	  
because	   of	   it.	   The	   liberal	   reforms	   led	   to	   a	   breakup	   of	   the	   old	   estates	   but,	   as	   in	   other	  
countries,	  they	  also	  had	  a	  de-­‐corporatizing	  effect	  on	  society.	  Feudal	  rights	  of	  the	  peasantry,	  
like	  fire-­‐wood	  gathering	  and	  grazing,	  were	  abolished.	  The	  countryside	  now	  became	  fenced	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Though	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  latifundi	  as	  a	  system	  of	  systematic	  exploitation	  has	  been	  significantly	  revised	  during	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  Petrusewicz,	  M.	  (1996)	  Latifundium.	  Moral	  
Economy	  and	  Material	  Life	  in	  a	  European	  Periphery,	  Ann	  Arbor,	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press;	  Dal	  Lago,	  E.	  (2005)	  Agrarian	  Elites.	  American	  Slaveholders	  and	  Southern	  Italian	  Landowners	  1815-­‐
1861,	  Baton	  Rouge,	  Louisiana	  State	  University	  Press.	  87	  So	  did	  the	  mezzadria	  regions	  become	  later	  the	  famous	  “red	  belt”,	  the	  stronghold	  of	  the	  left	  during	  the	  first	  republic	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  88	  The	  Legge	  Colreo	  of	  1862	  led	  to	  the	  selling	  of	  3700	  hectars	  of	  demonial	  and	  163	  000	  hectras	  of	  former	  Church	  property.	  Bevilaqua,	  P.	  (1993)	  p.	  45.	  89	  The	  change	  in	  the	  heritage	  laws	  had	  the	  consequence	  that	  each	  heir	  had	  the	  right	  to	  a	  guaranteed	  minimum	  share.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  breakup	  of	  many	  small	  and	  mid-­‐sized	  estates.	  Bevilaqua,	  P.	  (1993)	  p.	  45.	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out	  and	  enclosed.	  Combined	  with	  the	  virulent	  corruption	  surrounding	  the	  land-­‐reallocation	  
process,	   this	   had	   disastrous	   consequences	   for	   the	   peasants.	   In	   his	   brilliant	   report	   on	   the	  
social,	  economic	  and	  administrative	  conditions	  in	  the	  South,	  Sidney	  Sonnino	  wrote	  in	  1877	  
that	   in	  Sicily	  “	   ‘ecclesiastical	  property	   fell	  almost	  exclusively	  and	  with	  very	  rare	  exceptions	  
into	  the	  hands	  of	  prosperous	  landowners	  ,	  for	  the	  most	  part	  large	  landowners	  already.’	  “90	  
In	   fact,	   the	   shady	  procedure	  of	   land-­‐reallocation	  often	   led	   to	   “‘re-­‐expropriation’”91	   to	   the	  
old	  owners.	  Peasants	  were	  furious	  leading	  to	  a	  continuous	  series	  of	  societal	  discontent	  and	  
rebellion	   in	  places	   like	  Sicily	  and	  Calabria	   for	  decades	   to	  come.	   In	  analyzing	   the	   long-­‐term	  
political	   consequences	   of	   the	   failed	   land	   reform,	   Clark	   points	   out:	   “But	   the	   main	  
consequence	  was	  political	   rather	   than	  economic.	  A	  great	  opportunity	   for	   land	   reform	  had	  
been	   lost,	   and	  a	   legacy	  of	  hatred	  and	  bitterness	  had	  been	   created.”92	   The	   liberal	   elites	   in	  
other	  words	  had	  good	  reason	  to	  fear	  the	  people	  and	  to	  constrain	  the	  franchise	  as	  they	  had	  
constantly	  alienated	  them	  with	  their	  liberal	  reform	  policies.	  For	  Davis	  the	  
	  
impact	  of	  the	  new	  was	  felt	  most	  deeply	  in	  the	  rural	  world,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  Italy	  was	  initially	  far	  removed	  from	  
the	   heartlands	   of	   the	   new	   economic	   order	   did	   not	   make	   the	   forces	   of	   modernization	   less	   disruptive.	   New	  
commercial	   incentives	   brought	   instability	   and	   precariousness	   to	   the	   rural	   world,	   and	   as	   private	   property	  
expanded	   and	   common	   lands	   were	   enclosed	   the	   slender	   resources	   on	   which	   the	   survival	   of	   the	   rural	  
communities	   depended	   came	   under	   threat.	   These	   losses	   were	   exacerbated	   by	   unprecedented	   rates	   of	  
population	   growth,	   giving	   rise	   to	   the	   acute	   land-­‐hunger	   that	   became	   the	   most	   persistent	   cause	   of	   rural	  
discontent.93	  
	  
On	   top	  of	   the	   land	  ownership	   issues,	   there	  were	  additional	   factors	   that	   further	   aggrieved	  
the	   southern	   peasant	   population.	   Epidemic	   diseases	   were	   widespread:	   Cholera,	   typhoid,	  
smallpox,	   tuberculosis	   and	   scarlet	   fever	   left	   a	   death	   toll	   that	   ranged	  between	  50,000	  and	  
100,000	   each	   year.94	   By	   far	   the	   most	   fatal	   was	   malaria.	   Italy	   was	   by	   far	   the	   European	  
country	  most	  impacted	  by	  the	  disease.	  Approximately	  two	  million	  people	  were	  affected	  by	  
malaria	  each	  summer	  and	  in	  most	  southern	  areas	  it	  was	  responsible	  for	  almost	  one	  third	  of	  
all	  deaths.95	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  S.	  Sonnino	  IN:	  L.	  Franchetti	  &	  S.	  Sonnino,	  La	  Sicilia	  nel	  1876,	  Florence	  1877,	  ii,	  p.286.	  Quoted	  IN:	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  1.	  91	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  16. 92	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  17.	  93	  Davis,	  J.	  A.	  (2000)	  p.	  5.	  94	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  20-­‐21.	  95	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  21.	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The	  situation	  further	  tightened	  with	  the	  worldwide	  drop	  of	  agricultural	  prices	  from	  
the	  1880s	  onwards.96	  In	  the	  mid-­‐1880s	  even	  the	  most	  modern	  sectors	  of	  Italian	  agriculture	  
were	   at	   the	   verge	   of	   collapse.	   In	   contrast	   to	   Germany,	   this	   did	   not	   trigger	   protectionist	  
moves	  by	  the	  government.	  Most	  landowners	  therefore	  tried	  to	  pass	  the	  buck	  by	  cutting	  the	  
wages	  of	  the	  peasantry.	  Clark	  notes	  that	  “In	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  the	  Italian	  peasantry	  was	  
only	   just	  avoiding	  starvation,	  and	  many	  peasants	  were	  seriously	  undernourished.”97	   In	   the	  
1880s	   around	   thirty	   percent	   of	   Italians	   were	   rejected	   as	   conscripts	   by	   the	   army	   due	   to	  
malnutrition.	  	  
Throughout	   the	   19th	   century	   Italy	  was	   still	   a	   predominantly	   agricultural	   society.	   It	  
therefore	  only	  slowly	  saw	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  urban	  working	  class	  and	  proletariat.	  Instead,	  
Italy	  had	  a	  vast	  rural	  proletariat	  especially	  in	  the	  South.98	  The	  permanent	  revolts	  that	  shook	  
Sicily	  (Fasci)99	  and	  the	  brigantaggio	  (brigandage)	  that	  unfolded	  in	  Calabria	  are	  only	  the	  most	  
impressive	   manifestations.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   rural	   proletariat	   had	   trouble	   in	   forming	   a	  
coherent	  subculture.	  There	  remained	  an	  almost	  complete	  absence	  of	  a	  coherent	  worldview	  
that	   could	   have	   steered	   unorganized	   and	   diffuse	   discontent	   towards	   a	   revolution	   or	  
channeled	   it	   into	   concerted	   political	   action.	   Rebellions	   like	   the	   brigantage	   were	   largely	  
functional	   revolts	   triggered	   through	   pure	   grief	   but	   without	   the	   underpinning	   of	   common	  
programmatic	   ideas	   or	   worldviews.	   The	   social	   question	   in	   Italy	   was	   therefore	   first	   and	  
foremost	  a	  rural	  question	  and,	  on	  top	  of	  that,	  a	  southern	  question.100	  In	  the	  North,	  with	  its	  
wage	   earning	   peasants,	   or	   in	   central	   northern	   Tuscany,	   with	   the	   share	   cropping	   model,	  
social	  peace	  could	  be	  maintained	  longer.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Torp,	  C.	  (2010).	  97	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  20.	  98	  The	  point,	  often	  made	  regarding	  rural	  proletariats,	  that	  they	  cannot	  not	  stir	  revolution	  as	  their	  lack	  of	  geographically	  concentration	  makes	  it	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  overcome	  the collective	  action	  problem	  does	  not	  hold	  here.	  Southern	  peasants	  usually	  lived	  together	  in	  small	  hill-­‐top	  cities	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  malaria.	  99	  Ganci,	  S.M.	  (1980)	  I	  Fasci	  siciliani,	  IN:	  Cherubini,	  G.,	  Della	  Peruta,	  F.,	  Lepore,	  E.,	  Mazza,	  M.	  Mori,	  G.	  Procacci,	  G.	  &	  Villari,	  R.	  (eds.)	  Storia	  della	  Società	  Italiana,	  Vol.	  19,	  La	  crisi	  di	  fine	  secolo	  (1880-­‐1900),	  Milano,	  Teti,	  pp.	  197-­‐212.	  100	  Franchetti,	  L.	  (1992	  [1876/1877])	  Condizioni	  politiche	  e	  amministrative	  della	  Sicilia,	  Roma,	  Meridiana.	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6.2.3 Industrialization	  
	  Industrialization	   in	   Italy	   started	   to	   gradually	   expand	   from	   the	   1870s	   onwards.101	   The	   silk	  
industry	   was	   the	   frontrunner	   but	   it	   was	   heavily	   dependent	   on	   the	   volatility	   of	   silkworm	  
farming	   from	  mulberry	   trees.	   Diseases	   among	   silkworm	   populations	   had	   dire	   effects	   and	  
made	  silk	  vulnerable	  as	  a	  sector	   leading	   industry.	  Moreover,	   Italy	  came	   increasingly	  under	  
pressure	   from	   cheap	   Chinese	   imports.	   From	   the	   1880s	   onwards	   the	   silk	   industry	   was	   in	  
decline	  but	  by	  then	  more	  modern	  forms	  of	  industrialization	  such	  as	  metallurgy,	  mechanical	  
engineering	  or	  chemicals	  had	  started	  to	  expand.102	  However	  Italy,	  a	  nation	  that	  had	  unified	  
ten	   years	   before	   Germany,	   lagged	   considerably	   behind	   other	   European	   countries.	   In	  
Germany,	   the	   initial	   explosion	   in	   the	   1850s	   with	   the	   peak	   of	   the	   first	   wave	   of	  
industrialization	   reached	   in	   1870.	   Italian	   industrial	   growth	   only	   started	   to	   pick	   up	   pace	  
during	  the	  1880s.	  Steel	  productionskyrocketed	  from	  3,600	  tons	   in	  1881	  to	  158,000	  tons	   in	  
1889.	  	  
The	   most	   prominent	   impediment	   for	   a	   quick	   industrial	   revolution	   was	   the	  
astonishing	   absence	   of	   raw	   materials	   like	   steel	   and	   coal	   on	   the	   Italian	   peninsula.	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  had	  already	  managed	  to	  overcome	  this	  unfavorable	  starting	  position	  before	  
in	   its	   history.	   Italy	   had	   witnessed	   an	   incredible	   boom	   throughout	   15th	   and	   16th	   century	  
renaissance	  times.	  It	  was	  then	  one	  of	  the	  most	  progressive	  and	  innovative	  economic	  hubs	  in	  
the	  world.	  Trade,	  banking,	   shipbuilding	  and	  agriculture	  all	   saw	  major	   innovations	  diffusing	  
from	   Italy	   throughout	   the	  world.	   The	   discussion	   of	  why	   this	   progression	   ended	   in	   a	   huge	  
downturn	   in	   the	  17th	  and	  18th	   centuries	   is	  broad	  and	  need	  not	  be	   replicated	  here.	   It	  boils	  
down	   to	   a	   complicated	   mixture	   of	   the	   discovery	   of	   new	   continents,	   the	   war-­‐mongering	  
among	   the	   Italian	   city	   states,	   unproductive	   investments	   in	   fixed	   assets	   such	   as	   villas	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  Romano,	  R.	  (1980)	  Gli	  inizi	  del	  capitalismo	  italiano,	  IN:	  Cherubini,	  G.,	  Della	  Peruta,	  F.,	  Lepore,	  E.,	  Mazza,	  M.,	  Mori,	  G.	  Procacci,	  G.	  &	  Villari,	  R.	  (eds.)	  Storia	  della	  Società	  Italiana,	  Vol.	  19,	  La	  crisi	  di	  fine	  secolo	  (1880-­‐1900),	  Milano,	  Teti,	  pp.	  11-­‐52.	  102	  There	  has	  ever	  since	  been	  a	  massive	  debate	  about	  why	  southern	  Italy	  was	  ever	  able	  to	  strap	  itself	  of	  its	  backwardness	  compared	  to	  the	  North.	  Unification	  brought	  many	  negative	  economic	  aspects	  for	  the	  South.	  The	  abolition	  of	  trade	  barriers	  between	  the	  different	  Italian	  regions	  meant	  that	  the	  small	  silk	  industry	  that	  existed	  in	  the	  South	  was	  doomed.	  Northern	  production.	  Furthermore	  the	  North	  was	  geographically	  advantaged	  in	  terms	  of	  geographical	  proximity	  of	  trade	  partners.	  Unification	  meant	  also	  unified	  tax	  rates	  which	  put	  a	  huge	  burden	  on	  southerners	  whose	  income	  and	  living	  standards	  were	  of	  course	  lower.	  The	  North	  was	  also	  politically	  predominant	  and	  therefore	  it	  comes	  at	  little	  surprise	  that	  most	  tax	  gains	  were	  reinvested	  in	  the	  North.	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mansions,	  a	  skyrocketing	  population	  growth	  and	  the	  inflexibility	  of	  the	  guild	  system.103	  The	  
point	   is	   that	   “With	   the	   decline	   during	   the	   seventeenth	   century,	   Italy	   thus	   set	   out	   on	   its	  
career	  as	  an	  underdeveloped	  area	  within	  Europe”.104	  
The	  only	  branch	  of	  Italian	  agriculture	  and	  industry	  that	  flourished	  during	  the	  decline	  
between	  the	  17th	  and	  19th	  century	  was	  silk	  production.	  Italy	  produced	  80%	  of	  European	  silk	  
consumption	   during	   the	   18th	   century.105	   There	   were	   around	   120	   silk	   mills	   operating	   in	  
Bologna	   in	   the	   late	   17th	   century,	   which	   made	   the	   city	   the	   most	   industrialized	   town	   in	  
Europe.106	  The	   fact	   that	  almost	  all	   silk	  was	  exported	  as	   raw	  silk	   indicates	   that	  silk	  was	  not	  
working	   well	   as	   a	   leading	   sector	   complex	   that	   could	   encourage	   further	   branches	   of	  
industrialization.	   Furthermore,	   during	   the	   18th	   century	   the	   southern	   Italian	   silk	   industry	  
started	  to	  fall	  behind	  and	  both	  silk	  production	  and	  silkworm	  farming	  became	  an	  increasingly	  
northern	   dominated	   business.107	   From	   this	   point	   onwards,	   the	   gap	   in	   industrial	  
development	   between	   the	  North	   and	   the	   South	   started	   to	  widen.	  When	   Italy’s	   territorial	  
unification	  was	  completed	  in	  1871	  it	  was	  still	  an	  agricultural	  society.	  Between	  60%	  and	  70%	  
of	   the	  active	  population	  worked	  on	   the	   land.108	   Italy’s	   industrial	  base	  was	  marginal.	  While	  
England	  and	  France	  were	  producing	  pig-­‐iron	   tons	   in	   the	  millions,	   Italy	  made	   it	  only	   to	   the	  
ten	  thousands.	  The	  same	  holds	  for	  cotton	  spindles.	  The	  comparison	  of	  purchasing	  power	  in	  
1870	  unveils	  that	  Italy	  had	  not	  even	  reached	  half	  of	  the	  purchasing	  power	  of	  the	  UK.	  
	  
6.2.4 Economic	  Policy	  
Cavour	  had	  pushed	  for	  an	  active	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  economic	  development	  during	  the	  run	  
up	  to	  unification.	  He	  had	  especially	  emphasized	  state	  driven	  railway	  extension	  in	  Piedmont.	  
Nevertheless,	   Cavour’s	   active	   approach	   was	   abandoned	   soon	   after	   his	   death.	   Active	  
economic	   state	   policy	   was	   to	   fall	   victim	   to	   the	   programmatic	   shift	   towards	   laissez	   faire	  
within	   Italian	   Liberalism	   from	   the	  1870s	  onwards.	   The	   result	  of	   this	   shift	   in	  programmatic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  For	  a	  very	  good	  overview	  on	  this	  discussion	  see	  Zamagni,	  V.	  (1993)	  pp.	  2-­‐	  12.	  	  104	  Zamagni,	  V.	  (1993)	  p.	  7.	  105	  Zamagni,	  V.	  (1993)	  p.	  8.	  106	  Zamagni,	  V.	  (1993)	  p.	  8.	  107	  Just	  to	  note	  briefly,	  it	  is	  often	  argued	  that	  the	  Italian	  South	  was,	  due	  to	  its	  geographic	  and	  climatic	  conditions,	  always	  disadvantaged	  and	  therefore	  hampered	  in	  its	  development.	  The	  fact	  that,	  while	  Lombardy	  was	  a	  scant	  grazing	  land,	  Sicily	  was	  the	  breadbasket	  of	  the	  Mediterranean	  in	  ancient	  times	  hints	  that	  such	  developments	  are	  man-­‐made.	  	  	  108	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  12.	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ideas	  was	  quite	  material.	   In	  1870	   Italy	  had	  only	  6,429	  km	  of	   railways	  compared	  to	  18,876	  
km	  in	  Germany.109	  	  
Figure	  6-­‐3	  	  	  Italy	  in	  European	  Perspective:	  Economic	  indicators	  for	  1860.	  
	   Cotton-­‐Spindles	   Pig-­‐iron	  production	   Purchasing	  Power*	  
Italy	   500	  000	   30	  000	  tons	   54	  
UK	   30	  000	  000	   3	  800	  000	  tons	   116	  
France	   5	  500	  000	   1	  000	  000	  tons	   70	  
Germany	   2	  000	  000	   600	  000	  tons	   58	  
*Purchasing	  Power	  figures	  for	  1870.	  International	  comparison	  of	  GNP	  per	  capita	  at	  purchasing	  power	  parities	  (USA	  =	  100).	  	  
All	  numbers	  cited	  from	  Zamagni,	  V.	  	  (1993)	  p.	  25,	  40.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐4	  Cotton	  Spindles	  Italy	  1860.	  
	  
	  




Figure	  6-­‐5	  Steel	  Production	  1881-­‐1889	  Italy	  
	  
Graph	  by	  the	  author.	  Data	  from:	  Zamagni,	  V.	  (1993)	  p.	  25,	  40.	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Laissez-­‐faire	   programmatic	   ideas	   dominated,	   and	   hence	   the	   state	   intervention	   and	  
coordination	   of	   the	   economy	   that	   would	   have	   been	   necessary	   to	   catch	   up	   with	   the	  
European	  industrial	  frontrunners	  remained	  absent.	  Gerschenkron	  notes	  that	  “it	  would	  seem	  
altogether	   meaningful	   to	   regard	   the	   policies	   of	   the	   government	   as	   the	   strategic	   factor,	  
primarily	   responsible	   for	   the	   great	   spurt	   in	   industrialization	   of	   the	   period.	   Nothing	  
comparable	  seems	  to	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  Italy.”110	  Even	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  railways	  was	  
not	  used	  by	  the	  Liberal	  elites	  to	  establish	  a	   leading	  sector	  growth	  model.	   Instead,	  railroad	  
politics	   followed	   liberal	   laissez	   faire	   ideas.	   While	   Germany	   nationalized	   the	   railroad	  
companies	   in	   the	   1880s	   in	   order	   to	   form	   what	   would	   allegedly	   be	   the	   world’s	   largest	  
company,	   the	   Italian	   liberal	   governments	   contracted	   the	   Italian	   railroads	   out	   to	   private	  
operators.111	  Even	   though	   the	   railroad	  system	  expanded	   from	  6,400	  kilometers	   in	  1870	   to	  
13,600	  kilometers	  in	  1890,	  the	  impact	  of	  railways	  on	  industrial	  growth	  was	  minimal.	  Cafagna	  
puts	  forward	  that	  “	  ‘the	  demand	  for	  rails,	  engines,	  carriages	  and	  trucks,	  and	  iron	  for	  bridges	  
continued	   to	   be	   supplied,	  with	   few	   insignificant	   exceptions,	   from	   abroad.’	   “112	   To	   give	   an	  
example,	   the	  Railway	   company	   ‘Alta	   Italia’	  bought	  641	  wagons	  before	  1878,	  out	  of	  which	  
only	  39	  were	  manufactured	   in	   Italy.	  Meanwhile	  by	  1853	   in	  Germany,	   some	  99	  out	  of	  105	  
purchased	  locomotives	  were	  manufactured	  in	  Prussia.	  
Pushed	   by	   deteriorating	   conditions	   on	   the	   world	   markets,	   Italy	   made	   its	   first	  
protectionist	   turn	   in	   1887,	   more	   than	   one	   decade	   after	   the	   Germans	   had	   erected	   trade	  
barriers.	  Cafagna	  notes	  that	  this	  should	  remain	  the	  “only	  outstanding	  manifestation	  of	  state	  
support	   for	   the	   industrial	   development“113	   of	   Italy.	   And	   even	   this	   protectionist	   turn	  went	  
wrong.	  Gerschenkron	  notes	  that	  “the	  state	  not	  only	  failed	  to	  follow	  the	  Russian	  example	  but	  
on	  the	  contrary	  pursued	  policy,	  particularly	  in	  the	  field	  of	  protectionist	  tariffs,	  which	  clearly	  
slowed	  down	  the	  speed	  of	  growth	  by	  discriminating	  against	  these	  industries	  which	  had	  the	  
best	  prospects	  for	  growth”.114	  	  
The	   key	   reason	   behind	   the	   belated	   industrial	   development	   in	   Italy	   lies	   in	   the	  
programmatic	   beliefs	   of	   its	   elites.	   Economic	  programmatic	   ideas	  based	  on	   laissez-­‐faire	  do	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Gerschenkron,	  A.	  (1962)	  Economic	  Backwardness	  in	  Historical	  Perspective,	  Cambridge,	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  p.	  79.	  111	  Gerschenkron,	  A.	  (1962)	  p.	  84.	  112	  Cafagna,	  L.	  (1973)	  Italy	  1830-­‐1914,	  IN:	  Cipolla,	  C.	  (ed.),	  The	  Fontana	  economic	  history	  of	  
Europe,	  vol.	  iv,	  pt.	  1,	  London,	  p.	  287,	  cited	  IN:	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  27.	  113	  Cafagna,	  L.	  cited	  IN:	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.	  39.	  114	  Gerschenkron,	  A.	  (1970)	  p.	  125.	  
	   	   	   194	  
not	   square	   well	   with	   a	   catch	   up	   situation	   where	   the	   state	   would	   actively	   promote	  
development	  through	  economic	  policy.	  In	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  economic	  backwardness	  of	  the	  
Italian	  South,	  Bevilaqua	  argues	  that	  the	  Italian	  South	  deteriorated	  so	  much	  in	   its	   industrial	  
development	   after	   unification	   because	   the	   Bourbons,	   the	   rulers	   before	   unification,	   had	   a	  
plan	  for	   industrial	  development	  while	  the	   liberal	  governments	  from	  unification	  all	   the	  way	  
up	   to	   the	   late	  1880s	  did	  not.	  Bevilaqua	  puts	   forward	   that	  “one	  should	  especially	  note	   the	  
fact	   that,	   in	   the	   thirty	   years	   following	   unification,	   the	   national	   governments	   never	  
succeeded	  in	  elaborating	  any	  conceptual	  strategy	  for	  industrialization”.115	  Bevilaqua	  laments	  
the	  attitude	  of	  the	  Liberal	  political	  elites	  as	  “anti-­‐industrialist”,	  an	  accusation	  that	  one	  can	  
also	  find	  in	  Gerschenkron.	  Anti-­‐industrialism	  was	  nothing	  other	  than	  orthodox	  liberal	  laissez	  
faire	  and	   free	  market	  oriented	  programmatic	   ideas.116	  That	   these	  programmatic	   ideas	  and	  
beliefs	   did	   not	   prevail	   for	   all	   of	   the	   time	   among	   Italian	   Liberalism	   shows	   the	   active	   early	  
industrial	  politics	  of	  Cavour.	  Liberalism	  as	  a	  worldview	  was	  pushed	  into	  these	  programmatic	  
ideas	   through	   the	   stalemate	  with	   the	  Church.	  Only	   the	  agreement	  not	   to	  use	   the	   state	   in	  
order	  to	  interfere	  with	  society	  and	  the	  economy	  was	  acceptable	  for	  both	  worldviews	  at	  the	  
same	  time.	  
The	   only	   sector	   where	   Italian	   liberals	   allowed	   for	   state	   interference	   was	   the	  
military-­‐industrial	   complex	   which	   was	   needed	   for	   the	   numerous	   liberal	   foreign	   policy	  
adventures.	   The	   Italian	   Navy	   became	   the	   world’s	   second	   biggest	   during	   the	   1880s.	   The	  
construction	  of	  the	  Terni	  steel	  plant	  was	  a	  spillover	  of	  these	  policies.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  “Occorebbe	  soprattutto	  tenere	  conto	  del	  fatto	  che	  nei	  trenta	  anni	  seguiti	  all’unita,	  i	  governi	  nazionali	  non	  riuscirono	  a	  elaborare	  nessun	  abbozzo	  di	  strategia	  industriale”	  Bevilaqua,	  P.	  (1993)	  Breve	  Storia	  dell’Italia	  Meridionale:	  dall’ottocento	  a	  oggi,	  Roma,	  Donzelli,	  p.	  56	  116	  Bevilaqua’s	  assessment,	  that	  the	  governments	  did	  so	  because	  they	  simply	  did	  not	  know	  what	  else	  to	  do	  and	  because	  everyone	  in	  Europe	  was	  doing	  the	  same	  (following	  laissez	  faire)	  at	  that	  point	  in	  time,	  is	  therefore	  wrong.	  Bevilaqua,	  P.	  (1993)	  p.	  56.	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Figure	  6-­‐6	  Pig	  Iron	  Production	  Italy	  1860.	  
	  




However,	  the	  military	  industrial	  complex	  was	  not	  a	  success	  story	  either.	  In	  the	  steel	  and	  iron	  
sector	   a	   cartel	   of	   four	   big	   companies	   emerged,	   all	   with	   excellent	   political	   contacts,	   and	  
heavily	   dependent	   on	   armament	   and	   shipbuilding	   orders	   from	   the	   government	   at	   hugely	  
inflated	   prices.117	   This	   situation	   inhibited	   innovation	   and	   led	   in	   the	   long	   run	   to	   a	   non-­‐
competitiveness	   of	   Italian	   heavy	   industry	   compared	   to	   its	   European	   neighbors.	   It	   also	  
further	  fueled	  clientelism	  and	  corruption	  in	  the	  political	  system.	  	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐7	  Railway	  Expansion	  Italy	  1870-­‐1890.	  
	  
	  
Table	  by	  the	  author.	  Figures	  from	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  25.	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6.2.5 The	  Real	  Take	  Off	  
Italy	   experienced	   a	   massive	   economic	   spurt	   between	   1896	   and	   the	   First	   World	   War.	  
Gerschenkron	   identifies	   a	   growth	   of	   12.4%	   in	   the	   iron	   and	   steel	   sector,	   12.2%	   in	   the	  
engineering	   sector	   and	   13.7%	   in	   the	   chemical	   industry	   between	   1896	   and	   1908.118	   Italy’s	  
real	   industrial	   emergence	   was	   therefore	   a	   phenomenon	   of	   the	   20th	   rather	   than	   the	   19th	  
century	  and	  coincides	  with	  the	  moment	  when	  liberal	  Italian	  governments	  started	  to	  seek	  a	  
more	  active	   role	   for	   the	   state,	   first	   under	  Crispi	   –	  who	  actively	   confronted	  and	  broke	   the	  
truce	  with	  the	  Church	  –	  and	   later	  under	  Giolitti	   in	  a	  more	  reconciliatory	  climate.	   In	  a	  way,	  
Italy	  managed	   to	   jump	   straight	   into	   high	   industrialization	  without	   ever	   having	   completed	  
the	   first	   stage.	   This	   second	  wave	  was	   especially	   driven,	   as	   in	   other	   continental	   European	  
countries,	  by	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  chemical	  industry,	  through	  electrification	  and	  the	  takeoff	  
of	  car	  manufacturing.	  One	  factor	  that	  certainly	  contributed	  much	  to	  this	  development	  were	  
huge	  investments	  in	  hydroelectric	  plants	  in	  the	  Alps	  that	  made	  Italy,	  a	  country	  with	  no	  coal,	  
independent	  of	  expensive	  imported	  primary	  energy	  sources	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  Nevertheless,	  
Italy	  was	  still	  an	  overwhelmingly	  agrarian	  society	  but	  at	  least	  the	  state	  finances	  benefited	  a	  
great	   deal	   from	   this	   development.	   The	   finance	   minister	   Sonnino	   managed	   to	   constantly	  
reduce	  the	  deficit	  and	  the	  budget	  was	  even	  running	  a	  surplus	   from	  1898	  to	  1899.119	  For	  a	  
country	   known	   for	   its	   notorious	   public	   deficits	   it	   seemed	   almost	   revolutionary	   to	   sustain	  
non-­‐deficit	  budgets	  for	  the	  next	  eleven	  years.120	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐8	  Industrial	  Indicators	  and	  Political	  Power	  of	  the	  Left,	  Italy,	  Germany,	  UK.	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  39.	  
	  
The	   industrial	   spurt	   was	   largely	   confined	   to	   the	   great	   industrial	   triangle	   in	   the	   North	  
between	  Genoa,	   Turin	   and	  Milan.	   The	   South	   saw	  no	   such	  development.	   According	   to	   the	  
industrial	  census	  of	  1911,	  Lombardy	  industrial	  workers	  accounted	  for	  26%	  of	  the	  total	  active	  
population,	  while	  in	  Liguria	  it	  was	  21%	  and	  in	  Piedmont	  17%.	  In	  comparison,	  Basilicata	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Gerschenkron,	  A.	  (1962)	  p.	  75,	  cited	  IN:	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  119.	  	  119	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  122.	  120	  Mack	  Smith,	  D.	  (1969)	  pp.	  245-­‐247.	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South	  saw	  industrial	  worker’s	  only	  make	  up	  4%.121	  The	  percentages	  of	  men	  and	  women	  over	  
six	   years	   that	   could	  not	   read	  nor	  write	   in	  Piedmont	  was	  42.3	  %,	   in	   Lombardy	  45.7	  %	  and	  
Liguria	  56.3%,	  whereas	  Basilicata	  had	  88%,	  Calabria	  87%,	  Sardinia	  86.1%	  and	  Sicily	  85.3%.122	  
Other	   indicators	   for	   industrial	   expansion,	   such	   as	   the	   railroad	   network,	   roads	   and	   banks	  
followed	  similar	  patterns.	  Sicily	  had	  a	  total	  of	  only	  99	  kilometers	  of	  railroads	  in	  1859	  while	  
Piedmont	  had	  850.123	  Sicily	  had	  two	  banks,	  while	  Piedmont	  had	  hundreds.	  
To	   sum	  up,	   even	   after	   the	   industrial	   spurt	   before	   the	   First	  World	  War,	   the	   Italian	  
working	  class	  was	  still	  small	  and	  heterogeneous.	  Clark	  concludes:	  “These	  years	  saw	  not	  so	  
much	   ‘the	   making	   of	   the	   Italian	   working	   class’,	   as	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   Italian	   working	  
cities.”124	  The	  peculiarity	  of	  Italy	  was	  that	  it	  had	  a	  vast	  and	  broad	  rural	  precariate	  which	  was	  
very	   hard	   hit	   by	   the	   failed	   land	   tenure	   reform,	   especially	   in	   the	   South,	   and	   had	   been	  
exploited	   along	   the	   same	   lines	   as	   urban	   proletariats	   elsewhere.	   What	   made	   the	   Italian	  
situation	  particularly	  difficult	  overall	  was	  the	  huge	  fragmentation	  in	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  
workers.	  Landed	  workers	  were	  dependent	  on	  land	  tenure	  systems	  which	  were	  organized	  in	  
very	   different	   ways	   according	   to	   the	   region.	   Sicilian	   peasants	   in	   the	   latifundia	   were	  
organized	  along	  different	  lines	  to	  their	  Tuscan	  sharecropping	  equivalents	  or	  to	  the	  contract	  
peasants	  in	  the	  Po	  Valley.	  Furthermore,	  the	  industrial	  proletariat	  that	  was	  slowly	  forming	  in	  
the	  North	  was	  strongly	  concentrated	   in	   the	   industrial	   triangle	  between	  Genova,	  Turin	  and	  
Milan.	  These	  discrepancies,	   together	  with	   the	  closed	  nature	  of	   the	   Italian	  political	   system,	  
greatly	   inhibited	   mobilization	   from	   below.	   The	   state	   was	   marginalized	   in	   its	   role	   as	   a	  
developer	  between	  the	  Catholic’s	  subsidiarity	  and	  the	  liberal’s	  laissez	  faire	  doctrine.	  
The	  following	  section	  will	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  particularities	  of	  Church	  –	  State	  relations	  
in	  Italy	  and	  how	  they	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  modern	  welfare.	  
	  
6.3 Structure	  III	  -­‐	  Church	  and	  State	  
	  
The	  much	  lamented	  weakness	  of	  the	  Italian	  state	  –	  with	  such	  manifestations	  as	  the	  Fascist	  assumption	  of	  power	  
for	   two	   decades,	   the	   disaster	   of	   the	   crumbling	   of	   the	   Italian	   state	   during	   the	   Second	   World	   War,	   and	   the	  
continued	  failure	  of	  the	  Italian	  government	  to	  be	  fully	  legitimate	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  population	  –	  has	  been	  to	  no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  126.	  122	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.	  30.	  123	  Zamagni,	  V.	  (1993)	  p.	  14.	  124	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  127.	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Indeed,	   early	   Church-­‐State	   relations	   in	   Italy	   were	   not	   only	   important	   for	   the	   later	  
development	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  but,	  as	  I	  have	  shown	  above,	  also	  formed	  the	  trajectory	  of	  
Italian	  politics	  in	  the	  19th	  and	  20th	  century.	  
Cavour	  had	  advocated	  a	  “free	  Church	  in	  a	  free	  State”126	  but	  the	  reality	  was	  far	  from	  
that	  in	  19th	  century	  Italy.	  	  State-­‐Church	  conflicts	  sparked	  all	  over	  Europe	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  
but	   as	   Kelikan	   remarks,	   “the	   schism	   between	   cross	   and	   crown	   placed	   the	   Piedmontese	  
monarchy	   in	   a	   predicament	   without	   parallel	   elsewhere.”127	   In	   fact	   the	   deep	   alienation	  
between	  the	  Italian	  state	  and	  the	  Vatican	  was	  only	  settled	  after	  70	  years	  by	  the	  fascists	   in	  
1929	  with	  the	  Lateran	  Treaties.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  Culture	  War	  in	  Germany	  that	  only	  lasted	  
10	  years.	  
Even	   if	   Cavour	  had	   fantasized	   about	   a	   peaceful	   co-­‐existence	  between	  Church	   and	  
State,	   the	  reality	  was	  that	  unification	  had	  been	  achieved	  very	  much	  at	   the	  expense	  of	   the	  
Church	  and	  was	  driven	  by	  a	  fierce	  anti-­‐Vatican	   liberal	  elite.	  Pollard	  notes	  that,	  despite	  the	  
numerous	  fractions	  of	  Italian	  liberalism	  between	  right	  and	  left	  or	  monarchic	  and	  republican,	  
there	  existed	  one	  common	  denominator:	  	  
	  
What	  they	  all	  shared,	  whether	  revolutionary,	  radical	  or	  moderate,	  was	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  need	  to	  reform	  the	  Church,	  
that	  the	  Church	  and	  especially	  the	  papacy	  as	  then	  constituted	  were	  serious	  cultural	  and	  institutional	  obstacles	  to	  
the	  achievement	  of	  progress	  in	  Italy.128	  
	  
For	  over	   a	  millennium,	   the	  Church	  had	  played	  a	   key	   role	  on	   the	   Italian	  peninsula.	  
Not	  only	  was	  the	  spiritual	  center	  of	  Catholicism,	  the	  Vatican,	  situated	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  Rome,	  
but	  the	  papacy	  was	  simultaneously	  also	  the	  temporal	  ruler	  over	  vast	  stretches	  of	  land	  that	  
constituted	   the	   papal	   state.129	   Unlike	   in	   Germany,	  with	   its	   denominationally	   split	   society,	  
99%	  of	  the	  population	   in	  19th	  century	   Italy	  was	  Catholic.	   In	  total	  numbers	  there	  were	  only	  
around	  38	  000	  Jews	  as	  well	  as	  a	  similar	  number	  of	  Protestants	  representing	  the	  sole	  larger	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religious	  minorities.130	  During	   the	   first	  half	   of	   the	  19th	   century	   the	  Vatican	  proved	   to	  be	  a	  
bulwark	   of	   the	   Ancien	   Regime.	   The	   Catholic	   Church	   “stood	   as	   one	   of	   the	  most	   powerful	  
obstacles	  to	  Italian	  unification.”131	  
At	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   the	   Church	   was	   deeply	   troubled	   about	  
Napoleon’s	   occupation	   following	   the	   French	   revolution	   and	   the	   diffusion	   of	   French	  
revolutionary	   concepts	   (equality,	   citizenship	   and	   inalienable	   rights).	   Though	   relieved	   that	  
Napoleon	  had	  to	  withdraw	  from	  Italy	  after	  his	  Russian	  campaign	  failed	  in	  1814,	  the	  Church	  
knew	  that	  his	  stay	  had	  been	  long	  enough	  to	  import	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  French	  revolution	  and	  
its	  ideas	  to	  Italy.	  Pollard	  puts	  forward	  that:	  
	  
The	  great	  threats	  to	  the	  Church	  in	  Restoration	  Italy	  came	  from	  the	  political	  legacy	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  the	  
movements	  of	  liberalism	  and	  nationalism,	  and	  their	  adherents.	  The	  French	  Revolution	  and	  the	  French	  invasions	  
had	   left	  behind	  a	  rich	  humus	  of	  radical	  and	  revolutionary	   ideas	  and	  organizational	   forms	  modeled	  on	  those	  of	  
the	  French	  Jacobins.132	  	  
	  
In	  fact,	  programmatic	  ideas	  like	  freedom	  of	  religion,	  civil	  marriage	  and	  the	  curtailing	  of	  the	  
franchise	  survived	  Napoleon’s	  withdrawal.	  
After	  Restoration	  of	  the	  old	  order,	  the	  deeply	  reactionary	  pope	  Gregory	  XVI133	  was	  
succeeded	   by	   the	   progressively	   minded	   Pius	   IX	   in	   1846.	   This	   change	   in	   leadership	   gave	  
liberal	  Catholics	  and	  Italians	  some	  hope.	  Pius	  IX	  seemed	  open	  to	  modernity	  at	  first	  by	  lifting	  
the	  railroad	  ban	  of	  his	  predecessor	  Gregory	  XVI	  who	  had	  still	  stigmatized	  railways	  as	  ‘roads	  
of	  hell’	  (“Chemin	  de	  fer,	  Chemin	  d’Enfer”134)	  and	  banned	  railroads	  on	  the	  papal	  territories.	  
Pius	  IX	  also	  approved	  of	  other	  modern	  innovations,	  such	  as	  gaslights	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  Rome.	  
The	  liberals	  hoped	  that	  this	  pope	  would	  be	  less	  hostile	  towards	  the	  unification	  project.	  
This	  changed	  when	  the	  revolution	  hit	  Rome	   in	  1848.	  Pius	   IX	   fled	   the	  city	   to	  Gaeta	  
shortly	   before	   the	   Republic	   of	   Rome	   was	   proclaimed	   by	   Mazzini.	   It	   took	   French	   and	  
Neapolitan	  troops	  almost	  a	  year	  before	  they	  could	  put	  down	  the	  Mazzinian	  Republic	  which	  
was	   legendarily	   defended	  by	  Garibaldi.	   A	   year	   later,	   the	   by	   then	  deeply	   reactionary	   Pope	  
Pius	   IX	   returned	   to	  Rome.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  Liberals	   continued	   to	  hassle	  and	   squeeze	   the	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pontificate.	   The	   Italian	   unification	   of	   1861	   saw	  what	   little	   territory	   was	   left	   of	   the	   papal	  
state	  become	  increasingly	  surrounded.	  	  
The	  conflict	  between	  Liberals	  and	  Vatican	  picked	  up	  in	  salience	  during	  the	  1860s.	  On	  
the	   one	   side,	   unification	  was	   perceived	   by	  many	   liberals	   as	   incomplete	  without	   Rome	   as	  
capital.	   The	   slogan	   of	  many	   young	   liberal	   nationalists	  was	   “O	   Roma,	   O	  Morte!”135	   (Either	  
Rome,	  or	  Death).	  On	  the	  other	  side	  the	  Pope	  fueled	  the	  conflict	  with	  a	  series	  of	  anti-­‐liberal	  
and	   anti-­‐national	   measures.	   Even	   though	   Pope	   Pius	   IX	   was	   extremely	   bitter	   about	   the	  
Vatican’s	  loss	  in	  temporal	  power	  and	  territory,	  and	  had	  himself	  detained	  in	  the	  Vatican	  as	  a	  
highly	   symbolic	   prisoner	   of	   the	   new	   liberal	   state,	   he	   was	   far	   from	   indulging	   in	   apathy.	  
Instead	  he	  pursued	  a	  new	  strategy	  in	  order	  to	  conserve	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Church.	  He	  shifted	  
his	   strategy	   from	   temporal	   to	   spiritual	   rule.	   Central	   to	   this	   were	   three	   doctrinal	  
developments	   during	   the	   1860s:	   the	   Syllabus	   of	   Errors,	   papal	   infallibility	   and	   the	   Non	  
Expedite.	   This	   was	   supplemented	   with	   a	   Catholic	   counter	   offensive	   against	   liberalism	   in	  
society	  by	  fostering	  new	  features	  of	  the	  Catholic	  creed,	  such	  as	  the	  Virgin	  Mary	  cult	  that	  was	  
sparked	  around	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  doctrinal	  codification	  of	  the	  Immaculate	  Conception.	  
Pope	  Pius	   IX	   issued	   the	   encyclical	  Quanta	   Cura	   in	   1864	   containing	   the	   Syllabus	   of	  
Errors	   which	   “upheld	   the	   temporary	   power	   of	   his	   Holiness,	   denounced	   liberalism	   as	   an	  
anathema,	   and	   made	   Catholicism	   incompatible	   with	   nationalism.”136	   The	   syllabus	   was	   a	  
sharp	  condemnation	  of	  Liberalism,	  Rationalism	  and	  the	  modern	  nation	  state	  through	  a	   list	  
of	  80	  prominent	  liberal	  statements	  that	  were	  condemned.	  It	  denied	  that	  the	  “Church	  ought	  
to	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  State,	  and	  the	  State	  from	  the	  Church”.137	  Furthermore,	  it	  allowed	  
for	   no	   national	   churches	   independent	   from	   the	   Vatican138	   and	   deemed	   it	   especially	   false	  
that	  “in	  the	  present	  day	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  expedient	  that	  the	  Catholic	  religion	  should	  be	  held	  as	  
the	   only	   religion	   of	   the	   state”.139	   The	   syllabus	   argued	   fiercely	   against	   the	   abolition	   of	   the	  
“temporal	  power	  of	  which	  the	  Apostolic	  See	  is	  possessed”140	  and	  declared	  it	  also	  as	  wrong	  
that	  “In	  the	  case	  of	  conflicting	  laws	  enacted	  by	  the	  two	  powers,	  the	  civil	  law	  prevails.”141	  In	  
fact,	   Pollard	   puts	   forward	   that	   “Given	   the	   strictures	   of	   the	   Syllabus,	   ‘Liberal	   Catholic’	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seemed	  almost	  a	  contradiction	  in	  terms.”142	  In	  fact	  the	  syllabus	  was	  an	  instrument	  to	  clearly	  
delineate	  the	  Catholic	  worldview	  from	  the	  Liberal	  one.	  
The	   next	   step	   was	   the	   invention	   of	   papal	   infallibility	   by	   Pius	   IX	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	  
reinforce	   the	   central	   power	   of	   the	   papacy	   within	   Catholicism.	   Following	   heavy	   disputes	  
during	   the	   first	  Vatican	  Council	   in	  Rome	  attended	  by	  774	  bishops	   from	  all	  over	   the	  world,	  
the	   curia	   voted	   in	   July	   1870	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   concept.	   Progressively	   minded	   bishops	   like	  
Ketteler	  from	  Mainz	  heavily	  criticized	  and	  opposed	  the	  concept	  but	  nevertheless	  gave	  in	  to	  
the	  Pope’s	  plans	  at	  the	  last	  minute.	  Papal	  infallibility	  established	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  pope	  
on	   all	   doctrinal	  matters	   by	   setting	   out	   that	   “such	   definitions	   of	   the	   Roman	   pontiff	   are	   of	  
themselves	  and	  not	  from	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  Church	  irreformable”.143	  Anyone	  breaking	  this	  
dogma	  would	   be	   deemed	   “anathema”,144	   banished	   or	   denounced	   in	   other	   words.	   In	   this	  
way,	   the	   divine	   authority	   of	   the	   Pope	   became	   untouchable	   and	   his	   grip	   on	   the	   Vatican	  
hierarchy	  was	  tightened	  as	  never	  before.	  
Both	  the	  Syllabus	  of	  Errors	  and	  papal	   infallibility	  were	  hyper-­‐reactionary	  concepts.	  
Pollard	   notes	   that	   “The	   Syllabus	   seriously	   embarrassed	   the	   Catholic	   hierarchy	   in	   many	  
countries	  until	  Bishops	  Dupanloup	  of	  Orleans	  and	  Ketteler	  of	  Mainz	  intervened	  to	  publish	  a	  
reasoned	   analysis	   of	   its	   content	   and	   context	   that	   helped	   explain	   away	   its	   worst	  
elements.”145	   	   Pius	   IX’s	   strategy	   was	   that,	   having	   lost	   most	   of	   his	   temporal	   powers	   and	  
Papal-­‐territory,	   he	   must	   at	   least	   try	   to	   minimize	   the	   damage	   to	   his	   political	   power	   by	  
maximizing	   his	   control	   over	   the	   spiritual	   realm.	   In	   fact	   he	   strengthened	   his	   grip	   on	  most	  
Italian	   citizens.	   By	   implementing	   higher	   direct	   control	   over	   flock	   and	   clergy,	   the	   Pope	  
formed	   a	   powerful	   tool	   to	   lure	   the	   new	   Italian	   state	   into	   concessions.	   The	   liberal	   rulers	  
knew	  that	  ultimately	  the	  Pope,	  with	  his	  divine	  authority	  over	  99%	  of	  the	  Italian	  population,	  
could	   play	   an	   important	   part	   in	   fostering	   or	   delegitimizing	   the	   state’s	   institutions	   and	   its	  
ruling	  class.	  The	  reactionary	  and	  hostile	  program	  of	  Pius	  IX,	  as	  announced	  in	  1861	  and	  fully	  
implemented	  by	  1868,	  was	  rounded	  off	  by	  the	  issuing	  of	  Non	  Expedit.	  Best	  described	  with	  
the	   phrase	   “neither	   elected	   nor	   electors”146	   the	   Pope’s	   bulletin	   instructed	   that	   Catholics	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should	   abstain	   from	   any	   political	   involvement	   and	   completely	   refuse	   any	   form	   of	  
legitimating	  the	  new	  state.	  
From	   that	   point	   onwards	   the	   government	   lost	   its	   patience	   with	   the	   Vatican.	  
Becoming	   ever	   more	   aware	   that	   even	   treating	   the	   Church	   with	   silk	   gloves147	   would	   not	  
result	   in	   a	   friendlier	   position	   of	   the	   Church	   towards	   the	   Italian	   state,	   the	   Liberal	   State	  
reacted	  in	  an	  ever	  more	  hostile	  way.	  Kelikian	  notes	  that	  “Not	  one	  of	  the	  concessions	  from	  
the	   King	   Victor	   Emmanuel	   II	   seemed	   to	   satisfy	   the	   curia.”148	   After	   realizing	   that	   an	  
agreement	  with	  the	  Vatican	  was	  not	  possible,	   the	   liberal	  state	  started	  to	  enact	  a	  series	  of	  
measures	  that	  aimed	  at	  curtailing	  the	  Church’s	  powers.149	  At	  the	  core	  of	  these	  policies	  was	  
the	  establishing	  of	  rigid	  State	  control	  over	  education,	  the	  introduction	  of	  civil	  marriage	  and	  
a	  supervisory	  role	  for	  the	  State	  in	  the	  appointment	  of	  Bishops.	  This	  was	  Italy’s	  Culture	  War.	  
The	   conflict	   reached	   its	   climax	   with	   the	   break	   through	   the	   city	   walls	   of	   Rome150	   in	  
September	   1870	  which	   subsequently	   led	   to	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   the	   Pope	   into	   the	   Vatican.	  
From	   that	   point	   onwards	   he	   started	   to	   cultivate	   the	   image	   of	   being	   held	   prisoner	   in	   the	  
liberal	  Italian	  State.151	  
The	   confrontation	   between	   Church	   and	   State	   had	   a	   number	   of	   unexpected	  
consequences	   and	   arguably	   backfired	   for	   both	   sides.	   While	   the	   Vatican’s	   mobilization	   of	  
Catholics	   led	   to	   a	   weakening	   of	   its	   central	   authority	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   as	   these	   lay	   agents	  
increasingly	  took	  a	  life	  on	  their	  own,	  the	  liberal	  State’s	  repressive	  measures	  weakened	  the	  
appeal	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  for	  the	  citizens.	  
Catholic	  mobilization	   against	   the	   anti-­‐clerical	   state	   led	   to	   a	   phenomenon	   that	   the	  
Vatican	  had	  initially	  tried	  to	  avoid.	  It	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  relatively	  independent	  and	  
quite	  successful	  Catholic	  press.	  By	  1872	  seventeen	  Catholic	  daily	  newspapers	  existed,	  which	  
were	   accompanied	   by	   109	   Catholic	   periodicals.	   Furthermore,	   Catholicism	   started	   to	  
organize	   on	   the	   lay	   level	   in	   various	   associations	   and	   clubs.	   The	   spread	   of	   self-­‐organizing	  
Catholic	  organizations	  led	  to	  a	  supervision	  problem	  for	  the	  Vatican.	  Even	  though	  Italy	  was,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  reaction	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  anticlerical	  ‘Siccardi	  Laws’.	  It	  became	  a	  buzzword	  for	  anti-­‐liberal	  Catholics	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  century.	  	  147	  There	  had	  been	  a	  brief	  period	  after	  the	  sack	  of	  Rome	  during	  which	  the	  Liberal	  state	  tried	  to	  straighten	  out	  relations	  with	  the	  Vatican	  through	  concessions.	  148	  Kelikian,	  A.	  A.	  (2002)	  p.	  45.	  149	  Kertzer,	  D.	  I.	  (2000)	  p.	  194.	  150	  The	  taking	  of	  Rome	  became	  feasible	  when	  Napoleon	  III	  had	  to	  withdraw	  the	  French	  Garrison	  from	  the	  Eternal	  City	  due	  to	  the	  French-­‐Prussian	  war.	  151	  The	  demand	  to	  include	  Rome	  into	  the	  new	  Italy	  increased	  exponentially	  among	  young	  patriotic	  Italians	  who	  heralded	  ‘O	  Roma	  O	  Morte’	  (Or	  Rome,	  or	  Death!).	  Pollard,	  J.	  (2008)	  p.	  27.	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compared	   to	   German,	   Belgium	   or	   France,	   a	   laggard	   with	   this	   development	   it	   still	  
experienced	  a	   remarkably	   rapid	  extension	  of	  Catholic	   lay	  mobilization	   towards	   the	  end	  of	  
the	  century.	  However,	   the	   same	  Vatican	   that	  had	   issued	   the	  Non	  Expedite	   could	  not	  now	  
allow	  these	  movements	  be	  translated	  into	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  Catholic	  party.	  In	  fact,	  through	  
the	  formation	  of	  the	  Opera	  dei	  Congress	  (Congress	  Movement)	  the	  Vatican	  tried	  to	  correct	  
this	  mistake	  and	  to	  reestablish	  the	  Vatican’s	  control	  over	  the	  sprawling	  lay	  movement.152	  Its	  
statute	  of	  1883	  described	  its	  purpose	  to	  	  
	  
unite	  and	  reorganize	  Catholics	  and	  Catholic	  associations	  from	  all	  of	  Italy	  in	  a	  common	  and	  coordinated	  action	  to	  
defend	  […]	  all	  of	  the	  sacrosanct	  rights	  of	  the	  Church	  and	  of	  the	  papacy	  and	  the	  religious	  and	  social	  interests	  of	  
the	  Italians,	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  desires	  and	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  Holy	  Father	  and	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  the	  
episcopate	  and	  the	  clergy.153	  
	  
From	  unification	  onwards,	  Italy	  saw	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  Catholic	  subculture	  through	  
associations	   of	   all	   kinds.	   The	   phenomenon	   was	   initially	   interpreted	   by	   the	   Vatican	   as	   a	  
weakness	   of	   Catholicism	   in	   Italy	   because	   Catholicism	   should	   be	   so	   paramount	   on	   the	  
peninsula	   that	   the	   parochial	   network	   would	   be	   sufficient	   to	   foster	   it.	   A	   lay	   associative	  
network	   should	  not	  be	  needed.	   	  However,	   this	   changed	  with	   the	  election	  of	   Leo	  XIII	  who	  
defeated	  his	  reactionary	  opponent	  in	  1878	  by	  a	  slim	  margin.	  Though	  Leo	  XIII	  did	  not	  retreat	  
from	   the	   Vatican’s	   hostile	   stand	   regarding	   the	   Italian	   state,	   he	   “saw	   the	   importance	   of	  
adapting	  Church	   tactics	  and	  Church	  organization	   to	   the	  new	  times”154	  as	  Kertzer	  analyses.	  
This	   was	   a	   paradigm	   shift:	   an	   active	   fostering	   of	   organizational	   and	   programmatic	  
development	   of	   ideas	   on	   how	   to	   influence	   state	   and	   society	   was	   now	   demanded.	   It	   is	  
interesting	  that	  this	  happened	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  liberals,	  under	  Crispi,	  discovered	  the	  
state	  as	  a	  useful	  tool	  and	  recommenced	  stripping	  the	  Church	  of	  its	  prerogatives.	  Especially	  
Crispi’s	  attempts	  on	  welfare	  were	  perceived	  as	  a	  hostile	  attack.	  The	  Vatican	  could	  not	  react	  
with	  pure	  stoicism.	  It	  had	  to	  present	  alternatives.	  Leo	  XIII’s	  new	  strategy	  did	  not	  therefore	  
confine	   itself	   to	   the	   organizational	   level.	   With	   the	   issuing	   of	   the	   social	   encyclical	   Rerum	  
Novarum	  the	  new	  pope	  also	  pushed	  for	  an	  ideational	  modernization	  of	  Church	  ideology.	  155	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  This	  all	  also	  explains	  why	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  Catholic	  party	  in	  Italy	  never	  came	  about	  before	  the	  1920s.	  As	  brilliantly	  layed	  out	  in	  Kalyvas’s	  account.	  Kalyvas,	  S.	  (1996).	  153	  Kertzer,	  D.I.	   (2000)	  p.	  198.	  This	  statement	  differs	   in	  remarkable	  ways	   from	  similar	  German	  ones	  as,	  instead	  of	  progress,	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  papacy	  and	  Church	  prerogatives	  is	  central.	  154	  Kertzer,	  D.I.	  (2000)	  p.	  198.	  155	  Romanelli,	  R.	  (1979)	  pp.	  324-­‐338.	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In	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Vatican	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  the	  Roman	  Question	  (how	  
to	  restore	  the	  temporal	  power	  of	  the	  Pope)	  merged	  ever	  more	  into	  the	  Social	  Question.156	  
Not	  because	  the	  social	  question	  was	  all	  of	  a	  sudden	  so	  functionally	  pressing	  (it	  had	  been	  so	  
all	  the	  time)	  but	  because	  it	  was	  now	  being	  used	  as	  a	  political	  issue	  by	  Crispi.	  If	  the	  Vatican	  
did	  not	  want	   to	   lose	  more	  and	  more	  Catholics	   to	   Socialism	  or	   to	  Crispi,	  who	  by	  now	  was	  
starting	  to	  copy	  Bismarck’s	  carrot	  and	  stick	  strategy,	   it	  had	  to	  take	  action.	   Indeed,	  Leo	   IIIX	  
instructed	  his	  priests	  to:	  “	  ‘come	  forth	  from	  the	  sacristy	  and	  go	  among	  the	  people’	  ”.157	  The	  
Church	   launched	   a	   dense	   network	   of	   peasant	   leagues,	   cooperatives,	   Catholic	   rural	   saving	  
and	   loan	   banks	   and	   other	   economic	   and	   social	   organizations.	   However,	   the	   Church	   was	  
always	  worried	  that	  these	  lay	  organizations	  would	  escape	  direct	  Church	  control	  in	  the	  long	  
run.	  
6.3.1 Conclusion	  
From	  the	  developments	  sketched	  out	  above	  three	  major	  points	  are	  to	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  when	  
thinking	   about	   Italy’s	   historical	   development	   in	   the	   19th	   and	   20th	   century.	   The	   first	   is	   the	  
direct	   confrontation	  between	  Church	   and	   State	  which	   raged	  much	   longer	   and	  was	   fiercer	  
than	   in	   any	   other	   Continental	   European	   country	   (Italy	   1861-­‐1930;	   Germany	   1871-­‐1880).	  
One	  of	  the	  biggest	  differences	  between	  Italy	  and	  other	  countries	  was	  that,	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  
neither	   side	   seemed	   to	   gain	   the	   upper	   hand	   and	   so	   neither	   side	   wanted	   to	   give	   in.	   This	  
resulted	   in	   a	   war	   of	   worldviews	   in	   which	   the	   Pope	   filled	   Catholics	   with	   mistrust	   and	  
resentment	   towards	   the	   new	   state	   and	   its	   institutions	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   side,	   the	   Liberal	  
governing	   elite	   promoted	   hostility	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   Church.	   In	   the	   end,	   this	   resulted	   in	   the	  
absurd	   situation	   that	   both	   parties	   simultaneously	   reduced	   their	   legitimacy.	   The	   second	  
lesson	   is	   that,	   in	   contrast	   to	   other	   countries,	   the	   contest	   between	   both	   parties	   did	   not	  
translate	   into	   fruitful	   political	   competition.	  Neither	  modern	   parties	   nor	   social	  movements	  
formed.	   This	   Cold	   War	   was	   a	   programmatic	   stalemate	   in	   which	   each	   side	   –	   due	   to	   the	  
perverse	  fit	  of	  their	  worldviews	  –	  could	  fall	  back	  to	  their	  orthodox	  programmatic	  positions	  
of	   laissez	   faire	  on	   the	   liberal	   side	  and	   subsidiarity	  on	   the	  Church’s.	   Therefore,	  no	  modern	  
organizational	   vehicles	   evolved	   that	   could	   have	   channeled	   the	   widespread	   discontent	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  Brezzi,	  C.	  (1980)	  La	  ’Rerum	  Novarum’	  e	  il	  movimento	  cattolico.	  IN:	  Cherubini,	  G.,	  Della	  Peruta,	  F.,	  Lepore,	  E.,	  Mazza,	  M.	  Mori,	  G.	  Procacci,	  G.	  &	  Villari,	  R.	  (eds.)	  Storia	  della	  Società	  Italiana,	  Vol.	  19,	  La	  crisi	  di	  fine	  secolo	  (1880-­‐1900),	  Milano,	  Teti,	  pp.	  235-­‐278.	  	  157	  Cited	  IN:	  Pollard,	  J.	  (2008)	  p.	  60.	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society.	  Instead,	  in	  Italy	  both	  sides	  stayed	  put.	  Neither	  the	  Catholics	  nor	  the	  Liberals	  formed	  
modern	  mass	  parties	   in	  19th	  century	   Italy.	  The	   institutional	   setup	  of	   the	  polity	  guaranteed	  
that	  constituencies	  remained	  stable	  for	  both	  sides.	  For	  all	  these	  reasons,	  a	  contest	  of	  ideas	  
never	  developed	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  Catholicism	  as	  well	  as	  liberalism	  were	  much	  narrower	  and	  
old-­‐school	  in	  Italy	  than	  in	  any	  other	  Continental	  European	  country	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  the	  
19th	  century.	  As	  we	  will	   see	   in	   the	   following	  chapter,	  modern	  Catholic	  Social	   teaching	  was	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  For	  a	  good	  assessment	  of	  the	  precise	  origins	  of	  Rerum	  Novarum	  see:	  Misner,	  P.	  (1992).	  
	   	   	   206	  
	  
	   	   	   207	  
	  




The	  following	  chapter	  will	  analyze	  the	  early	  trajectories	  of	  Italian	  welfare	  state	  formation	  against	  the	  
backdrop	  of	  the	  institutional,	  historical,	  economic,	  political	  and	  especially	  Church-­‐State	   legacies	   laid	  
out	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter.	   I	   will	   try	   to	   answer	   three	   interrelated	   questions	   on	   Italian	   welfare	  
development:	  First,	  why	  did	  Italian	  modern	  welfare	  develop	  so	  late	  even	  though	  early	  liberal	  leaders	  
like	  Cavour	  had	  carried	  strong	  convictions	  that	  without	  a	  modern	  welfare	  system	  it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  
form	   the	   great	   society	   that	   was	   needed	   for	   the	   liberal	   nation	   building	   project?	   Second,	   why	   did	  
modern	   welfare	   still	   come	   about	   in	   the	   end?	   Third,	   why	   did	   the	   new	   welfare	   regime	   differ	   so	  
extensively	   in	   shape	   from	   the	   late	   19th	   century	   paramount	   German	   role	   model?	   The	   argument	  
advanced	   in	   the	   following	   section	   is	   that	   the	   early	   truce	   between	   the	   two	   predominant	   political	  
forces	  on	  the	  peninsula,	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  the	  Liberal	  state	  elites,	  on	  welfare	  matters	  led	  to	  a	  
situation	   in	  which	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  of	  programmatic	  competition	  on	  welfare	   ideas	  could	  not	  unfold.	  
Liberalism	  was	   happy	   to	   rely	   on	   laissez	   faire	   ideology	  while	   the	   Church	  was	   delighted	   to	   embrace	  
subsidiarity	  that	  allowed	  it	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  its	  antiquated	  poor	  relief	  ideas.	  This	  was	  possible	  as	  long	  as	  
the	  welfare	  apparatus	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  remained	  unchallenged	  by	  the	  Liberals.	  The	  result	  was	  
that	  when	  the	  Liberals	  under	  Crispi	  did	  finally	  attempt	  to	  strip	  the	  Church	  of	  its	  welfare	  prerogatives,	  
none	  of	  the	  political	  forces	  had	  yet	  prepared	  any	  blueprints	  for	  a	  modern	  welfare	  regime.	  Therefore,	  
the	  first	  modern	  Italian	  welfare	  legislation	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  produced	  only	  rudimentary	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7.1 The	  origins	  of	  Italian	  Welfare	  
Any	   account	   of	   Italian	   welfare	   provisions	   must	   start	   with	   a	   description	   of	   how	   welfare	  
looked	  like	  before	  modern	  social	  security	  was	  brought	  about.	  Italian	  welfare	  consisted	  of	  a	  
widespread	   system	  of	   local,	   usually	   Church	   run,	   charity	   institutions	   –	   the	   so	   called	  Operé	  
Pie.	   The	   roughly	   20	   000	  Operé	   Pie	   existing	   at	   the	   time	   of	   unification	   constituted	   a	   highly	  
fragmented,	   opaque,	   inefficient	   and	  often	   corrupt	   system	  of	  welfare	  provision.	  Operé	  Pie	  
were	   usually	   constituted	   of	   poor	   relief	   institutions	   but	   sometimes	   also	   hospitals	   and	  
hospices.	   The	   Liberal	   Senator	   Leopoldo	   Franchetti	   wrote	   about	   Operé	   Pie	   in	   his	   famous	  
report	  about	  state,	  administration	  and	  social	  conditions	  in	  Southern	  Italy	  in	  1876:	  
	  
the	  Operé	  Pie	  are	  in	  general	  considered	  by	  the	  class	  that	  administers	  them	  as	  a	  domain	  that	  has	  to	  strive	  for	  the	  
personal	   advantage.	   For	   the	   honest	   ones	   they	   are	   a	  means	   of	   influence	   and	   favoritism,	   for	   the	   less	   honest	   a	  
source	  of	  easy	  profits	  and	  illicit	  earnings.1	  	  
	  
	  The	   liberals	   that	   took	   power	   in	   the	   kingdom	   of	   Piedmont-­‐Sardinia,	   during	   the	   mid-­‐18th	  
century,	   had	   therefore	   ample	   reason	   to	   reform	   the	   existing	   system.	   It	   was	   highly	  
dysfunctional	  and	  out	  of	   sync	  with	   the	  Liberal	  modernization	  claims	  and	   in	   the	  hands	  and	  
under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Vatican,	  liberalism’s	  arch-­‐enemy.	  	  
Indeed,	   even	  before	  unification,	   liberalism	  had	   already	   launched	   various	   attempts	  
to	   bring	   poor	   relief	   under	   state	   control	   in	   Piedmont-­‐Sardinia.	   Cavour	   had	   studied	   and	  
published	   extensively	   on	   the	   English	   poor	   relief	   reforms	   of	   the	   early	   19th	   century.2	   He	  
envisioned	   a	   modern	   welfare	   state	   along	   British	   lines	   that	   would	   help	   to	   form	   a	   great	  
society	  as	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  the	  liberal	  nation-­‐	  and	  state-­‐building	  project.	  Italian	  Liberals	  in	  the	  
1850s	  were	  still	  convinced	  that	  unification	  could	  only	  be	  successful	  if	  supported	  by	  a	  social	  
revolution.3	   Cavour	   expressed	   this	   as	   early	   as	   1851	   in	   a	   speech	   to	   the	   Piedmont	   senate	  
where	  he	  put	  forward:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “le	  opere	  pie	  sono	  considerate	  in	  genere	  della	  classe	  che	  le	  administra	  come	  un	  campo	  che	  deve	  fruttare	  per	  proprio	  vantaggio.	  Per	  gli	  onesti	  sono	  un	  mezzo	  di	  influenza	  e	  di	  favoritismo,	  per	  i	  meno	  onesti	  una	  sorgente	  di	  facili	  lucri	  e	  di	  illeciti	  guadagni”	  Fianchetti,	  L.,	  Sonnino.	  S.	  (1974)	  
Inchiesta	  in	  Sicilia,	  Vol.	  I,.	  Firenze,	  Vallechhi,	  P.	  110,	  cited	  IN:	  Fargion,	  V.	  (1986)	  Welfare	  state	  e	  
decentramento	  in	  Italia:	  Le	  politiche	  socio-­‐assistenziali	  negli	  anni	  settanta,	  Florence,	  European	  Univeristy	  Institute,	  Doctoral	  Thesis,	  SPS	  Department,	  p.	  3.	  2	  Little	  did	  Cavour	  know	  though	  that	  the	  English	  poor	  law	  reform	  of	  the	  1830s	  would	  also	  utterly	  fail	  as	  a	  quick	  look	  at	  the	  novels	  of	  Charles	  Dickens	  reveals.	  3	  This	  indeed	  resembles	  Bismarck’s	  ideas	  of	  an	  ‘Innere	  Reichsgründung’	  –	  the	  internal	  consolidation	  of	  the	  Reich	  after	  its	  external	  consolidation	  through	  the	  unification	  wars.	  See	  chapter	  III.	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I	  believe	  that	  there	  exists	  an	  immense	  prejudice	  against	  the	  idea	  of	  legal	  charity,	  but	  I	  predict	  that	  all	  societies	  
which	  have	  arrived	  at	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   [economic]	  development	  will	   necessarily	   resort	   to	   legal	   charity.	   I	   also	  
believe	  that	  experience	  will	  show	  in	  a	  not-­‐so-­‐distant	  future	  that	  legal	  charity,	  which	  is	  administered	  well	  and	  is	  
governed	   by	   sound	   norms,	   can	   produce	   immense	   [economic	   and	   social]	   benefits	   [for	   the	   nation]	   without	  
resulting	  in	  those	  devastating	  [financial]	  consequences	  [for	  the	  taxpayer	  and	  the	  state]	  that	  many	  [conservatives	  
and	  critics]	  fear.4	  
	  
Cavour’s	   idea	   was	   to	   liberate	   Italian	   society	   from	   the	   grip	   of	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   by	  
establishing	  a	  state	  run	  system	  of	  welfare,	  but	  his	  first	  attempts	  ended	  in	  disastrous	  defeat.5	  
The	   Vatican	   was	   able	   to	   form	   an	   alliance	   with	   Conservative	   Catholic	   deputies	   in	   the	  
Piedmont	   parliament	   and	   managed	   to	   convince	   the	   Piedmontese	   monarchy	   (House	   of	  
Savoy)	  of	  the	  merits	  of	  its	  cause.	  	  The	  social	  security	  law	  that	  was	  finally	  approved	  in	  1859	  
did	  technically	  provide	  the	  possibility	  of	  temporary	  state	  supervision	  of	  Operé	  Pie.	  But	  it	  was	  
clear	   that	   the	   state	   supervision	   was	   never	   put	   into	   practice.	   The	   result	   was	   drastic.	  
Liberalism,	   from	  that	  point	  onwards,	   left	  Church	  welfare	  untouched,	  which	  meant	   that	  all	  
previous	  good	  intentions	  of	  creating	  a	  fruitful	  liberal	  debate	  on	  welfare	  that	  went	  beyond	  a	  
‘state	  hands	  off	  approach’	  were	  put	  on	  ice.	  In	  fact,	  Quine	  notes:	  
	  
In	  the	  1860s	  and	  1870s,	  the	  governing	  class	  issued	  no	  great	  program	  of	  social	  reform	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  new	  
nation	  state.	  Nor	  did	  Italian	  liberalism	  more	  generally	  produce	  its	  own	  principles	  of	  social	  rights	  or	  entitlements	  
to	  welfare.6	  
	  
With	   the	   abandonment	   of	   the	   programmatic	   idea	   of	   social	   reform,	   Italian	   liberalism	  
distinguished	  social	  liberalism	  from	  its	  worldview.	  Italian	  Liberalism	  instead	  adopted	  laissez	  
faire	   programmatic	   ideas.	   Consequently,	   state	   interventions	   like	   social	   security	   were	  
encountered	  by	  a	  “fear	  and	  loathe”7	  attitude	  among	  Italian	  liberals	  in	  the	  first	  three	  decades	  
after	  unification.	  Pure	  market	   liberal	   laissez-­‐faire	  programmatic	   ideas	   started	   to	  dominate	  
between	  1860	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1880s.	  Italian	  liberals	  wanted	  to	  see	  the	  state	  in	  a	  fence	  
position	  on	  welfare.	   This	   remarkably	   differs	   from	   the	  developments	  of	   liberalism	   in	  other	  
European	   countries	   at	   the	   same	   time.	  While	   Liberalism	   in	   other	   European	   countries,	   like	  
Germany	   or	   the	   UK,	   developed	   gradually	   away	   from	   pure	   laissez	   faire	   “Manchesterism”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Count	  Camillo	  Benso	  di	  Cavour	  (from	  a	  speech	  delivered	  to	  the	  Piedmontese	  Senate,	  17	  February	  1851),	  quoted	  IN:	  Quine,	  M.	  S.	  (2002)	  Italy’s	  Social	  Revolution:	  Charity	  and	  Welfare	  from	  
Liberalism	  to	  Fascism,	  Houndsmills,	  Palgrave,	  p.	  14.	  5	  Therefore,	  Italian	  liberalism	  seems	  not	  to	  have	  been,	  at	  least	  during	  its	  early	  stages,	  as	  void	  of	  different	  nuanced	  ideas	  on	  social	  security	  as	  some	  authors	  portray	  it.	  6	  Quine,	  M.	  S.	  (2002)	  p.	  38.	  7	  Quine,	  M.S.	  (2002)	  p.	  39.	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towards	   more	   state	   driven	   approaches,	   Italian	   Liberalism	   seemed	   to	   take	   the	   opposite	  
direction.	  Quine	  summarizes	  by	  putting	  forward	  that	  	  
	  
Even	   when	   advocating	   individual	   responsibility	   for	   welfare,	   German	   liberals	   formulated	   corporatist	   plans	   for	  
social	  betterment	  which	  did	  not	  preclude	  support	  for	  collectivism	  under	  state	  direction.8	  	  
	  
The	  ideological	  level	  of	  Italian	  liberalism	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  seemed	  to	  have	  fallen	  back	  
to	  that	  of	  British	  liberalism	  in	  the	  18th	  century.	  
The	  first	  law	  considering	  welfare	  after	  unification	  reflected	  these	  new	  programmatic	  
ideas.	  Law	  No.	  753	  as	  approved	  by	  parliament	  on	  the	  3rd	  August	  1862	  provided	  a	  legal	  basis	  
and	   framework	   for	   the	   operation	   of	   Operé	   Pie	   and	   had	   been	   layered	   attached	   onto	   an	  
earlier	  Piedmont	  law	  from	  1859.	  It	  established	  a	  potential	  technical	  supervisory	  role	  for	  the	  
state	  over	  Operé	  Pie	  which	  was	  never	  thoroughly	  implemented.	  As	  so	  often	  in	  Liberal	  Italy,	  
state	  supervision	  belonged	  only	  to	  the	  paese	  legale	  (legal	  world)	  and	  never	  became	  part	  of	  
the	  paese	  reale	  (real	  world).	  	  
The	  question	   is	  why	   Italian	  Liberalism	  developed	   in	  a	  direction	  that	  had	   long	  been	  
surpassed	  by	  the	  liberal	  movements	  in	  other	  countries?	  One	  explanation	  is	  that	  Cavour	  had	  
learned	   from	   his	   clash	   with	   the	   Church	   in	   1859	   on	  welfare	   and	   shied	   away	   from	   further	  
challenging	  the	  Church	  during	  unification.	  After	  having	  secularized	  the	  educational	  system,	  
stripped	  the	  church	  of	  large	  parts	  of	  its	  property	  and	  encircled	  Rome,	  Cavour	  simply	  did	  not	  
want	   to	   further	  “increase	   the	   resentment	  of	   the	  old	  elites	  against	   the	  new	  government.”9	  
Even	  if	  social	  security	  reform	  was	  deeply	  entrenched	  in	  the	  liberal	  worldview,	  at	  that	  point	  
in	  time	  it	  would	  have	  endangered	  the	  Liberal	  state-­‐building	  interest.	  
Fargion	  has	  a	  different	  explanation	  and	  underlines	  that	  the	  passivity	  of	  the	  state	  on	  
welfare	  came	  from	  a	  deep-­‐seated	  disinterest	   in	  the	   lower	  social	  stratus	  by	  the	  new	  liberal	  
state	  elites.	  She	  comments:	  
	  
However,	   if	   we	   analyze	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   legislative	   directives	   approved	   in	   the	   first	   three	   decades	   of	   Italian	  
parliamentary	  activity,	   there	   is	  no	  doubt	  about	  the	  undisputed	  substantial	  disinterest	  of	   the	  ruling	  classes	   in	  a	  
narrower	  sense	  towards	  the	  charitable	  bodies	  and	  in	  a	  general	  sense	  towards	  problems	  of	  social-­‐assistance.10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Quine,	  M.	  S.	  (2002)	  p.	  39.	  9	  “Aumentare	  i	  risentimenti	  delle	  veccie	  elites	  verso	  il	  nuovo	  governo.”	  Fargion,	  V.	  (1986)	  p.	  7.	  The	  first	  three	  decades	  after	  unification	  saw	  some	  attempts	  to	  reform	  the	  malfunctioning	  and	  corrupt	  system	  but	  these	  were	  usually	  half-­‐hearted	  attempts	  proposed	  by	  individual	  deputies	  that	  had	  no	  success.	  10	  “Tuttavia	  se	  analizziamo	  la	  natura	  dei	  provvedimenti	  legislative	  approvati	  nei	  primi	  tre	  decenni	  di	  attività	  del	  Parlamento	  italiano	  appare	  indubbio	  un	  sostanziale	  disinteresse	  delle	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Such	   disregard	   for	   the	   lower	   social	   classes,	   and	   the	   preoccupation	   of	   liberal	   elites	   with	  
themselves,	   certainly	  existed	   in	  post-­‐unification	   Italy	  but	  Fargion	  does	  not	  assess	  whether	  
this	  was	  only	  a	  common	  attitude	  or	  whether	  it	  was	  deeper	  embedded	  in	  the	  worldview	  of	  
Italian	  Liberalism.	  
Other	   scholars	   see	   the	   constraints	   posed	   by	   the	   large	   scale	   budget	   deficits	   that	  
liberal	  Italy	  inherited	  from	  the	  pre-­‐unification	  states	  as	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  welfarephobia	  of	  
post-­‐unification	   political	   elites	   in	   Italy.	   Maurizio	   Ferrera	   puts	   forward	   that	   the	   constant	  
brinkmanship	   on	   a	   debt	   crisis,	   along	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   whole	   liberal	   movement	   is	  
premised	  on	  having	  a	  balanced	  budget,	  countered	  any	  attempt	  to	  press	  for	  an	  active	  role	  of	  
the	   State	   in	   welfare.11	   It	   was	   therefore	   convenient	   for	   the	   state	   to	   leave	   welfare	   in	   the	  
hands	  of	  the	  Church.	  Indeed,	  as	  the	  following	  quote	  shows,	  the	  liberal	  ministers	  felt	  a	  chill	  
down	  the	  back	  of	  their	  necks	  when	  they	  thought	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  opening	  the	  door	  to	  big	  
government.	   Giuseppe	   Zanardelli,	   the	   minister	   of	   public	   works	   under	   Crispi	   put	   forward	  
that:	  
	  
we	  have	  no	  empire,	  no	  industry,	  no	  navy.	  If	  we	  expunge	  every	  expression	  of	  private	  activity,	  what	  will	  we	  have	  
left?	  We	  will	   become	   a	   nation	   of	   administrators;	  we	  will	   create	   a	   society	   enmeshed	   in	   the	  machinery	   of	   the	  
state;	  we	  will	  have	   l’impiegomania,	  [employee-­‐mania]	  which,	  already	  being	  so	  widespread	  and	  consuming,	  will	  
end	   up	   impeding	   the	   functioning	   of	   ministries	   and	   departments	   and	   blocking	   the	   vital	   circulatory	   system	   of	  
government.12	  
	  
This	   would	   not	   change	   even	   when	   the	   Mazzinian	   Republican	   Left	   took	   power.	   Fargion	  
remarks	   that	   even	   after	   the	   shift	   towards	   a	   left	   liberal	   government	   (Sinistra	   Storica)	   the	  
“activity	   of	   the	   left	   concluded	   having	   achieved	   nothing”.13	   Liberal	   Italy	   did	   not	   see	   the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  welfare	  state	  during	  the	  first	  three	  decades	  after	  unification.	  	  The	  “boldest	  
social	  reform	  was	  the	  introduction	  of	  compulsory	  education	  from	  six	  to	  nine	  years	  of	  age	  in	  
1877”14	  as	  Ferrera	  remarks.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  classi	  dirigenti	  nei	  confronti	  sia	  degli	  enti	  caricativi	  in	  senso	  stretto	  che	  in	  generale	  delle	  problematiche	  socio-­‐assistenziali.”	  	  Fargion,	  V.	  (1986)	  p.	  6.	  11	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1984)	  Il	  welfare	  state	  in	  Italia:	  Sviluppo	  e	  crisi	  in	  Prospettiva	  comparata,	  Bologna,	  Il	  Mulino.	  12	  Zanardelli	  cited	  IN:	  Quine,	  M.	  S.	  (2002)	  p.	  40.	  13	  “l’attivitá	  della	  Sinistra	  storica	  si	  conclude	  con	  nulla	  di	  fatto.”	  Farigon,	  V.	  (1986)	  p.	  12.	  There	  had	  been	  several	  reform	  attempts	  like	  the	  “utopistic”	  (Fargion)	  one	  of	  the	  Minister	  Nicotera	  in	  1877	  all	  went	  up	  in	  smoke.	  14	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1986)	  Italy,	  IN:	  Flora,	  P.	  (ed.)	  Growth	  to	  Limits:	  The	  Western	  European	  Welfare	  
States	  Since	  World	  War	  II,	  Volume	  2,	  Germany,	  United	  Kingdom,	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  p.	  388.	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In	  addition,	  Ferrera	  points	  to	  another	  possible	  explanation	  for	  the	  non-­‐formation	  of	  
the	  Italian	  welfare	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  that	  goes	  beyond	  mere	  structural	  
(budget)	  or	  attitudinal	  (disinterest	  of	  the	  elite)	  explanations.	  Ferrera	  puts	  forward	  that	  post-­‐
unification	   liberalism	   was	   embracing	   “Laissez	   faire”	   as	   a	   programmatic	   idea	   of	   non-­‐
intervention	   of	   the	   state	   in	   welfare,	   hence	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   belief	   system	   of	   Liberals	  
embedded	   in	   the	  worldview	  of	   Italian	   Liberalism.15	  The	  “plebe”	   should	  be	  helped	   through	  
teaching	   it	   the	   “virtue	   of	   work	   and	   saving	   and	   the	   development	   of	   individual	  
responsibility.”16	  However,	  this	  differed	  drastically	  from	  Cavour’s	  early	  welfare	  ideas	  of	  the	  
1850s	  in	  which	  he	  envisioned	  a	  great	  society	  built	  by	  the	  Liberal	  state.	   If	  the	  reluctance	  to	  
build	  a	  welfare	  system	  was	  new	  to	  Italian	  Liberalism,	  the	  question	  is	  what	  triggered	  this	  shift	  
in	  Italian	  liberal	  ideology,	  especially	  because	  it	  also	  ran	  counter	  to	  the	  experiences	  in	  most	  
other	   European	   countries.	   Could	   it	   be	   that	   the	   liberal	   ideology	   had	   shifted,	   following	   the	  
first	   setbacks	   on	   pre-­‐unification	  welfare	   reform	   in	   Piedmont,	   from	   an	   active	   approach	   of	  
building	  a	  social	  society	  towards	  a	  passive	  laissez-­‐faire	  ideology?	  
The	  effects	  of	   the	   liberal	   state	   versus	   church	   conflict	   here	  were	   the	   same	  as	   they	  
were	   in	   the	  domain	  of	  economic	  policy.	  The	   liberal	  State	  and	  Church	  managed	   to	   reach	  a	  
truce	   on	   welfare	   from	   the	   1860s	   onwards.	   This	   amounted	   to	   a	   gentlemen’s	   agreement	  
between	   Church	   and	   liberal	   elites	   whereby	   neither	   party	   interfered	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   the	  
other.	  This	  was	  possible	   through	  the	  perverted	   fit	  of	   the	  two	  sides’	  worldviews	  that	  came	  
about	  owing	  to	  the	  match	  between	  the	  programmatic	  ideas	  of	  subsidiarity	  and	  laissez	  faire,	  
both	   of	   which	   had	   long	   been	   surpassed	   by	   the	   Catholic	   and	   Liberal	   movement	   in	   other	  
European	  countries.17	  The	  result	  was	  a	  residual	   role	   for	   the	  state	   in	  welfare	   in	   the	   first	  30	  
years	  after	  unification.	  It	  was	  comfortable	  for	  Italian	  liberalism	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  ‘laissez	  faire’	  
because	  the	  permanent	  financial	  dilemma	  of	  the	  young	  state	  heavily	  constrained	  them.18	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1984)	  p.	  28.	  16	  “A	  sollevare	  e	  redimere	  la	  plebe	  con	  la	  virtu	  del	  lavoro	  e	  del	  risparmio	  e	  collo	  svolgimento	  della	  responsabilità	  individuale”	  Depretis	  cited	  IN:	  Gaeta,	  F.	  &	  Villani,	  P.	  (1967)	  Documenti	  e	  
Testimonianze,	  Milano,	  Principato,	  p.	  794,	  cited	  IN:	  Fargion,	  V.	  (1986)	  p.	  12.	  17	  To	  my	  surprise	  I	  found	  out	  that	  the	  neo-­‐corporatism	  literature	  of	  the	  1980s	  had	  already	  pointed	  out	  that	  such	  combinations	  were	  possible.	  Streeck,	  W.	  &	  Schmitter,	  P.	  (1985).	  	  18	  Whether	  though	  this	  constraint	  was	  really	  so	  significant	  remains	  questionable	  –	  Bismarck	  was	  also	  far	  from	  having	  balanced	  budgets	  when	  introducing	  welfare	  –	  though	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  Bismarck	  was	  not	  really	  a	  liberal	  and	  did	  not	  worry	  too	  much	  about	  balanced	  budgets	  in	  general.	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7.2 Crispi:	  Breaking	  the	  Stalemate	  and	  opening	  the	  Virtuous	  Circle	  
Like	  in	  Germany,	  the	  ‘carrot’	  of	  public	  welfare	  legislation	  was	  accompanied	  by	  the	  ‘stick’	  of	  direct	  repression19	  	  	  
Maurizio	  Ferrera	  
	  
The	   first	   real	   attempt	   to	   intrude	   into	   the	   Catholic’s	   sphere	   of	   influence	   came	   by	   way	   of	  
Crispi’s	  provisions	   regarding	  Operé	  Pie	   in	  1890.	  With	   the	  Law	  No.	  6892	  of	   the	  17th	  of	   July	  
1890	   he	   established	   full	   state	   supervision	   over	   Operé	   Pie.	   After	   the	   political	   and	   social	  
economic	  agony	  that	  a	   long	  period	  of	  Laissez	  Faire	  politics	  had	  brought	  to	   Italy,	  Crispi	  was	  
determined	  to	  grant	  the	  new	  state	  a	  stronger	  and	  more	  proactive	  role.	  The	  Crispi	  law	  was	  a	  
milestone	  in	  social	  security	  development	  in	  Italy	  because	  it	  represented	  a	  first	  real	  break	  of	  
the	  Church’s	   virtual	  monopoly	  on	  poor	   relief.	  Nevertheless,	   it	   did	  not	  mark	   the	  advent	  of	  
modern	   social	   security	   in	   the	   country	   as	   it	   essentially	   left	   the	   old	   system	   of	   charitable	  
institutions	  intact.	  Fargion	  notes:	  
	  
	  As	  one	  can	  very	  well	  see,	  it	  confirms	  the	  reluctance	  of	  the	  official	  powers	  to	  take	  on	  an	  active	  role	  to	  overcome	  
the	  conditions	  of	  misery	  by	  which	  are	  caught	  vast	  parts	  of	  the	  urban	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  rural	  masses.20	  	  
	  
Quine	  points	  out	  that	  the	  state	  control	  of	  the	  Operé	  Pie	  did	  not	  change	  anything	  about	  the	  
system	  as	  such.	  The	  new	  policy	  “thought	  to	  perfect	  the	  system	  of	  carita-­‐legale,	  but	  not	  to	  
found	  a	  social	  state.”21	  
The	   content	   of	   the	   proposal	   that	   Crispi	   presented	   to	   parliament	   on	   the	   18th	  
February	  1890	  was	  characterized	  by	  “a	  logic	  of	  cold	  rationalization	  of	  the	  existing.”22	  Crispi	  
had	   been	   inspired	   by	   Bismarck’s	   anti-­‐Catholic	   Culture	  War	   legislation.	   Therefore,	   Crispi’s	  
legislation	   was	   anticlerical	   rather	   than	   social-­‐reformist.	   The	   idea	   was	   to	   crowd	   out	   the	  
Church	  from	  poor	  relief,	  not	  to	  modernize	  it.	  
The	   Vatican	   answered	   by	   unleashing	   its	   press,	   mobilizing	   its	   followers	   and	   even	  
lifted	  Non	  Expedite	   to	  a	   limited	  extent	   in	  order	   to	  block	   the	  proposal.	  Despite	   this	   strong	  
clerical	  resistance	  the	  bill	  passed	  parliament.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  “Proprio	  come	  in	  Germania,	  la	  ‘carota’	  della	  legislazione	  previdenziale	  fu	  accompagnata	  dal	  ‘bastone’	  della	  repressione	  diretta”.	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  213.	  20	  “Come	  si	  può	  ben	  vedere,	  si	  conferma	  dunque	  la	  riluttanza	  del	  potere	  pubblico	  ad	  assumere	  un	  ruolo	  attivo	  per	  il	  superamento	  delle	  condizioni	  di	  miseria	  in	  cui	  versano	  vaste	  sacche	  della	  popolazione	  sia	  urbana	  che	  rurale.”	  Fargion,	  V.	  (1986)	  p.	  21.	  21	  Quine,	  M.	  S.	  (2002)	  p.	  56.	  Quine	  shows	  convincingly	  that	  implementation	  of	  state	  control	  of	  opera	  pie	  was,	  once	  enacted,	  a	  disaster	  in	  implementation	  and	  did	  therefore	  never	  really	  happen.	  See:	  Quine,	  M.S.	  (2002)	  pp.	  56-­‐63.	  22	  “una	  logica	  di	  fredda	  razionalizzazione	  dell’esistente”	  Fargion,	  V.	  (1986)	  p.	  16.	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The	  important	  outcome	  of	  Crispi’s	  legislation	  was	  the	  break	  with	  the	  truce	  between	  
the	  Vatican	  and	  the	  Liberal	  elites.	  The	  fallback	  position	  of	  subsidiarity	  for	  Catholicism	  and	  of	  
laissez	  faire	  for	  Liberalism	  was	  no	  longer	  comfortable.	  However,	  the	  question	  remains	  why	  
Crispi	  broke	  with	  the	  Church	  at	  exactly	  that	  point	  in	  time.	  One	  reason	  was	  certainly	  Crispi’s	  
fiercely	  anti	  Catholic	  personality	  as	  a	  “mangia	  prete”,	  a	  priest	  eater.	  What	  might	  be	  more	  
plausible	   is	   that,	   like	   in	   Germany,	   the	   equilibrium	   between	   State	   and	   Church	   in	   Italy	   had	  
been	  upset	  in	  the	  1880s	  by	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  Socialist	  worldview	  that	  threatened	  to	  form	  a	  
new	   subculture.	   As	   the	   number	   of	   strikes	   increased	   drastically	   in	   the	   1880s	   (263	   strikes	  
between	   1880	   and	   1886),	   the	   government	   first	   tried	   to	   quash	   the	  workers	  movement	   by	  
jailing	  most	  of	  the	  Socialist	  Party	  leadership.	  Turatti,	  the	  socialist	   leader,	  was	  sentenced	  to	  
12	   years	   after	   he	   allegedly	   participated	   in	   a	   strike	   in	   Milan.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   Liberal	  
establishment	  around	  Crispi	  responded	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Socialist	  movement	  by	  trying	  
to	  copy	  Bismarck’s	  carrot	  and	  stick	  approach	  –	  except	  without	  the	  carrot.	  
Besides	  mere	  repression,	   the	  entrenchment	  of	   the	  Socialist	  worldview	   in	   Italy	  also	  
had	  another	  effect.	  The	  other	  forces	  had	  to	  react	  with	  programmatic	  development.	  In	  other	  
words,	  Crispi	  had	  triggered	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  of	  doctrinal	  development.	  	  Ferrera	  remarks	  that,	  
from	   the	  end	  of	   the	  1880s	  onwards,	   thinking	   about	   social	   security	  became	  ever	  more	   “in	  
vogue”	  in	  Italy.	  Even	  if	  Catholicism,	  Conservatism,	  Liberalism	  and	  the	  Left	  had	  not	  tabled	  any	  
serious	  social	  security	  ideas	  between	  1860	  and	  1890s,	  from	  this	  point	  onwards	  they	  showed	  
a	   sudden	   remarkable	   interest	   in	   the	   social	   question.23	   It	   seemed	   that	   the	   political	  
establishment	  in	  Italy	  finally	  started	  to	  perceive	  modern	  welfare	  policy	  as	  a	  political	  device.	  
The	  social	  question,	  which	  was	  largely	  a	  southern	  question	  in	  Italy,	  became	  widely	  debated	  
in	   public.	   In	   Turin	   an	   intellectual	   movement	   similar	   to	   the	   “Socialists	   of	   the	   Chair”	  
(Kathedersozialisten)	  started	  to	  emerge	  and	  discussed	  liberal	  or	  state	  induced	  Conservative	  
welfare	  solutions.24	  The	  Left	  started	  to	  think	  in	  revisionist	  terms	  about	  state	  provided	  social	  
security	  while	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  slowly	  began	  refining	  its	  ideas	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  
social	   encyclical	   Rerum	   Novarum.	   Catholics,	   Conservatives	   and	   Liberals	   had	   different	  
interests	   in	   welfare.	   Similarly	   to	   Bismarck,	   the	   governing	   camp	   saw	   social	   security	   as	   a	  
political	   means	   “to	   press	   for	   an	   authoritarian	   restoration	   in	   an	   anti-­‐parliamentarian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23“Social	  policy	  thus	  gained	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  agenda	  of	  all	  political	  movements.	  Formerly	  opposed,	  on	  different	  grounds,	  to	  any	  state	  reform,	  Socialists	  and	  Catholic	  movements	  now	  started	  to	  favour	  and	  actually	  press	  for	  active	  intervention.”	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1986)	  p.	  388.	  24	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1986)	  p.	  388.	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direction”.25	  For	  the	  Liberals,	  modern	  social	  security	  was	  a	  tool	   that	  could	  compensate	  for	  
the	   lack	   of	   tangible	   successes	   they	   had	   had	  with	   the	  modernism	  which	   they	   had	   tried	   to	  
infuse	  into	  Italy.26	  The	  Catholics	  wanted	  to	  defend	  their	  prerogatives	  in	  poor	  relief.	  	  
	  
7.3 Catholic	  Social	  ideas	  in	  Italy	  
Chapter	  IV	  showed	  how	  the	  freshly	  unified	  state	  clashed	  with	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  how	  
the	  Vatican	  struck	  back	  by	  negating	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  new	  state	  and	  its	   institutions.	  As	  
the	   State	   stripped	   the	   Church	   of	   its	   prerogatives	   in	   education	   and	   broke	   most	   of	   its	  
temporal	  powers,	  the	  Church	  responded	  by	  excommunicating	  the	  King,	  issuing	  the	  Syllabus	  
of	  Errors,	  establishing	  papal	  infallibility	  and	  forbidding	  any	  Catholic	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  new	  
polity	  through	  either	  voting	  in	  elections	  or	  taking	  office.	  This	  meant	  that	  Catholicism	  in	  Italy,	  
in	   contrast	   to	   in	   Germany,	   did	   not	   develop	   a	   political	   party	   that	   granted	   it	   power	   and	  
influence	  in	  the	  new	  polity.27	  Instead,	  it	  limited	  itself	  to	  sabotaging	  the	  new	  state	  by	  ignoring	  
it.	   In	   contrast	   to	   Germany,	   where	   the	   Catholics	   could	   influence	   legislation	   through	   the	  
Center	   Party,	   Italian	   Catholics	   locked	   themselves	   out	   from	   these	   possibilities.	   Italian	  
Catholicism	   did	   not	   develop	   a	   network	   of	   lay	   organizations	   before	   the	   mid-­‐1890s	   nor	   a	  
political	  party	  until	  the	  1920s.28	  
Furthermore,	  the	  Italian	  state	  did	  indeed	  challenge	  the	  Church	  on	  numerous	  fronts	  
but,	  up	  to	  the	  1890s,	  never	  on	  welfare.	  Operé	  Pie,	  the	  Church’s	  massive	  welfare	  apparatus	  
in	  Italy,	  was	  left	  untouched	  until	  1890.	  Unlike	  in	  Germany,	  where	  Bismarck	  used	  social	  policy	  
as	  a	  political	  means	  of	  eliminating	  his	  rivals,	  the	  Liberal	  state	  in	  Italy	  did	  not	  engage	  in	  any	  
equivalent	  action	  before	  the	  1890s.	  As	  there	  was	  no	  challenge	  to	  the	  organization	  of	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  “a	  premere	  per	  una	  restaurazione	  autoritaria	  in	  direzione	  anti-­‐parlamentare”	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1984)	  p.	  30.	  26	  In	  General	  Ferrera	  sees	  the	  emergence	  of	  concrete	  social	  policy	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  20th	  rather	  than	  one	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  in	  Italy	  despite	  that	  the	  first	  laws	  were	  enacted	  in	  the	  1890s.	  According	  to	  Ferrera	  interventionist	  social	  policies	  were	  expanded	  along	  with	  the	  franchise	  in	  the	  Giolitti	  era	  but	  it	  was	  only	  after	  WWI	  that	  social	  policy	  became	  the	  major	  topic	  of	  the	  day.	  It	  was	  then	  indeed	  in	  1919	  that	  the	  government	  introduced	  compulsory	  old	  age,	  invalidity	  and	  unemployment	  insurance	  schemes.	  This	  is	  the	  era	  that	  Ferrera	  labels	  ‘social	  insurance	  from	  below’	  and	  is	  according	  to	  him	  marked	  by	  a	  spike	  in	  party	  and	  union	  activism	  with	  the	  Socialists	  and	  Catholics	  actively	  competing	  against	  one	  another	  in	  the	  field	  of	  social	  security.	  The	  advent	  of	  fascism	  then	  set	  a	  contemporary	  end	  to	  this	  by	  halting	  social	  policy	  expansion.	  Only	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Corporatist	  state	  social	  policy	  gained	  again	  momentum	  from	  1927	  onwards	  and	  was	  expanded	  as	  a	  means	  of	  social	  control	  and	  in	  order	  to	  give	  selective	  benefits.	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1986)	  p.	  389.	  	  27	  Romanelli,	  R.	  (1979)	  pp.	  324-­‐338.	  28	  Brezze,	  C.	  (1980)	  pp.	  235-­‐278.	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security	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Operé	  Pie,	  the	  episcopate	  saw	  no	  reason	  to	  invest	  in	  developing	  new	  
ideas	  on	  modern	  social	  security	  that	  could	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  Catholic	  creed.	  Catholic	  
ideas	  on	  welfare	  and	  social	  security	  in	  1880s	  Italy	  were	  therefore	  on	  a	  level	  comparable	  to	  
that	   of	  German	  Catholic	   thinking	   on	  welfare	   in	   the	   1820s.	  As	   early	   as	   1969,	   the	  historian	  
Dennis	  Mack	  Smith	  was	  already	  very	  much	  on	  point	  when	  he	  wondered	  that	  	  
	  
Perhaps	  the	  very	  strength	  of	  clericalism	  in	  Italy	  had	  deprived	  her	  of	  the	  stimulus	  which	  in	  France	  was	  to	  create	  a	  
flourishing	  school	  of	  lay	  Catholic	  philosophers.29	  
	  
Catholic	   social	   teaching	   in	   Italy,	   up	   until	   the	   1880s,	   still	   embraced	   a	   very	   ‘organic’	  
interpretation	  of	  Neo-­‐Thomasian	  ideas.	  This	  basically	  meant	  that	  every	  individual	  had	  been	  
attributed	   a	   place	   in	   society	   by	   God.	   If	   people	   started	   to	   change	   this	   through	   the	  
introduction	   of	   potentially	   progressive	   social	   programs,	   then	   the	   whole	   body	   of	   society	  
would	  inevitably	  cease	  to	  work	  in	  the	  way	  God	  had	  foreseen	  it.	  Early	  Italian	  Catholic	  social	  
welfare	   was,	   therefore,	   confined	   to	   poor	   relief	   through	   the	   Operé	   Pie	   system.	   The	  
archbishop	  of	  Milan	  and	  a	  prominent	  exponent	  of	   Italian	  Catholic	  social	   teaching,	  Cardinal	  
Ferrari,	  exemplified	  this	  when	  instructing	  the	  lower	  clergy:	  
	  
Should	  make	  the	  poor	  understand	  that	  everything	  is	  ordained	  by	  God,	  that	  it	  is	  God	  who	  makes	  some	  rich	  and	  
some	  poor30	  
	  
The	   Operé	   Pie	   system	  worked	   perfectly	   for	   this	   purpose.	  Money	   was	   transferred	  
from	   the	   rich	   to	   the	   poor	   through	   alms.	   This	   had	   the	   advantage	   that	   the	   rich	   would	   be	  
granted	  ascension	   into	  heaven	   through	   the	  doing	  of	  good	  deeds	  while,	  on	   the	  other	   side,	  
the	  poor	  were	  guaranteed	  not	   to	   starve.	  The	  bad	  news	   for	   the	  poor	  was	   that	   they	  would	  
always	  remain	  poor.	  Rising	  from	  the	  lower	  social	  classes	  to	  higher	  rungs	  was	  not	  part	  of	  the	  
logic	  of	  this	  system.	  The	  system	  also	  assigned	  the	  Church	  a	  monopoly	  role	  as	  the	  organizing	  
interlocutor	   between	   all	   societal	   groups	   and	   social	   strata.	   As	   no	   credible	   challenger	   on	  
welfare	   rose	   to	   rival	   this	   system	   in	   Italy,	   such	   as	   Bismarck	   or	  maximalist	   Socialism	   in	   the	  
German	  case,	  the	  Vatican	  saw	  little	  need	  to	  develop	  alternatives.	  The	  election	  of	  the	  anti-­‐
clerical	   Crispi	   as	   Prime	   Minister	   changed	   this.	   Pollard	   notes	   about	   Crispi:	   “In	   particular,	  
Francesco	   Crispi,	   former	   lieutenant	   of	  Garibaldi	   in	   the	   invasion	   of	   Sicily,	  was	   a	   fire-­‐eating	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Mack	  Smith,	  D.	  (1969)	  p.	  251.	  30	  Cited	  IN:	  Pollard,	  J.	  (2008)	  p.	  51.	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anti-­‐clerical,	  a	  veritable	  mangia	  prete	  (‘priest	  eater’).”31	  In	  addition,	  during	  the	  1890s	  a	  wave	  
of	   societal	   discontent	   swept	   Italy	   that	   caused	   the	   Church	   to	   become	   ever	   more	   worried	  
about	   the	   spread	   of	   collective	   organizing	   among	   peasants	   under	   exclusion	   of	   the	   Church.	  
The	   growing	  workers’	  movement	   in	   the	   cities	   of	   the	  North,	   combined	  with	   the	   arrival	   of	  
Socialism,	  also	  worried	  the	  Vatican.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  “Roman	  Question”	  (how	  to	  
restore	   the	   temporal	   power	   of	   the	   Pope)	   shifted	   for	   the	   Vatican	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   19th	  
century	   ever	   more	   into	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   “Social	   Question”.	   The	   Vatican	   had	   to	   take	  
action	  if	  it	  did	  not	  want	  to	  lose	  ever	  more	  Catholics	  to	  Socialism	  or	  Liberalism.	  Indeed,	  Leo	  
IIIX	  instructed	  his	  priests	  to:	  “	  ‘come	  forth	  from	  the	  sacristy	  and	  go	  among	  the	  people’	  ”.32	  
The	   Church	   started	   to	   launch	   a	   dense	   network	   of	   peasant	   leagues,	   cooperatives,	   Catholic	  
rural	  saving	  and	  loan	  banks	  and	  other	  economic	  and	  social	  organizations.	  	  
The	   newly	   ordained	   Pope	   Leo	   XIII	   and	   his	   Rerum	   Novarum	   encyclical	   were	   very	  
important	   in	  kick-­‐starting	  this	  process,	  particularly	  as	   it	   finally	  allowed	  for	  collective	  action	  
by	  not	  explicitly	  banning	  unions	  and	  strikes	  as	  the	  Syllabus	  of	  Errors	  had	  done.	  Under	  Pius	  X,	  
the	  Catholic	  union	  movement	   finally	  started	  to	  grow	  but	   it	  was	  nevertheless	  still	   six	   times	  
smaller	   than	   their	   Socialist	   counterparts.	   The	   Socialists,	   however,	   saw	   the	   threat	   that	   the	  
new	  Catholic	  organizations	  posed	  to	  the	  left-­‐ideational	  hegemony	  on	  unions	  and	  hence	  the	  
CGL,	  the	  biggest	  Socialist	  union,	  accused	  the	  Catholics	  of	  “‘	  systemic	  bootlegging’”.33	  Pollard,	  
meanwhile,	  notes	  about	  the	  fundamental	  change	  in	  the	  Catholic	  approach	  to	  welfare	  that	  
	  
It	  had	  managed	   to	  create	  nothing	   less	   than	  a	  Catholic	   ‘sub-­‐culture’	  alongside	   the	  Marxist	  one,	   thus	   laying	   the	  
foundations	  for	  the	  brief	  period	  of	  success	  of	  the	  Catholic	  political	  party,	  the	  Partito	  Populare	  Italiano,	  from	  1919	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Pollard	  J.	  (2008)	  p.	  39.	  32	  Cited	  in	  Pollard,	  J.	  (2008)	  p.	  60.	  33	  Cited	  IN:	  Pollard,	  J.	  (2008)	  p.	  63.	  34	  Pollard,	  J.	  (2008)	  p.	  68. 
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Figure	  7-­‐1	  Italian	  Union	  Membership	  1910	  
	  
Figure	  by	  the	  author.	  Data	  from	  Pollard,	  J.	  (2008)	  p.	  64.	  
	  
	  
7.3.1 The	  Socialists	  
The	  PSI	  (Partito	  Sociale	  Italiano)	  was	  founded	  in	  1892	  at	  a	  socialist	  congress	  in	  Genoa.	  Even	  
though	  the	  German	  SPD	  loomed	  large	  as	  a	  role	  model,	  the	  PSI	  still	  differed	  in	  its	  ideological	  
composition.35	  Italian	  Socialism	  had	  not	  only	  been	  rooted	  in	  a	  Marxist	  tradition	  but	  was	  also	  
heavily	   influenced	  by	   republican	  and	   radical	   thinking	  of	   the	  unification	  and	   independence	  
movements	   inspired	   by	   people	   like	   Mazzini	   and	   Garibaldi.	   Therefore,	   the	   PSI	   followed	  
Bakunin’s	   legalistic	   and	   minimalistic	   interpretation	   of	   Socialism	   rather	   than	   Marx’s	  
maximalist	  German	  Socialism.	   Italian	  Socialism	  was	  also,	   to	   some	  extent,	  a	  product	  of	   the	  
middle	  classes	  which	  made	  Marx	  sarcastically	  describe	  it	  as	  a	  
	  
a	  gang	  of	  drop-­‐outs,	  the	  dregs	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie	  […]	  All	  the	  so-­‐called	  Sections	  of	  the	  International	   in	   Italy	  are	  
run	  by	  lawyers	  without	  clients,	  by	  doctors	  without	  training	  or	  patients	  and	  by	  billiard	  playing	  students.36	  
	  
Indeed,	   at	   the	   beginning	   Italian	   Socialism	   lacked	   strong	   and	   direct	   connections	   to	   the	  
workers’	   movement,	   which	   was	   itself	   heavily	   fragmented	   and	   rather	   small.	   Turati,	   the	  
socialist	  leader,	  was	  well	  aware	  that	  the	  Italian	  working	  class	  was	  still	  far	  too	  small	  to	  stir	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Spinella,	  M	  (1980)	  Antonio	  Labriola	  e	  l’origine	  del	  marxismo	  in	  Italia.	  IN:	  Cherubini,	  G.,	  Della	  Peruta,	  F.,	  Lepore,	  E.,	  Mazza,	  	  M.	  Mori,	  G.	  Procacci,	  G.	  &	  Villari,	  R.	  (eds.)	  Storia	  della	  Società	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successful	   revolution.	   The	   strategy	  was,	   therefore,	   to	  express	   and	  press	   for	   socialist	   ideas	  
within	   the	  existing	   state	   structures.	  Bartocci	  notes:	   “The	  party	   then	  gave	   itself	   the	   role	  of	  
initiating	   true	   worker’s	   legislation	   through	   political	   agitation	   and	   parliamentary	   action.”37	  	  
Therefore,	  early	  Italian	  Socialism	  was	  less	  revolutionary	  and	  less	  stuck	  in	  Marxist	  positivism	  
than	  most	   of	   its	   other	   European	   counterparts.38	   Bartocci	   reminds	   us	   that	   as	   early	   as	   the	  
third	  Party	  Congress	  in	  1888,	  Andrea	  Costa,	  the	  former	  Anarchist	  leader	  who	  had	  converted	  
to	   Socialism,	   put	   forward	   that	   there	   was	   an	   “opportunity	   to	   translate	   the	   achievements	  
realized	   by	   the	   working	   class	   through	   the	   social	   conflict	   in	   terms	   of	   minimum	   wages,	  
equality	  in	  redistribution,	  working	  hours,	  rest	  on	  Sundays,	  invalidity	  and	  old	  age	  pensions.”39	  	  
How	  could	   this	  be	  possible,	   though?	  As	   long	  as	   the	   franchise	  was	   restricted	   it	  did	  
not	  matter	  that	  the	  power	  resources	  of	  union	  and	  party	  membership	  skyrocketed.	  Without	  
parliamentarian	   representation	   there	   could	   be	   no	   legislative	   impact.	   The	   Party	   therefore	  
had	  the	  reverse	  problem	  of	  its	  German	  counterpart.	  It	  was	  minimalist	  revisionist	  but	  could	  
not	   translate	   this	   into	  parliamentary	  action	  because	   it	  had	  no	  presence	   in	  parliament.40	   In	  
contrast,	   the	  German	  Socialists	  had	   revolutionary	   ideology	   that	  was	   suited	   for	   the	   streets	  
but	  had	  to	  apply	  it	  in	  parliament.41	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  “Il	  partito	  affidava	  poi	  a	  se	  stesso	  il	  ruolo	  die	  realizzare	  una	  seria	  legislazione	  del	  lavoro	  attraverso	  l’agitazione	  politica	  e	  l’azione	  parlamentare.”	  Bartocci,	  E.	  (2000)	  La	  formazione	  del	  nucleo	  originario	  dello	  stato	  sociale.	  IN:	  Zamagni,	  V.	  (ed.)	  Povertà	  e	  innovazioni	  istituzionali	  in	  
Italia.	  Bologna,	  Il	  Mulino,	  p.	  628.	  38	  Romanelli,	  R	  (1979)	  pp.	  285-­‐306.	  The	  demand	  for	  social	  security	  was	  included	  in	  the	  new	  ‘minimalist’	  party	  program	  put	  forward	  by	  Turati	  and	  Kulicioff.	  This	  program	  largely	  ignored	  the	  progressive	  developments	  of	  the	  Northern	  European	  socialist	  parties	  towards	  universalism.	  Social	  security	  demands	  were,	  like	  the	  Italian	  working	  class,	  fragmented	  along	  occupational	  lines.	  The	  demands	  differed	  therefore	  sometimes	  even	  from	  shop	  floor	  to	  shop	  floor	  and,	  on	  top	  of	  that,	  the	  vast	  rural	  proletariat	  remained	  excluded	  for	  a	  long	  time.	  The	  party	  was,	  therefore,	  not	  split	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  social	  security	  should	  be	  introduced	  per	  se	  but	  rather	  on	  the	  question	  which	  kind	  of	  social	  security	  should	  be	  introduced.	  Common	  ground	  was	  only	  that	  a	  social	  policy	  regime	  should	  be	  state	  run	  and	  compulsory.	  Bartocci,	  E.	  (2000)	  p.	  683.	  39	  Bartocci,	  E.	  (2000)	  p.	  680.	  40	  Keeping	  in	  mind	  the	  extremely	  limited	  franchise	  and	  the	  very	  low	  turnout	  the	  Socialists	  still	  managed	  to	  climb	  from	  six	  seats	  in	  1892	  to	  32	  seats	  in	  1900.	  The	  Socialist’s	  success	  marked	  the	  first	  “expansion	  of	  mass	  politics	  in	  a	  political	  world	  that	  had	  previously	  been	  dominated	  by	  closed	  and	  exclusive	  elites	  of	  notables	  and	  landowners.”	  In	  1900	  they	  could	  finally	  claim	  the	  position	  of	  the	  most	  important	  opposition	  party	  by	  scoring	  as	  many	  seats	  as	  radicals	  and	  republicans	  together.	  Nevertheless,	  their	  numeric	  influence	  was	  still	  marginal	  (6	  seats	  in	  1892).	  41	  Nevertheless,	  the	  PSI	  would	  also	  undergo	  changes	  in	  its	  ideological	  position.	  The	  influence	  of	  syndicalism,	  especially	  from	  France,	  grew	  constantly	  and	  peaked	  with	  the	  syndicalist	  and	  maximalist	  turnaround	  of	  the	  Party	  at	  its	  congress	  in	  1903.	  The	  pendulum	  swung	  back	  again	  to	  the	  reformist	  tradition	  in	  1907. 
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Figure	  7-­‐2	  Socialist	  MPs	  compared	  to	  total	  mandates	  Italian	  parliament	  1892-­‐1900	  
	  
	  




After	  Crispi	  had	  tried	  and	  failed	  to	  employ	  a	  Bismarckian	  ‘carrot	  and	  stick’	  approach	  without	  
the	  carrot	  against	  Socialists	  and	  Catholics,	  the	  Liberal	  Giolitti	  became	  Prime	  Minister.	  Giolitti	  
was	  convinced	  that	   Italy	  could	  only	  advance	   into	  the	  exclusive	  club	  of	  the	  other	  European	  
industrialized	  nations	  “	  ‘not	  by	  shooting	  the	  workers,	  but	  rather	  by	  instilling	  in	  them	  a	  deep	  
affection	  for	  our	  institutions	  so	  that	  we	  ourselves	  and	  not	  the	  socialists	  will	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  
promoters	   of	   progress	   and	   as	   the	   ones	  who	   are	   trying	   to	   do	   everything	   possible	   in	   their	  
favor’.	  “42	  In	  line	  with	  this	  strategy,	  Giolitti	  did	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  constructive	  openings	  of	  
the	  Socialists	  on	  social	  policy	  either.43	  	  
The	   first	   real	   attempt	   to	   introduce	  a	  modern	   social	   security	   system	  was	  made	  by	  
the	  new	  Prime	  Minister	  Giovanni	  Giolitti.	  He	  was	  deeply	  concerned	  about	  the	  rising	  societal	  
discontent	   that	   spread	   across	   Italy	   during	   the	   last	   two	   decades	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   and	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wanted	  to	  pursue	  a	   ‘third	  way’	  between	  reaction	  and	  revolution.	   In	  a	  speech	  to	  voters	   in	  
Busca	  he	  put	  forward	  that:	  
	  
Italy	  finds	   itself	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  period	  in	   its	  political	   life.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  
kingdom	  of	   Italy,	  public	  opinion	   is	  profoundly	  troubled,	  strong	  and	  audacious	  extremist	  parties	  have	  emerged,	  
new	  social	  problems	  challenge	  us,	  the	  masses	  have	  entered	  into	  political	  life	  and	  parliamentary	  institutions	  have	  
fallen	  into	  crisis.	  All	  this	  reveals	  the	  start	  of	  a	  new	  period	  of	  profound	  transformations.44	  
	  
His	  own	  special	  brand	  of	  social	  liberalism	  called	  for	  the	  state	  to	  take	  up	  a	  neutral	  mediating	  
role	   between	   the	   different	   classes.	   In	   his	   opinion	   “Bias	   towards	   their	   bosses	   turns	   the	  
working	   classes	   into	   ‘enemies	   of	   the	   state’.”45	   Giolitti	   finally	   wanted	   to	   implement	   a	  
wholesale	  ‘carrot	  and	  stick’	  approach	  in	  Italy.	  Quine	  notes	  that	  he	  “made	  it	  very	  clear	  that	  
he	  intended	  to	  pursue	  a	  Bismarckian	  policy	  aimed	  at	  binding	  the	  workers	  and	  their	  leaders	  
to	  the	  State	  in	  order	  to	  stabilize	  and	  conserve	  the	  political	  system.”46	  However,	  Giolitti	  had	  
one	   big	   problem:	   he	   had	   a	   strong	   vision	   on	   social	   security	   but	   only	   very	   vague	  
programmatic	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  go	  about	  it.	  Giolitti	  opined	  that	  
	  
because	  there	  are	  so	  many	  social	  injustices	  to	  remedy,	  and	  all	  of	  them	  are	  very	  grave,	  and	  because	  
we	  can	  only	  scrape	  at	  the	  surface	  of	  them,	  due	  to	  spending	  excesses	  and	  the	  sad	  conditions	  of	  our	  
budget,	  the	  only	  real	  question	  is	  where	  do	  we	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  reform.47	  
	  
The	  deep-­‐seated	   liberal	   convictions	  of	  Giolitti’s	   parliamentary	  majority	   and	   the	  budgetary	  
constraints	   had	   the	   result	   that	   Giolitti’s	   first	   attempt	   to	  modernize	   Italian	  welfare	   fell	   far	  
short	   of	   the	   achievements	   of	   the	   Bismarckian	   project	   in	   Germany.	   The	   Italian	   Parliament	  
approved	   Accident	   Insurance	   on	   the	   17th	   March	   1898	   as	   the	   first	   compulsory	   social	  
insurance	   law.	   It	   went	   into	   force	   on	   1	   January	   1899.48	   The	   introduction	   of	   Old	   Age	   and	  
Invalidity	  schemes	  on	  a	  voluntary	  basis	  followed	  a	  year	  later.	  
The	   outcome	   of	   the	   Giolittian	   reforms	   was	   therefore	   rather	   rudimentary.	   The	  
seminal	  Italian	  social	  policy	  historian	  Arnaldo	  Cherubini	  judges	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  ‘Cassa	  
nazionale	  di	  previdenza	  per	   la	  vecchiaia	  e	   l’invaliditá	  degli	  operai’	   (National	  Worker’s	  Old-­‐
Age	   and	   Invalidity	   Insurance	   Fund)	   as	   “an	   institute,	   which	   repeats	   the,	   already	   proven	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Giovanni	  Giolitti	  at	  a	  speech	  to	  voters	  in	  Busac,	  29	  October	  1899,	  cited	  IN:	  Quine,	  S.M.	  (2000)	  p.	  67.	  45	  Quine,	  S.M,	  (2002)	  p.	  68.	  46	  Quine,	  S.M.	  (2002)	  p.	  68.	  47	  Giolitti	  quoted	  IN:	  Valeri,	  N.	  (1952)	  Discorsi	  extraparlamentari	  di	  Giovanni	  Giolitti,	  Turin,	  pp.	  238,	  241	  and	  245,	  cited	  IN:	  Quine,	  S.	  M.	  (2002)	  p.	  70	  48	  Cherubini,	  A.	  (1977)	  Storia	  della	  previdenza	  sociale	  in	  Italia	  (1860-­‐1960),	  Editori	  Riuniti,	  Roma,	  p.	  112. 
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inefficient	   way,	   of	   non-­‐mandatory	   accountability.”49	   Even	   though	   the	   funds	   were	   state-­‐
backed,	   take	  up	  of	   the	   schemes	  was	  marginal.	   In	   fact,	  with	  only	  one	   compulsory	   scheme,	  
the	   Italian	  social	   security	  system	  was	  not	  much	  more	  than	  a	  skeleton.	  By	  1915,	  almost	  20	  
years	   after	   its	   introduction,	   the	   coverage	   rate	   of	   the	   voluntary	   pension	   scheme	   had	   not	  
exceeded	  two	  percent	  of	  the	  working	  population.	  In	  Germany	  in	  the	  same	  year	  the	  rate	  was	  
57	   percent.50	   Even	   the	   compulsory	   Accident	   Insurance	   only	   covered	   eleven	   percent	   of	   all	  
active	  workers.	  During	  the	  first	  two	  decades	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  
	  
	  The	   mismatch	   between	   the	   ‘ideals’	   of	   the	   reformers	   and	   the	   ‘sad	   reality’	   became	   ever	   more	   obvious,	   and	  
therefore	  the	  first	  decades	  of	   the	  new	  century	  were	  marked	  by	  the	   insight	   that	  a	  social	   reform,	  which	   limited	  
itself	  for	  the	  largest	  part	  to	  educate	  the	  people	  through	  alleviation,	  incentives	  and	  bonuses	  to	  take	  up	  their	  own	  
prevention,	  did	  not	  live	  up	  to	  the	  real	  social	  needs.51	  
	  
7.3.3 Assessment	  
Catholicism	   reacted	   to	   the	   challenges	   of	  modernity	   in	   Italy	   in	   a	  much	   less	   proactive	  way	  
than	   it	   had	   in	   Germany.	   It	   took	   it	   much	   longer	   to	   develop	   an	   intellectual	   fundament	   to	  
tackle	  the	  worker’s	  question.52	  The	  Italian	  Left,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  did	  not	  have	  the	  problem	  
of	   maximalist	   opposition	   to	   any	   form	   of	   social	   security	   –	   as	   the	   German	   Socialists	   had	  
experienced	   –	   but	   rather	   had	   to	   deal	  with	   a	   heavily	   fragmented	   proletariat	   and	   a	   strictly	  
curtailed	   franchise	   that	   forestalled	   their	   attempts	   at	   entry	   into	   parliament.	   Liberalism,	  
meanwhile,	   went	   the	   whole	   period	   from	   the	   1860s	   to	   1890s	   without	   developing	   any	  
progressive	  or	  nuanced	  views	  on	  social	  security	  besides	  a	  rudimentary	   laissez	  faire	   idea	  of	  
state	  intervention.	  
Most	   accounts	  on	   the	  evolution	  of	   early	  modern	   Italian	  welfare	   see	   liberal	   laissez	  
faire	   thinking	   as	   an	   integral	   element	   behind	   the	   retarded	  development	   of	   Italian	  welfare.	  
However,	   they	   do	   little	   to	   account	   for	   why	   laissez-­‐faire	   became	   the	   paramount	   ideology	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  “un	  istituto	  il	  quale	  ripete	  il	  cammino,	  giá	  dimostratosi	  inefficace,	  della	  libera	  adesione.	  “	  Cherubini,	  A.	  (1977)	  p.	  113.	  50	  Quine,	  S.	  M.	  (2002)	  p.	  94.	  51	  “Das	  Missverhältnis	  zwischen	  den	  „Idealen“	  der	  Reformer	  und	  der	  „traurigen	  Wirklichkeit“	  wurde	  immer	  offenkundiger,	  und	  so	  stand	  das	  erste	  Jahrzehnt	  des	  neuen	  Jahrhunderts	  im	  Zeichen	  der	  Erkenntnis,	  dass	  eine	  Sozialreform,	  welche	  sich	  im	  Wesentlichen	  darauf	  beschränkte,	  das	  Volk	  durch	  Erleichterungen,	  Anregungen	  und	  Prämien	  zu	  eigener	  Vorsorge	  zu	  erziehen,	  dem	  wirklichen	  sozialen	  Bedürfnis	  nicht	  gerecht	  wurde.“	  Sellin,	  V.	  (1971)	  Die	  Anfänge	  
staatlicher	  Sozialreform	  im	  liberalen	  Italien,	  Stuttgart,	  Klett,	  p.	  184.	  52	  Are,	  G.	  (1963)	  I	  cattolici	  e	  la	  questione	  sociale	  in	  Italia,	  Milano,	  Feltrinelli,	  pp.	  9-­‐119.  
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within	  the	  movement.	  Most	  authors	  see	  the	  prevalence	  of	  laissez	  faire	  as	  the	  result	  of	  fiscal	  
constraints	  and	  budget	  pressures.	  It	  seems	  doubtful	  that	  budget	  pressures	  alone	  are	  enough	  
to	  explain	  passivity	  in	  welfare	  policies.	  Bismarck	  did	  not	  have	  a	  balanced	  budget	  either	  and	  
yet	   he	   managed	   to	   introduce	   welfare.	   Other	   continental	   examples	   show	   that	   there	   are	  
many	   ways	   to	   outsource	   costs	   to	   employees	   and	   employers	   when	   introducing	   modern	  
welfare	  regimes.	  Other	  authors	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  liberalism	  was	  too	  afraid	  to	  break	  the	  
Church’s	   welfare	  monopoly	   after	   Cavour’s	   failure	   in	   Piedmont	   in	   1859.	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
Church’s	  prerogatives	  had	  been	  broken	  on	  many	  occasions	  subsequent	  to	  that	  episode,	  so	  
why	  not	  on	  welfare?	  Lynch	  and	  Fargion	  see	  the	  retarded	  development	  of	  the	  Italian	  welfare	  
state	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Italian	  liberalism’s	  “lacked	  sense	  of	  the	  state”.53	  However,	  they	  fall	  short	  
in	  providing	  an	  answer	  for	  why	  such	  a	  sense	  should	  be	  absent.	  
I	   advocate	   another	   explanation	   for	   the	   puzzle	   of	   the	   (non-­‐)	   formation	   of	   Italian	  
welfare	   that	   fuses	   particular	   points	   of	   these	   analyses.	   My	   own	   analysis	   shows	   that	   the	  
predominance	   of	   ‘laissez	   faire’	   in	   Italian	   liberalism	   was	   simply	   the	   best	   ideational	   match	  
between	  the	  two	  major	  competing	  forces	  on	  the	  peninsula,	   the	  Church	  and	  the	  Liberals.54	  
Embracing	   subsidiarity	   (Catholicism)	   and	   laissez	   faire	   (liberalism)	   represented	   a	   perfect	  
ideational	   armistice	   in	  which	   neither	   of	   the	   two	   dominant	   political	   powers	   lost	   face.	   The	  
prevalence	   of	   Church-­‐run	   Operé	   Pie	   could	   be	   interpreted	   by	   liberals	   as	   private	   welfare	  
provision	   and	   therefore	   in	   line	   with	   their	   laissez	   faire	   creed.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	  
Catholics	   could	   look	   to	   the	   prevalence	   of	   Operé	   Pie	   as	   a	   glorious	   defense	   of	   their	  
subsidiarity	   concept.	   It	   was,	   in	   other	   words,	   the	   result	   of	   a	   silent	   ideational	   gentlemen’s	  
agreement	  between	  the	  two	  forces	  rather	  than	  the	  hegemony	  of	  barebones	  liberal	  beliefs	  in	  
a	  self-­‐regulating	  market	  society.	  This	  gentlemen’s	  agreement	  was	  possible	  in	  Italy	  because,	  
in	   contrast	   to	  Germany,	  no	   credible	   challenger	  existed	   to	  actively	   threaten	   to	   introduce	  a	  
ideationally	   concurring	   welfare	   system	   as	   Bismarck	   did	   in	   Germany.55	   As	   there	   was	   no	  
competition	  between	  different	  welfare	  alternatives,	  everyone	  retreated	  to	  their	  respective	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Lynch,	  J.	  (2009) Lynch,	  J.	  (2009)	  Italy:	  A	  Christian	  Democratic	  or	  Clientelistic	  Welfare	  State,	  IN:	  van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  &	  Manow,	  P.	  (eds.)	  Religion,	  Class	  Coalitions	  and	  Welfare	  States,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  p.	  103.	  54	  Lynch	  argues	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  in	  a	  side	  note	  that	  “In	  the	  liberal	  period,	  then,	  the	  Church’s	  role	  in	  perpetuating	  its	  own	  dominance	  of	  the	  social	  assistance	  sector	  was	  indirect,	  operating	  mainly	  as	   a	   default	   option	   pursued	   only	   because	   of	   liberal	   politicians’	   own	   preferences	   for	   limited	  central	  government	  involvement.”	  Lynch,	  J.	  (2009)	  p.	  103.	  55	  The	  Italian	  left	  could	  have	  but	  was	  not	  in	  parliament.	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fallback	  position.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  neither	  Liberalism	  nor	  the	  Church	  developed	  modern	  
welfare	  ideas	  until	  the	  1890s.	  
Catholic	  social	  teaching	  did	  not	  play	  a	  role	  when	  it	  came	  to	  laying	  the	  foundations	  of	  
the	  Italian	  welfare	  state	  precisely	  because	  a	  modern	  form	  of	  Catholic	  social	  teaching	  had	  not	  
yet	  developed	  in	  Italy.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  Lynch	  states	  at	  the	  end	  of	  her	  account	  
that	  “This	  chapter	  finds	  little	  evidence	  that	  Christian	  Democracy	  has	  determined	  the	  shape	  
of	   the	   Italian	   welfare	   state	   through	   the	   mechanism	   of	   parties	   that	   carry	   and	   enforce	   a	  
particular	   set	   of	   socio-­‐religious	   doctrines”,56	   as	   neither	   a	   party	   nor	   a	   doctrine	   existed.	   I	  
would	  push	  Lynch’s	  assessment	  even	   further	  and	  argue	   that	   the	  awkward	  strategic	  match	  
between	   two	   diametrically	   opposed	   ideas	   made	   the	   non-­‐development	   of	   Italian	   welfare	  
possible.	  
The	   Question	   is	   then:	   why	   did	   modern	   Italian	   welfare	   eventually	   develop	   in	   the	  
1890s?	  The	  answer	  starts	  with	   the	   fiercely	  anti-­‐clerical	  Crispi	  who	  broke	   the	   three	  decade	  
long	  gentlemen’s	  agreement57	  between	  the	  Church	  and	  the	  State	  by	  extending	  state	  control	  
to	   welfare.	   This	   upsetting	   of	   the	   stalemate	   started	   a	   competition,	   similar	   to	   in	   Germany	  
during	  the	  1870s,	  during	  which	  all	  political	  actors	  started	  to	  produce	  ideas	  on	  social	  security	  
in	  line	  with	  their	  worldviews.	  
	  
7.4 Conclusion	  
The	  analysis	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  stalemate	  between	  the	  liberal	  State	  and	  the	  Church	  led	  to	  a	  
situation	  of	  both	  ideational	  and	  organizational	  non-­‐competition.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  none	  of	  
the	  two	  could	  produce	  any	  ideational	  or	  organizational	  capacities	  on	  welfare	  as	  the	  relative	  
ceasefire	   between	   them	   guaranteed	   an	   untouchable	   sphere	   of	   interest	   for	   each.	   It	   is	  
astonishing	   that	   this	   particular	   situation	   led	   to	   a	   comparatively	   delayed	   development	   of	  
both	  Catholicism	  and	  Liberalism	  in	  Italy	  of	  all	  places,	  where	  both	  movements	  were	  stronger	  
than	  anywhere	  else	  on	  the	  continent	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  Only	  when	  the	  
Liberals	  broke	  their	  welfare	  truce	  with	  the	  Vatican	  did	  Italy	  witness	  a	  decade	  of	  accelerated	  
ideational	   competition	  on	  social	   security	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  century.	  All	  of	  a	   sudden,	  every	  
party	   was	   moving.	   Ideas	   about	   modern	   welfare	   provisions	   were	   generated	   not	   only	   by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Lynch,	  J.	  (2009)	  p.	  114.	  57	  I	  use	  the	  term	  “gentlemen”	  in	  reference	  to	  Benedetto’s	  idealist	  description	  of	  the	  destra	  storica	  as	  “a	  spiritual	  aristocracy	  of	  upright	  and	  loyal	  gentlemen”,	  Croce	  cited	  IN:	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.	  6.	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Liberals	  and	  Catholics	  but	  also	  by	   the	  evolving	  Socialist	  movement.	  As	  already	  seen	   in	   the	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Interlude:	  The	  Interwar	  years	  
Italy	  
Italy	  witnessed	  a	  remarkable	  welfare	  state	  expansion	   in	   the1920s.	  The	   ‘red	  years’	  of	  1919	  
and	  1920	  saw	  skyrocketing	  working	  class	  militancy	  which	  deeply	  worried	  the	  liberal	  political	  
establishment	  that	  reacted	  with	  a	  “conscious	  political	  strategy	  of	  bourgeois	  stabilization”,1	  
as	  Quine	  notes.	  On	  19th	  October	  1919,	  Law	  No.	  2214	  was	   introduced	  which	  provided	  for	  a	  
state-­‐run	   and	   compulsory	   unemployment	   insurance	   scheme	   that	   would	   cover	   all	   regular	  
and	  full-­‐time	  employed	  male	  and	  female	  workers,	  even	  those	  employed	  in	  agriculture.2	  The	  
law	  went	  into	  effect	  on	  the	  1st	  June	  1920.	  It	  was	  the	  first	  national	  insurance	  program	  in	  the	  
world	   that	   included	   agricultural	   laborers.	   Copied	   from	   the	   German	   equivalent	   were	   the	  
mandatory	   schemes	   financed	   through	   equal	   contributions	   from	   workers	   and	   employers.	  
Coverage,	   though,	   was	   very	   limited	   and	   eligibility	   difficult	   to	   prove.	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
groundbreaking	  character	  of	  the	  compulsory	  nature	  of	  the	  new	  system	  was	  mirrored	  in	  the	  
enrollment	  figures.	  From	  1915	  to	  1920	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  insured	  had	  risen	  from	  two	  
to	  thirty	  six	  percent.3	  The	  basis	  of	  the	  Italian	  welfare	  state,	  that	  had	  formerly	  been	  limited	  to	  
workers	   in	   the	   northern	   industrial	   cities,	   had	   now	   been	   expanded	   throughout	   the	   entire	  
peninsula.	   For	   the	   first	   time,	   Italy	   was	   closing	   the	   social	   security	   gap	   between	   itself	   and	  
other	   industrialized	   European	   nations.	   However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   keep	   in	  mind	   that	   this	  
booming	  period	  was	  of	  very	  short	  duration	  given	  that	  the	  Fascists	  started	  to	  take	  over	  only	  
four	  years	  later.	  
Italy’s	  social	  security	  innovation	  of	  the	  1920s	  was	  not	  simply	  brought	  about	  through	  
a	  turnaround	  in	  the	  liberal	  government’s	  policy	  in	  order	  to	  appease	  the	  raging	  working	  class.	  
The	   picture	   is	   more	   complex.	   The	   suffrage	   reforms	   of	   1913	   and	   then	   1918,4	   plus	   the	  
introduction	  of	  proportional	   representation,	   redefined	  the	  rules	  of	   the	  political	  game.	  Not	  
only	  did	  the	  Socialists	  now	  enter	  parliament	   in	  great	  numbers	  but	  the	  same	  year	  also	  saw	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Quine,	  M.	  S.	  (2002)	  p.	  103.	  2	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  Modelli	  di	  Solidarietà:	  politica	  e	  riforme	  sociali	  nelle	  democrazie,	  Bologna,	  Il	  Mulino,	  p.	  217.	  3	  Quine,	  M.	  S.	  (2002)	  p.	  107.	  4	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  212.	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the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  political	  force,	  the	  Partito	  Populare	  Italiano	  (PPI),	  as	  the	  first	  Catholic	  
party	  in	  Italy.	  The	  forceful	  entrance	  of	  two	  new	  political	  forces	  into	  the	  parliamentary	  arena	  
severely	   limited	   the	   possibilities	   for	   horse-­‐trading	   in	   parliament.	   The	   system	   whereby	  
individual	  favoritism	  was	  granted	  by	  the	  government	  to	  certain	  liberal	  deputies	  in	  exchange	  
for	   support,	   which	   had	   worked	   so	   well	   under	   the	   single	   member	   district	   system	   with	   a	  
restricted	   franchise,	   was	   no	   longer	   possible.	   The	   liberal	   system	   of	   transformismo	  
governance	   had	   come	   to	   an	   end.	   Liberal	   governments	   could	   not	   reach	   out	   to	   individual	  
deputies	   through	   concessions	   but	   instead	   had	   to	   deal	   with	   parliamentary	   groups	   that	  
shared	  worldviews	  and	  programmatic	  ideas.5	  Similar	  to	  how	  Germany	  was	  governed	  around	  
the	  same	  time	  by	  the	  famous	  Weimar	  Coalition	  of	  Catholics	  and	  Social	  Democrats,	  Italy	  saw	  
years	  of	  “competitive	  expansion”6	  of	  welfare	  after	  the	  war.	  Ferrera	  notes	  “The	  promise	  of	  
welfare	  expansion	  should	  serve	  exactly	  this	  purpose:	  every	  political	  group	  counted	  in	  fact	  to	  
gain	  something.”7	  This	  expansion	  was	   further	   facilitated	  through	  the	   increased	  “climate	  of	  
national	  solidarity”8	  that	  the	  years	  of	  deprivation	  during	  World	  War	  I	  had	  produced.	  The	  war	  
had	  resulted	  in	  widespread	  suffering.	  The	  Liberals	  were,	  all	  of	  a	  sudden,	  not	  governing	  the	  
country	  on	  their	  own	  anymore.	  The	  Liberal	  Prime	  Minister,	  Francesco	  Saverio	  Nitti,	  formed	  a	  
welfare	   coalition	  with	   the	   PPI	   and	   the	   Socialists	  which	   causes	   Setan-­‐Watson	   to	   comment	  
that	  “it	  became	  soon	  obvious	  that	  if	  the	  Partito	  Popolare	  could	  be	  called	  the	  legitimate	  wife	  
of	  Nitti,	  the	  Socialist	  Party	  was	  his	  lover.”9	  
	  
The	  short	  career	  of	  the	  Italian	  Interwar	  Christian	  Democrats	  
The	  Vatican	  had	  been	  against	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  PPI.	  When	  confronted	  with	  the	  steep	  rise	  
of	  Socialism	  on	  seemingly	  all	  levels	  of	  Italian	  society	  and	  politics,	  however,	  the	  Church	  saw	  
no	  other	  solution	  than	  to	  “reluctantly,	  grudgingly,	  give	  in”10	  and	  to	  allow	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  
Catholic	   Party.	   Subsequently	   the	   charismatic	   Sicilian	  priest,	  Don	   Luigi	   Sturzo,	   founded	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  213.	  6	  “competizione	  espansiva”	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  218.	  7	  “La	  rivendicazione/promessa	  di	  un	  estensione	  dei	  diritti	  sociali	  doveva	  servire	  proprio	  a	  questo	  scopo:	  ciascun	  raggruppamento	  politico	  contava	  infatti	  di	  guadagnarci	  qualcosa.”	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  218.	  8	  “il	  clima	  di	  <<solidarita	  nazionale>>”	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  225.	  9	  “<<negli	  ambienti	  politici	  si	  affermo	  ben	  presto	  che	  se	  il	  partito	  popolare	  poteva	  essere	  definite	  la	  moglie	  legittima	  di	  Nitti,	  il	  Partito	  Socialista	  ne	  era	  l’amante>>”	  Setan-­‐Watson	  quoted	  IN:	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  229.	  10	  Pollard,	  J.	  (1996)	  p.	  77.	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Partito	   Popolar	   (PPI)	   on	   18th	   January	   1919.11	   The	   Party	   experienced	   a	   sweeping	   electoral	  
success	  immediately	  and	  its	  involvement	  in	  the	  social	  security	  expansion	  also	  showed	  that	  it	  
had	  considerable	  political	   influence.	  The	  1919	  elections	  under	  proportional	  representation	  
saw	  it	  claim	  100	  out	  of	  508	  seats	  making	  it	  the	  second	  largest	  parliamentary	  group	  after	  the	  
Socialists.12	  For	  the	  Vatican	  the	  PPI	  was	  too	  leftist.	  According	  to	  Mack	  Smith	  	  
the	  popolari	  were	  a	  mass	  party	  inclined	  if	  anything	  to	  the	  Left.	  Their	  official	  program	  included	  theoretical	  plans	  
for	  condemning	  imperialism,	  introducing	  proportional	  representation	  and	  votes	  for	  women,	  and	  for	  dividing	  up	  
big	  estates	  among	  the	  peasants;	  an	  extreme	  wing	  around	  Miglioli	  was	  almost	  Marxist.13	  
	  
As	   the	   leadership	  was	  diffuse,	  however,	  Clark	   is	  also	   right	  when	  observing	   that	   it	   “was	  an	  
uneasy	   fusion	   of	   Right,	   Center	   and	   Left-­‐wing	   Catholics”.14	   Landless	   Catholic	   agricultural	  
laborers	   from	   the	   South	   could	   be	   found	   alongside	   large	   estate-­‐holding	   agro-­‐industrialists	  
form	   the	   North.	   Sturzo,	   the	   party	   leader,	   therefore	   knew	   that	   even	   with	   his	   charisma	   it	  
would	  be	  difficult	  to	  hold	  party	  together	  without	  the	  support	  of	  the	  ecclesiastical	  hierarchy.	  
As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  this	  would	  soon	  be	  proven	  right.	  In	  1922,	  Benedict	  XV	  died	  and	  the	  new	  
Pope	   Pius	   XI	   was	   even	   more	   hostile	   towards	   any	   form	   of	   political	   engagement	   of	   lay	  
Catholics.	  For	  the	  Vatican,	  the	  PPI	  had	  only	  been	  the	  “’least	  bad	  of	  all	  parties’”.15	  How	  true	  
this	   was	   came	   to	   light	   when,	   within	   the	   same	   year,	   fascist	   black-­‐shirt	   squads	   started	   to	  
attack	   the	   Catholic	   peasant	   leagues	   and	   agricultural	   unions	   in	   the	   northern	   countryside	   –	  
and	  the	  Pope	  remained	  remarkably	  silent.16	  The	  next	  step	  was	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  time.	  As	  the	  
Vatican	   saw	   that	   it	   would	   be	   easier	   to	   come	   to	   terms	   over	   the	   Roman	   Question	   with	  
Mussolini	  directly,	  rather	  than	  through	  parliamentary	  battles,	  it	  quickly	  withdrew	  its	  support	  
for	   the	   PPI.	   In	   1924,	   fourteen	   Conservative	   PPI	   deputies	   broke	   ranks17	   with	   the	   Party	   in	  
parliament	   and	   voted	   for	   Mussolini’s	   Acerbo	   Law	   (Legge	   Acerbo)	   which	   abolished	  
proportional	   representation	   and	   would	   guarantee	   the	   party	   with	   the	   most	   votes	   an	  
automatic	  upgrade	  to	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  mandates.	  This	  was	  the	  last	  nail	  in	  the	  
coffin	  for	  the	  PPI	  and	  Italian	  democracy.	  The	  Party	  went	  underground	  in	  1926,	  as	  most	  other	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parties	   did,	   but	   disintegrated	   quickly	   “with	   hardly	   a	  murmur	   from	   the	   Primate	   of	   Italy”.18	  
Instead,	  Mussolini	  was	   later	  heralded	  by	  Pope	  Pius	  XI	   as	   “the	  man	   sent	  by	  providence.”19	  
The	  irony	  is	  that,	  while	  Catholic	  Church	  had	  indirectly	  facilitated	  the	  fascists’	  taking	  of	  power	  
in	  order	   to	  get	  a	   settlement	  of	   the	  Roman	  Question,	   it	  was	   the	  Church	   that	   triggered	   the	  
decline	  of	  fascism	  a	  decade	  later.	  It	  was	  the	  growing	  dissatisfaction	  and	  alienation	  between	  
Church	   and	  Regime	   that	   led	   to	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   the	  Vatican’s	   backing	   for	  Mussolini	   and	  
paved	  the	  way	  for	  his	  subsequent	  demise.	  
	  
Germany	  
In	   contrast	   to	   Italy,	   German	   social	   policy	   did	   not	   see	   such	   exciting	   expansions	   during	   the	  
interwar	  years.	  Most	  parts	  of	   the	   social	   security	   complex	  had	  already	  been	  put	   into	  place	  
and,	   therefore,	   Weimar	   years	   saw	   a	   process	   of	   steady	   expansion	   and	   consolidation	   in	  
contrast	   to	   Italy’s	   more	   revolutionary	   institutional	   changes	   and	   sweeping	   reforms.20	  
Nevertheless,	  this	  expansion	  was	  substantial:	  sickness	  insurance	  increased	  its	  coverage	  rate	  
from	  48%	  in	  1919	  to	  61	  %	  in	  1929,	  whereas	  old	  age	  insurance	  also	  expanded	  its	  uptake	  from	  
69%	   to	   74%.	   With	   these	   figures,	   Weimar	   almost	   reached	   the	   coverage	   rates	   of	   West	  
Germany	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  albeit	  with	  far	  lower	  replacement	  rates.	  The	  main	  drivers	  
of	   this	  process	  were	   the	  Catholic	  Center	  Party,	  which	   controlled	   the	  department	  of	   social	  
affairs	  without	   interruption	   from	  1920	  until	   1928,	   and	   the	   Social	  Democrats	  who	  became	  
promoters	  of	  social	  security	  legislation	  during	  the	  Weimar	  regime.	  The	  most	  important	  new	  
feature	  legislated	  in	  Weimar	  was	  certainly	  the	  introduction	  of	  collective,	  mandatory	  and	  bi-­‐
partite	   financed	   unemployment	   insurance	   in	   1927	   as	   the	   fourth	   pillar	   of	   the	   security	  
system.21	  However,	  a	  more	  astonishing	  development	  in	  social	  security	  was	  the	  dismantling	  
of	   the	   democratic	   regime	   that	   happened	   during	   the	   big	   retrenchment	   discussions	   of	   the	  
great	  crisis	  years	  of	  the	  1929/1930.	  The	  new	  unemployment	  provisions,	  in	  particular,	  could	  
not	  cope	  with	  the	  huge	   increase	   in	  unemployment	  that	  the	  crisis	  produced.	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scheme	   had	   been	   designed	   to	   cope	   with	   600,000	   unemployed	   persons	   with	   maximum	  
provisions,	   in	  extreme	   situations,	   for	  perhaps	  800,000	   claimants.22	  Conservative	  estimates	  
put	  the	   increase	   in	  unemployment	  as	  going	  from	  3.8%	  in	  1928	  to	  17.2%	  in	  1932.	  This	  was	  
simply	  too	  much	  for	  the	  system	  to	  bear	  and	  the	  debate	  in	  how	  to	  row	  the	  provisions	  back	  
turned	   into	   the	   issue	   over	   which	   the	   last	   democratically	   elected	   government	   of	  Weimar	  
would	  ultimately	  dissolve.23	  
What	   followed	   were	   numerous	   cut	   backs	   during	   the	   time	   of	   the	   presidential	  
cabinets,	   moves	   which	   can	   now	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   reversal	   of	   the	   early	   welfare	  
expansion	  logics.	  If	  the	  democratic	  parties	  of	  the	  center	  had	  expanded	  welfare	  in	  the	  early	  
after	  war	  years	  during	  the	  Weimar	  coalition	  in	  order	  to	  buy	  legitimacy	  and	  loyalty,	  then	  this	  
tactic	   had	   a	   boomerang	   effect	   during	   retrenchment	   times.	   Cutting	   back	   on	   welfare	  
represented,	  for	  most	  citizens,	  a	  betrayal.24	  
	  
The	  German	  Christian	  Democrats	  in	  the	  Interwar	  years	  
During	  the	  Weimar	  Republic,	   the	  Center	  Party	  had	  therefore	  started	  to	  position	   itself	  as	  a	  
progressive	  on	  social	  security	  and	  other	  worker’s	  related	  issues.	  The	  subsequent	  formation	  
of	   the	   ‘Weimar	  Coalition’,	   together	  with	  Social	   Liberals	   (DDP)	  and	  Social	  Democrats	   (SPD),	  
proved	   that	   these	  were	   not	   empty	  words.25	   The	   Center	   Party	   became	  what	   the	   historian	  
Morsey	  subsequently	  called	  a	  “left-­‐democratic	  group”.26	  However,	   in	  contrast	   to	   the	  early	  
Kaiser	   Reich,	   the	   Center	   could	   no	   longer	   present	   itself	   as	   the	   sole	   promoter	   of	   welfare	  
legislation.	  The	  Center	  Party	  was	  thus	  facing	  a	  dilemma:	  it	  was	  now	  far	  easier	  to	  enact	  new	  
welfare	  legislation	  with	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  but	  also	  far	  more	  difficult	  to	  claim	  credit	  for	  it.	  
Therefore,	  only	  the	  introduction	  of	  female	  suffrage	  could	  for	  some	  time	  halt	  the	  slide	  in	  the	  
number	   of	   Catholic	  mandates.27	   Nevertheless,	   the	   Catholics’	   share	   of	   the	   Reichstag	  went	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down	   from	   22.8%	   in	   1912	   to	   13.6%	   in	   1920	   and	   further	   descended	   to	   11.9%	   in	   1932.28	  
Notwithstanding	   this	   drop,	   the	   Center	   Party	   remained	   extremely	   influential	   owing	   to	   its	  
pivotal	   position	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   the	   Weimar	   party	   center.29	   Four	   out	   of	   a	   total	   of	   ten	  
Chancellors	   were	  members	   of	   the	   Center	   Party.	   Between	   1919	   and	   1932,	   the	   party	   sent	  
ministers	   into	   eighteen	   different	   cabinets.	   It	   was	   virtually	   impossible	   to	   ignore	   the	   Party	  
when	   it	   came	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   coalition	   governments.	   Therefore,	   it	   had	   far	   more	  
influence	   on	   policy	   than	   its	   nominal	   strength	   in	   mandates	   and	   votes	   might	   suggest.	  
However,	   the	   turbulent	   political	   climate	   of	   the	   Weimar	   years	   –	   that	   saw	   it	   often	   more	  
resemble	  a	   situation	  of	  permanent	   civil	  war	   rather	   than	  a	   stable	  democracy	  –	  meant	   that	  
the	  permanent	  government	  position	  of	  the	  party	  caused	  it	  to	  be	  widely	  held	  responsible	  for	  
many	  unpopular	  decisions.	  At	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Weimar	   regime,	  only	  about	  one	   third	  of	   the	  
Catholic	  population	  still	  voted	  for	  the	  Center	  Party.30	  The	  rather	  naive	  idea	  of	  taming	  Hitler	  
by	   supporting	   his	   government	   failed.	   The	   fascists	   quickly	   started	   to	   dismantle	   Weimar	  
Democracy.	  Parties	  and	  their	  organizations	  were	  banned	  one	  after	  another.	  The	  last	  existing	  
party	  in	  Germany,	  the	  Center	  Party	  eventually	  dissolved	  itself	  on	  5th	  June	  1933	  in	  order	  not	  
to	  be	  dissolved	  by	  the	  Regime.	  
	  
Summary	  
Catholicism	  and	   social	   security	   during	   the	   interwar	   years	   shared	  many	   common	  elements	  
but	   there	  were	   also	   several	   divergences	   in	   Italy	   and	  Germany.	   In	   both	   countries,	   political	  
parties	   used	   social	   security	   provisions	   in	   order	   to	   quench	   the	   thirst	   for	   revolution	   after	  
World	  War	  One.	  Social	  security	  was	  simultaneously	  used	  to	  buy	  legitimacy	  for	  the	  post-­‐war	  
states	   and	   their	   political	   regimes.	   In	   Italy,	   there	   was	   no	   formal	   regime	   change	   but	   the	  
introduction	  of	  proportional	  representation	  and	  the	  radical	  expansion	  of	  the	  franchise	  was,	  
de	   facto,	   a	   democratic	   revolution.	   Germany	   instead	   saw	   for	   the	   first	   time	   the	   dawn	   of	   a	  
shaky	  democracy	  that	  proved	  hard	  to	  stabilize.	  	  
It	   is	   striking	   that	   social	   security	  expansion	  was	  brought	  about	   in	  both	   countries	   in	  
similar	   ways.	   There	   were	   similar	   coalitions	   between	   Catholics,	   Social	   Liberals	   and	   Social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Lönne,	  K.	  (1986)	  p.	  222.	  One	  has	  to	  remark	  though	  that	  the	  party	  scored	  a	  19.7%	  of	  all	  mandates	  in	  the	  elections	  for	  the	  Constitutional	  assembly.	  This	  can	  be	  categorized	  as	  a	  onetime	  effect	  due	  to	  the	  fears	  of	  parts	  of	  the	  electorate	  from	  a	  revolutionary	  take	  over	  from	  the	  left.	  29	  Morsey,	  R.	  	  (1981)	  p.	  141.	  30	  Morsey,	  R.	  (1981)	  p.	  148.	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Democrats	  that	  propelled	  the	  expansion	  of	  social	  welfare	  schemes.	  Political	  Catholicism	  had	  
become	   an	   established	   force	   in	   both	   countries,	   albeit	   this	   was	   a	   rather	   short-­‐lived	  
phenomenon	  in	  Italy	  in	  contrast	  to	  Germany.	  The	  commitment	  of	  Catholic	  parties	  to	  social	  
policy	  was	  considerable	  in	  both	  countries.	  Given	  the	  lower	  level	  of	  industrialization	  in	  Italy,	  
the	   PPI	   was	   more	   concentrated	   on	   building	   up	   peasant	   leagues,	   organizing	   labor	   in	   the	  
countryside	   and	   extending	   social	   security	   to	   the	   agriculture	   sector,	   while	   the	   German	  
Catholics	   were	   traditionally	   more	   interested	   in	   schemes	   to	   protect	   industrial	   workers.	   In	  
both	   countries	   the	   parties	   actively	   tried	   to	   woo	   Catholic	   workers	   away	   from	   the	   Social	  
Democrats.	  The	  fascists	  were	  helped	  to	  power	  by	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Center	  Party	  and	  PPI,	  
but	   this	  was	   not	   the	   decisive	   step	   that	   secured	   their	   countries’	   fate.	   Instead,	   the	   Vatican	  
abandoned	   the	   Catholic	   parties	   and	   opted	   for	   a	   bypassing	   of	   democratic	   institutions	  
altogether	  in	  order	  to	  directly	  negotiate	  concordats	  with	  the	  fascists.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  
it	   seems	   fair	   to	   conclude	   that	   it	   was	   precisely	   the	   Vatican	   and	   its	   conscious	   action	   of	  
withdrawing	  support	  from	  political	  Catholicism	  that	   led	  to	  both	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Catholic	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The	  lasting	  impression	  left	  by	  the	  moral	  and	  material	  devastation	  of	  twelve	  years	  of	  Nazi	  rule	  opened	  
a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  political	  Catholicism	  and	  Conservative	  Protestantism	  to	  join	  together	  in	  a	  
single	   political	   movement.	   The	   programmatic	   position	   of	   the	   Christian	   Democratic	   Party	   that	  
emerged	   after	   World	   War	   Two	   was,	   therefore,	   a	   very	   special	   blend	   of	   two	   movements	   that	   had	  
existed	   in	   sharp	  opposition	   to	  one	  another	   for	  most	  of	  German	  history.	   The	   following	  Chapter	  will	  
show	  how	   the	  different	  worldviews	  and	  programmatic	   ideas	  on	   society	  and	   the	  economy	  wrestled	  
with	  each	  other	  during	  the	  early	  years	  of	   the	  Christian	  Democrats.	  The	  advent	  of	   the	  social	  market	  
economy	  was	  a	  fiercely	  fought	  battle	  of	  ideas	  between	  both	  denominations	  in	  which	  the	  Protestant	  
Ordoliberals,	  grouped	  around	  the	  minister	  of	  the	  economy	  Erhard,	  were	  allowed	  to	  install	  a	  market	  
economy	   while	   the	   Catholics	   obtained	   the	   securing,	   and	   even	   expansion,	   of	   the	   pre-­‐war	   welfare	  
institutions.	  Of	  interest	  here	  is	  that	  the	  social	  market	  economy,	  as	  a	  concept,	  is	  not	  the	  result	  of	  class	  
reconciliation	   within	   a	   Christian	   Democratic	   interclass	   party.	   Instead	   it	   represents	   an	   ideational	  
compromise	  between	  the	  Catholics’	  and	  Protestants’	  different	  perceptions	  of	  what	  had	  gone	  wrong	  
in	  Weimar	  and	  which	  version	  of	  embedded	  Capitalism	  was	  most	  acceptable	  thereafter.	  In	  the	  second	  
part,	   the	  Chapter	  will	   show	  how	  this	  agreement	  came	  to	  be	   institutionalized	   in	  the	  overall	  German	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Interconfessionalism,	   the	   merging	   of	   Catholicism	   and	   Protestantism	   in	   a	   single	   political	  
movement,	   was	   a	   fundamentally	   new	   experiment	   in	   the	   political	   history	   of	   Germany.	  
Although	  there	  had	  been	  attempts	  to	  form	  interconfessional	  political	  organizations	  in	  Kaiser	  
Reich	  and	  Weimar	  Republic,	  they	  had	  usually	  failed	  due	  to	  the	  strong	  divergences	  between	  
each	  denomination’s	  worldviews.	  After	  1945,	  the	  moral	  and	  material	  devastation	  left	  by	  the	  
reign	  of	   a	   total	   ideology	   resulted	   in	   a	   situation	  where	  moral	  healing	  was	  primarily	   sought	  
through	   a	   Re-­‐Christianization	   of	   society.	   The	   common	   perception	  was	   that	   the	   Nazis	   had	  
played	   the	   two	   religions	   off	   against	   one	   another.	   Stronger	   political	   collaboration	   of	   both	  
denominations	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  way	  to	  forestall	  this	  in	  the	  future.	  
	   Considerations	  and	  debates	   for	  a	  program	  of	  a	  new	   inter	   confessional	  party	   started	  as	  
early	  as	  1945	  when	  former	  Center	  Party	  Catholics	  and	  Protestant	  Conservative	  notables	  met	  
in	  Cologne.	  The	  partition	  of	  Germany	  into	  different	  occupational	  zones	  meant	  that	  any	  new	  
political	  formation	  had	  to	  be	  licensed	  by	  the	  Allies	  in	  the	  corresponding	  zone.	  The	  Christian	  
Democrats	   therefore	  evolved	  bottom	  up	   from	  different	   regional	   initiatives.	  These	   regional	  
entities	   only	   merged	   into	   the	   Christian	   Democratic	   Union	   (CDU)	   on	   the	   federal	   level	   in	  
October	  1950.1	  The	   fragmented	  early	  developments	  of	   the	  party	  had	  consequences.	  First,	  
the	   Bavarian	   Christian	   Democrats	   produced	   their	   own	   party	   outlet,	   the	   Christian	   Social	  
Union	  (CSU)	  that	  would	  not	  merge	  with	  the	  main	  party.	  Second,	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  in	  
the	   Soviet	   occupational	   zone	   in	   East	   Germany	   were	   soon	   drawn	   into	   the	   orbit	   of	   the	  
Socialist	  Unity	  Party	  of	  Germany	   (SED).	  Third,	   the	  different	  evolving	   regional	  entities	  were	  
not	   evolving	   inter-­‐confessionally	   but	   developed	   along	   confessional	   lines	   depending	   on	  
whether	  they	  were	  situated	  in	  Catholic	  or	  Protestant	  regions.	  While	  the	  CDU	  developed	  in	  
the	  the	  footsteps	  of	  the	  Center	  Party	  in	  Catholic	  regions,	  it	  developed	  out	  of	  the	  remnants	  
of	  the	  National	  Conservative	  and	  National	  Liberal	  parties	  in	  the	  Protestant	  regions.	  
	   The	  formation	  of	  an	  interconfessional	  party	  was	  a	  great	  opportunity	  as	  it	  meant	  tearing	  
down	   the	   boundaries	   of	   a	   denominationally	   segregated	   Conservative	   electorate.	   On	   the	  
other	   hand,	   it	   also	   bore	   the	   risk	   of	   confessional	   and	   programmatic	   bifurcation.	   The	  
foundational	  manifestos	   of	   the	   regional	   party	   entities	   had	   reflected	   a	   strong	   segregation	  
along	  confessional	   lines.	   If	   the	  party	  wanted	  to	  succeed	   it	  had	  to	  develop	  a	  programmatic	  
middle	  way	  between	  both.	  The	  caveat	  was	  that	  both	  the	  Protestant	  and	  Catholic	  camps	  had	  
not	  only	  fundamentally	  different	   interpretations	  of	  what	  had	   led	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  Weimar,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Zolleis,	  U.	  (2008)	  Die	  CDU,	  Baden	  Baden,	  Nomos,	  p.	  99;	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2002)	  p.	  74.	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and	   how	   this	  was	   to	   be	   avoided	   in	   the	   future,	   but	   also	   different	   views	   on	   economic	   and	  
social	  policy.	  The	  first	  decades	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	  were	  therefore	  marked	  less	  
by	  material	   conflicts	  between	   the	   representatives	  of	  workers	  and	  employers	  but	  between	  
Ordoliberal2	  Protestants	  and	  Christian	  Socialist	  Catholics.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  meeting,	  merging	  
and	  conflicting	  of	  the	  two	  very	  different	  worldviews	  of	  Catholicism	  and	  Protestantism	  in	  one	  
party	  produced	  a	   very	   special	   blend	  of	   socioeconomic	  programmatic	   ideas	  which	  were	   to	  
evolve	   as	   the	   constitutive	   element	  of	  Germany’s	   political	   economy	  model	   after	   1945:	   the	  
social	  market	  economy.	  
	   The	   fact	   that	   the	  Christian	  Democrats	  went	   on	   to	  win	   the	   first	   four	   federal	   elections	  
allowed	   them	   to	   have	   an	   extraordinary	   impact	   on	   the	   political	   and	   economic	  
institutionalization	  of	  Germany.	  If	  one	  wants	  to	  fully	  understand	  the	  institutional	  impact,	  it	  
is	   necessary	   to	   look	   to	   the	   complicated	   and	   fierce	   struggles	   and	   trade-­‐offs	   between	  
Catholics	   and	   Protestants	   and	   how	   they	  were	   accommodated	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   new	  
programmatic	  ideas.	  
	   The	   following	   chapter	   will,	   in	   the	   first	   part,	   analyse	   how	   the	   difficult	   marriage	   of	  
Protestant	  and	  Catholic	  socioeconomic	  ideas	  evolved	  during	  the	  first	  years	  after	  the	  war.	  In	  
the	  second	  part,	   the	  chapter	  will	   show	  how	  these	   ideational	  developments	  affected	  social	  
policy	  making.	  
	  
8.1 If	  it	  does	  not	  fit	  use	  a	  bigger	  Hammer	  
The	  opening	  of	  Catholics	  and	  Protestants	  towards	  one	  another	  was	  built	  on	  the	  insight	  that	  
their	   own	   divisions	   during	   the	  Weimar	   years	   had	   contributed	   to	   the	   fast	   rise	   of	   the	   Nazi	  
Party.	  Neither	  political	  Catholicism	  nor	  Conservative	  Protestantism	  had	  been	  able	  to	  hinder	  
Hitler’s	  ascendance	  to	  power	  on	  their	  own.3	  As	  many	  Germans	  thought	  that	  the	  “third	  Reich	  
originated	   in	   the	   increasing	  alienation	   from	  God”,4	   there	  was	  a	  deep	   longing	   for	  Christian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Ordoliberals’	  favoured	  economic	  system	  is	  a	  free	  market	  economy	  in	  which	  the	  state	  plays	  a	  strong	  role	  by	  imposing	  and	  enforcing	  the	  institutional	  framework	  under	  which	  economic	  competition	  unfolds.	  The	  state	  is	  therefore	  responsible	  for	  making	  sure	  that	  cartelization	  and	  other	  market-­‐	  and	  competition-­‐distorting	  phenomena	  do	  not	  occur.	  The	  evolution	  of	  the	  concept	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  on	  the	  coming	  pages.	  3	  Also	  in	  this	  vein	  are	  the	  views	  of	  the	  first	  CDU	  party	  programs	  that	  describe	  denominational	  unity	  as	  the	  solution	  for	  preventing	  the	  re-­‐occurrence	  of	  the	  devastating	  past.	  See:	  CDU	  (1945c)	  Kölner-­‐Leitsätze	  pp.	  1-­‐2.	  And:	  CDU	  (1945b)	  Frankfurter-­‐Leitsätze,	  p.	  3.	  4	  “Da	  das	  dritte	  Reich	  durch	  die	  zunehmende	  Entfremdung	  von	  Gott	  entstanden	  ist.“	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2001)	  p.	  30.	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Unity	   which	   was	   perceived	   as	   a	   way	   to	   safeguard	   against	   any	   new	   sliding	   into	  
totalitarianism.	   Simultanously,	   German	   society	   experienced	   a	   re-­‐spiritualization	   after	   the	  
war.	  Church	  attendance	  soared	  and	  over	  65%	  of	  German	  Catholics	  and	  50%	  of	  Protestants	  
responded	  that	  they	  attended	  mass	  regularly	  in	  an	  Allied	  survey	  in	  March	  1946.5	  	  The	  moral	  
and	   material	   havoc	   caused	   by	   the	   Nazi	   regime	   had	   produced	   what	   Schelsky	   called	   a	  
“common	  disorientation”	  in	  German	  society.6	  	  
	   The	  rupture	  that	  the	  total	  defeat	  in	  the	  war	  had	  brought,	  along	  with	  the	  moral	  disgrace	  
that	   the	   Holocaust	   had	   left,	   had	   opened	   a	  window	   for	   discontinuity	   that	  was	   far	   greater	  
than	   it	   had	  been	  after	  World	  War	  One.	   Even	   the	   formation	  of	   an	   inter-­‐confessional	  party	  
seemed	  possible	  for	  the	  first	  time.7	  In	  fact,	  that	  striving	  for	  greater	  Christian	  Unity	  was	  seen	  
as	  an	  adequate	  way	  to	  overcome	  the	  shadows	  of	   the	  past	  can	  be	   found	  all	  over	   the	  early	  
CDU	  manifestos.	   The	   Berlin	   Program	  was	   of	   the	   view	   that	   “From	   the	   chaos	   of	   guilt	   and	  
disgrace,	   in	   which	   the	   deification	   of	   a	   criminal	   adventure	   has	   thrown	   us,	   an	   order	   in	  
freedom	   can	   only	   evolve,	   if	   we	   remember	   the	   cultural,	   ethical	   and	   moral	   force	   of	  
Christianity”.8	  As	  the	  traditional	  political	  vehicles	  of	  political	  Protestantism	  (the	  Conservative	  
and	   National	   Liberal	   parties)	   had	   been	   discredited	   by	   their	   involvement	   with	   the	   Nazis,9	  
interconfessionalism	  was	  a	  chance	  to	  bind	  their	   former	  voters	  to	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  
project.	  Indeed,	  the	  potential	  was	  huge.	  Among	  the	  regular	  church	  goers	  in	  the	  1940s,	  71%	  
of	   Catholics	   and	   40%	   of	   the	   Protestants	   indicated	   an	   affinity	   towards	   the	   Christian	  
Democrats.10	  
	   The	   shift	   in	   the	   power	   balance	   between	   the	   two	   denominations	   in	   favour	   of	  
Catholicism	   after	  World	  War	  One	  was	   also	   favourable	   for	   unity.	   In	   contrast	   to	   pre-­‐fascist	  
times,	   Catholics	   were	   no	   longer	   pinned	   against	   a	   hegemonic	   “Protestant-­‐Prussian	  
‘Leitkutur’”.11	  The	  loss	  of	  Eastern	  Germany	  to	  the	  the	  USSR’s	  sphere	  of	  influence	  meant	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Meritt,	  A.J.	  &	  Meritt	  R.L.	  (1970)	  Public	  opinion	  in	  occupied	  Germany:	  The	  OMGUS	  Surveys,	  Urbana,	  IL,	  1970,	  pp.	  81-­‐83.	  6	  Schulz,	  G.	  (2005)	  Geschichte	  der	  Sozialpolitik	  in	  Deutschland	  seit	  1945:	  Band	  3,	  	  Baden	  Baden,	  Nomos,	  p.	  78.	  7	  Zolleis,	  U.	  (2008)	  p.	  99.	  8	  „Aus	  dem	  Chaos	  von	  Schuld	  und	  Schande,	  in	  das	  uns	  die	  Vergottung	  eines	  verbrecherischen	  Abenteuers	  gestürzt	  hat,	  kann	  eine	  Ordnung	  in	  Freiheit	  nur	  erstehen,	  wenn	  wir	  uns	  auf	  die	  kulturgestaltenden	  sittlichen	  Kräfte	  des	  Christentums	  besinnen“,	  CDU	  (1945a)	  Gründungsaufruf	  der	  CDU	  Berlin	  26.	  Juni	  1945,	  p.1.	  9	  Cary,	  N.D.	  (1996)	  The	  Path	  to	  Christian	  Democracy,	  Cambridge,	  Massachusetts,	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  p.	  149.	  10	  Meritt,	  A.J.	  &	  Meritt	  R.L.	  (1970)	  pp.	  81-­‐83.	  11	  Zolleis,	  U.	  (2008)	  p.	  97.	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roughly	   45%	  of	   the	  West	  German	   society	  was	  now	  Catholic	   and	   this	   confident	   group	  was	  
eager	   to	   cement	   their	   power	   positions	   in	   the	   new	   republic.	   In	   addition,	   the	   Conservative	  
centers	  of	  Prussian	  Protestantism,	  the	   large	  estates	  of	  the	  Junkers,	  now	  found	  themselves	  
geographically	   situated	   in	   the	  Soviet	  occupational	   zone	  as	  most	  of	   its	   former	  political	   and	  
agrarian	  power	  resources	  were	  now	  in	  Poland.12	  Furthermore,	  the	  Nazi	  rule	  had	  discredited	  
Conservative	  Protestantism’s	  State	  Socialist	  programmatic	   ideas.	  This	  opened	  a	  window	  of	  
opportunity	   for	   other	   versions	   of	   Protestant	   economic	   thinking	   that	   had	   previously	   been	  
suppressed,	  such	  as	  those	  inspired	  by	  the	  social-­‐liberal	  tradition.	  The	  new	  post-­‐war	  flagship	  
of	  Protestantism’s	  economic	  thinking	  and	  theorizing	  shifted	  from	  Bismarck’s	  State	  Socialism	  
towards	   Protestant	   Ordoliberalism.	   Ordoliberalism	   was	   a	   specific	   brand	   of	   neo-­‐liberal	  
economic	  theory	  that	  had	  been	  developed	  during	  the	  war	  by	  the	  Freiburg	  School	  of	  scholars	  
led	   by	   Walter	   Eucken.	   After	   the	   war,	   Eucken	   soon	   established	   a	   close	   relationship	   with	  
Ludwig	   Erhard.	   As	   Ordoliberalism	   developed,	   to	   large	   extent,	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	  
weaknesses	   of	   the	  Weimar	   socioeconomic	   system,	   it	   quickly	   became	   the	   new	   Protestant	  
economic	  paradigm.	  Catholicism	  had	  also	  reformulated	  its	  socioeconomic	  concept	  in	  light	  of	  
the	   failure	   of	  Weimar.	   The	   basis	   of	   Catholic	   socioeconomic	   thought	   had	   shifted	   towards	  
Christian	  Socialism,	  a	  concept	  elaborated	  in	  the	  social	  encyclical	  Quadragesimo	  Anno	  issued	  
by	  Pope	  Pius	  XI	  in	  1931.	  	  
	   Thus	   the	   new	   Christian	   Democratic	   party	   was	   not	   merely	   a	   repackaging	   and	   a	  	  
relabeling	  of	  Catholicism	  and	  Protestantism	  from	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  and	  Weimar	  regimes,	  but	  
instead	  the	  experiences	  of	  war	  and	  totalitarianism	  led	  also	  to	  a	  rethinking	  and	  remodelling	  
of	  socioeconomic	  programmatic	  ideas	  of	  both	  denominations.	  The	  crux	  was	  only	  that	  both	  
the	   insights	  about	  what	  had	  gone	  wrong	   in	  Weimar,	  and	  hence	  the	  resulting	   ideas	   for	  the	  
future	   socioeconomic	   set	   up,	  were	   very	  different	  between	   the	   two	  denominations.	  Bösch	  
remarks	   that	   between	   Catholics	   and	   Protestants	   “at	   first	   very	   different	   political	   ideas	  
prevailed,	   which	   hindered	   a	   concerted	   party	   formation”13	   as	   there	   “persisted	   a	   latent	  
mutual	   mistrust.”14	   While	   Catholicism	   advocated	   the	   neo-­‐corporatist	   ideas	   of	   Christian	  
Socialism	  the	  Protestants	  rallied	  for	  a	  market	  economy	  where	  the	  state	  would	  ensure	  free	  
competition	   and	   limited	   welfare	   provision.	   The	   often-­‐propagated	   tale	   (especially	   by	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Cited	  IN:	  Cary,	  N.	  D.	  (1996)	  p.	  149.	  13	  “zunächst	  äußerst	  unterschiedliche	  politische	  Vorstellungen	  vorherrschten,	  die	  eine	  gemeinsame	  Parteibildung	  erschwerten.“	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2001)	  Die	  Adenauer	  CDU:	  Gründung,	  Aufstieg	  
und	  Krise	  einer	  Erfolgspartei	  1945-­‐1969,	  Stuttgart,	  Deutsche	  Verlags	  Anstalt,	  p.	  21.	  14	  “bestand	  ein	  latentes	  gegenseitiges	  Misstrauen”	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2001)	  p.	  21.	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Christian	   Democrats	   themselves)	   of	   a	   happy	   marriage	   between	   Catholicism	   and	  
Protestantism	   through	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   social	   market	   economy	   after	   World	   War	   II	   is	  
therefore	  a	  myth.	  
	   For	  some	  time	  it	  looked	  like	  as	  if	  the	  positions	  would	  be	  irreconcilable.	  Only	  Adenauer,	  
with	  his	  mediating	  skills	  and	  his	  acceptability	  as	  a	  credible	  negotiating	  partner	  on	  both	  sides,	  
could	  break	  the	  gridlock.	  The	  advent	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  also	  helped.	  Catholics	  and	  Protestants	  
were	  tremendously	  scared	  of	  Bolshevism	  and	  Adenauer	  was	  a	  master	  in	  exploiting	  this.	  In	  a	  
letter	   to	  a	  cleric	  who	  was	  not	  convinced	  of	   the	   interconfessional	  project,	  Adenauer	  wrote	  
“that	   in	   these	   times,	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  big	  battle	  between	  Christianity	  and	  materialist	  
Marxism,	  all	  Christian	  forces	  have	  to	  be	  united”.15	   It	  helped	  that	  there	  were	  people	   in	  the	  
party	   that	   were	   not	   overly	   attached	   to	   the	   economic	   doctrine	   of	   their	   denomination.	  
According	  to	  Hermann	  Lutze,	  a	  Protestant	  pastor	  who	  had	  been	  very	  active	  in	  the	  Protestant	  
resistance	  movement	  during	  fascism,	  	  
	  
It	  would	  be	  an	  unutterable	  misfortune	  for	  our	  people	  if	  our	  common	  Christian	  outlook	  did	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  
overcome	  antagonisms	   […]	  Everything	   therefore	  depends	  on	  whether	  we	  can	  establish	   links	  with	   the	  working	  
class.	  The	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  simply	  a	  middle-­‐class	  party,	  for	  the	  Christian	  worker	  must	  
feel	  that	  his	  rights	  are	  just	  as	  much	  spoken	  for	  as	  any	  other	  class.16	  
	  
With	  his	  tactical	  wisdom,	  Adenauer	  managed	  to	  force	  both	  denominations	  into	  what	  Frank	  
Bösch	   called	   a	   “negative	   consensus”.17	   As	   a	   consequence,	   “the	   party	   first	   aimed	   at	   the	  
middle	   ground	   between	   liberal	   individualism	   and	   Christian	   Socialism”.18	   How	   this	   middle	  
ground	  evolved	  and	   later	   translated	   into	   the	  concept	  of	   the	   liberal	   leaning	  concept	  of	   the	  
social	  market	  economy	  (Soziale	  Marktwirtschaft),	  despite	  the	  Catholic	  majority	  in	  the	  party,	  
will	   be	   shown	   below.	   In	   the	   following	   part	   we	   scrutinize	   the	   evolution	   and	   concept	   of	  
Protestant	  Ordoliberalism	  and	  Catholic	  Christian	  Socialism	  in	  greater	  detail.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  “<<dass	  in	  dieser	  Zeit,	  in	  der	  es	  sich	  um	  den	  großen	  Kampf	  zwischen	  Christentum	  und	  materialistischem	  Marxismus	  handelt,	  alle	  christlichen	  Kräfte	  gesammelt	  werden	  müssen	  […]>>.“	  Adenauer	  cited	  IN:	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2001)	  p.	  28.	  16	  Pastor	  Hermann	  Lutze	  from	  Wuppertal	  a	  cofounder	  of	  the	  regional	  Christian	  Democratic	  party	  outlet.	  First	  cited	  IN:	  Foehse,	  U.	  (1978)	  Entstehung	  und	  Entwicklung	  der	  Christlich-­‐Demokratischen	  Union	  in	  Wuppertal,	  1945-­‐1950,	  p.	  18,	  cited	  IN:	  Pridham,	  G.	  (1977)	  p.	  28.	  17	  “Negativkonsens”	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2001)	  p.	  28.	  18	  Lappenküper,	  U.	  (2004)	  The	  Christian	  Democratic	  Union	  in	  Germany,	  IN:	  Gehler	  &	  Kaiser	  (ed.)	  
Christian	  Democracy	  in	  Europe	  since	  1945,	  Vol	  2,	  p.	  27.	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8.1.1 Ordoliberalism	  
Ordoliberalism	   has	   its	   roots	   in	   1930s	   Germany	   and	   became	   one	   of	   the	   ruling	   economic	  
paradigms	  for	  German	  economy	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  It	  developed	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  
the	  Weimar	  economic	  crisis	  of	  the	  1930s	  which	  was	  not	  perceived	  primarily	  as	  an	  economic	  
crisis	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  political	  one.19	  Two	  papers	  of	  the	  political	  economists	  Walter	  Eucken20	  
and	   Alexander	   Rüstow21	   were	   central	   for	   the	   birth	   of	   this	   school	   of	   thought.	   The	   core	  
message	  was	   that	   the	   corporatism	   that	  Weimar	   had	   inherited	   from	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich,	   and	  
had	  subsequently	  expanded	  during	  the	  1920s,	  lied	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  all	  troubles.	  The	  German	  
state	   saw	   its	   political-­‐economic	   leverage	   crippled	   by	   a	   dense	   web	   of	   organized	   interests	  
represented	   by	   associations	   and	   political	   parties.	   These	   parties	   not	   only	   exerted	   their	  
influence	  through	  the	  pluralist	  possibilities	  that	  the	  Weimar	  institutional	  and	  constitutional	  
system	   provided	   but	   also,	   according	   to	   the	   early	   Ordoliberals,	   through	  Weimar’s	   specific	  
form	   of	   welfare	   corporatism.	   In	   particular,	   the	   self-­‐administrative	   feature	   of	   the	   welfare	  
state	  built	   in	   the	  Kaiser	  Reich,	  which	  granted	  all	   social	  partners	  a	  say	   in	   these	   institutions,	  
was	   a	   thorn	   in	   the	   side	   of	   Protestant	   Ordoliberals.	   While	   political	   Catholicism,	   Social	  
Democracy	   and	   the	   unions	   had	   colonized	   the	   self-­‐administration	   bodies	   of	   the	   welfare	  
institutions,	  political	  Protestantism	  had	  never	  obtained	  any	  political	  representation	  in	  these	  
entities.	   This	   is	   an	   additional	   reason	   for	   the	   shift	   of	   Protestant	   economic	   programmatic	  
ideas	  from	  State	  Socialism	  towards	  Ordoliberal	  Protestant	  ideas.	  
	   	  The	  prescription	  of	  early	  Ordoliberalism	  was	  clear-­‐cut:	  the	  state	  should	  free	  itself	  from	  
the	  corporatist	  web	  of	   interests	   in	  which	   it	  was	   caught.	   The	   first	   step	  was	   that	   “the	   state	  
should	  retreat	  from	  its	  historically	  accumulated	  obligations	  in	  social	  policy.”22	  However,	  the	  
state	   should	   not	   become	   a	   classic	   liberal	   nightwatchman	   state.	   Instead,	   it	   should	   take	   a	  
strong	  supervisory	  role	  over	  the	  economy	  and	  ensure	  that	  monopolizing	  interests	  were	  held	  
at	   bay.	   This	  would	   guarantee	   the	  maximum	   social	   benefit	   for	   the	   country.	   The	   state	   had	  
primacy	   over	   economics	   and	  was	   to	   guarantee	   free	   competition	   on	   the	  market.23	  Walter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Manow,	  P.	  (2000)	  p.	  7. 20	  Eucken,	  W.	  (1932)	  Staatliche	  Strukturwandlungen	  und	  die	  Krisis	  des	  Kapitalismus,	  IN:	  
Weltwirtschaftliches	  Archiv	  36,	  pp.	  297-­‐321.	  21	  Ruestow,	  A.	  (1932)	  Interessenpolitik	  oder	  Staatspolitik?	  IN:	  Der	  Deutsche	  Volkswirt	  6,	  p.	  169.	  22	  Manow,	  P.	  (2000)	  p.	  8.	  23	  Abelshauser,	  W.	  (1996)	  Erhard	  oder	  Bismarck?	  Geschichte	  und	  Gesellschaft,	  Vol.	  22,	  No.	  3,	  pp.	  376-­‐392,	  p.	  380.	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Eucken	   formulated	   this	   in	  his	   two	   famous	  postulations	  on	   the	   relation	  between	   state	  and	  
economy:	  
First	  principle:	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  state	  should	  be	  focused	  on	  dissolving	  economic	  power	  groups	  or	  at	  limiting	  their	  
functioning.	  […]	  Second	  principle:	  The	  politico-­‐economic	  activity	  of	  the	  state	  should	  focus	  on	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  
economy,	  not	  on	  the	  guidance	  of	  the	  economic	  process.24	  
	  
If	   this	   system	   was	   implemented	   in	   the	   right	   way	   then	   no	   corrections	   through	   a	   social	  
security	  system	  would	  be	  necessary.	  
	   Manow	  points	  out	   that,	   in	   the	  1930s,	  many	  of	   the	  positions	  held	  by	  early	  Ordoliberals	  
came	   close	   to	   Carl	   Schmitt’s	   notion	   of	   the	   ‘total	   state’	   and	   that	   in	   general	   “German	  
Ordoliberalism	   thus	   revealed	   profound	   authoritarian	   dispositions.”25	   Nevertheless,	   what	  
was	  to	  come	  after	  the	  Nazi	  power	  grab	   in	  terms	  of	  a	  total	  state	  went	  too	  far	  even	  for	  the	  
most	   committed	   Ordoliberal.	   The	   devastating	   experiences	   of	   the	   Nazi	   period	   led	   to	   a	  
rethinking	   of	   Ordoliberalism	   in	   almost	   entirely	   anti-­‐political	   terms	   after	   1945.	   The	   Nazi	  
regime	   had	   demonstrated	   that	   abolishing	   pluralism,	   interest	   associations	   and	   parties	  was	  
really	  enough	  to	  reach	  the	  Ordoliberal’s	   ideal.	  The	  central	   idea	  of	  post-­‐war	  Ordoliberalism	  
was	   that	   certain	   state	   entities,	   necessary	   for	   the	   regulation	   of	   the	   economy,	   should	   be	  
entirely	  withdrawn	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  politics.	  
	   The	   central	   bank	   and	   the	   antitrust	   agencies	   should	   operate	   freely,	   shielded	   from	   any	  
influences	  of	  interest	  groups,	  parties	  or	  politicians.	  The	  reestablishing	  of	  the	  old	  Bismarckian	  
welfare	   corporatism	   should	   be	   avoided	   by	   any	   means.	   Eucken	   saw	   social	   policy	   as	  
something	   that	  would,	   in	   the	   long	   run,	  kill	  all	   individual	   self-­‐responsibility.	  He	  emphasized	  
that	   it	   would	   “foster	   collectivization,	   create	   coercion	   and	   dependency	   that	   diminish	   self-­‐
responsibility	   and	   endanger	   the	   unfolding	   of	   the	   powers	   which	   strive	   in	   the	   individual	  
human	   being	   for	   fulfillment.”26	   Social	   policy	   was	   therefore	   “in	   the	   first	   place	   economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  “Erster	  Grundsatz:	  Die	  Politik	  des	  Staates	  sollte	  darauf	  gerichtet	  sein,	  wirtschaftliche	  
Machtgruppen	  aufzulösen	  oder	  ihre	  Funktionen	  zu	  begrenzen.	  [..]	  Zweiter	  Grundsatz:	  Die	  
wirtschaftspolitische	  Tätigkeit	  des	  Staates	  sollte	  auf	  die	  Gestaltung	  der	  Ordnungsformen	  der	  
Wirtschaft	  gerichtet	  sein,	  nicht	  auf	  die	  Lenkung	  des	  Wirtschaftsprozesses.“	  	  italics	  in	  original,	  Eucken,	  W.	  (1952)	  Grundsätze	  der	  Wirtschaftspolitik,	  J.	  C.	  B.	  Mohr,	  Tübingen,	  pp.	  334,	  336.	  25	  Manow,	  P.	  (2000)	  p.	  8.	  26	  “die	  Vermassung	  fördern,	  Zwang	  und	  Abhängigkeit	  schaffen,	  die	  Selbstverantwortung	  vermeiden	  und	  die	  Entfaltung	  der	  Kräfte	  gefährden,	  die	  im	  einzelnen	  Menschen	  zur	  Verwirklichung	  streben.“	  Eucken,	  W.	  (1949)	  Die	  Sozialpolitische	  Frage,	  Heidelberg,	  Weber,	  	  p.	  113,	  cited	  IN:	  Kaufmann,	  F.-­‐	  X.	  (2003)	  p.	  130.	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regulatory	  policy”.27	  Ruestow	  complemented	  this	  by	  putting	  forward	  that	  “social	  policy	  has	  
in	   the	   80	   years	   of	   its	   existence	   developed	   through	   uncontrolled	   growth”.28	   Regarding	  
Christian	   Democratic	   post-­‐war	   plans	   to	   reintroduce	   Bismarckian	   welfare,	   Manow	   judges	  
that	   “in	   their	   view,	  with	   this	  measure	  German	   politics	   had	   stepped	   again	   on	   the	   slippery	  
slope	  of	  pluralist	  interest	  politics	  which	  had	  led	  to	  Germany’s	  political,	  economic	  and	  moral	  
ruin	  once	  again.”29	  Mueller	  Armack,	  who	  later	  became	  state	  secretary	  in	  the	  ministry	  of	  the	  
economy	   and	   was	   the	   person	   who	   adopted	   Ordoliberalism	   for	   the	   Christian	   Democrats,	  
opined	   as	   early	   as	   1947	   that,	   in	   any	   case,	   “the	   social	   policy	   results	   […]	   have	   been	   quite	  
poor”.30	  Kaufmann	  notes	  that	  for	  Ludwig	  Erhardt,	  later	  to	  become	  Finance	  Minister	  and	  	  the	  
single	  most	  prominent	  Christian	  Democratic	  exponent	  of	  Ordoliberalism,	  “economic	  policy	  
was	   the	  best	   social	  policy.”31	  The	  Protestant	  Ordoliberal	   faction	   in	   the	  CDU	  was	   therefore	  
heavily	  opposed	  to	  any	  reestablishing	  of	  welfare	  state	  arrangements.	  Their	  counter	  concept	  
was	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  classic	  liberal	  creed	  of	  welfare	  by	  growth	  and	  a	  participatory	  form	  
of	   property	   distribution	   through	  widespread	   distribution	   of	   company	   shares	   to	   the	   entire	  
population.	  This	  people’s	  capitalism	  (Volkskapitalismus)	  should,	   in	  the	   long	  run,	   lead	  to	  an	  
equalization	  of	  society	  and	  to	  a	  evening	  out	  of	  all	  social	  classes	  into	  the	  leveled	  middleclass	  
society	  (nivellierte	  Mittelstandsgesellschaft).32	  Thus,	  at	  the	  beginning	  Ordoliberalism	  did	  not	  
foresee	  any	  form	  of	  social	  security	  arrangements.	  
	   While	  Müller-­‐Armack	  was	  the	  person	  that	  would	  go	  on	  to	  translate	  Ordoliberal	  doctrine	  
into	   the	   less	   politically	   polarizing	   and	   easier	   to	   handle	   concept	   of	   the	   Social	   Market	  
Economy,	   Erhard	   was	   the	  man	   who	   had	   the	   task	   of	   making	   the	   concept	   popular	   among	  
Germans.	  The	  “Prophet	  of	  the	  Market	  Economy”	  (Görtemarker)	  was,	  himself,	  not	  one	  of	  the	  
leading	  Ordoliberals	  but	  rather	  the	  person	  that	  did	  the	  marketing	  for	  them.33	  Adenauer	  had	  
understood	  early	  on	  that	  Erhard,	  who	  had	  not	  even	  had	  a	  party	  membership	  up	  until	  1948,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  “<<Sozialpolitik	  in	  erster	  Linie	  als	  Wirtschaftspolitik>>“	  Eucken,	  W.,	  cited	  IN:	  Kaufmann,	  F.-­‐X.	  (2003)	  p.	  131.	  28	  “Die	  Sozialpolitik	  hat	  sich	  in	  den	  bald	  80	  Jahren	  ihres	  Bestehens	  als	  Wildwuchs	  entwickelt.“	  Ruestow,	  W.,	  cited	  IN:	  Kaufmann,	  F.-­‐X.	  (2003)	  p.	  132.	  29	  Manow,	  P.	  (2000)	  p.	  16.	  30	  „Dass	  die	  sozialpolitischen	  Ergebnisse	  eines	  solchen	  Kollektivismus	  in	  allen	  Ländern,	  die	  sich	  ihm	  verschreiben,	  recht	  mager	  waren“	  Müller-­‐Armack,	  A.	  (1947)	  Wirtschaftslenkung	  und	  Marktwirtschaft,	  	  Hamburg,	  p.	  106,	  cited	  IN:	  Kaufmann,	  F.X.	  (2003)	  p.	  130.	  31	  Kaufmann,	  F.-­‐X.	  (2003)	  p.	  131.	  This	  is	  in	  some	  way	  an	  odd	  statement	  as	  Erhardt	  should	  according	  to	  strict	  Ordoliberalims	  not	  have	  been	  for	  any	  economic	  policy	  at	  all.	  32	  Abelshauser,	  W.	  (1996)	  p.	  379.	  33	  Conze,	  E.	  (2009)	  Die	  Suche	  nach	  Sicherheit,	  Siedler	  Verlag,	  p.	  164.	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could	   be	   used	   in	   a	   formidable	   way	   to	   contain	   the	   left	   wing	   of	   the	   CDU	   and	   to	   counter	  
demands	  for	  nationalization	  from	  the	  Social	  Democrats.34	  Given	  his	  Ordoliberal	  convictions,	  
Bösch	  therefore	  points	  out	  that	  “Ludwig	  Erhard,	  who	  today	  is	  blessed	  by	  every	  toastmaster	  
as	   the	   father	   of	   the	   social	   market	   economy,	   was	   instead	   much	   more	   the	   father	   of	   the	  
market	  economy.”35	  
	  
8.1.2 Christian	  Socialism	  
Similarly	   to	   the	  Ordoliberals,	   the	   Catholic	   socioeconomic	   thinking	   after	   the	   Second	  World	  
War	  was	  a	  synthesis	  of	  the	  past.	  The	  question	  was,	  as	  for	  Ordoliberals,	  deciding	  what	  went	  
wrong	  with	  the	  socioeconomic	  conditions	  of	  Weimar	  that	  paved	  the	  way	  to	  the	  Nazi	  regime.	  
A	   central	   element	   in	   shaping	   Catholic	   thinking	   was	   the	   second	   papal	   social	   encyclical	  
Quadragesimo	  Anno.	  Issued	  in	  1931,	  it	  contained	  a	  detailed	  criticism	  of	  the	  socioeconomic	  
trends	  of	  the	  inter-­‐war	  period.	  Largely	  developed	  and	  drafted	  by	  the	  German	  Catholic	  social	  
philosopher,	  Oskar	  Nell-­‐Breuning,	  Quadragesimo	  Anno	  marked	   the	  40th	  anniversary	  of	   the	  
first	  social	  encyclical	  –	  Rerum	  Novarum	  –	  and	  sought	  to	  elaborate	  on	  certain	  key	  concepts	  of	  
Catholic	  Social	  doctrine	  and	  to	  update	  them	  for	  the	  day.	  It	  begins	  with	  a	  critical	  reflection	  of	  
the	   socioeconomic	   conditions	   of	   the	   1930s	   which	   seem	   to	   be	   largely	   derived	   from	   the	  
German	  and	  Italian	  situation,	  though	  the	  countries	  are	  never	  explicitly	  mentioned.	  Against	  
this	  background	  the	  encyclical	  develops	  its	  concept	  of	  Christian	  Socialism.	  
	   The	  prime	  target	  of	  criticism	  is	  the	  current	  “economic	  dictatorship”36	  brought	  about	  by	  a	  
rampant	   system	   of	   free	   competition	   which	   had	   led	   to	   the	   “virtual	   degradation	   of	   the	  
majesty	  of	  the	  state”.37	  According	  to	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  “the	  free	  market	  has	  destroyed	  
itself”38	   an	   aspect	   on	   which	   the	   Catholic	   critique	   mirrors	   the	   Ordoliberal	   standpoint.	  
However,	   the	   Catholics	   fundamentally	   differ	   in	   their	   prescriptions	   for	   curing	   this	  malaise.	  
The	  Encyclical	  stresses	  that	  its	  socioeconomic	  concept	  is	  neither	  neo-­‐liberal	  nor	  socialist	  but	  
marks	  a	  distinct	  Catholic	  third	  way.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Conze,	  E.	  (2009)	  p.	  164.	  35	  „Ludwig	  Erhard,	  der	  heute	  in	  allen	  Festreden	  als	  Vater	  der	  sozialen	  Marktwirtschaft	  gepriesen	  wird,	  war	  eher	  der	  Vater	  der	  Marktwirtschaft.“	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2002)	  Macht	  und	  Machtverlust:	  Die	  
Geschichte	  der	  CDU,	  Stuttgart,	  München,	  Deutsche	  Verlags	  Anstalt,	  p.	  20.	  36	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  109.	  37	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  109.	  38	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  109.	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   In	   contrast	   to	   Socialism,	   private	   property	   remains	   central	   but,	   unlike	   neo-­‐liberal	  
conceptions,	  any	  private	  property	  has	   to	  be	  subject	   to	   the	   increase	  of	   the	  common	  good.	  
Quadragesimo	  Anno	  is	  of	  the	  view	  that	  “the	  right	  order	  of	  economic	  life	  cannot	  be	  left	  to	  a	  
free	  competition	  of	   forces”.39	  The	   judgment	   is	  harsh:	   “free	  competition	   […]	  clearly	   cannot	  
direct	   economic	   life”	   as	   “it	   cannot	   curb	   and	   rule	   itself”.40	   Unrestricted	   free	   market	  
competition	  would	  be	  directed	  by	  the	  “evil	   individualistic	  spirit”41	  spread	  by	  “the	  errors	  of	  
individualist	   economic	   teaching”	   stemming	   from	  a	   “poisoned	   spring”.42	   Instead,	   the	   papal	  
letter	  puts	  forward	  that	  economic	  life	  must	  again	  be	  “subject	  to	  and	  governed	  by	  a	  true	  and	  
effective	  directing	  principle.”43	  The	  moral	   restraints	  under	  which	  such	  order	  should	  evolve	  
has	   to	   be	   guarded	   by	   state	   and	   government.44	   Quadragesimo	   Anno	   therefore	   grants	   the	  
state	  a	  far	  greater	  role	  than	  the	  preceding	  encyclical	  Rerum	  Novarum.	  It	  reflects	  an	  easing	  of	  
Catholic	   state	   skepticism	   through	   decades	   of	   collaboration	   by	   Catholic	   parties	   in	  
governments.	  Nevertheless,	  according	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  the	  state	  should	  only	  
intervene	  where	  the	  social	  partners	  cannot	  organize	  themselves.	  
	   The	   encyclical	   promotes	   a	   specific	   type	   of	   neo-­‐corporatism	   in	   which	   the	   state	   only	  
intervenes	  as	  a	  last	  resort.	  At	  first	  glance	  this	  seems	  to	  come	  close	  to	  Ordoliberalism	  but	  the	  
differences	   are	   huge.	   While	   Ordoliberalism	   sees	   the	   free	   market	   as	   the	   most	   important	  
regulator	  of	   socioeconomic	   life	  and	  affairs	  and	  believes	   that	   it	  would	  only	  be	  harmed	  and	  
distorted	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   collective	   organizations,	   Christian	   Socialism	   emphasizes	   the	  
importance	   of	   collective	   organization	   for	   the	   common	   good.45	   Employers	   and	   employees	  
should	   be	   organized	   in	   mutual	   associations	   depending	   on	   the	   sector	   of	   activity.	   These	  
mutual	  associations	  should	  grant	  a	  stable	  and	  smooth	  running	  of	  the	  economy	  which	  would	  
avoid	  strikes	  on	  one	  side	  and	  wage	  deprivation	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  encyclical	  notes	  that	  “both	  
workers	  and	  employers	  with	  united	  strength	  and	  counsel	  can	  overcome	  the	  difficulties	  and	  
obstacles	   and	   let	   a	  wise	  provision	  on	   the	  part	   of	   the	  public	   authority	   aid	   them”.46	  Wages	  
should	   be	   negotiated	   fairly	   in	   bi-­‐partite	   negotiations	   and,	   in	   case	   of	   stalemate	   or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  87.	  40	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  88.	  41	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  88.	  42	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  88.	  43	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  88.	  44	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  132.	  45	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  85.	  46	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  73.	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dissatisfaction,	   the	   state	   should	   intervene.	   Workers	   should	   be	   protected	   by	   ample	   work	  
protection	  legislation	  that	  would	  regulate	  maximum	  work	  hours	  as	  well	  as	  female	  and	  child	  
labor.	  Co-­‐determination	  should	  reduce	  industrial	  conflict	  and	  give	  the	  employed	  a	  say	  in	  the	  
administration	  of	  the	  firm.	  
	   In	  general,	  “the	  riches	  that	  economic-­‐social	  developments	  constantly	   increase	  ought	  to	  
be	  so	  distributed	  among	  individual	  persons	  and	  classes	  that	  the	  common	  advantage	  of	  all,	  
which	   Leo	   XIII	   had	   praised,	   will	   be	   safeguarded”.47	   The	   prime	   aim	   of	   the	   economy	   is	   to	  
increase	   the	   aggregate	   wealth	   instead	   of	   individual	   riches.	   This	   shared	   wealth	   should	   be	  
generated	   not	   only	   through	   the	   payment	   of	   a	   “just	  wage”	   and	   the	   regulation	   of	  working	  
hours	  and	  conditions	  but	  also	  through	  a	  system	  of	  redistribution.	  Therefore,	  “we	  must	  strive	  
that	  at	   least	   in	  the	  future	  the	  abundant	   fruits	  of	  production	  will	  accrue	  equitably	  to	  those	  
who	  are	  rich	  and	  will	  be	  distributed	  in	  ample	  sufficiency	  among	  the	  workers.”48	  This	  was	  a	  
clear	   call	   for	   a	   redistribution	   system	   that	   went	   far	   beyond	   the	   traditional	   “almsgiving,	  
beneficence	  and	  munificence”49	  that	  the	  earlier	  encyclical	  Rerum	  Novarum	  had	  postulated	  
and	   which	   was	   certainly	   much	   more	   positive	   towards	   welfare	   than	   the	   Ordoliberal	  
postulations.	  
	   Nevertheless,	  despite	  proclaiming	  that	  “loftier	  and	  nobler	  principles	  –	  social	   justice	  and	  
social	  charity	  –	  must,	  therefore	  be	  sought”50	  the	  encyclical	  does	  not	  give	  concrete	  answers	  
on	  how	  redistribution	  should	  be	  organized.	  It	  therefore	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  description	  of	  
its	   preferred	   welfare	   system.	   It	   only	   emphasizes	   that	   it	   should	   occupy	   a	   middle	   ground	  
between	  Socialist	  collectivism	  and	  liberal	  individualism.	  What	  is	  certain,	  though,	  is	  that	  the	  
encyclical	   diverged	   tremendously	   from	   Ordoliberal	   principles	   by	   advocating	   a	   detailed	  
blueprint	   for	   a	  quasi-­‐corporatist/private-­‐corporatist	   (quasi-­‐	   because	  of	   the	  absence	  of	   the	  
state	  as	  a	  active	  corporatist	  partner)	  economy	   in	  which	  “the	  associations,	  or	  corporations,	  
are	   composed	   of	   delegates	   from	   the	   two	   syndicates	   (that	   is	   of	   workers	   and	   employers)	  
respectively	   of	   the	   same	   industry	   and	   profession,	   and	   as	   true	   and	   proper	   organs	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  75.	  48	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  61.	  49	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  50.	  50	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  88.	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institutions	  of	  the	  state,	  they	  direct	  the	  syndicates	  and	  coordinate	  their	  activities	  in	  matters	  
of	  common	  interest	  towards	  one	  and	  the	  same	  end.”51	  
	   The	  provisions	  of	  Quadragesimo	  Anno	  are	  the	  main	  reference	  point	  for	  post-­‐war	  Catholic	  
social	  thinking	  as	  the	  doctrine	  was	  neither	  significantly	  changed	  nor	  put	  into	  practice	  during	  
the	  1930s	  and	  1940s.	   	  The	  way	  that	   the	  writings	  of	   the	  1930s	  were	  still	   contemporary	   for	  
Catholics	  even	  in	  the	  1960s	  shows	  an	  angry	  reply	  to	  early	  Ordoliberal	  versions	  of	  the	  social	  
market	  economy	  by	  Oswald	  Nell-­‐Breuning,	  the	  German	  ghostwriter	  of	  Quadragesimo	  Anno.	  
He	  highlights	   that	  “the	  programmatic	   idea	  of	  a	  so	  called	  total	  competition	   is,	  according	  to	  
Catholic	  Social	  teaching,	  not	  a	  useful	  role	  model.”52	  The	  frequent	  use	  of	  the	  term	  Christian	  
Socialism	   in	  the	  CDU	  manifestos	   in	  the	  Catholic	  occupational	  zone	   is	  a	   further	   indicator	  of	  
the	   importance	   of	   Quadragesimo	   Anno	   for	   German	   post-­‐war	   Catholicism.	   It	   was	   almost	  
entirely	  confined	  to	  the	  Catholic	  regions	  where	  “on	  the	  programmatic,	  personal	  as	  well	  as	  
on	   the	   organizational	   level	   the	   CDU	   evolved	   out	   of	   political	   Catholicism.”53	   As	   Bösch	  
remarks,	   “in	   almost	   none	   of	   the	   majoritarian	   Protestant	   foundation	   circles	   the	   Catholic	  
demand	  for	  a	  ‘Christian	  Socialism’	  could	  be	  found”.54	  The	  Protestant	  manifestos	  advocated	  	  
the	  centralization	  of	   institutions	   in	  contrast	   to	   the	  Catholics’	  demands	   for	   federalization.55	  
The	   social	   structure	   of	   the	   party	   members	   was	   also	   different.	   Protestant	   regional	   party	  
entities	   often	   saw	   themselves	   explicitly	   as	   representatives	   of	   the	   Conservative	  
bourgeoisie.56	   In	   fact,	   there	   were	   almost	   no	   workers	   or	   union	   functionaries	   among	   the	  
founding	  members,	  who	  were	   usually	   recruited	   from	   the	   local	   community	  members	  with	  
academic	  backgrounds	   and	   the	   self-­‐employed	  middle	   classes.57	   Religion	   also	  played	   less	   a	  
role	  for	  the	  Protestant	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  Catholic	  Christian	  Democrats.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  p.	  93.	  52	  „Das	  Denkmodell	  des	  sogenannten	  vollständigen	  Wettbewerbs	  ist	  nach	  der	  katholischer	  Soziallehre	  kein	  brauchbares	  Vorbild.“	  Nell-­‐Breuning,	  O.	  (1960)	  IN:	  Rüther,	  G.	  (1986)	  p.	  254.	  53	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2001)	  p.	  29.	  54	  “fand	  sich	  in	  so	  gut	  wie	  keinem	  der	  mehrheitlich	  protestantischen	  Gründerkreise	  die	  Katholische	  Forderung	  nach	  einem	  <<	  Christlichem	  Sozialismus>>“	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2001)	  p.	  35.	  55	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2001)	  p.	  43.	  56	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2001)	  p.	  44.	  57	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2001)	  p.	  44.	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   Therefore,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  “third	  way”	  of	  the	  German	  post-­‐war	  economy	  was	  not	  the	  
exclusive	   result	   of	   Catholic	   Social	   teaching.58	   If	   the	   provisions	   of	  Quadragesimo	  Anno	   and	  
Christian	  Socialism	  had	  been	  institutionalized	  fully	  in	  the	  after	  war	  period	  then	  the	  German	  
political	  economy	  would	   look	  very	  much	  different	  today.	  Quadragesimo	  Anno	  prescribes	  a	  
strict	   corporatist	   order	  under	  Christian	   ideals	   in	  which	   state	   intervention	   is	   regulated	   and	  
limited	   by	   the	   subsidiarity	   principle.	   Instead,	   we	   have	   to	   investigate	   to	   what	   extent	   the	  
German	  post-­‐war	  economy	  based	  its	  “motivation	  in	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  ethics	  of	  both	  
great	  confessions.”59	  
	  
8.1.3 The	  Programmatic	  development	  
The	  strongly	  divergent	  positions	  of	  Protestant	  Ordoliberals	  and	  Catholic	  Christian	  Socialists	  
did	   not	   make	   for	   an	   easy	   fusion	   of	   the	   two	   worldviews	   into	   a	   new	   programmatic	   idea.	  
Adenauer,	  though,	  was	  convinced	  that	  one	  could	  not	  just	  lump	  both	  worldviews	  together	  to	  
form	   a	   new	   programmatic	   idea	   as	   “No	   new	   party	   can	   be	   built	   on	   “gathering”	   because	  
“gathering”	   does	   not	   indicate	   any	   particular	   pathway	   into	   the	   future.”60	   As	   Bösch	   puts	   it	  
“Adenauer	  himself	  had	  the	  advantage,	  to	  be	  acceptable	  for	  both	  sides,	  as	  he	  shared	  many	  
views	   about	   the	   economy	   with	   the	   Protestants,	   but	   was	   at	   the	   same	   time	   a	   believing	  
Catholic.”61	  It	  was	  personalities	  like	  him	  who	  “were	  to	  provide	  the	  new	  party	  with	  its	  most	  
important	  single	  integrating	  force.”62	  Nevertheless,	  even	  though	  Adenauer	  was	  a	  master	  in	  
manipulating	   both	   sides,	   it	   was	   far	   from	   easy	   to	   appease	   both	   sides	   and	   to	   fuse	   the	  
incongruent	  worldviews	   into	  a	  single	  program.	  The	   following	  section	  will	  portray	   the	  early	  
struggles	  over	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  socioeconomic	  programmatic	  ideas.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Kaufmann,	  F.-­‐X.	  (2003)	  p.	  137.	  59	  „Begründung	  in	  der	  Wirtschafts	  und	  Sozialethik	  beider	  großer	  Konfessionen.“	  Kaufmann,	  F.-­‐X.	  (2003)	  p.	  137.	  60	  Cary,	  N.	  D.	  (1996)	  p.	  180.	  61	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2002)	  p.	  76.	  62	  Pridham,	  G.	  (1977)	  Christian	  Democracy	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  London,	  Croon	  Helm,	  p.	  52.	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8.1.4 Programmatic	  ideas	  in	  the	  CDU	  	  
During	   the	   1940s,	   the	   CDU	   produced	   six	   major	   party	   manifestos.63	   The	   Gründungsaufruf	  
(1945),64	  the	  Frankfurter	  Leitsätze	  (1945),65	  the	  Kölner	  Leitsätze	  (1945),66	  the	  party	  program	  
from	  Neheim-­‐Hüsten	   (1946),67	   the	  Ahlen	   program	   (1948)68	   and	   the	  Düsseldorfer	   Leitsätze	  
(1949).69	  They	  nicely	  exemplify	  the	  limbo	  the	  party	  went	  through	  on	  its	  programmatic	  ideas	  
and	   beliefs	   in	   the	   early	   years.	   The	   Frankfurter	   Leitsätze	   continued	   to	   reflect	   the	   strong	  
position	  of	  Christian	  Socialists	  that	  demanded	  the	  nationalization	  of	  key	  industries,	  though	  
these	   are	   completely	   eradicated	   four	   years	   later	   in	   the	   Düsseldorfer	   Leitsätze	   where	   the	  
final	  turn	  towards	  the	  CDU’s	  market	  liberalism	  is	  cemented.	  The	  first	  official	  party	  platform,	  
the	   Hamburg	   Program	   from	   1953,	   was	   not	   amended	   until	   1968	   and	   incorporates	   and	  
reconfirms	  the	  positions	  from	  Düsseldorf.	  It	  marked,	  therefore,	  the	  end	  of	  Christian	  Socialist	  
attempts	   to	   install	   a	   neo-­‐corporatist	   regulation	  of	   post-­‐war	  Germany	   socioeconomics	   and	  
embodies	  the	  self-­‐confinement	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Christian	  Socialist	  wing	  to	  welfare	  policy.	  	  
	   The	  Kölner	  Leitsätze	  from	  June	  1945	  is	  the	  first	  official	  programmatic	  communication	  of	  
the	  CDU.	  On	  eight	  pages	  the	  manifesto	  promotes	  strong	  Christian	  Socialist	  positions	  but,	  at	  
the	   same	   time,	   also	   leaves	   room	   and	   acknowledges	   the	   importance	   of	   individual	  
entrepreneurship.	  This	   Janus-­‐headedness	  carries	  on	   throughout	   the	   text	  which	  states	   that	  
“The	   dominance	   of	   Big	   Capital,	   private	  monopolies	   and	   enterprises	  will	   be	   broken”70	   and	  
that	  “banking	  and	  insurance	  will	  be	  state	  controlled”.71	  It	  also	  puts	  forward,	  meanwhile,	  that	  
“Private	   initiatives	  and	   individual	  responsibility	  will	  be	  conserved.	  Small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  
businesses	   will	   be	   assisted	   and	   proliferated.”72	   The	   Frankfurter	   Leitsätze,	   a	   second	   party	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  These	  six	  manifestos	  are	  the	  more	  prominent	  ones.	  There	  are	  though	  actually	  many	  more	  as	  each	  regional	  party	  entity	  published	  its	  own	  founding	  manifesto.	  64	  CDU	  (1945a)	  Gründungsaufruf	  der	  CDU	  Berlin	  26.	  Juni	  1945.	  65	  CDU	  (1945b)	  Frankfurter	  Leitsätze,	  Politische	  Leitsätze	  der	  Christlich	  Demokratischen	  Union	  Stadtkreis	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main,	  September	  1945.	  66	  CDU	  (1945c)	  Kölner	  Leitsätze,	  Juni	  1945.	  67	  CDU	  (1946)	  CDU	  Parteiprogramm	  von	  Neheim-­‐Huesten	  vom	  1.3.1946	  68	  CDU	  (1947)	  CDU	  überwindet	  Kapitalismus	  und	  Marxismus:	  Das	  Ahlener	  Wirtschafts	  und	  Sozialprogramm	  der	  CDU.	  69	  CDU	  (1949)	  Düsseldorfer	  Leitsätze.	  15.7.1949.	  70	  „Die	  Vorherrschaft	  des	  Großkapitals,	  der	  privaten	  Monopole	  und	  Konzerne	  wird	  gebrochen.“,	  CDU	  (1945c)	  p.	  4.	  71	  “Das	  Banken	  und	  Versicherungswesen	  unterliegt	  der	  staatlichen	  Kontrolle.“,	  CDU	  (1945c)	  p.	  4.	  72	  „Privatinitiative	  und	  Eigenverantwortlichkeit	  werden	  erhalten.	  Mittel	  und	  Kleinbetriebe	  werden	  gefördert	  und	  vermehrt.“	  CDU	  (1945c)	  p.	  4.	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manifesto	   that	   was	   put	   forward	   a	   couple	   of	   months	   later	   in	   September	   1945,	   tips	   the	  
balance	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Christian	  Socialists.	  	  
	   The	   Frankfurter	   Leitsätze	   propagates	   an	   “economic	   Socialism	   on	   a	   democratic	  
fundament”.73	  The	  program	  demands	  nationalization	  of	  heavy	  industry	  and	  major	  banks	  as	  
well	  as	  other	  key	  sectors	  central	  to	  reconstruction.	  However,	  this	  call	  is	  eased	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  manifesto	  where	  the	  central	  role	  of	  individual	  economic	  action	  is	  highlighted.	  Regarding	  
social	   security	   the	   manifesto	   makes	   a	   clear	   reference	   to	   the	   pre-­‐fascist	   system.	   “The	  
conservation	   of	   the	   German	   Social	   Insurance	   is	   despite	   the	   given	   financial	   difficulties	   an	  
exigency,	   however	   it	   has	   to	   be	   simplified	   and	   liberated	   from	   exaggerated	   bureaucratic	  
burdens.”74	  This	  was	  a	  clear	  call	  for	  the	  re-­‐establishing	  of	  the	  social	  security	  system	  whose	  
formation	   the	   Catholic	   Center	   Party	   had	   heavily	   influenced	   in	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich	   and	   later	  
expanded	  with	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  during	  the	  Weimar	  Republic.	  In	  particular,	  it	  should	  be	  
cleansed	   from	   the	   clientelist	   add-­‐ons	   and	   program	   fragmentation	   that	   the	   Nazis	   had	  
enacted.	  Regarding	   industrial	   relations	   the	  program	   followed	  a	   similar	   line.	  Central	   to	   the	  
Frankfurter	  Leitsätze	  was	  the	  reintroduction	  of	  a	  system	  of	  codetermination	  and	  collective	  
wage	   bargaining	   that	   had	   been	   created	   by	   the	   Catholic	   Center	   Party	   and	   the	   Social	  
Democrats	   in	  Weimar.	  The	  text	   incorporates	  a	  pledge	  to	  ensure	  an	  “equal	  participation	  of	  
the	  employees	  in	  the	  guidance	  of	  the	  economy”	  in	  the	  future.75	  
	   Konrad	   Adenauer,	   who	   had	   started	   to	   emerge	   as	   the	   future	   strong	   man	   of	   the	   CDU,	  
feared	   that	   too	  much	  Christian	   Socialism	  would	   alienate	   the	  Ordoliberal	   Protestants	   from	  
the	   inter-­‐confessional	   project.	   He	   was	   therefore	   eager	   to	   roll	   back	   the	   Catholic	   Christian	  
Socialist	  influence.	  	  The	  strategy	  was	  to	  call	  for	  a	  party	  congregation	  in	  Neheim-­‐Huesten	  in	  
March	  1946	  that	  produced	  the	  third	  CDU	  manifesto	  within	   less	  than	  a	  year.	   It	  dropped	  all	  
previous	   promises	   to	   socialize	   industries	   by	   stating	   that	   the	   “pressing	   question	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  “Wir	  bekennen	  uns	  zu	  einem	  wirtschaftlichem	  Sozialismus	  auf	  Demokratischer	  Grundlage,	  und	  zwar	  in	  folgender	  Form:	  Wir	  erstreben	  die	  Überführung	  gewisser	  großer	  Urproduktionen,	  Großindustrien	  und	  Großbanken	  in	  Gemeineigentum.	  Wir	  wollen	  ferner	  dass	  die	  Wirtschaft	  im	  Großen	  einheitlich	  gelenkt	  werde.	  Aber	  dennoch	  soll	  Platz	  für	  individuellen	  Wettbewerb	  sein.“	  CDU	  (1945b)	  p.	  6.	  74	  “Die	  Erhaltung	  der	  deutschen	  Sozialversicherung	  ist	  trotz	  der	  gegebenen	  finanziellen	  Schwierigkeiten	  eine	  Notwendigkeit,	  sie	  muss	  jedoch	  vereinfacht	  und	  von	  übermäßiger	  bürokratischer	  Belastung	  befreit	  werden.“	  CDU	  (1945b)	  p.	  7.	  75	  “und	  wünschen	  eine	  Weiterentwicklung	  dieser	  sozialen	  Grundrechte	  in	  Richtung	  auf	  eine	  gleichberechtigte	  Teilnahme	  der	  Arbeitnehmerschaft	  an	  der	  Führung	  der	  Wirtschaft.“	  CDU	  (1945b)	  p.	  7.	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socialization	  of	  parts	  of	  the	  economy	  is	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time	  not	  convenient”.76	  That	  said,	  the	  
program	   is	   still	   far	   from	   being	   purely	   neoliberal	   as	   social	   insurance	   was	   kept	   and	  
codetermination	  procedures	  between	  employers	  and	  employees	  was	  also	  advocated.77	  
	   The	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	  over	  the	  future	  economic	  policy	  position	  entered	  its	  next	  round	  with	  the	  
Ahlen	  party	  program	  in	  March	  1946	  which	  saw	  the	  CDU	  pulled	  once	  again	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  
Christian	   Socialism.	   Under	   the	   telling	   title	   “CDU	   overcomes	  Marxism	   and	   Capitalism”	   the	  
program	  opens	  with	  the	  assessment	  that	  “The	  capitalist	  economic	  system	  did	  not	  live	  up	  to	  
the	   state	   and	   social	   interests	   of	   the	   German	   people.”78	   The	   manifesto	   positions	   itself	  
strongly	   against	   any	   capitalist	   profit-­‐	   and	   power-­‐accumulation	   and	   is	   dominated	   by	   the	  
three	   central	   claims	   for	   socialization	   of	   heavy	   industries,	   codetermination	   in	   industry	  
between	  employers	  and	  employees	  and	  of	  rigid	  state	  control	  of	  money,	  bank	  and	  insurance	  
systems.	  The	  Ahlen	  program	  therefore	  goes	  further,	  and	  is	  more	  concrete	  in	  its	  claims,	  than	  
what	  had	  gone	  before.	  It	  reverses	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  Neheim-­‐Huesten	  program	  stating	  that	  
“Also	   in	   the	   iron	   manufacturing	   heavy	   industry	   the	   path	   of	   socialization	   should	   be	  
followed.”79	  
	   Even	   though	   the	   term	   Christian	   Socialism	   has	   vanished	   from	   the	   program	   it	   now	  
embraces	  aspects	  of	  neo-­‐corporatism	  by	  advocating	  a	  triangle	  in	  which	  the	  economic	  order	  
should	  be	  structured	  between	  equal	  representatives	  of	  state,	  economy	  and	  consumers.80	  	  In	  
this	  much,	   the	  Ahlen	  program	   is	   congruent	  with	   the	  papal	   social	   encyclical	  Quadragesimo	  
Anno	  which	   had	  markedly	   positioned	   itself	   against	   liberal	  market	   capitalism	   fifteen	   years	  
earlier.81	  Ahlen	  marked	  the	  highpoint	  of	  Christian	  Socialist	  tendencies.82	  The	  Ahlen	  program	  
has	   achieved	   enormous	   prominence	   amongst	   the	   long	   line	   of	   Christian	   Democratic	   party	  
programs.	  Bösch	  points	  out	  that	  the	  “Huge	  myth	  of	  the	  small	  program”	  that	  the	  manifesto	  
contains	  for	  the	  union	  and	  workers’	  wing	  of	  the	  CDU	  is	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  up	  until	  
now	  (mistakenly)	  has	  been	  taken	  as	  the	  founding	  manifesto	  of	  a	  party	  in	  which	  its	  decisively	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  “Die	  sich	  aufdrängende	  Frage	  der	  Vergesellschaftung	  von	  Teilen	  der	  Wirtschaft	  ist	  zur	  Zeit	  nicht	  praktisch“	  CDU	  (1946)	  p.	  6.	  77	  CDU	  (1946)	  p.	  5.	  78	  “Das	  kapitalistische	  Wirtschaftssystem	  	  ist	  den	  staatlichen	  und	  sozialen	  Lebensinteressen	  des	  deutschen	  Volkes	  nicht	  gerecht	  geworden.“	  CDU	  (1947)	  p.	  3.	  	  79	  „Auch	  bei	  der	  eisenschaffenden	  Großindustrie	  ist	  der	  Weg	  der	  Vergesellschaftung	  zu	  beschreiten.“	  CDU	  (1947)	  p.	  6.	  80	  CDU	  (1947)	  p.	  13.	  81	  Rauscher,	  A.	  (1980)	  p.	  16.	  82	  Pridham,	  G.	  (1977)	  p.	  31.	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capitalist-­‐critical	  attitude	  was	  enshrined.83	  The	  left	  party	  wing	  of	  the	  CDU	  still	   thinks	  today	  
that	  the	  Ahlen	  manifesto	  was	  a	  forceful	  reply	  of	  the	  Christian	  Socialist	  wing	  to	  Adenauer’s	  
attempt	  to	  corral	  the	  party	  into	  a	  more	  liberal	  position.84	  In	  reality	  it	  was	  Adenauer	  himself	  
who	   had	   developed	   the	   draft	   party	   program	   almost	   single-­‐handedly.	   Adenauer	   pursued	  
three	  aims	  in	  doing	  so:	  first,	  he	  wanted	  to	  appease	  but	  also	  influence	  the	  workers’	  wing	  of	  
the	  party	  by	  adopting	  some	  of	   the	  positions	  of	  Christian	  Socialism	  and	  thereby	  quenching	  
their	  thirst.	  Second,	  he	  wanted	  to	  crush	  his	  internal	  left	  leaning	  party	  rival	  –	  Jacob	  Kaiser	  –	  
and,	  third,	  he	  wanted	  to	  secure	  the	  support	  of	  workers	  in	  the	  upcoming	  elections	  in	  North	  
Rhine	   Westphalia.85	   By	   drafting	   both	   programs,	   Adenauer	   did	   not	   demonstrate	  
schizophrenia	   but,	   rather,	   his	   excellence	   in	   tactical	   manoeuvres.	   Both	   wings	   of	   the	   party	  
could	   sell	   both	   programs	   as	   successes	   to	   their	   own	   followers.	   With	   the	   Ahlen	   program	  
Adenauer	   had	   achieved	   his	   aims	   regarding	   the	   left	   wing	   of	   the	   party.	   That	   the	   Ahlen	  
program	  was	  more	  of	  a	  concession,	  rather	  than	  an	  embracement	  of	  the	  Catholic	  left	  wing	  of	  
the	   party,	   can	   also	   be	   derived	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   Adenauer’s	   suspicion	   saw	   him	   insist	   on	  
erasing	  the	  term	  Christian	  Socialism	  from	  the	  party	  program.	  He	  was	  now	  willing	  to	  give	  the	  
Ordoliberal	  protestant	  wing	  of	   the	  party	  more	   leverage.	  Pridham	  notes	   that	   “the	   trend	   in	  
the	   party	   from	   1948	   was	   in	   an	   economically	   Conservative	   direction,	   which	   ensured	   the	  
success	  of	  Erhard’s	  plans	  in	  1949.”86	  
	   The	   Düsseldorfer	   Leitsätze,	   only	   three	   years	   later,	   pointed	   in	   the	   completely	   opposite	  
direction.	  It	  saw	  the	  Soziale	  Marktwirtschaft	  etched	  in	  the	  stone	  of	  the	  CDU	  party	  program.	  
The	   document	   opens	   with	   the	   telling	   statement	   that	   “he	   who	   wants	   to	   be	   free	   has	   to	  
subordinate	  himself	   to	   competition”.87	   The	  manifesto	  provides	   a	   sophisticated	   framework	  
for	   an	   Ordoliberal	   market	   economy.	   The	   program	   claims	   to	   be	   a	   market	   economic	  
supplement	   to	   the	   Ahlen	   program	   but	   is,	   in	   reality,	   a	   fundamental	   break	   from	   its	  
propositions.88	  Any	  sign	  of	  corporatism	  that	  the	  Ahlen	  program	  still	  contained	  is	  eradicated	  
and	   replaced	   with	   a	   strong	   call	   for	   a	   market	   economy	   in	   which	   ‘true’	   competition	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2002)	  p.	  18.	  84	  Rauscher	  notes	  that	  „war	  das	  Ahlener	  Programm	  	  in	  erster	  Linie	  die	  Devise	  der	  Linkskatholiken“,	  Rauscher,	  A.	  (1980)	  Die	  Katholische	  Soziallehre	  im	  gesellschaftlichen	  Entwicklungsprozess	  der	  Nachkriegszeit,	  IN:	  Langer,	  A.	  (ed.)	  Katholizismus.	  Wirtschaftsordnung	  
und	  Sozialpolitik	  1945-­‐1963,	  Paderborn,	  Schöningh,	  p.	  19.	  85	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2002)	  p.	  18.	  86	  Pridham,	  G.	  (1977)	  	  p.	  31.	  87	  CDU	  (1949)	  p.	  20.	  88	  CDU	  (1949),	  p.	  2.	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guaranteed	   through	   a	   tough	   monopoly	   and	   cartel	   controls	   backed	   by	   an	   independent	  
central	  bank	  to	  guard	  against	  inflation.	  Social	  policy	  only	  features	  to	  a	  limited	  extent	  in	  the	  
program.	  
	   To	  summarize,	   the	  early	  party	  programs	  wanted	  to	   find	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  dilemma	  that	  
the	  “regulating	  socialist	  and	  state	  socialist	  tendencies	  were	  rejected	  as	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  
baleful	  collectivism.	  But	  also	  the	  liberal	  organization	  of	  the	  economy	  without	  any	  reference	  
to	  the	  common	  good	  was	  rejected.”89	  Nevertheless,	  it	  seemed	  that	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  
the	  social	  market	  economy	  principles	  at	  the	  party	  rally	  in	  Düsseldorf,	  market	  liberalism	  had	  
successfully	   out-­‐manoeuvred	   the	   Christian	   socialist	   currents	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1940s.90	   In	  
Düsseldorf	   the	  CDU	  had	  opted	   for	  a	  “socially	   responsible	  version	  of	   the	  market	  economy”	  
but,	  as	  Lappenküchner	  notes,	  with	  the	  Düsseldorf	  program	  “socialization	  tendencies	  and	  the	  
plea	   for	   a	   corporatist	   economic	  order	  were	   largely	   abandoned.”91	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   Lönne	  
states	  that	  the	  Düsseldorf	  program	  was	  essentially	  sold	  as	  “market	  economic	  complement	  
to	  the	  Ahlen	  program	  but	  represented	  in	  the	  end	  a	  strong	  and	  final	  dislocation	  of	  the	  CDU	  
politics	  from	  societal	  and	  economic	  reform	  policy	  towards	  capitalist	  market	  politics”.92	  The	  
analysis	   presented	   above	   arrives	   at	   a	   similar	   conclusion.	   The	   Düsseldorf	   manifesto	   is	  
especially	  important	  in	  this	  respect	  because	  it	  put	  an	  end,	  for	  the	  time	  being	  at	  least,	  to	  the	  
discussion	   between	  Catholic	   left-­‐	   and	   Protestant	  market-­‐liberals.	  What	   had	   found	   its	  way	  
into	   the	   Düsseldorf	  manifesto	  was	   to	   remain	   there	   throughout	   the	   next	   decade	   and	  was	  
reaffirmed	  in	  the	  two	  party	  manifestos	  of	  the	  1950s.	  	  
	   The	   fundamental	   and	   final	   nature	   of	   the	   Düsseldorfer	   Leitsätze’s	   message	   for	   the	  
Christian	  Democratic	   platform	   shows	  up	   in	   the	  party	  manifestos	  of	   the	  1950s.	  With	   great	  
self-­‐confidence	   they	  boast	   that	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	  Christian	  Democratic	   social	  market	  
economy	  had	  stabilized	  the	  country	  and	  helped	  it	  to	  embark	  on	  an	  unprecedented	  path	  of	  
growth.	   The	   Hamburg	   Program	   of	   1953	   once	   again	   emphasizes	   that	   “nationalization	   and	  
socialist	   state	   ownership	   is	   no	   solution	   for	   the	   social	   question”93	   and	   that	   instead	   “Social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  “Reglementierende	  sozialistische	  und	  staatssozialistische	  Tendenzen	  wurden	  als	  Wegbereiter	  eines	  unheilvollen	  Kollektivismus	  abgelehnt.	  Aber	  auch	  eine	  liberale	  Wirtschaftsführung	  ohne	  Bindung	  an	  das	  Gemeinwohl	  wurde	  zurückgewiesen.“	  Lönne,	  K.-­‐E.	  (1986)	  p.	  267.	  90	  Schulz,	  M.	  (2005)	  p.	  141.	  91	  Lappenküchler,	  U.	  (2004)	  p.	  27.	  92	  Lönne,	  K.-­‐E.	  (1986)	  p.	  273.	  93	  CDU	  (1953)	  Hamburger	  Programm	  CDU:	  Das	  Programm	  der	  Christlich	  Demokratischen	  Union	  für	  den	  zweiten	  Bundestag,	  22.4.1953,	  p.	  17.	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insurance	  is	  a	  solid	  part	  of	  our	  social	  system.”94	  Furthermore,	  it	  contains	  a	  pledge	  to	  “keep	  
the	  well-­‐proven	  version	  of	  the	  categorized	  social	  insurance.”95	  	  
	   The	  German	  Christian	  Democrats’	  route	  regarding	  economic	  and	  social	  structure	  seems	  
to	  have	  been	  fairly	  well	  settled	  in	  the	  early	  1950s.	  Christian	  Democracy	  settled	  for	  a	  system	  
that	  allowed	  for	  a	  maximum	  of	  economic	  competition	  and	   liberalization	  with	  any	  negative	  
outcomes	  being	  corrected	  a	  posteriori	  through	  social	  insurance.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Catholic	  
worldview,	  with	   its	  programmatic	   ideas	  of	  Christian	   Socialism	  and	   the	  neo-­‐corporatism	  of	  
Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  had	  been	  defeated	  when	   it	   came	   to	   the	   structuring	  of	   the	  economy	  
but	  were	  compensated	  for	  with	  welfare.	  Indeed,	  Hockerts	  notes	  that	  the	  Catholic	  employee	  
wing	   “went	   into	   the	   offensive	   in	   the	   field	   of	   social	   policy,	   and	   achieved	   here	   some	  
substantial	   achievements	   against	   the	   neo	   liberals.”96	   The	   interconfessional	   trade	   off	   on	  
programmatic	  ideas	  meant	  that	  Protestantism	  could	  fortify	  the	  free	  market	  economy	  while	  
the	  Catholics	  had	  to	  scrap	  their	  plans	  for	  (neo-­‐)corporatism.	  As	  compensation,	  the	  Catholics	  
were	  had	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  social	  security	  regime	  of	  the	  pre-­‐fascist	  period	  enshrined	  into	  
the	   CDU	   program.	   Thus,	   parts	   of	   the	   Ordoliberal	   concept	   of	   free	   market	   competition	  
became	  integral	  part	  of	  German	  Christian	  Democratic-­‐Catholic	  social	  teaching.	  Even	  on	  the	  
yearly	   rally	   of	   the	   German	   Catholics	   in	   1949	   the	   social	   market	   economy	   received	   a	   very	  
positive	  reception.97	  	  
	   According	   to	  Manow	   this	   programmatic	   compromise	  between	   two	  denominations	  was	  
institutionalized	  when	  the	  Catholics	  were	  granted	  the	  reintroduction	  of	  the	  pre-­‐war	  welfare	  
regime	   while	   the	   Protestants	   introduced	   the	   Ordoliberal	   institutions	   of	   an	   independent	  
central	  bank	  and	  a	   cartel	  agency.98	  However,	   this	  does	  not	  explain	  why	   the	  German	  Post-­‐
War	   economic	   order	   became	  much	  more	   neo-­‐corporatist	   than	   Ordoliberlism	  would	   have	  
ordinarily	   allowed	   it	   to	   be.	   This	   indicates	   that	   the	   inner	   party	   compromise	   between	  
Orldoliberalism	  and	  Christian	  Socialism	  was	  not	  as	  stable	  and	  eternal	  as	   is	  often	  assumed.	  
The	   next	   section	   will	   analyze	   how	   a	   series	   of	   external	   constraints	   and	   interests	   such	   as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  CDU	  (1953)	  p.	  16.	  95	  CDU	  (1953)	  p.	  16.	  96	  „ging	  sie	  auf	  dem	  Feld	  der	  Sozialpolitik	  in	  die	  Offensive,	  und	  sie	  erreichte	  hier	  beträchtliche	  Durchsetzungserfolge	  gegenüber	  Neoliberalen“	  Hockerts,	  H.	  G.	  (1988)	  p.	  45.	  97	  Langer,	  A.	  (1980)	  p.	  54.	  98	  Manow,	  P.	  (2000)	  Modell	  Deutschland	  as	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  Interdenominational	  Compromise.	  Minda	  De	  Gunzburg	  Center	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  European	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  paper.	  Cambridge.	  Harvard	  University.	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demands	   from	   the	   Allies,	   employers	   and	   the	   Korea	   crisis	   again	   shifted	   the	   programmatic	  
ideas	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Catholics	  during	  the	  1950s.	  
	  	  
8.2 The	  (re-­‐)transformation	  of	  the	  Social	  Market	  Economy	  
The	  question	  to	  be	  tackled	  here	  is	  how	  Protestant	  Ordoliberalism	  were	  able	  to	  have	  such	  a	  
strong	   initial	   impact,	   despite	   that	   an	   unfavourable	   shift	   in	   the	   denominational	   balance	   in	  
West	   Germany	   and	   the	   closer	   links	   between	   Protestantism	   and	   Nazism,	   and	   how	   this	  
influence	   could	   later	  be	  quickly	   reversed.	  Catholics,	   and	   the	  proponents	  of	  Catholic	   social	  
teaching,	  were	  in	  a	  majority	  position	  within	  the	  party.	  Zolleis	  remains	  vague	  when	  stressing	  
that	   “The	   development	   of	   the	   CDU	   as	   the	   party	   of	   the	   social	   market	   economy	   was	  
dependent	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  party	  external	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Western	  
Allies,	   the	   currency	   reform	   and	   the	   long	   standing	   successes	   of	   the	   Frankfurt	   Economic	  
Council	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  Ludwig	  Erhard.”99	  We	  shall	  now	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  and	  unravel	  
these	  different	  explanations.	  
	  
8.2.1 The	  Ordoliberal	  Dominance	  
Adenauer	   was	   obsessed	   with	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   new	   political	   movement	   rather	   than	  
assembling	  the	  leftovers	  of	  previous	  political	  players.	  Cary	  notes	  that	  “For	  Adenauer,	  then,	  
the	  SPD	  was	  an	  old	  and	  shop	  worn	  party	  that	  was	  in	  danger	  of	  becoming	  an	  appendage	  of	  
the	   communists,	   while	   the	   CDU	  was	   a	   new,	   tolerant,	  moderate,	   coherent,	   and	   genuinely	  
interdenominational	  movement.”100	  In	  fact,	  Adenauer	  wanted	  to	  emphasize	  the	  break	  with	  
the	   old	   Center	   Party	  whenever	   he	   could.	   Cary	   notes	   that	   “When	   he	   did	  mention	   the	   old	  
Center,	   his	   purpose	  was	   to	  deny	   its	   tradition	   to	   the	  new	  Center”.101	  Adenauer	   repeatedly	  
emphasized	  that	  the	  party	  should	  be	  “a	  new	  party,	  not	  a	  combination	  of	  an	  old	  party	  from	  
an	  era	   that	   is	  dead	  and	  gone.”102	   It	  was	   therefore	  also	   in	  Adenauer’s	   interest	   to	   foster	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  “Die	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  der	  CDU	  als	  Partei	  der	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  Marktwirtschaft	  hing	  aber	  in	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  Masse	  von	  parteiexternen	  Entwicklungen,	  wie	  dem	  Einfluss	  der	  Westallierten,	  der	  Währungsreform	  und	  den	  langjährigen	  Erfolgen	  des	  Frankfurter	  Wirtschaftsdirektoriums	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  der	  Leitung	  von	  Ludwig	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  tab.“	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  100	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economic	  policy	   line	   for	   the	   CDU	   that	   diverged	   from	   the	  Center	   Party’s	   focus	  on	  Catholic	  
social	  teaching.	  This	  served	  his	   interests	  of	  making	  the	  CDU	  more	  distinguishable	  from	  the	  
Social	   Democrats	   (SPD).	   Furthermore,	   international	   considerations	   also	   played	   a	   role.	  
Adenauer	   was	   much	   more	   interested	   tactical	   and	   pragmatic	   thinking	   than	   abstract	  
theoretical	   debates.	   The	   onset	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   and	   the	   need	   for	   the	   Marshall	   Plan	   aid	  
convinced	  him	  that,	   in	  order	  not	  to	  upset	  the	  Western	  allies,	  pledges	  for	  nationalization	  in	  
the	  programmatic	  ideas	  of	  his	  party	  should	  be	  kept	  to	  a	  minimum.103	  Moreover,	  the	  shift	  of	  
political	   Catholicism	   from	   the	   Left	   towards	   the	   Center	   was	   also	   a	   reaction	   to	   the	   short	  
economic	  boom	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1940s.	  Rauscher	  points	  out	  that	  “The	  more	  the	  employees	  
were	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   social	   market	   economy,	   the	   less	   they	   thought	   about	  
nationalization.”104	  
	   Thus,	   although	   the	   Adenauer	   factor	   certainly	   plays	   a	   role	   it	   cannot	   alone	   explain	   the	  
shifts.	  Abelshauser	  points	  out	   that	   the	  exogenous	  effects	  of	   the	  onset	  of	   the	  Korean	  War	  
were	   of	   immense	   importance	   in	   influencing	   the	   power	   balance	   between	   supporters	   of	  
Christian	   Socialism	   and	   market	   liberalism.	   Abelshauser	   also	   remarks	   that	   the	   currency	  
reform	   of	   the	   20th	   June	   1948,	   which	   Erhard	   coupled	   with	   stringent	   market	   liberalizing	  
reforms,	   was	   a	   de	   facto	   implementation	   of	   a	   neo-­‐liberal	   agenda	   in	   the	   German	   political	  
economy	   long	   before	   the	   resolution	   of	   the	   programmatic	   war	   of	   words	   in	   the	   Christian	  
Democratic	   party	  manifestos.105	  With	   this	   move,	   Erhard	   and	   the	   Ordoliberals	   had	   gained	  
considerable	  ground	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  supporters	  of	  state	  interventionist	  politics	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  
real	  politics	  while	  Catholic	  Christian	  Socialists	  were	  still	  discussing	  programs.106	  The	  currency	  
reform	  and	  the	  move	  to	  a	  free	  market	  economy	  immediately	  ignited	  an	  enormous	  economic	  
spurt.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  move	  towards	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  market	  economy	  seemed	  therefore	  
to	  have	  decided	  the	  debate	  between	  market	  and	  planning.	  However,	  the	  Korea	  crisis	  would	  
soon	  render	  all	  programmatic	  Ordoliberal	  statements	  useless	  and	  degrade	  Ludwig	  Erhard	  to	  
what	  Schofield	  called	  a	  “paper	  tiger	  of	  German	  industry”.	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8.2.2 Exogenous	  Factors	  and	  the	  Catholic	  backlash	  -­‐	  The	  Korea	  Crisis	  
The	  early	  boost	  in	  growth	  turned	  soon	  out	  to	  be	  little	  more	  than	  a	  firework.	  The	  economy	  
began	  to	  fizzle	  out	  from	  1950	  onwards	  and	  stumbled	  into	  its	  first	  crisis.	  The	  unemployment	  
rate	   soared	   to	  11%	   in	  1950.	  By	  1951	   two	  million	  people	  were	  already	  out	  of	  work.107	  The	  
premises	  of	  the	  free	  market	  promised	  by	  Erhard	  crumbled.	  The	  Allied	  forces	  and	  the	  Allied	  
High	   Commission	   became	   especially	   worried	   about	   the	   potential	   destabilizing	   effect	   of	  
structural	  unemployment.	  At	  first	  the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  allies	  had	  been	  convinced	  of	  the	  merits	  
of	  Ordoliberalism’s	  break	  with	  the	  traditions	  of	  German	  corporatism.	  Shonfield	  remarks	  that	  
the	   Anglo	   Saxon	   allies	   felt	   that	   “Whatever	   the	   view	   of	   the	   German	   central	   government,	  
business	  would	  in	  future	  be	  kept	  small,	  divided,	  and	  competitive.”108	  Nevertheless,	  owing	  to	  
the	  economic	  downturn	  and	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  Allies	  changed	  their	  approach	  to	  
German	   economic	   reconstruction.	   Henceforth,	   they	   prioritized	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   stable	  
German	   economy	   and	   their	   concerns	   increasingly	   targeted	   the	   “philosophy”109	   in	   which	  
Ludwig	  Erhard’s	  neo-­‐liberal	  approach	  was	  grounded.	  The	  fear	  was	  that	  Erhard’s	  neo	  liberal	  
policy	  would	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  overcome	  the	  problem	  of	  unemployment,	  especially	  since	  
active	  labor	  market	  policies	  did	  not	  feature	  in	  the	  policy	  repertoire	  of	  the	  Ordoliberals.	  The	  
increasing	   competition	   between	   two	   systems,	   in	   light	   of	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   Cold	  War,	   was	  
deemed	  to	  be	  dangerous	  by	  the	  allies.	  Events	  started	  to	  accelerate	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  
Korean	   War	   on	   the	   25th	   June	   1950	   which	   triggered	   a	   worldwide	   economic	   crisis.	   The	  
Western	   Allies	   demanded	   active	   labor	   market	   programs	   and	   an	   end	   to	   the	   restricted	  
monetary	   policy.	   Erhard	   and	   the	   predecessor	   institution	   of	   the	   central	   bank	   strongly	  
opposed	  this.	  The	  US	  High	  Commissioner	  General	  Mc	  Cloy	  increased	  the	  pressure	  on	  Erhard	  
by	   threatening	   to	   halt	   the	   Marshall	   Plan	   aid.	   When	   half	   of	   the	   Christian	   Democratic	  
parliamentary	   group	   in	   the	   Bundestag	   crossed	   the	   aisle	   to	   vote	   for	   a	   Social	   Democratic	  
proposal	   on	   active	   labor	   measures,	   Erhard	   knew	   he	   had	   to	   move.	   While	   still	   calling	   it	   a	  
“General	  attack	  on	  the	  German	  market	  economy”,	  he	  did	  order	  the	  development	  of	  active	  
labor	  market	  programs.110	  
	   Surprisingly	   the	   Korea	   crisis	   soon	   developed	   counterintuitive	   and	   unexpected	   positive	  
economic	   effects	   for	   West	   Germany	   as	   it	   was	   the	   only	   western	   country	   with	   industrial	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  University	  Press,	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overcapacities.	  Furthermore,	  the	  war	  led	  to	  a	  heavy	  worldwide	  increase	  in	  demand	  for	  raw	  
materials.	   Heavy	   industry	   based	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   raw	  materials	   soon	   ran	   into	   supply	  
problems.	   Even	   Erhard	   agreed	   now	   that	   some	   state	   coordination	   of	   these	   industries	  was	  
necessary.	   His	   speech	   in	   the	   German	   Bundestag	   on	   the	   14th	   March	   1951	   used	   the	   word	  
‘planning’	  numerous	  times.	  It	  was	  ridiculed	  by	  some	  as	  “funeral	  address	  of	  the	  free	  market	  
economy”.111	  In	  addition,	  the	  Allied	  demand	  for	  planning	  increased	  with	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  
war	  in	  Korea.	  On	  the	  6th	  March	  1951	  they	  asked	  “a	  considerable	  modification”112	  of	  the	  free	  
market	  economy	  as	  they	  needed	  supplies	  of	  armory	  goods	  and	  started	  to	  demand	  a	  German	  
contribution	  to	  their	  own	  defense.	  German	  industry	  seized	  this	  opportunity.	  Employers	  had	  
never	   been	   happy	   with	   the	   Ordoliberal	   and	   Anglo-­‐Saxon	   provisions	   for	   the	   German	  
economy.	  	  Shoenfield	  notes	  that	  “the	  last	  thing	  the	  German	  industrialists	  contemplated	  was	  
to	  establish	  a	  free	  economy	  of	  small	  producers	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  spirit.”113	  
	   The	   employer	   associations	   were	   long	   since	   sour	   about	   being	   excluded	   from	   all	  
decisionmaking	  regarding	  the	  political	  economy	  under	  Erhard’s	  Ordoliberal	  worldviews.	  The	  
Korea	   crisis	   gave	   their	   complaints	  more	   girth.	   Erhard	   gave	   the	   employers’	   association	   the	  
task	  of	  coordinating	  raw	  materials	  and	  heavy	  industry,	  but	  did	  not	  allow	  the	  state	  to	  play	  an	  
active	   role	   in	   this.	   This	  new	   role	   for	   the	  Federation	  of	  German	   Industries	   (BDI)	  during	   the	  
Korea	  crisis	  laid	  the	  foundations	  for	  the	  restoration	  of	  Germany’s	  prewar	  (neo-­‐)	  corporatist	  
structure.	   Abelshauser	   comments	   that	   “Cooperative	   self-­‐administration	   and	   interest	  
politics,	   originating	   in	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich,	   became	   fully	   fledged	   in	   the	  Weimar	   Republic	   and	  
were	  authoritatively	  deformed	  during	  the	  NS	  Regimes,	  also	  left	  their	  imprint	  on	  the	  market	  
economy	  of	   the	   fifties.”114	   Therefore,	  Rhine	  Capitalism	   (Rheinischer	  Kapitalismus),	  with	   its	  
corporatism	  that	  was	  constitutive	  for	  the	  German	  post-­‐WWII	  economy,	  was	  not	  a	  product	  
of	   the	   concept	  of	   the	   social	  market	  economy	   (at	   least	  not	  of	   its	  Ordoliberal	  part).	   In	   fact,	  
only	  through	  the	  events	  of	  the	  Korea	  crisis	  did	  corporatist	  elements	  come	  to	  be	  introduced	  
into	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  social	  market	  economy.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  „Leichenrede	  der	  freien	  Marktwirtschaft“	  Abelshauser,	  W.	  (1987)	  p.	  23.	  112	  Abelshauser,	  W.	  (1987)	  p.	  23.	  113	  Shonfield,	  A.	  (1969)	  p.	  240.	  114	  „Korporative	  Selbstverwaltung	  und	  Interessenpolitik,	  im	  Kaiserreich	  entstanden,	  in	  der	  Weimarer	  Republik	  voll	  ausgebildet	  und	  während	  des	  NS-­‐Regimes	  autoritär	  verformt,	  gaben	  auch	  der	  Marktwirtschaft	  der	  fünfziger	  Jahre	  ihr	  Gepräge.“	  Abelshauser,	  W.	  (1987)	  p.	  24.	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   The	   Ordoliberal	   aim	   of	   a	   clean	   break	   with	   the	   corporatist	   German	   past	   could	   not	   be	  
fulfilled.	   “German	   industry	   thought	   otherwise”115	   and	  used	   all	   its	   leverage	   to	   reinstall	   the	  
corporatist	   pre-­‐war	   system.	   Shonfield	   therefore	   eloquently	   assesses	   that	   “The	   defeat,	  
division,	  and	  chaos	  which	  Germany	  suffered	  in	  the	  1940s	  did	  not	  wipe	  out	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  
past”.116	  
	   That	  parts	  of	   the	  German	  economy	   fell	   back	   into	  partial	   corporatism	  during	   the	  1950s	  
seems	  to	  be	  the	  outcome	  of	  crude	  interest	  politics	  on	  behalf	  capital	  that	  did	  not	  want	  to	  be	  
shackled	   by	   Ordoliberal	   constraints.	   Employers	   seemed	   to	   have	   seized	   the	   window	   of	  
opportunity	  that	  the	  Korea	  War	  presented	  in	  order	  to	  suppress	  Ordoliberal	  demands	  within	  
the	   ruling	   Christian	   Democrats.	   Yet,	   this	   is	   only	   one	   part	   of	   the	   story,	   as	   capital	   only	  
succeeded	   in	   doing	   so	   because	   it	   had	   found	   allies	   in	   the	   Catholic	   part	   of	   the	   Christian	  
Democrats	  –	  people	  for	  whom	  corporatism	  remained	  deeply	  entrenched	  in	  their	  worldview.	  
This	   economic	   model	   shared	   many	   affinities	   with	   the	   Christian	   Socialist	   provisions	   of	  
Quadragesimo	  Anno	   that	   allowed	   it	   to	   capitalize	   on	   the	  Korea	   crisis	   by	   garnering	   support	  
from	  the	  Allies	  and	  employers	  against	   their	  Ordoliberal	  opponents	   inside	   their	  own	  party.	  
The	   interests	   of	   the	   employers	   and	   Allies,	   therefore,	   were	   neatly	   matched	   with	   the	  
worldview	  and	  the	  programmatic	   ideas	  of	  Catholic	  Christian	  Socialists.	  This	  match	  secured	  
the	  stability	  of	  Rhine	  Capitalism	  in	  post-­‐war	  Germany.	  
	  
8.2.3 Social	  Democracy	  caught	  in	  Ideational	  competition	  
Social	  Democracy	  had	  a	  difficult	  start	  after	  the	  war.	  Against	  most	  internal	  expectations	  the	  
SPD	  lost	  the	  two	  first	  elections	  to	  the	  Christian	  Democrats.117	  In	  particular,	  the	  party	  was	  not	  
able	   to	   make	   inroads	   among	   the	   middle	   classes	   and	   Catholic	   workers.118	   The	   Social	  
Democrat’s	   traditional	   programmatic	   beliefs	  were	   a	   burden	   against	   the	  backdrop	  of	   large	  
scale	  nationalizations	  in	  East	  Germany.	  The	  party	  started	  to	  change	  its	  programmatic	  ideas	  
as	   a	   reaction	   to	   the	   events	   in	   East	   Germany,	  which	  were	   perceived	   as	   the	   advent	   of	   yet	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Shonfield,	  A.	  (1969)	  p.	  240.	  116	  Shonfield,	  A.	  (1969)	  p.	  240.	  117	  The	  first	  elections	  were	  lost	  on	  a	  rather	  slim	  margin.	  In	  1949	  the	  CDU	  got	  31%	  of	  the	  vote	  while	  the	  SPD	  reached	  29.2%.	  In	  the	  second	  federal	  elections	  in	  1953	  the	  CDU	  dramatically	  increased	  its	  share	  to	  50.2%	  while	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  stagnated	  at	  31,8%.	  118	  Schulz,	  G.	  (2005)	  Sozialpolitische	  Denk	  und	  Handlungsfelder,	  IN:	  Schulz,	  G.	  (ed.)	  Geschichte	  
der	  Sozialpolitik	  in	  Deutschland	  seit	  1945,	  Band	  3,	  Baden	  Baden,	  Nomos,	  p.	  85.	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another	  authoritarian	  regime	  in	  Germany,	  and	  the	  early	  electoral	  defeats.	  	  During	  the	  1950s	  
the	  party	  increasingly	  aimed	  at	  developing	  a	  “third	  way”	  between	  a	  market	  and	  a	  planned	  
economy.	  As	   the	  concept	  of	   the	  social	  market	  economy	  was	   incredibly	  popular	  during	  the	  
1950s,	  some	  of	  its	  provisions	  were	  adopted	  by	  the	  Social	  Democrats.119	  	  The	  transformation	  
of	  the	  SPD	  from	  a	  Socialist	  to	  a	  Social	  Democratic	  party	  took	  a	  decade.	  In	  the	  end	  came	  the	  
Godesberg	  program,	  adopted	  by	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  in	  1959,	  which	  had	  scrapped	  any	  call	  
for	  nationalization	  from	  its	  content.	  The	  1950s	  were	  therefore	  marked	  by	  a	  rapprochement,	  
rather	   than	   harsh	   confrontation,	   between	   the	   Social	   and	   Christian	   Democrats.	   The	   party	  
now	   emphasized	   a	   “regulated	   market	   economy”120	   with	   aspects	   such	   as	   an	   independent	  
cartel	  agency	  that	  were	  borrowed	  from	  the	  Ordoliberal	  economic	   toolkit.121	  Confrontation	  
between	  Christian	  and	  Social	  Democrats	  existed	   in	   foreign,	  European	  and	  defense	  policies	  
but	  less	  so	  on	  socioeconomic	  issues.	  
	   Even	  before	  the	  big	  shift	  of	  the	  Godesberg	  program,	  the	  positions	  of	  Christian	  and	  Social	  
Democrats	  were	  closer	  to	  one	  another	  than	  one	  might	  expect.	  The	  “Politische	  Leitsätze	  der	  
SPD”	  which	  was	  developed	  in	  May	  1946	  shortly	  after	  the	  fusion	  of	  Communists	  and	  Social	  
Democrats	   in	   East	   Germany,	   had	   more	   stringent	   calls	   for	   socialization	   than	   the	   early	  
Christian	   Democratic	   programs.	   Nevertheless,	   they	   still	   advocate	   “as	   much	   self-­‐
administration	  as	  possible”	   in	  the	  economy.	  Only	  the	  heavy,	  raw-­‐material	  based	  industries	  
should	   be	   nationalized	   –	   something	   which	   was	   congruent	   with	   position	   taken	   by	   the	  
Christian	  Democrats	   in	  the	  Ahlen	  program.	  The	  early	  Social	  Democratic	  position	  was	  more	  
radical	  than	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  view,	  but	  only	  to	  a	  small	  extent.	  Where	  the	  Christian	  
Democrats	   demanded	   that	   “banking	   and	   insurance	   is	   state	   controlled”122	   the	   Social	  
Democrats	   put	   that	   “money	   and	   credit	   supply	   and	   the	   insurance	   system	   are	   subject	   to	  
socialist	  planning”.123	  Nevertheless,	  on	  social	  security	  there	  was	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  difference.	  In	  the	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  Schulz,	  G.	  (2005)	  p.	  86.	  120	  Schulz,	  G.	  (2005)	  p.	  140.	  121	  „setzte	  in	  der	  SPD	  parallel	  zur	  Weiterentwicklung	  sozialistischer	  Vorstellungen	  eine	  zunehmende	  Annäherung	  an	  Vorstellungen	  der	  Sozialen	  Marktwirtschaft	  ein.“	  Schulz,	  M.	  (2005)	  p.	  140.	  122	  „das	  Banken	  und	  Versicherungswesen	  unterliegt	  der	  staatlichen	  Kontrolle.“	  CDU	  (1945c)	  Kölner	  Leitsätze	  Juni	  1945,	  p.	  4.	  123	  “Geld	  und	  Kreditversorgung	  und	  das	  Versicherungswesen	  sind	  Gegenstand	  sozialistischer	  Planung.“	  SPD	  (1946)	  Politische	  Leitsätze	  der	  SPD,	  Mai	  1946,	  p.	  3.	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early	   programs	   the	   Social	   Democrats	   explicitly	   demanded	   a	   “unitary	   social	   insurance”124	  
against	   the	  risks	  of	  old	  age	  and	  sickness	  whereas	  the	  early	  CDU	  manifestos	  advocated	  the	  
reinstalling	  of	  the	  pre-­‐fascist	  social	  insurance	  complex.	  Indeed,	  the	  Hamburg	  program	  of	  the	  
Christian	  Democrats	  argued	   that	  “we	  will	   keep	   the	  well-­‐proven	  version	  of	   the	  categorized	  
social	  insurance.”125	  
	   In	   the	   run	   up	   to	   the	  Godesberg	   Program	   the	   differences	   between	   Christian	   and	   Social	  
Democratic	   positions	  on	   the	   economy	  and	  welfare	   almost	   entirely	   evaporated.	   The	   Social	  
Democrats	   adopted	   the	   core	   positions	   of	   the	   social	   market	   economy	   stating,	   in	   the	  
Godesberg	   program	   itself,	   that	   “therefore,	   the	   Social	   Democratic	   party	   approves	   the	   free	  
market,	  wherever	   reigns	  real	  competition”.126	  Even	  Ordoliberal	  key	  postulations	  about	   the	  
damaging	   effects	   of	   cartels	   and	  monopolies	   are	  well	   reflected	   in	   the	  Godesberg	   program	  
which	   puts	   forward	   that	   “Where	   markets	   come	   under	   the	   dominance	   of	   individuals	   or	  
groups,	   manifold	   measures	   are	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   conserve	   the	   freedom	   in	   the	  
economy.”127	  The	  paragraph	  ends	  with	  the	  famous	  quote	  “Competition	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  –	  
planning	  as	  far	  as	  necessary”.128	  
	   Also	  the	  call	  for	  the	  unitary	  approach	  to	  social	  security	  cannot	  be	  found	  anymore	  in	  the	  
manifesto.129	   Instead,	   latest	  after	  the	  pension	  reform	  of	  1957	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  moved	  
“ever	   more	   towards	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   divided	   social	   insurance”130	   as	   advocated	   by	   the	  
Christian	  Democrats.	  
	   The	  programmatic	   change	  of	   the	   Social	  Democrats	   at	  Godesberg	   is	   often	  attributed	   to	  
the	  dramatic	  electoral	  disaster	  of	   the	  1957	  elections	  and	  a	  process	  of	  “Westernization”	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  „zur	  Vorsorge	  von	  wirtschaftlichen	  Folgen	  von	  Alter	  und	  Unfällen	  soll	  eine	  einheitliche	  Sozialversicherung	  geschaffen	  werden“	  SPD	  (1946),	  p.	  6.	  125	  CDU	  (1953)	  p.	  16.	  126	  “deshalb	  bejaht	  die	  Sozialdemokratische	  Partei	  den	  freien	  Markt,	  wo	  immer	  wirklich	  Wettbewerb	  herrscht.“	  SPD	  (1959)	  Grundsatzprogramm	  der	  Sozialdemokratischen	  Partei	  Deutschlands,	  Beschlossen	  vom	  außerordentlichen	  Parteitag	  der	  sozialdemokratischen	  Partei	  Deutschlands	  in	  Bad	  Godesberg	  vom	  13.	  bis	  15.	  November	  1959,	  p.	  14.	  127	  „Wo	  aber	  Märkte	  unter	  die	  Vorherrschaft	  von	  einzelnen	  oder	  von	  Gruppen	  geraten,	  bedarf	  es	  vielfältiger	  Maßnahmen,	  um	  die	  Freiheit	  in	  der	  Wirtschaft	  zu	  erhalten.“	  SPD	  (1959)	  p.	  14.	  128	  „Wettbewerb	  soweit	  wie	  möglich	  –	  Planung	  soweit	  wie	  nötig“	  SPD	  (1959)	  p.	  14.	  129	  SPD	  (1959)	  pp.	  9-­‐10.	  130„In	  der	  Folge	  bewegten	  sich	  die	  Sozialdemokraten	  immer	  mehr	  auf	  das	  Konzept	  der	  gegliederten	  Sozialversicherung	  zu.“	  Boldorf,	  M.	  (2001)	  Sozialpolitische	  Denk	  und	  Handlungsfelder,	  IN:	  Ruck,	  M.	  &	  Boldorf,	  M.	  (eds.)	  Geschichte	  der	  Deutschen	  Sozialpolitik	  in	  
Deutschland	  seit	  1945,	  Band	  IV,	  Nomos,	  p.	  105.	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“Americanization”	   of	   German	   Social	   Democracy.	   I	   advocate	   here	   that	   the	   convergence	   of	  
the	   Social	   Democrats	   towards	   Christian	   Democratic	   key	   positions	   flows	   from	   ideational	  
competition.	   The	   “additive	   compromise”131	   between	   Christian	   Democrats	   and	   Social	  
Democrats	  resulted	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Grand	  Coalition	  in	  1966.	  
	  
8.2.4 The	  Liberals	  
From	  the	  very	  outset,	  the	  German	  post-­‐war	  Liberal	  party,	  Freie	  Demokratische	  Partei	  (Free	  
Democratic	  Party,	  FDP),	  was	  a	  hybrid	  that	  incorporated	  the	  prewar	  schism	  between	  left	  and	  
right	  liberals	  which	  had	  been	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  pre-­‐war	  party	  systems.132	  While	  culture	  
and	  educational	  politics	  was	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  left-­‐liberals,	  economic	  and	  social	  policy	  were	  
firmly	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   right	   wing	   of	   the	   party.	   Dittberner	   describes	   the	   social	   policy	  
position	  of	  the	  early	  FDP	  as	  that	  of	  a	  “social-­‐reactionary,	  class	  conscious	  bourgeoisie	  interest	  
party.”133	  The	  1946	  manifesto	  states	  that	  “Personal	  initiative	  and	  free	  competition	  increase	  
the	  economic	  output	  and	  personal	  property	  is	  a	  constitutive	  basis	  of	  a	  healthy	  economy.”134	  
This	   made	   the	   Liberals	   an	   excellent	   collaborator	   for	   the	   Ordoliberals	   in	   the	   Christian	  
Democratic	  Union	  and	  a	  strong	  ally	  for	  Erhard’s	  ideas	  on	  a	  free	  market	  economy.	  
	   The	  social	  policy	  concept	  of	  the	  Liberals	  stood	  in	  the	  social-­‐liberal	  tradition.	  This	  meant	  
that	   the	   party	   was	   not	   completely	   against	   welfare	   but	   only	   against	   welfare	   provision	  
through	   the	   state.	   For	   the	   FDP,	   welfare	   should	   instead	   come	   from	   civil	   society.	  
Consequently,	   the	   party	   voted	   against	   the	   Lastenausgleichsgesetz	   from	   1948,	   the	  
codetermination	   law	   for	   the	   steel	   and	   steel	   industries	   in	   1951	   and	   the	  pension	   reform	  of	  
1957	   despite	   sitting	   in	   the	   government	   that	   announced	   them.	   A	   trademark	  was	   that	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  Boldorf,	  M.	  (2001)	  p.	  106.	  132	  The	  FDP	  obtained	  11.9	  %	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  first	  federal	  elections	  in	  1949	  and	  9.5%	  in	  1953.	  Even	  though	  this	  was	  a	  considerable	  share	  for	  the	  FDP,	  back	  then	  it	  could	  not	  exercise	  as	  much	  influence	  in	  the	  governmental	  coalition	  as	  it	  did	  in	  later	  years	  after	  the	  Party	  system	  had	  become	  heavily	  concentrated	  thereby	  putting	  them	  in	  a	  very	  pivotal	  position	  between	  both	  big	  parties.	  133	  „sozialreaktionäre,	  klassenbewusste	  bürgerliche	  Interessenpartei“	  Cited	  IN:	  Schulz,	  G.	  (2001)	  p.	  87.	  134	  „Persönliche	  Initiative	  und	  freier	  Wettbewerb	  steigern	  die	  wirtschaftliche	  Leistung,	  und	  persönliches	  Eigentum	  ist	  eine	  wesentliche	  Grundlage	  gesunder	  Wirtschaft.“	  FDP	  (1946)	  Programmatische	  Richtlinien	  der	  Freien	  Demokratischen	  Partie,	  4.	  Februar	  1946,	  p.	  12.	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party	   fiercely	   opposed	   any	   move	   towards	   an	   egalitarianisation	   and	   unitarianisation	   of	  
German	  social	  security	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  Beveridge	  plan.135	  
	  
8.3 Social	  Security	  
Social	  policy	  development	  unfolded	  in	  three	  different	  phases	  after	  the	  war.	  The	  first	  phase	  
constituted	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  immediate	  war	  damages.	  The	  second	  phase	  is	  marked	  
by	   the	   reintroduction	   of	   pre-­‐war	   social	   security.	   Phase	   three	   saw	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	  
reestablished	   schemes	   in	   the	   late	   1950s,	   which	   reached	   its	   peak	   with	   Adenauer’s	   big	  
pension	  reform	  of	  1957.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  especially	  focus	  on	  phases	  two	  and	  three	  
in	   which	   the	   structural	   decision	   to	   reestablish	   the	   traditional	   German	   social	   security	   was	  
made.	  	  
	   Two	  questions	   lie	   at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	   following	   section.	   The	   first	  one	  asks	  why	   the	  old	  
social	   security	   system	  was	   chosen	   even	   though	   the	   Beveridge	   solution	   would	   have	   been	  
cheaper,	   was	   backed	   by	   the	   Allies	   and	   was	   the	   most	   modern	   solution	   of	   that	   time.	   The	  
second	  addresses	  the	  issue	  of	  how,	  in	  the	  late	  1950s,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  introduce	  –	  despite	  
the	   Ordoliberal	   programmatic	   hegemony	   within	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   –	   a	   welfare	  
expansion	   of	   such	   size	   that	   it	   saw	   Germany	   catapulted	   once	   again	   into	   the	   group	   of	   big	  
welfare	  spending	  nations.	  
	   The	   advent	   of	   the	   German	   post-­‐war	   social	   security	   system	   is	   neither	   the	   product	   of	  
Catholic	  Christian	  Socialism	  nor	  of	  Ordoliberalism	  but	  rather	  the	  result	  of	  both	  worldviews.	  
Furthermore,	   the	   reestablishing	   of	   the	   pre-­‐war	   social	   policy	   institutions	   would	   not	   have	  
been	  possible	   if	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  had	  not	  have	  programmatically	  evolved	  towards	  the	  
Christian	   Democrats’	   position	   during	   the	   1950s.	   Decisive	   for	   the	   failure	   of	   Beveridge	   in	  
Germany	  is,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  SPD	  was	  tempted	  towards	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  social	  market	  
economy	  through	  the	  ideational	  competition	  posed	  by	  the	  Christian	  Democrats.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  Beverdige	  was	  a	  English	  social	  reformer	  who	  prepared	  the	  UK‘s	  most	  encompassing	  welfare	  reform	  in	  the	  1940s.	  His	  plan	  foresaw	  universalization	  of	  benefits	  and	  a	  financing	  through	  flatrate	  taxation.	  It	  inspired	  the	  post-­‐war	  Scandinavian	  reforms	  as	  well	  as	  many	  other	  countries’	  plans.	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8.3.1 Destruction	  
German	  politicians	  found	  the	  conditions	  in	  the	  immediate	  post-­‐war	  phase	  very	  challenging.	  
Some	   7.9	   million	   refugees	   were	   fleeing	   from	   the	   former	   eastern	   German	   territories	   into	  
West	   Germany.	   They	   were	   joined	   by	   1.5	   million	   Germans	   that	   had	   fled	   the	   Soviet	  
occupational	  zone.	  This	  represented	  roughly	  one	  fifth	  of	  the	  total	  German	  population.136	  In	  
addition	  there	  were	  six	  million	  “displaced”	  persons,	  mostly	  forced	  laborers	  and	  prisoners	  of	  
war.	  On	  top	  of	  this	  came	  the	  4.1	  million	  war	  victims	  such	  as	   invalids,	  widows	  and	  orphans	  
that	   had	   to	   be	   compensated	   and	   the	   1.6	  million	   German	   prisoners	   of	   war	   that	   returned	  
between	   1947	   and	   1955.	   Added	   to	   these	   figures	   are	   the	   circa	   3.4	   million	   war-­‐damaged	  
persons	   (Kriegsgeschädigte)	  on	  whom	  the	  war	  had	   inflicted	  severe	  property	   losses.	   In	   fact	  
the	   Allied	   bombing	   raids	   are	   estimated	   to	   have	   eradicated	   one	   third	   of	   all	   housing	   in	  
Germany.	  Politicians	  were	  aware	  of	  this	  and	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  
issue.	  Adenauer’s	  speeches	  are	  a	  rich	  source	  for	  post-­‐war	  social	  policy	  statistics.	  In	  1951	  he	  
boosted	  on	  a	  party	  rally	  in	  Bielefeld:	  
I	  want	  to	  mention	  two	  facts	  here:	  we	  have	  4	  million	  war-­‐damaged	  and	  surviving	  dependents	  in	  the	  Republic.	  In	  
the	  year	  1949	  the	  states	  had	  to	  take	  care	  of	  them,	  which	  spent	  in	  each	  year	  a	  total	  of	  1.9	  billion	  Marks	  on	  this.	  In	  
the	   fiscal	   year	  1950/1951	   the	   federal	   state	   required	  3.3	  billion	   for	   the	   same	   task.	   I	  may	  also	  point	   to	  housing	  
construction.	   The	   number	   of	   flats	   which	   are	   to	   be	   constructed	   in	   this	   fiscal	   year	   is	   330	   to	   350,000,	   which	  
represents	  an	  extraordinary	  achievement,	  a	  record	  number.137	  	  
Indeed,	   if	   one	   did	   not	   want	   to	   risk	   a	   long	   term	   pauperization	   of	   this	  massive	   amount	   of	  
people,	  social	  measures	  had	  to	  be	  taken	  quickly	  as	  the	  political	  consequences	  were	  already	  
visible.	  The	  influx	  of	  so	  many	  diverse	  and	  deprived	  groups	  reflected	  heavily	  in	  the	  first	  two	  
elections	   after	   the	   War.	   The	   party	   system	   became	   fragmented	   and	   fears	   of	   Weimar’s	  
“polarized	   pluralism”138	   were	   sparked	   again.	   	   The	   first	   German	   Bundestag	   featured	   eight	  
different	   parties	   and	   the	   potential	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   further	   protest	   or	   single	   issue	  
parties	   was	   huge.	   If	   these	   cleavages	   were	   not	   quickly	   accommodated	   through	   social	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  Hockerts,	  H.	  G.	  (1988)	  	  Integration	  der	  Gesellschaft,	  IN:	  Funke,	  M.	  (ed.)	  Entscheidung	  für	  den	  
Westen,	  Bonn,	  Bouvier,	  p.	  41.	  137	  „Ich	  will	  hier	  noch	  zwei	  Tatsachen	  erwähnen.	  Wir	  haben	  in	  der	  Bundesrepublik	  4	  Millionen	  Kriegsgeschädigte	  und	  Hinterbliebene.	  Im	  Jahr	  1949	  lag	  die	  Sorge	  für	  sie	  bei	  den	  Ländern,	  die	  in	  jedem	  Jahre	  hierfür	  insgesamt	  1,9	  Milliarden	  aufgewendet	  haben.	  Der	  Bund	  wendet	  im	  selben	  Haushaltsjahr	  1950/51	  für	  denselben	  Zweck	  3,3	  Milliarden	  auf.	  Ich	  darf	  auch	  Hinweisen	  auf	  den	  Wohnungsbau.	  Die	  Zahl	  von	  330	  bis	  350.000	  Wohnungen,	  die	  in	  diesem	  Haushaltsjahr	  erstellt	  werden,	  stellt	  eine	  ganz	  große	  Leistung	  dar,	  eine	  Rekordziffer.“	  Rede	  des	  Vorsitzenden	  der	  CDU,	  	  Konrad	  Adenauer,	  auf	  dem	  Parteitag	  der	  CDU	  Westfalen	  in	  Bielefeld,	  14.	  Januar	  1951.	  138	  Satori,	  G.	  (1982)	  Teoria	  dei	  Partiti	  e	  caso	  Italiano,	  Milano,	  Sugar	  Co.	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compensation	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  emerging	  Republic	  would	  be	  in	  jeopardy	  also	  because	  the	  
climate	   between	   the	   main	   federal	   union	   (Deutscher	   Gewerkschaftsbund,	   DGB)	   and	   the	  
increasingly	  neo-­‐liberal	  economic	  policy	  of	  Erhard	  started	  to	  pick	  up	  salience.139	  
	   The	  partial	  restauration	  of	  the	  social	  security	  system	  by	  the	  Allies	  did	  not	  help	  much.	   It	  
had	   only	   been	   marginally	   upgraded	   since	   Bismarck’s	   day.	   Pensions	   were	   roughly	   on	   the	  
same	  benefit	  levels	  as	  seventy	  years	  before.	  They	  had	  been	  developed	  on	  the	  premises	  that	  
life	   expectancy	   was	   fairly	   low	   and	   only	   a	   restricted	   number	   of	   people	   would	   ever	   reach	  
pension	   age.	   Neither	   condition	   held	   any	   longer.	   The	  Minister	   of	   Labor	   and	   Social	   Affairs,	  
Anton	  Storch,	  emphasized	  in	  the	  pension	  reform	  debate	  of	  1956	  that	  “the	  current	  system	  of	  
social	   security	   has	   to	   be	   assessed	   on	  whether	   it	   still	   sufficiently	   reflects	   the	   societal	   and	  
economic	  changes	  that	  happened	  during	  the	  past	  seventy	  years.”140	  
	   The	   pressure	   for	   social	   reform	   in	   post-­‐war	   Germany	   was	   therefore	   coming	   from	   two	  
sides.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  immediate	  consequences	  of	  the	  War	  demand	  quick	  reaction	  in	  terms	  
of	   social	   security	   but,	   on	   top	   of	   this,	   the	   old	   social	   security	   system	   was	   antiquated.	   The	  
immediate	   reaction	   to	   this	  was	   a	   number	   of	   laws	   during	   the	   1940s141	   that	   dealt	  with	   the	  
acute	  hardship	  that	  the	  War	  had	  left.	  Part	  of	  this	  legislative	  package	  was	  the	  solidarity	  law	  
for	   war	   victims	   (Lastenausgleichsgesetz),	   the	   compensation	   law	   for	   Nazi	   victims	  
(Wiedergutmachung	  für	  Opfer	  Nationalsozialistischer	  Verfolgung),	   the	  war	  victims’	  welfare	  
fund	   (Kriegsopferfürsorge)	   and	   the	   legal	   framework	   for	   the	   large	   scale	   housing	  
reconstruction	  projects	  (Wohnungsbau).	  Even	  though	  authors	  like	  Skocpol	  have	  shown	  that	  
post-­‐war	   social	   security	   had	   drastic	   long	   term	   effects	   in	   the	   US,	   this	  was	   not	   the	   case	   in	  
Germany.142	  We	  can	  therefore	  move	  directly	  on	  to	  scrutinizing	  the	  reestablishing	  of	  the	  old	  
Bismarckian	  social	  security.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  Hockerts,	  H.	  G.	  (1988)	  p.	  43.	  140	  „das	  geltende	  System	  der	  sozialen	  Sicherheit	  daraufhin	  zu	  prüfen,	  ob	  es	  auf	  alle	  diese	  gesellschaftlichen	  Wandlungen,	  die	  sich	  in	  den	  vergangenen	  70	  Jahren	  vollzogen	  haben,	  noch	  ausreichend	  Rücksicht	  nimmt.“	  Anton	  Storch	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  Pension	  reform,	  1956,	  cited	  IN:	  Abelshauser,	  W.	  (1987)	  Die	  langen	  fünfziger	  Jahre,	  Düsseldorf,	  	  Schwann,	  p.	  141.	  141	  Nevertheless,	  the	  consequences	  of	  some	  of	  the	  laws	  are	  still	  felt	  today	  as	  for	  example	  is	  the	  case	  in	  widows’	  pensions.	  142	  Skocpol,	  T.	  (1992)	  Protecting	  Soldiers	  and	  mothers:	  The	  political	  origins	  of	  social	  policy	  in	  the	  
United	  States,	  Cambridge,	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  
	   	   	   266	  
8.3.2 Beveridge	  comes	  to	  Germany	  
By	  1949	  West	  Germany	  was	  already	  paying	  out	  more	  –	  measured	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  –	  
on	  social	  security	  than	  any	  other	  Western	  country	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  system,	  which	  
had	  been	  provisionally	  restored	  by	  the	  Allied	  control	  council,	  was	  hugely	  deficient.	  Reform	  
was	   necessary	   but	   it	   was	   by	   no	   means	   a	   given	   that	   such	   reform	   would	   lead	   to	   the	  
reestablishing	   of	   the	   old	   social	   security	   system.	   Beveridge’s	   ideas	   had	   become	   a	   highly	  
fashionable	  alternative	  and	  were	  being	  pushed	  by	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  actors	  at	  
that	   time.	   There	   is	   a	  misleading	   common	   perception	   that	   a	   powerful	   bourgeoisie-­‐liberal-­‐
Conservative	  block	  was	  pitted	  against	  a	  Left	  made	  up	  of	  unions	  and	  Social	  Democrats	  after	  
the	  war	   and	   that	   it	  was	   this	   that	   led	   to	   the	   reintroduction	   of	   Bismarckian	   social	   security.	  
Instead,	   social	   security	   saw	   the	   rapid	   evolution	   of	   what	   some	   German	   scholars	   call	   the	  
“krypto-­‐grand	  coalition”	  of	  social	  security.143	  This	  was	  an	  extensive	  and	  strong	  collaboration	  
between	  the	  Christian	  and	  Social	  Democrats	  on	  welfare	  issues	  during	  the	  1940s	  and	  1950s.	  
During	   the	   pension	   reform	   debate	   the	   Social	   Democrats	   even	   extensively	   thanked	   the	  
Christian	  Democrats	  for	  their	  smooth	  collaboration.	  A	  Beveridge	  solution	  seemed	  also	  likely	  
because	  Adenauer’s	  position	  regarding	  social	  security	  was	  far	  from	  dogmatic.	  Adenauer	  only	  
wanted	  a	  balanced	  outcome	  between	  a	   ‘welfare	  state’	   (Sozialstaat)	  and	  a	   ‘providing	  state’	  
(Versorgungsstaat)	  but	  “where	  the	  borders	  between	  the	  two	  were,	  he	  did	  not	  know.	  It	  was	  
also	  alien	  to	  him	  to	  think	  himself	  dizzy	  on	  such	  issues”.144	  That	  Beveridge	  failed	  in	  the	  end	  	  
was	  due	  to	  the	  opposition	  from	  within	  the	  governing	  camp.	  
	   Indeed,	   the	   main	   friction	   on	   welfare	   issues	   came	   from	   within	   the	   government	   camp	  
where	   a	   “(largely	   protestant)	   bourgeoisie-­‐neoliberal	   economic	   wing	   in	   the	   government	  
coalition”145	   	   competed	  against	  a	   “Christian	  Social	   (largely	  Catholic	  employee)	  wing	  within	  
the	   government	   coalition”.146	   Fierce	   opposition	   to	   the	   reform	   proposal	   came	   from	   the	  
liberals	   (FDP)	  who	   showed	   an	   almost	   panicking	   fear	   that	   the	   expansion	   of	  welfare	  would	  
quell	   any	   type	   of	   individual	   responsibility	   in	   the	   German	   citizens.	   A	   liberal	   member	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  Hockerts,	  H.	  G.	  (1988)	  p.	  44.	  144	  „wo	  da	  die	  Grenzlinien	  verlaufen,	  wusste	  er	  nicht.	  Es	  lag	  ihm	  auch	  fern,	  sich	  über	  so	  etwas	  schwindlig	  zu	  denken.“	  Hockerts,	  H.	  G.	  (1988)	  p.	  52.	  145	  „den	  (vornehmlich	  protestantischen)	  bürgerlich-­‐neoliberalen	  Wirtschaftsflügel	  in	  der	  Regierungskoalition,	  den	  christlich-­‐sozialen	  (vorwiegend	  katholischen	  Arbeitnehmer-­‐)	  Flügel	  innerhalb	  der	  Regierungskoalition	  mit	  Präsenz	  auch	  im	  DGB“	  Hockerts,	  H.	  G.	  (1988)	  p.	  45.	  146	  Hockerts,	  H.	  G.	  (1988)	  p.	  45.	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parliament,	   Dr.	   Dehler,	   specifically	   warned	   against	   the	   “suspected	   economic	  
consequences.”147	  He	  also	  proclaimed	  a	  deep-­‐seated	   fear	   that	   “especially	   the	  government	  
gives	   in	   with	   its	   proposal	   to	   the	   troubling	   tendency	   of	   our	   times	   towards	   collective	   risk	  
hedging	   at	   any	   price	   and	   is	   ready	   to	   sacrifice	   the	   individual	   self-­‐responsibility,	   this	   huge	  
social	  stimulant.”148	  
	  
8.3.3 Beveridge	  leaves	  Germany	  
After	  1945	  the	  Allies,	  and	  especially	  the	  British,	  pressed	  for	  a	  remodeling	  of	  social	  security	  
along	   the	   lines	   of	   the	   Beveridge	   report.	   William	   Beverdige	   was	   a	   British	   economist	   and	  
social	   reformer	  who	   chaired	   an	   inter-­‐party	   commission	   of	   the	   British	  House	   of	   Commons	  
charged	  with	  the	  task	  of	  developing	  a	  post-­‐war	  social	  policy	  reform	  agenda	  in	  1942.149	  The	  
Beveridge	   plan	   was	   institutionalized	   by	   the	   post-­‐war	   Labor	   government	   in	   1948	   and	   is	  
regarded	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  modern	  British	  welfare	  state.	  The	  plan	  provided	  for	  flat	  
rate	  social	  security	  and	  health	  care	  for	  every	  citizen,	  regardless	  of	  occupational	  status,	  to	  be	  
financed	   through	   taxation.	   It	   created	   the	   famous	   British	   national	   insurance	   and	   health	  
service.	   The	   Beveridge	   proposals	   fundamentally	   differed	   from	   traditional	   German	   social	  
security	  as	  it	  attached	  social	  rights	  to	  citizenship.	  
	   The	  modern	   ideas	   found	   in	   the	   report	   also	  had	   a	   huge	   impact	   beyond	  Britain	   as	  most	  
Social	  Democratic	  parties	  in	  Scandinavia	  adopted	  its	  egalitarian	  provisions	  while	  parties	  on	  
Continent	   were	   similarly	   inspired	   by	   it.	   Beveridge’s	   approaches	   to	   social	   security	   reform	  
became	  heatedly	  discussed	   in	  post-­‐war	  France,	  Switzerland	  and	  the	  Netherlands.	  Not	  only	  
were	  Beveridge’s	   the	  most	   prominent,	   fresh	   and	  modern	   ideas	   of	   1940s	   Europe	  but	   they	  
were	   also	   actively	   promoted	   by	   the	   French	   and	   the	   British	   in	   their	   occupational	   zones.150	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  „zu	  befürchtende	  wirtschaftliche	  Folgen“	  Dr.	  Dehler	  (FDP).	  2.	  Deutscher	  Bundestag-­‐154.	  Sitzung	  am	  27.	  Juni	  1956,	  8335-­‐39,	  8362,	  cited	  IN:	  Abeslhauser,	  W.	  (1987)	  p.	  142.	  	  148	  “gerade	  auch	  die	  Regierung	  in	  ihrer	  Vorlage	  der	  besorgniserregenden	  Neigung	  unserer	  Zeit	  zu	  kollektiven	  Sicherung	  um	  jeden	  Preis	  nachgibt	  und	  die	  individuelle	  Selbstverantwortung,	  diese	  Große	  soziale	  Stimulans,	  preiszugeben	  bereit	  ist.“	  Dr.	  Dehler	  (FDP).	  2.	  Deutscher	  Bundestag-­‐154.	  Sitzung	  am	  27.	  Juni	  1956,	  8335-­‐39,	  8362,	  cited	  IN:	  Abeslhauser,	  W.	  (1987)	  p.	  142.	  	  149	  Beveridge	  is	  often	  labeled	  as	  “the	  translation	  of	  Keynes	  into	  social	  policy”	  due	  to	  his	  emphasizing	  of	  the	  interaction	  effects	  between	  regulation	  efforts	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  society.	  Schulz,	  G.	  (2005)	  p.	  145.	  150	  Schulz,	  G.	  (2005)	  p.	  146.	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The	   plan	   had	   left	   a	   deep	   impression	   on	   the	   German	   Social	   Democrats	   and	   the	   union	  
movement	  as	  Beveridge	  himself	   also	  extensively	   toured	  Germany	  at	   that	   time	   in	  order	   to	  
promote	  his	  project.151	  
	   The	  chances	  for	  a	  reform	  in	  this	  direction	  also	  seemed	  good	  because	  the	  rationalization	  
of	   social	   security	   into	   a	   single	   big	   scheme	   came	   with	   the	   promise	   of	   improved	   cost	  
containment,	  which	  was	  a	  core	  issue	  for	  Allies	  and	  Germans.152	  There	  was	  only	  one	  caveat.	  
The	  Beveridge	  plan	  showed	  surprising	  similarities	  to	  the	  Nazi	  social	  security	  reform	  plans	  of	  
the	  early	  1940s.	  The	  notorious	  head	  of	  the	  German	  Labor	  Front,	  Robert	  Ley,	  had	  developed	  
plans	   for	   the	   centralization	   and	   unitarisation	   of	   German	   social	   security	   (along	   racist	  
ideological	   lines)	   in	   1940	   that	   were	   heavily	   advertised	   but	   never	   materialized.	   Indeed,	  
Hockerts	  goes	  even	  so	  far	  as	  to	  call	  Ley	  the	  German	  Beveridge.153	  
	   The	  reform	  proposed	  by	  the	  Allies	   foresaw	  a	  fusion	  of	  sickness,	  accident,	   invalidity	  and	  
pension	   insurance.	   The	   traditional	   German	   separation	   between	   blue	   and	   white	   collar	  
workers	  would	   fall	   by	   the	  wayside.	   Furthermore,	   the	   plan	   called	   for	   the	   unification	   of	   all	  
health	   insurance	   providers	   and	   schemes.	   Regarding	   these	   provisions,	   the	   proposal	   came	  
very	   close	   to	   a	   Beveridge	   solution	   but	   differed	   in	   the	   financing.	   The	   throwback	   to	   the	  
German	   insurance	   tradition	   was	   that	   the	   financing	   remained	   contribution-­‐	   and	   not	   tax-­‐
based.154	   The	   consequence	   was	   that	   the	   contributions	   were	   to	   be	   higher	   than	   during	  
Weimar	   times	  and	   led	   to	   fewer	  benefits.	   The	  proposal	   saw	  a	  downgrading	  of	  white	   collar	  
workers	   to	   the	   level	   of	   blue	   collar	  workers.155	   This	   seemed	   odd	   as	   the	  working	   class	   had	  
fought	  for	  decades	  for	  an	  upgrade	  to	  white	  collar	  status.	  The	  provisions	  of	  the	  Allied	  reform	  
plans	  turned	  this	  upside	  down.	  
	   The	  plans	  therefore	  quickly	  spawned	  an	  impressive	  alliance	  of	  domestic	  adversaries.	  The	  
opposition	  coalition	  encompassed	  such	  diverse	  social	  groups	  as	  the	  employers,	  white	  collar	  
employees,	   the	   self-­‐employed,	   physicians,	   the	   private	   insurance	   companies156	   and,	   to	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  Which	  both	  had	  discussed	  similar	  plans	  already	  since	  1902.	  152	  Hockerts,	  H.-­‐G.	  (1980) Sozialpolitische	  Entscheidungen	  im	  Nachkriegsdeutschland:	  alliierte	  und	  deutsche	  Sozialversicherungspolitik	  1945-­‐1957,	  Stuttgart,	  Klett-­‐Cotta,	  p.	  31.	  153	  Schulz,	  G.	  (2005)	  p.	  148.	  154	  Hentschel,	  V.	  (1983)	  Geschichte	  der	  Deutschen	  Sozialpolitik:	  1880-­‐1980,	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main.	  Suhrkamp,	  p.	  147.	  155	  Hockerts,	  H.-­‐G.	  (1980)	  pp.	  32-­‐33.	  156	  Hockerts,	  H.-­‐G.	  (1980)	  pp.	  40-­‐42.	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certain	   extent,	   even	   the	   unions	   and	   the	   Social	   Democrats	   which	   wanted	   the	   egalitarian	  
effects	  of	  the	  reform	  but	  not	  if	  it	  meant	  such	  a	  heavy	  decrease	  of	  benefits.157	  Hockerts	  notes	  
that	   the	   “Lunctim	  between	   (long	  aspired)	  universal	   insurance	  and	   (hard	   to	   justify)	  benefit	  
reduction	  had	   led	   the	  party	   into	  a	  decision	  dilemma.”158	   	  White	  collar	  workers,	  especially,	  
feared	  a	  benefit	  downgrading	  and	  mobilized	  their	  political	  representatives	  in	  the	  Liberal	  and	  
Christian	   Democratic	   parties.	   Further	   opponents	   were	   found	   in	   the	   social	   security	  
bureaucracy	   who	   had	   opposed	   and	   diluted	   the	   Nazi	   plans	   in	   the	   1940s.	   They	   took	   great	  
pride	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   ‘their’	   social	   security	   system	   had	   survived	   the	   Nazi	   onslaughts	   and	  
were	  very	  much	  unwilling	  to	  see	  the	  system	  dismantled.159	  
	   Despite	   the	   domestic	   opposition,	   the	   British	   and	   French	   continued	   to	   press	   for	   the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  reform.	  Only	  the	  Americans	  were	  becoming	  skeptical	  and	  preferred	  
to	   give	   the	   issue	   back	   to	   the	   Germans.	   What	   tipped	   the	   balance	   in	   the	   end	   was	   the	  
increasing	  friction	  between	  the	  Soviets	  and	  the	  Allies	  with	  the	  onset	  of	   the	  Cold	  War.	  The	  
more	  the	  Soviets	  pushed	  for	  implementation	  of	  the	  reform,	  the	  less	  the	  Allies	  were	  willing	  
to	  give	  in.	  The	  escalation	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  also	  gave	  the	  domestic	  opponents	  of	  the	  plan	  new	  
ammunition	  as	  the	  Russians	  implemented	  their	  own	  plan	  in	  the	  Soviet	  occupational	  zone	  on	  
1	  February	  1947.160	  	  
	   From	   fall	   of	   1947	   onwards,	   the	   Allied	   control	   council	   that	   was	   to	   guarantee	   the	   joint	  
administration	   of	   occupied	  Germany	   existed	   only	   on	   paper.	   In	   one	   of	   the	   last	   substantial	  
meetings	  of	  the	  Council,	  a	  Soviet	  “Beveridge	  style”	  reform	  proposal	  was	  put	  on	  hold	  by	  the	  
Allies.	   The	   London	  conference	   in	  March	  1948	   reestablished	  West	  Germany	  as	  a	   sovereign	  
political	  entity.	  This	  was	  decided	  during	  the	  period	  of	  Soviet	  exclusion	  and	  represented	  the	  
final	  nail	  in	  the	  coffin	  for	  any	  social	  security	  overhaul	  led	  by	  the	  occupational	  forces.	  
	   The	  idea	  of	  an	  introduction	  of	  a	  Beveridge	  system	  by	  the	  Allies	  had	  been	  delegitimized.	  
The	   Western	   members	   of	   the	   control	   council	   subsequently	   agreed	   to	   hand	   the	   social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  Hentschel,	  V.	  (1983)	  p.	  148.	  See	  also	  Hockerts	  who	  points	  out	  that	  egalitarian	  Social	  Security	  solutions	  were	  discussed	  by	  the	  German	  Social	  Democrats	  since	  as	  early	  as	  1902.	  Hockerts,	  H.-­‐G.	  (1980)	  p.	  31.	  158	  “Das	  Junktim	  zwischen	  (langerstrebten)	  Einheitsversicherung	  und	  (schwer	  verantwortbarer)	  Leistungsverschlechterung	  hatte	  sie	  in	  ein	  Entscheidungsdilemma	  geführt.“	  Hockerts,	  H.-­‐G.	  (1980)	  p.	  61.	  159	  Hockerts,	  H.	  G.	  (1980)	  pp.	  47-­‐49.	  160	  Hockerts,	  H.-­‐G.	  (1980)	  p.	  66.	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security	   issue	   back	   to	   the	   Germans.	   The	   Law	   and	   Ordinance	   Gazette	   of	   the	   British	  
occupational	   zone	   in	  1948	  states	   that:	   “The	   remodeling	  of	   social	   security	   is	   subject	   to	   the	  
German	  lawmaking	  bodies.”161	  	  
	   The	   restructuring	   of	   post-­‐war	   German	   social	   security	   lay	   therefore	   with	   the	   Frankfurt	  
Economic	  Council.	  The	  first	  law	  on	  the	  reformation	  of	  German	  social	  security	  was	  passed	  on	  
the	   17th	   December	   of	   1948.	   It	   foresaw	   the	   reestablishing	   of	   the	   pre-­‐war	   social	   security	  
system	  and	  was	  surprisingly	  voted	  for	  by	  the	  27	  Social	  Democratic	  as	  well	  as	  the	  27	  Christian	  
Democratic	   members	   of	   the	   Council.	   The	   Liberals	   abstained	   from	   voting.	   The	   puzzling	  
decision	  by	  the	  German	  Social	  Democrats	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  two	  factors.	  The	  first	  was	  that	  
they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  blocking	  the	  reestablishing	  of	  welfare	  especially	  in	  the	  
lead	   up	   to	   the	   first	   federal	   elections	   in	   1949.	   The	   second	   reason	   was	   that	   the	   SPD	   was	  
convinced	  that	  they	  could	  win	  these	  elections	  by	  a	   landslide	  victory.	  This	  would	  then	  have	  
allowed	  them	  to	  implement	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  Beveridge	  social	  security	  system	  without	  having	  
to	   compromise	   with	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   and	   with	   far	   higher	   benefit	   levels	   than	   the	  
former	  Allied	  plans	  had	  foreseen.	  The	  Social	  Democrats	  had	  miscalculated	  their	   luck.	  They	  
lost	  the	  1949	  elections	  by	  a	  very	  slim	  margin.	  
	   The	   Frankfurt	   Council	   produced	   the	   “Law	   for	   the	   adaption	   of	   the	   social	   insurance	  
benefits	  to	  the	  changed	  salary	  and	  price	  level	  and	  its	  financial	  safeguarding”162	  which	  was	  in	  
many	   ways	   as	   monstrous	   as	   its	   title.	   It	   restored	   the	   pre-­‐fascist	   German	   social	   insurance	  
system	  that	  had	  evolved	  from	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  through	  Weimar	  and	  moderately	  updated	  its	  
benefit	   levels	   to	   the	   socioeconomic	   situation	   of	   the	   late	   1940s.	   White	   and	   blue	   collar	  
schemes	   remained	   separate,	   the	   organizational	   fragmentation	   of	   the	   numerous	   health	  
insurances	   was	   retained	   and	   the	   principle	   of	   self-­‐administration	   reintroduced.163	   A	  
structural	   reform	   and	   modernizing	   overhaul	   of	   the	   social	   security	   system	   was,	   for	   the	  
moment,	   off	   the	   table.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   reestablishing	   of	   social	   security	   along	   the	   old	  
occupational	   lines	   also	  meant	   that	   a	   historical	   –	   and	   not	   a	   systematic	   –	   evolution	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  “Die	  Neuordnung	  der	  Sozialversicherung	  obliegt	  den	  deutschen	  gesetzgebenden	  Körperschaften.“	  Drittes	  Gesetz	  zur	  Neuordnung	  des	  Geldwesens,	  Teil	  II.	  4.	  Abschnitt,	  Paragraph	  23,	  Verordnungsblatt	  für	  die	  Britische	  Zone,	  30.	  1948,	  p.	  154,	  cited	  IN:	  Abeslhauser,	  W.	  (1996)	  p.	  385.	  162	  “Gesetz	  über	  die	  Anpassung	  von	  Leistungen	  der	  Sozialversicherung	  an	  das	  veränderte	  Preisgefüge	  und	  ihre	  finanzielle	  Sicherstellung.“	  Hentschel,	  V.	  (1983)	  p.	  153.	  163	  Schmidt,	  M.-­‐G.	  (1988)	  p.	  68.	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institutions	   was	   reestablished.	   The	   new	   system	   did	   not	   distribute	   benefits	   according	   to	  
need,	  but	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  acquired	  social	  security	  rights.	   In	  particular,	   the	  benefit	   levels	  of	  
pensions	  were	  extraordinary	  low.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Germany’s	  social	  security	  expenditure	  
was	  comparably	  high.	  In	  1953,	  Germany	  had	  spent	  19.4%	  of	  its	  GDP	  on	  welfare	  while	  in	  the	  
same	  year	  Great	  Britain	  only	  spent	  12.5%	  and	  Sweden	  13.5%.	  Indeed,	  spending	  had	  almost	  
doubled	  compared	  to	  the	  Weimar	  Republic’s	  outlay	  of	  11.8%	  in	  the	  economic	  boom	  year	  of	  
1928,	  though	  benefits	  were	  only	  moderate.	  It	  would	  only	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  before	  these	  
pathologies	  would	  lead	  to	  calls	  for	  a	  new	  reform.	  	  
	  
8.3.4 Pensions	  
During	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1950s,	  in	  particular,	  it	  became	  ever	  more	  obvious	  that	  the	  gap	  
between	   rich	   and	   poor	   was	   widening	   instead	   of	   closing	   –	   contrary	   to	   what	   had	   been	  
predicted	  by	  the	  Ordoliberals.	  Ludwig	  Erhard’s	  promise	  that	  a	  social	  market	  economy	  would	  
lead	  to	  welfare	  for	  all	  (“Wohlstand	  für	  alle”)	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  include	  social	  groups,	  such	  as	  
pensioners,	  with	  comparatively	  weak	  market	  positions.	  The	  after	  war	  period	  again	  saw	  the	  
spread	  of	  a	  deep	  fear	  of	  becoming	  old,	  with	  the	  reestablished	  social	  security	  system	  coming	  
in	  for	  increasing	  criticism.	  The	  public	  debate	  was	  littered	  with	  expressions	  such	  as	  “Pension-­‐
chaos”	   or	   “Social	   legislation	   jungle”.164	   	   A	   total	   of	   52	   laws	   on	   the	   adaption	   and	  
reconstruction	  of	  social	  security	  were	  produced	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Republic,	  a	  figure	  
that	   was	   never	   reached	   before	   or	   after.165	   The	   insurance	   now	   also	   covered	  more	   people	  
than	  ever	  before.	   In	   fact,	  social	  security	  spending	   in	  relation	  to	  GDP	  climbed	  higher	   in	  the	  
early	  1950s	   than	   it	  had	  been	   in	   the	  pre-­‐war	  boom	  period	  between	  1934	  and	  1939.166	  The	  
calls	   for	   an	   overhauling	   of	   the	   German	   social	   security	   system	   therefore	   became	   louder	  
during	  the	  1950s.	  	  
	   On	  the	  21st	  February	  1952	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  made	  their	  first	  move	  by	  demanding	  a	  
parliamentary	   commission	   be	   set	   up	   to	   look	   at	   social	   reform.167	   The	   Christian	   Democrats	  
tried	   to	   block	   its	   formation	   at	   any	   price	   because	   they	   feared	   a	   similar	   popular	   impact	   as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164	  Schulz,	  G.	  (2005)	  p.	  149.	  165	  Schmidt,	  M.G.	  (1988)	  p.	  70.	  166	  Schmidt,	  M.G.	  (1988)	  p.	  71.	  167	  „Soziale	  Studienkommision“	  Hockerts,	  H.-­‐G.	  (1980)	  p.	  216.	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followed	   the	   Beveridge	   Commission	   in	   the	   UK.	   In	   particular,	   the	   Christian	   Democrat-­‐
controlled	   Labor	   Ministry	   “mobilized	   all	   levers	   in	   order	   to	   capsize	   the	   Social	   Democratic	  
motion”.168	   Faced	   with	   fierce	   parliamentary	   resistance	   from	   the	   governmental	   camp	   the	  
Social	  Democrats	  established	  their	  own	  internal	  party	  commission	  in	  September	  1952	  which	  
produced	  the	  “Basic	  Principles	  of	  the	  Social	  overall	  plan	  of	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party”.169	  	  
This	  was	  a	  German	  Beveridge	  plan	  whose	  provisions	  mirrored	  the	  British	  and	  Scandinavian	  
reform	   trajectories.170	   The	   plan	   advocated	   a	   state	   guarantee	   to	   work	   towards	   full	  
employment,	   the	   introduction	   of	   an	   exchequer-­‐financed	   flat	   rate	   social	   security	   system	  
based	  on	  citizenship	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  national	  health	  system.	  
	   The	   provisions	   of	   the	   Social	   Democrat’s	   reform	   plan	   were	   more	   of	   a	   sketch	   than	   a	  
blueprint,	  but	  it	  was	  enough	  to	  put	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  government	  under	  pressure	  to	  
move.	   Adenauer	   tactically	   captured	   the	   term	   “Social	   Reform”	   by	   inserting	   it	   into	   his	  
government	   declaration	   in	   1953.171	   Initially,	   the	   task	   of	   coming	   up	  with	   an	   answer	   to	   the	  
Social	   Democrats’	   plans	   was	   handed	   to	   the	   Labor	   Minister,	   Anton	   Storch,	   and	   his	  
department.	  Stroch	  also	  announced	  a	  broad	  social	  reform	  in	  1952	  but	  not	  much	  happened	  
thereafter.	   The	   Hamburg	   Party	   congregation	   of	   1953	   states	   that	   the	   “’established	   and	  
proven	   form	   of	   the	   compounded	   social	   insurance’	   was	   not	   at	   disposition	   for	   any	   of	   the	  
governing	  parties.”172	   It	  was	  the	  univocal	  opinion	  “especially	  the	  left	  wing	  of	  the	  [Christian	  
Democratic]	  Union	  emphasized	  that	  the	  necessary	  reforms	  could	  be	  done	  without	  changing	  
the	   traditional	   organizational	   structure	   which	   had	   been	   restored	   in	   the	   first	   legislative	  
period.”173	   The	  existing	   system	  should	   therefore	  be	   rationalized	  and	  organized	   in	   a	  better	  
way	  but	  not	  changed	  completely.	  	  As	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  deputy	  Blank	  emphasized	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168	  Hockerts,	  H.-­‐G.	  (1980)	  p.	  219.	  	  169	  „Grundlagen	  des	  Sozialgesamtplans	  der	  SPD“	  Schulz,	  G.	  (2001)	  p.	  149.	  170	  Boldorf,	  M.	  (2005)	  p.	  124.	  171	  Schulz,	  G.	  (2005)	  p.	  124.	  172	  „Demgegenüber	  stand	  die	  „bewährte	  Form	  der	  gegliederten	  Sozialversicherung“	  für	  keine	  der	  Regierungsparteien	  zur	  Disposition.“	  Hockerts,	  H.-­‐G.	  (1980)	  p.	  224.	  173	  „Gerade	  auch	  der	  linke	  Unionsflügel	  betonte,	  dass	  alle	  notwendigen	  Reformen	  ohne	  Veränderung	  des	  in	  der	  ersten	  Legislaturperiode	  wiederhergestellten	  traditionellen	  Organisationsgefüges	  möglich	  seien.“	  Hockerts,	  H.-­‐G.	  (1980)	  p.	  224.	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parliament,	  “We	  demand	  in	  all	  social	  security	  branches	  the	  reestablishing	  of	  the	   insurance	  
principle.”174	  	  
	   Nevertheless,	   Adenauer	   was	   still	   not	   pleased	   with	   the	   programmatic	   results	   of	   his	  
interventions.	   In	   August	   1955,	   he	  met	  with	  Winfried	   Schreiber,	   a	   political	   economist	   and	  
president	   of	   the	   Federation	   of	   Catholic	   Employers.	   Adenauer	   was	   greatly	   impressed	   by	  
Schreiber’s	   ideas	  on	  a	  broad	  pension	  reform	  and	  asked	  him	  to	  present	  a	  reform	  proposal.	  
He	  presented	  his	  plans	  on	  the	  5th	  December	  1955	  and	  elaborated	  on	  his	  propositions	  on	  the	  
“adaptation	  and	  dynamization	  of	  pensions”.175	  The	  core	  of	  the	  pension	  reform	  of	  adaptation	  
and	   dynamization	   was	   that	   pensions	   would	   be	   automatically	   adapted	   to	   contemporary	  
wage	  increases.	  	  
	   Despite	   the	   strong	   backing	   of	   the	   Chancellor,	   Schreiber’s	   plan	  met	   extreme	   resistance	  
from	  most	  of	  the	  cabinet.	  The	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Economy	  and	  Finance,	  Erhard	  and	  Schaeffer,	  
rallied	  especially	   frenetically	  against	   the	  alleged	  “poison	  of	  dynamization”	   (Erhard).	  Erhard	  
would	  have	  liked	  to	  see	  pensions	  cut	  down	  to	  a	  minimum	  supplement176	  as	  he	  thought	  the	  
reform	  would	   lead	   to	  a	   “soulless	  mechanized	   society”.177	   Furthermore,	  Vocke	   the	  head	  of	  
the	   Central	   Bank’s	   predecessor,	   the	   federation	   of	   state	   banks,	   warned	   strongly	   that	   the	  
planned	   indexation	  of	  the	  pensions	  would	  undermine	  the	  furture	  central	  bank’s	  credibility	  
in	   guarding	   against	   inflation.	   For	  Wilhelm	   Röpke,	   one	   of	   the	  most	   prominent	   Ordoliberal	  
economists,	   the	   reform	   would	   lead	   to	   an	   “artificial	   limp	   of	   a	   society	   crippled	   by	  
proletarisation	   and	   crumbled	   through	   collectivization.”178	   Furthermore,	   the	   employer	  
associations	  were	   absolutely	   opposed	   to	   any	   such	   social	   security	   expansion.	   The	   problem	  
was	  that	  the	  “government	  proposal	  was	  in	  reality	  not	  really	  a	  government	  proposal”.179	  Not	  
only	  the	  Ordoliberals	  in	  the	  cabinet	  opposed	  it	  but	  also	  the	  Ordoliberal	  parts	  of	  the	  Christian	  
Democrat’s	   parliamentary	   group	  were	   seen	   to	   be	   revolting.	   The	   tactic	   of	   the	   antagonists	  
was	   to	   slow	  down	   reform	  discussion	   in	   the	   cabinet	  until	   it	  would	  eventually	   fall	   from	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  “Wir	  verlangen	  in	  allen	  Sozialversicherungszweigen	  Wiederherstellung	  des	  Versicherungsprinzips“	  CDU	  deputy	  Blank	  in	  the	  German	  Bundestag	  on	  the	  23.	  September	  1949,	  cited	  IN:	  Höckerts,	  H.	  G.	  (1980)	  p.	  228.	  175	  Schmähl,	  E.	  (2005)	  IN:	  Schulz	  M.	  (ed.)	  p.	  400.	  176	  Hentschel,	  V.	  (1983)	  p.	  165.	  177	  “seelenlos	  mechanisierte	  Gesellschaft”	  Abelshauser,	  W.	  (1996)	  p.	  387.	  178	  “die	  Prothese	  einer	  durch	  Proletarismus	  verkrüppelten	  und	  durch	  Vermassung	  zerkrümelten	  Gesellschaft“,	  Röpke	  cited	  IN:	  Abeslhauser,	  W.	  (1996)	  p.	  388.	  179	  “dass	  der	  Regierungsentwurf	  eigentlich	  kein	  Regierungsentwurf	  war.“	  Hentschel,	  V.	  (1983)	  p.	  165.	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agenda.	  This	  strategy	  seemed	  to	  work,	  but	  then	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  presented	  their	  own	  
cohesive	  pension	  reform	  proposal.	  	  
	   The	   records	   of	   the	   parliamentary	   pension	   reform	   debate	   from	   1957	   confirm	   the	  
positions	  and	  developments	  outlined	  above.	  The	  FDP	  parliamentarian	   Jentsch	  emphasized	  
in	   his	   speech	   that	   there	   was	   too	   much	   affinity	   between	   the	   Social	   Democratic	   and	   the	  
Christian	  Democratic	   reform	  proposal.	   180	   Especially	   the	  dynamic	   character	   of	   the	  Pension	  
law	   proposal	   seemed	   unbearable	   and	   too	   Social	   Democratic	   for	   the	   Liberals.	   The	   Liberal	  
parliamentarian	  Jentzsch	  also	  put	  forward	  that	  “This	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  dynamic	  pension,	  
[…]	  The	  law	  proposed	  by	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  parliamentary	  group,	  which	  is	  deliberated	  in	  
parallel,	  also	  features	  the	  dynamic	  pension.”181	  The	  Social	  Democrat	  speaker	  Preller	  was,	  on	  
the	  other	  hand,	  very	  happy	  about	  the	  overlaps	  between	  the	  Christian	  Democrat	  and	  Social	  
Democratic	   reform	  proposals.	  He	  emphazises	   that	   “with	  great	  pleasure	   I	  have	   taken	   from	  
the	  elaborations	  of	   colleague	  Stingl	   this	   afternoon	   that	   this	  position	   is	   also	   shared	  by	   this	  
wing	   of	   the	   Christian	   Democrats”182	   but	   also	   criticized	   that	   the	   “union	   wing	   within	   the	  
largest	  government	  party,	  […],	  had	  evidently	  not	  been	  able	  to	  push	  its	  position	  against	  the	  
other	  parts	  of	  the	  largest	  government	  party.”183	  After	  the	  shock	  of	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  Social	  
Democratic	  reform	  proposal	  four	  days	  earlier,184	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  government	  had	  
little	  choice	  than	  to	  agree	  to	  the	  revised	  Schreiber	  proposal	  on	  the	  18th	  January	  1956.	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  V.	  (1983)	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  die	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  Deutschen	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  185.	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  Printed	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  G.	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  Stingl	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  entnommen,	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  der	  CDU	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  P.	  269.	  Abg.	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  (SPD)	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  185.	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   The	   results	   of	   the	   reform	  were	   “one	   of	   the	  most	   important	   social-­‐political	   reforms	   of	  
German	  history”.185	  Pensions	  were	   increased	  to	  65%	  of	  the	   last	  salary	  of	  workers	  and	  72%	  
for	   white	   collar	   employees.	   They	   were	   now	   status	   upholding	   beyond	   retirement.	   The	  
dynamization	  of	  the	  pension	  saw	  them	  automatically	  adapt	  to	  the	  changes	   in	  the	   levels	  of	  
prices,	  wages	  and	  the	  inflation	  rate.	  The	  pension	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  mere	  old	  age	  supplement,	  	  
but	   rather	   was	   a	   substitute	   for	   the	  worker’s	   former	   salary.	   The	   calculation	   based	   on	   the	  
previous	  income	  also	  guaranteed	  that	  the	  living	  standard	  did	  not	  decrease	  when	  retiring.	  It	  
also	   narrowed	   the	   gap	   between	   blue	   collar	   workers	   and	   white	   collar	   employees	   and	  
therefore	  had	  equalizing	  effects,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  at	  least.	  
	   Adenauer’s	   frenetic	  support	  had	  been	  crucial	   for	   the	  bill.	  Adenauer	  was	   in	   favor	  of	   the	  
bill,	  less	  due	  to	  his	  Catholic	  world	  views	  but	  rather	  because	  he,	  like	  Bismarck,	  saw	  welfare	  as	  
a	  formidable	  instrument	  to	  bind	  the	  electorate	  to	  him	  and	  the	  Christian	  Democrats.	  Without	  
him,	   the	   proposal	   would	   never	   have	   gotten	   beyond	   the	   resistance	   of	   the	   cabinet.	   The	  
enormous	  economic	  growth	  rates	  in	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  during	  the	  1950s	  was	  also	  helpful	  
in	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   reforms.186	   Between	   1951	   and	   1960	   the	   West	   German	  
economy	   grew	   by	   approximately	   6%	   annually	   and	   the	   country	   went	   from	   mass	  
unemployment	   to	   full	   employment.	   Still	   though,	   it	   seems	   surprising	   that	   such	   a	   heavily	  
expansionist	   reform,	   that	   saw	  Germany’s	   relative	   spend	  on	   social	   security	  become	  one	  of	  
the	   highest	   in	   the	   world,	   was	   done	   by	   a	   Christian	   Democratic	   and	   liberal	   governmental	  
coalition.	  The	  argument	  advanced	  here	  is	  that	  the	  pressures	  that	  the	  Social	  Democrats,	  with	  
their	  continuous	  issuing	  of	  attractive	  reform	  proposals,	  inflicted	  on	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  
had	  opened	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	   for	   the	   left	  Catholic	  wing	  of	   the	  party	   to	   implement	  
their	   policy	   preferences	   which	   had	   previously	   been	   forestalled	   by	   the	   Protestant	  
Ordoliberals	  in	  the	  party.	  
	   The	  pension	  reform	  of	  1957	  was	  an	  enormous	  popular	  success.	  A	  public	  opinion	  survey	  
from	  the	  Allensbach	  Institute	  found	  that	  Germans	  ranked	  it	  as	  the	  “Most	  popular	  event	   in	  
the	   eight	   year	   long	   history	   of	   the	   Federal	   Republic.”187	   Even	   social	   policy	   experts	   gave	   a	  
positive	  reception	  to	   the	  reform	  –	  something	  which	  contributed	   immensely	   to	  Adenauer’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	  Schmidt,	  M.	  G.	  (1988)	  p.	  73.	  186	  Stipulated	  largely	  through	  the	  enormous	  influx	  of	  human	  capital	  from	  the	  former	  eastern	  parts	  of	  Germany	  and	  East	  Germany	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Korea	  boom.	  187	  „das	  populärste	  Ereignis	  der	  achtjährigen	  Geschichte	  der	  Bundesrepublik“	  Schmidt,	  M.	  G.	  (1983)	  p.	  75.	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landslide	  victory.	  In	  1957,	  the	  Chancellor	  announced	  further	  reforms	  –	  including	  a	  reform	  of	  
health	   and	   accident	   insurance	   which	   never	   materialized.	   With	   the	   ascendance	   of	   the	  
Ordoliberal	   Protestant	   Ludwig	   Erhard	   into	   the	   position	   of	   Adenauer’s	   successor	   as	  
Chancellor	  in	  1963,	  any	  further	  progressive	  welfare	  reform	  ambition	  was	  forestalled.	  Erhard	  
had	  already	  proclaimed	  in	  1957	  that	  “already	  now	  one	  can	  no	  longer	  speak	  of	  the	  immunity	  
of	  social	  security	  to	  crisis:	  one	  third	  of	  the	  GDP	  is	  used	  for	  taxation	  and	  social	  contributions.	  




This	   episode	   also	   featured	   a	   fierce	   battle	   between	   Ordoliberalism	   and	   Catholicism.	   The	  
compromise	  was	   found	   in	   the	  cartel	   and	  central	  bank	   laws.	  Therefore,	  1957	  was	  not	  only	  
the	  year	  of	  Adenauer’s	  big	  pension	  reform	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  also	  the	  “Conceptual	  final	  
stroke	  of	   the	   social	  market	  economy”.189	   The	  core	  Ordoliberal	  projects	  of	  an	   independent	  
federal	   central	   bank	   (Bundesbank)	   and	   the	   Cartel	   Law,	   which	   led	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   an	  
independent	   Cartel	   Agency,	   were	   finally	   enacted.	   Both	   laws	   legalized	   the	   former	   interim	  
institutions	  that	  had	  been	  set	  up	  by	  the	  occupational	  forces.	  	  
	   The	   employer	   and	   industry	   federations	   rallied	   fiercely	   against	   the	   two	   laws	   and	  
threatened	  to	  mobilize	  all	   their	  power	  against	  Adenauer’s	  pension	  plans	   if	   the	  Ordoliberal	  
legislation	  was	  enacted.	  Adenauer’s	  way	  out	  of	  this	  dilemma	  was	  to	  compromise	  both	  sides	  
by	  making	  sure	  that	  the	  cartel	   legislation	  passed	  parliament	  with	  a	  number	  of	  exemptions	  
that	  appeased	  the	  employers’	  organizations.	  
	   Once	   again,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   Employer	   Centered	   Approaches	   (ECAs),	   employers	   were	  
certainly	  not	   in	  the	  driving	  seat	  when	  it	  came	  to	  social	  security	   legislation	   in	  the	  after	  war	  
period.	  Furthermore,	  employers	  were	  neither	  liberal	  or	  monetarists	  as	  they	  heavily	  opposed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  „Schon	  jetzt	  könne	  von	  einer	  Krisenfestigkeit	  des	  System	  der	  sozialen	  Leistungen	  nicht	  mehr	  gesprochen	  werden:	  ein	  Drittel	  des	  Sozialprodukts	  werde	  für	  Steuern	  und	  Sozialabgaben	  verwandt.	  Steige	  dieser	  Satz	  weiter,	  müsse	  man	  allen	  Ernstes	  eine	  Minderung	  der	  volkswirtschaftlichen	  Leistungskraft	  befürchten.“	  Ludwig	  Erhard	  on	  the	  2.11.1959	  in	  a	  letter	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  economy	  to	  the	  ministry	  of	  finance.	  Cited	  IN:	  Boldorf,	  M.	  (2001)	  p.	  131.	  189	  Werner	  Schulz	  cited	  IN:	  Conze,	  E.	  (2009)	  p.	  169.	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any	  neo-­‐liberal	   legislative	   framework	   that	  would	  have	  circumscribed	   their	  economic	   room	  
for	   maneuver.	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   employers	   had	   no	   influence	   on	   the	   after	   war	  
socioeconomic	   constitution	  of	  West	  Germany,	  but	  only	   that	   this	   influence	  was	  not	  direct.	  
Instead,	   they	   accepted	   welfare	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   a	   total	   Ordoliberal	   framework.	   Power	  
Resource	   Approaches	   (PRAs),	   which	   emphasize	   the	   influence	   of	   labor	   in	   bringing	   about	  
social	   security	   legislation,	   face	   a	   similar	   problem	   in	   explaining	   West	   German	   welfare	  
legislation	  in	  the	  1950s.	  The	  Social	  Democrats	  certainly	  accelerated	  the	  drive	  towards	  social	  
security	  by	  pressing	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  into	  action	  through	  their	  numerous	  legislatives	  
proposals.	   However,	   these	   proposals	   did	   not	   propose	   an	   egalitarian	   decommodifying	  
welfare	   state	   as	   PRA	   would	   predict.	   Instead,	   they	   looked	   surprisingly	   similar	   to	   Christian	  
Democratic	   proposals.	   Furthermore,	   cross	   class	   coalitions	   on	   risk	   sharing	   as	   advocated	  by	  
second	  generation	  PRA	  advocates	  could	  also	  not	  be	  detected.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  not	  surprising	  
that	  Baldwin’s	  seminal	  contribution	  on	  risk	  sharing	  only	  includes	  the	  German	  case	  from	  the	  
1970s	  onwards.	   Instead,	  a	  good	  explanation	  for	  the	  specific	  outcome	  of	  Post-­‐World	  War	  II	  
German	  welfare	   is	   provided	   by	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   denominational	   compromise	   between	  
Protestant	   Ordoliberals	   and	   Social	   Catholics.	   The	   battle	   of	   ideas,	   and	   subsequent	  
compromise,	   between	   the	   two	   subcultures	  within	   the	   Christian	  Democratic	   party	   yields	   a	  
much	   more	   convincing	   explanation	   of	   the	   socioeconomic	   post-­‐war	   order	   than	   the	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Despite	   substantial	   ideational	   developments	   and	   the	   diffusion	   of	   Christian	   Socialist	   ideas	   after	  
fascism,	  Italy	  did	  not	  witness	  a	  general	  welfare	  overhaul.	  This	  is	  puzzling	  as,	  since	  the	  release	  of	  the	  
second	  papal	  social	  encyclical	  Quadragesimo	  Anno	  in	  1931,	  Christian	  Socialist	  thinking	  had	  made	  vast	  
inroads	   into	   Italian	   political	   Catholicism.	   During	   the	   late	   1940s	   more	   than	   one	   third	   of	   Christian	  
Democratic	  Party	  members	  came	  from	  the	  Catholic	   left.	  Similarly,	   the	  Catholic	   left	  did	  not	  face	  any	  
strong	   ideologically	   organized	   intraparty	   opposition	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   the	   Ordoliberals	   within	   the	  
German	   Christian	   Democrats.	   Nevertheless,	   we	   cannot	   observe	   any	   substantial	   welfare	   reform	   in	  
Italy	  after	  the	  war.	   Instead,	  the	  existing	  system	  was	  further	  expanded,	   fragmented	  and,	   in	  the	  end,	  
remodelled	  as	  a	  clientelist	  tool.	  During	  the	  De	  Gasperi	  era	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  relied	  heavily	  on	  
the	   Church	   and	   the	   employer	   association	   Confindustria	   to	   gather	   votes.	   Neither	   group	   had	   any	  
interest	  in	  welfare	  reform.	  During	  the	  1950s	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  constantly	  tried	  to	  emancipate	  
themselves	  from	  them	  so	  they	  had	  to	  build	  their	  own	  electoral	  ties.	  These	  ties	  were	  so	  diverse	  in	  the	  
different	  parts	  of	  Italy	  that	  they	  counteracted	  any	  comprehensive	  welfare	  reform	  attempt.	  This	  led	  to	  
the	  subsequent	  drift	  of	  the	   Italian	  welfare	  system	  into	  an	  oversized	  clientelist	  exchange	  machinery,	  
especially	  in	  the	  South	  of	  the	  country.	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This	  chapter	  will	  start	  by	  analysing	  how	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  managed	  to	  rise	  once	  again	  as	  
one	  of	  the	  dominant	  political	  players	  on	  the	  Italian	  peninsula.	  In	  a	  second	  step,	  it	  will	  show	  
how	  this	  development	  impacted	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Italian	  Christian	  Democratic	  party	  
and	   how	   this	   latter	   struggled	   throughout	   the	   late	   1950s	   to	   emancipate	   itself	   from	   the	  
Vatican’s	   influence.	   The	   third	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	  will	   show	   how	   all	   this	   impacted	   on	   the	  
evolving	  of	  a	  clientelist	  welfare	  state	  in	  post-­‐war	  Italy.	  	  
	  
9.1 Mussolini’s	  fall	  
The	   way	   that	   Mussolini	   was	   ousted	   from	   power	   led	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   specific	  
constellation	  of	  actors	  on	  the	  Italian	  peninsula	  that	  was	  decisive	  for	  the	  socioeconomic	  and	  
political	   remodelling	   of	   Italian	   Institutions	   after	   the	   Second	   World	   War.	   The	   actors	   that	  
emerged	   would	   be	   central	   for	   Italy’s	   post-­‐war	   development.	   These	   were	   the	   Allies,	   the	  
Church	  and	  the	  Resistance.	  	  
An	  early	   landmark	  was	  the	  July	  Plot	  of	  1943.	  In	  Italy	   it	  was	  already	  becoming	  clear	  
that	  the	  war	  was	  being	   lost.	  Facing	  the	  surrender	  of	  the	  Axis	   in	  Northern	  Africa,	  Mussolini	  
knew	  that	  the	  next	  step	  had	  to	  be	  an	  Allied	  landing	  in	  Sicily.	  In	  a	  desperate	  attempt,	  he	  met	  
with	  Hitler	  in	  order	  to	  persuade	  him	  to	  come	  to	  a	  separate	  peace	  agreement	  with	  Stalin	  and	  
deploy	  the	  German	  eastern-­‐front	  armies	  for	  the	  defence	  of	  Italy.	  At	  home,	  civil	  unrest	  was	  
growing	  with	   strikes	   in	   Turin	   factories	   and	   food	   riots.	  Hitler’s	   refusal	   to	   close	   the	   eastern	  
front,	   the	   first	  Allied	  bombing	  raids	  on	  Rome	  and	  the	  Allied	   landing	   in	  Sicily	   signalled	   that	  
the	   war	   was	   slipping	   away	   from	   Italy	   and	   that	   the	   regime	   was	   on	   the	   brink	   of	   collapse.	  
Mussolini’s	  sacking	  of	  half	  of	  his	  cabinet	  on	  the	  5th	  February	  1943	  certainly	  did	  not	  make	  the	  
leading	  Fascist	  party	  notables	  happier.	  Nevertheless,	  even	  in	  spite	  of	  this	  situation,	  nobody	  
in	   the	   higher	   fascist	   circles	   wanted	   to	   make	   the	   first	   move	   against	   the	   Duce.	   Nobody	  
describes	  the	  situation	  better	  than	  Clark	  who	  is	  of	  the	  view	  that	  	  
a	   vast	   Renaissance	   drama,	   with	   plots	   and	   counterplots	   around	   the	   Court,	   with	   passionate	   loyalties	   and	   final	  
betrayals.	  The	  leading	  actors	  wore	  impressive	  costumes	  and	  bore	  resplendent	  titles	  –	  King,	  Pope,	  Marshal,	  Duce,	  
Grand	  Council	  –	  but	  they	  all	  improvised	  their	  parts,	  and	  they	  all	  covered	  their	  tracks.1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  296.	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In	  the	  end,	  Mussolini	  was	  overthrown	  by	  his	  own	  Fascist	  Grand	  Council.	  Vatican	  diplomacy,	  
with	  its	  excellent	  contacts,	  had	  already	  ensured	  that	  an	  authoritarian	  governmental	  solution	  
with	  the	  King	  as	  head	  of	  state	  was	  acceptable	  to	  Washington.	   Indeed,	  this	  was	  one	  of	  the	  
first	   steps	   in	   the	  Vatican	  becoming	  one	  of	   the	  most	  powerful	  political	  players	   in	  post-­‐war	  
Italy.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  most	  of	  the	  army	  and	  the	  security	  forces	  had	  signalled	  their	  loyalty	  
to	  the	  King	  should	  Mussolini	  be	  overthrown.	  Given	  this	  situation	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Duce	  was	  not	  
very	   spectacular.	   By	   a	  majority	   of	   19	   to	   7,	   the	   fascist	   Grand	   Council	   voted	   to	   effectively	  
transfer	  all	  important	  powers	  from	  Mussolini	  to	  the	  King.	  When	  Mussolini	  met	  with	  the	  King	  
the	  following	  day	  he	  was	  arrested.	  Concerning	  the	  reactions	  of	  the	  population	  Clark	  notes:	  
“Hardly	  a	  fascist	  stirred.	  In	  Rome,	  it	  was	  as	  if	  Fascism	  had	  never	  been.”2	  	  
The	  political	  crisis	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  crisis	  of	  Musssolini	  the	  man	  instead	  of	  one	  of	  
the	   Italian	   state	   or	   the	   Italian’s	   people	   engagement	   and	   fascination	   with	   fascism.	   The	  
problem	   was	   that	   Mussolini’s	   fall	   did	   not	   automatically	   mean	   the	   end	   of	   war	   for	   Italy.	  
Instead,	  the	  Germans	  started	  to	  massively	  deploy	  troops	  over	  the	  Alps	  once	  they	  saw	  that	  
the	  new	  head	  of	  government,	  General	  Badoglio,	  had	  dissolved	  the	  Fascist	  Party	  and	  begun	  
(secret)	   peace	   negotiations	   with	   the	   Allies.3	   The	   King	   and	   Badoglio	   had	   to	   flee	   south	   for	  
Allied	  protection	  which	  put	  them	  into	  a	  weak	  political	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Pope	  who	  had	  
stayed	  in	  Rome	  throughout	  the	  Allied	  bombings	  and	  had	  even	  established	  a	  legacy	  as	  a	  true	  
Roman	   citizen	   by	   visiting	   the	   Roman	   population	   in	   bomb	   shelters	   and	   ordering	   the	  
ecclesiastical	   apparatus	   to	   engage	   in	   large	   scale	   relief	   actions.4	   German	   airborne	   troops	  
liberated	  Mussolini	   only	   two	  month	   later	   from	   his	  mountain	   prison	   on	   the	  Gran	   Sasso	   in	  
Abruzzo	   and	   installed	   him	   in	   the	   North	   as	   the	   head	   of	   the	   Nazi	   puppet	   regime	   of	   the	  
Repubblica	  di	   Salo.	  The	   Italian	  political	   caste	  had	   therefore	  been	   liberated	   from	  Mussolini	  
but	  not	   from	   the	  war,	   and	   so	  had	   to	  witness	   the	  quick	   reintroduction	  of	  Mussolini	   in	   the	  
North	   combined	   with	   a	   brutal	   German	   military	   occupation.	   The	   subsequent	   civil	   war	  
between	   a	   fascist	   North,	   effectively	   controlled	   by	   the	   Germans,	   and	   the	   Kingdom	   of	   the	  
South,	  effectively	  controlled	  by	  the	  western	  Allies,	  would	  last	  from	  13	  September	  1943	  until	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  Gentile,	  E.	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the	  25	  April	  1945.5	  What	  is	  important	  is	  that	  it	  was	  the	  Allies	  and	  the	  Vatican	  that	  prevailed	  
and	  emerged	  from	  the	  conflict	  as	  the	  two	  dominant	  forces.	  
	  
9.1.1 The	  Vatican	  
After	   the	   war,	   the	   Vatican	   managed	   to	   position	   itself	   once	   again	   as	   one	   of	   the	   central	  
political	  brokers	  on	  the	  peninsula.	  The	  fall	  of	  Mussolini	  was	  an	  opportunity	  to	  retake	  power	  
over	  the	  Italian	  peninsula	  that	  had,	  at	  least	  in	  its	  temporal	  element,	  been	  diminished	  since	  
the	  Risorgimento.	  Giovagnioli	   remarks	   “In	   reality,	  having	  been	   in	  a	  weak	  position	  up	  until	  
1929,	   in	   the	   second	   after	   war	   period	   the	   Church	   passes	   from	   the	   position	   of	   fearing	  
something	  from	  Italy	  to	  one	  of	  being	  able	  to	  do	  something	  for	  Italy.”6	  However,	  the	  Church’s	  
interest	  was	  not	  so	  much	  one	  of	  doing	  something	  “for”	  but	  rather	  something	  “with”	   Italy.	  
The	   fact	   that	   it	   had	   established	   early	   contacts	  with	   the	   Allies,	   and	   especially	   its	   excellent	  
contacts	  with	  Washington,	  gave	  it	  a	  position	  as	  one	  (if	  not	  the)	  key	  player	  in	  Italian	  after	  war	  
politics.	   The	   positive	   relationship	   between	   Pius	   XII	   and	   Roosevelt	   proved	   fruitful	   for	   the	  
Church,	   while	   both	   sides	   shared	   the	   absolute	   priority	   of	   forestalling	   Soviet	   influence.	  
Therefore,	   “Already	   at	   the	   exit	   of	   the	   war,	   antisovietism	   represented	   a	   dominant	  
component	  in	  the	  internal	  debates	  of	  the	  world	  of	  Italian	  Catholics.”7	  Historians	  as	  different	  
as	   Pollard	   and	   Chabod	   agree	   that	   the	   power	   of	   the	   papacy	   after	   World	   War	   Two	   had	  
reached	  a	  point	  that	  had	  not	  been	  witnessed	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Roman	  Empire.8	  	  Towards	  
the	   end	   of	   the	   war,	   Pius	   XII	   even	   managed	   to	   establish	   a	   personal	   cult	   that	   almost	  
outstripped	  Mussolini’s.	  It	  helped	  that	  he	  was	  the	  first	  pope	  born	  in	  Rome	  for	  200	  years.	  To	  
this	   day,	   Pius	   XII	   is	   still	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   “the	   last	   real	   Pope”.9	   His	   powers	   over	   the	  
ecclesial	  hierarchy	  are	  legendary.	  Not	  a	  single	  Italian	  Bishops	  conference	  was	  held	  up	  until	  
1956	  which	  is	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  centralization	  of	  power	  in	  his	  office.	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The	  German	  Catholic	  revival	  came	  from	  the	  moral	  disorientation	  that	  followed	  the	  
widespread	   indoctrination	   through	   a	   total	   ideology.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   resurgence	   of	   the	  
Church	  in	  Italy	  was	  carefully	  orchestrated	  through	  Vatican	  politics,	  the	  influencing	  of	  public	  
opinion	   and	   a	   bold	   institutional	   strategy.	   Italian	   Catholicism	   and	   its	   institutions	   had	   been	  
protected	   through	   the	   Lateran	   Treaties	   which	   provided	   for	   a	   type	   of	   cohabitation	   with	  
fascism	   so	   survived	   it	   rather	   undamaged.	   The	   Catholic	   subculture,	   which	   had	   strived	   to	  
emerge	  from	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  onwards,	  was	  still	  intact	  while	  the	  Vatican	  had	  –	  under	  
the	  smokescreen	  of	  the	  Lateran	  Pacts	  –	  established	  a	  small	  but	  influential	  economic	  empire	  
in	   the	   finance	  and	  media	   sectors.	   The	   revival	  of	   religion	  as	  a	  political	   force	  was	   therefore	  
fundamentally	  different	  in	  the	  two	  countries	  after	  the	  war.	  In	  Germany,	  it	  was	  a	  grassroots	  
spiritual	   quest	   for	   orientation	   and	   absolution	   on	   which	   Christian	   Democratic	   politicians	  
could	   cleverly	   build	   their	   party.	   In	   Italy,	   the	   Church	   had	   never	   fully	   given	   up	   its	   political	  
leverage.	   Its	   strategy	   was,	   therefore,	   not	   one	   of	   building	   a	   new	   democratic	   Christian	  
movement	  but	  rather	  to	  position	  itself	  so	  that	  it	  could	  replace	  the	  fascist	  regime.	  Pius	  XII’s	  
strategy	  was	  one	  of	  power	  accumulation	  and	  centralization.	  Intermediary	  actors,	  such	  as	  a	  
Christian	  Democratic	  movement,	  had	  no	  place	  in	  his	  strategy.	  The	  papacy	  had	  little	  faith	  in	  
Democracy	  and	  would	  have	  favored	  an	  Iberian	  solution	  (an	  autocratic	  regime	  backed	  by	  the	  
Catholic	   Church	   like	   in	   Franco’s	   Spain	   or	   Salazar’s	   Portugal).10	   Pierelli	   writes	   that	   “In	   the	  
dominant	   reflection	   of	   the	   ecclesiastical	   hierarchy	   the	   hypothesis	   of	   a	   ‘encompassing	  
reconquistation’	  of	  society	  remained	  solidly	  anchored.”11	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  make	  a	  transition	  
from	  fascism	  to	  post-­‐fascism	  “through	  a	  Salazarian	  type	  of	  institutional	  exit“.12	  This	  Catholic	  
takeover	   was	   also	   to	   be	   organized	   with	   the	   help	   of	   Catholic	   lay	   organizations	   such	   as	  
Catholic	  Action.	  Its	  leader,	  Luigi	  Gedda,	  wrote	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  General	  Badoglio	  in	  1943	  that	  he	  
was	  willing	  to	  offer	  some	  of	  his	  2.5	  million	  member	  organization	  to	  substitute	  the	  fascists’	  
functionaries	   in	   state	   and	   administration.13	   Italy	   was	   thus	   to	   become	   an	   “authoritarian,	  
semi-­‐dictatorial	  regime,	  with	  solid	  Catholic	  support.”14	  If	  this	  was	  not	  possible,	  then	  at	  least	  
the	   provisions	   of	   the	   Lateran	   Pacts	   (enacted	   between	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   and	  Mussolini)	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should	   be	   rescued	   from	   the	   ruins	   of	   the	   fascist	   regime.15	   During	   the	   1940s	   the	   Vatican	  
adopted	   modern	   techniques	   of	   political	   mobilization.	   Throughout	   the	   1940s,	   Catholicism	  
started	  to	  resemble	  “more	  and	  more	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  mass	  political	  movement	  with	  a	  
charismatic	  leader	  -­‐	  the	  Pope.”16	  Carefully	  choreographed	  and	  orchestrated	  mass	  rallies	  on	  
St	  Peters	  Square	  became	  common.	  Older	  cults,	  like	  the	  Marian	  Cult,	  were	  newly	  codified	  by	  
the	   Vatican	   and	   re-­‐launched	   on	   a	   massive	   scale	   in	   order	   to	   ignite	   Catholic	   spirituality.17	  
Despite	   being	   keen	   on	   authoritarian	   solutions,	   the	   Vatican	   was	   also	   one	   of	   the	   few	  
institutions	  that	  managed	  to	  distance	  early	  enough	  from	  the	  doomed	  regime.	  Even	  though	  
there	  was	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  cohabitation	  and	  even	  cooperation,18	  the	  Pope	  was	  still	  one	  of	  
the	  first	  persons	  to	  abandon	  regime	  and	  Duce.	  This	  paid	  off	  in	  post-­‐war	  Italy	  as	  the	  Church	  
could	   present	   itself	   as	   the	   being	   only	   institution	   that	   could	   make	   a	   credible	   claim	   to	  
continue	  the	  work	  of	  pre-­‐fascist	  Italy	  that	  was	  not	  morally	  entangled	  with	  it.	  
	   That	  said,	  Pope	  Benedict	  XV	  had	  still	  called	  Mussolini	   in	   the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  Lateran	  
Treaties	   ‘man	   of	   providence’.19	   The	   twenty	   years	   of	   fascism	   had	   produced	   a	   strong	  
antiliberal	   and	   antidemocratic	   right	   wing	   in	   the	   Church	   hierarchy	   that	   had	   welcomed	  
fascism	  as	  a	  transitional	  period	  towards	  the	  “restoration	  of	  the	  antique	  order”.20	  After	  the	  
fall	  of	  Mussolini,	  however,	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	   lay	  Catholics	  had	  quite	  a	  different	  opinion	  
and	  contributed	  to	  bringing	  the	  regime	  down.	  This	  made	  the	  big	  pool	  of	  Italian	  mainstream	  
Catholicism	   from	   which	   De	   Gasperi	   would	   build	   the	   DC	   (Democrazia	   Christiana).21	  
Furthermore,	  there	  was	  a	  growing	  clerical	  Catholic	  left	  which	  adhered	  to	  Christian	  Socialist	  
ideas.	   To	   sum	   up,	   Catholicism	   became	   a	   very	   powerful	   and	   central	   political	   player	   in	   the	  
immediate	   post-­‐war	   period.	   However,	   Catholicism	   itself	   was	   also	   home	   to	   numerous	  
different	  political	  and	  doctrinal	  leanings	  that	  were	  often	  at	  odds	  with	  each	  other	  in	  terms	  of	  
their	   programmatic	   ideas.	   Catholicism	   in	   the	   1940s	   and	   1950s	   consisted	   of	   a	   broad,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Only	  after	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  had	  secured	  the	  entry	  of	  the	  Lateran	  treaties	  into	  Article	  seven	  of	  the	  constitution	  the	  Vatican	  entered	  into	  symbiosis	  with	  the	  DC.	  16	  Pollard,	  J.	  (2008)	  p.	  124.	  17	  Blackbourn,	  D.	  (1991)	  The	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  Europe	  since	  the	  French	  Revolution:	  A	  Review	  Article.	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History.	  Vol.	  33.	  No	  4.	  18	  Webster,	  R.	  A.	  (1960)	  The	  Cross	  and	  the	  Fasces.	  Christian	  Democracy	  and	  Fascism	  in	  Italy.	  Stanford.	  Stanford	  University	  Press.	  See	  especially;	  pp.	  119-­‐128.	  19	  Colarizi,	  S.	  (1994)	  Storia	  dei	  partiti	  nell’Italia	  repubblicana,	  Roma,	  Laterza,	  p.	  37.	  20	  “Restaurazione	  dell’ordine	  antico	  che	  clerico-­‐fascisti	  e	  conservativi	  auspicano.”	  Colarizi,	  S.	  (1994)	  Storia	  dei	  partiti	  nell’Italia	  repubblicana,	  Bari,	  Laterza,	  p.	  41.	  21	  Colarizi,	  S.	  (1994)	  p.	  38.	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moderately	  liberal,	  lay	  movement,	  which	  was	  flanked	  by	  the	  Conservative	  Vatican	  hierarchy	  
on	  one	  the	  right	  side	  and	  a	  Christian	  Socialist	  movement	  to	  the	  Left.	  	  
	  
9.1.2 The	  Allies:	  the	  marginalization	  of	  the	  resistance	  
Britain	  regarded	  the	  Mediterranean	  and	  Italy	  as	  its	  traditional	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  Ginsburg	  
notes	   that	   “Churchill’s	   main	   preoccupation	   was	   to	   preserve	   what	   he	   called	   ‘traditional	  
property	   relations’	   from	  the	   threat	  of	   rampant	  Communism.”22	   In	   fact,	   the	  British	  were	   in	  
favour	  of	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	  King	  and	  a,	  not	  necessarily	  de-­‐fascistized	  but	  certainly	  anti-­‐
communist,	  post-­‐liberation	  Italy.	  This	  aim	  seemed	  to	  become	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  realise	  
with	   the	   rapidly	   growing	   armed	   resistance	   in	   the	   North	   dominated	   by	   the	   Socialists	   and	  
Communists.	  Since	  the	  British	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  sustainable	  recipe	  for	  coping	  with	  this	  
situation	   and,	   as	   events	   in	   Greece	   and	   Tito’s	   moves	   in	   Yugoslavia	   became	   ever	   more	  
alarming,	  the	  US	  started	  to	   increasingly	  take	  control	  of	  events.	  The	  Americans	  understood	  
that	  the	  rise	  of	  Communism	  could	  best	  be	  cushioned	  through	  food	  supplies	  and	  economic	  
help	   for	   the	   devastated	   Italian	   society.	   For	  Ginsborg	   the	   difference	  was	   that:	   “The	  British	  
proclaimed	   their	   intention	   to	   ‘prevent	   epidemics	   and	   disorders’	   the	   Americans	   to	   ‘create	  
stability	  and	  prosperity.”23	  
In	  order	  to	  antagonize	  the	   leftist	  forces	   in	  the	  resistance	  and	  to	  cut	  them	  off	  from	  
any	   say	   in	   the	   institutional,	   political	   and	   economic	   re-­‐launch	   of	   post-­‐War	   Italy,	   the	   Allies	  
actively	   tried	   to	  marginalize	   the	   role	   of	   the	   CLN	   (Comitato	   di	   Liberazione	  Nazionale).	   The	  
CLN	  was	  the	  high	  council	  of	  all	  partisan	  groups	  and	  consisted	  mostly	  of	  representatives	  from	  
the	   Communist	   Party	   (PCI),	   the	   Italian	   Socialist	   Party	   (PSI),	   the	   Republican	   (liberal)	   party	  
(Partito	   d’Azione),	   and	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   (DC).	   However,	   	   the	   actual	   fighting	  
resistance	  consisted	  only	  of	  the	  Garibaldi	  Brigades	  from	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  the	  Matteotti	  
Brigades	  from	  the	  Socialists	  and	  the	  Gustizia	  e	  Liberta	  Brigades	  from	  the	  Liberal	  Action	  Party	  
and	   thus	   it	   lacked	   a	   larger	   Christian	   Democratic	   component.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   Christian	  
Democrats	  became	  the	  preferred	  partner	  for	  the	  Western	  Allies	  who	  feared	  the	  heavily	  left-­‐
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  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990)	  A	  History	  of	  Contemporary	  Itay,	  London,	  Penguin	  Books,	  p.	  40.	  23	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  41.	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leaning	  politics	  of	  the	  resistance.	  As	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  had	  only	  a	  “token”24	  presence	  
and	   no	   vested	   interests	   in	   the	   CLN,	   they	   could	   quickly	   present	   themselves	   as	   a	   clear-­‐cut	  
alternative,	  independent	  of	  the	  left-­‐dominated	  CLN,	  for	  Allied	  cooporation.25	  
To	   conclude,	   Christian	   Democrats	   evolved	   quickly	   as	   a	   central	   political	   player	   in	  
post-­‐war	  Italy	  despite	  having	  only	  marginally	  contributed	  to	  the	  resistance.	  They	  could	  do	  so	  
because	   they	   were	   able	   to	   perfectly	   play	   the	   role	   of	   interlocutor	   for	   the	   US.	   This	   is	   in	  
contrast	   to	   the	   other	   remnants	   of	   the	   Italian	   state,	   personified	   by	   the	   King	   and	   Prime	  
Minister	  Badoglio,26	  which	  had	  been	  severely	  discredited	  due	  to	  their	  earlier	  collaboration	  
with	  Mussolini.	  
	  
9.1.3 Christian	  Democracy:	  the	  beginnings	  
The	  strong	  presence	  and	  influence	  of	  the	  Allies	  and	  Church	  inhibited	  the	  Vatican	  in	  pushing	  
through	  its	  preference	  for	  the	  “Iberian	  solution”.	  The	  Americans	  and	  British	  that	  had	  fought	  
a	   war	   in	   the	   name	   of	   Democracy	   and	   could	   simply	   not	   allow	   the	   reintroduction	   of	   an	  
autocracy	  –	  especially	  given	  the	  rising	  tensions	  between	  East	  and	  West.	  The	  Vatican	  had	  no	  
other	  choice	  than	  to	  swallow	  the	  bitter	  pill	  of	  Christian	  Democracy	  as	  an	  interlocutor	  in	  the	  
democratic	  system.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  analyse	  the	  early	  evolution	  of	  the	  party	  under	  
De	  Gasperi.	  It	  will	  also	  assess	  the	  mark	  it	  left	  on	  the	  constitutional	  referendum	  and	  national	  
elections	  of	  the	  2nd	  June	  1946	  and	  the	  first	  parliamentary	  elections	  of	  18th	  April	  1948.	  
The	  DC	  developed	  out	  of	  former	  cadres	  of	  the	  Catholic	  party	  of	  the	  interwar	  years,	  
the	  Partito	  Popolare	   Italiano	  (PPI).	  This	  gave	  De	  Gasperi,	  as	  the	   last	  secretary	  of	  the	  PPI,	  a	  
central	  role.	  Despite	  the	  personal	  continuity	  the	  two	  projects	  were	  fundamentally	  different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  48.	  25	  The	  role	  of	  the	  CLN,	  and	  the	  internal	  consocational	  mechanisms	  that	  it	  was	  built	  on,	  became	  the	  central	  focus	  of	  a	  revisionist	  nationalist	  and	  increasingly	  nasty	  debate	  among	  Italian	  historians	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Communism	  in	  Eastern	  Europe.	  Their	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  guaranteed	  seats	  for	  the	  Communists	  and	  Social	  Democrats	  in	  the	  CLN	  led,	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  to	  a	  degregation	  of	  the	  Italian	  post	  war	  political	  system.	  De	  Felice,	  R.	  (1995)	  Rosso	  e	  Nero,	  Milano,	  Baldini	  and	  Castoli.	  These	  accounts	  are	  heavily	  contested	  by	  Anglo	  Saxon	  scholars	  on	  contemporary	  Italian	  political	  history.	  See:	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010),	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (2010)	  26	  Pietro	  Badoglio,	  member	  of	  the	  Fascist	  party,	  was	  named	  Prime	  Minister	  by	  King	  Victor	  Emmanuel	  III	  after	  he	  had	  dismissed	  Mussolini.	  Badoglio	  remained	  Prime	  Minister	  from	  July	  1943	  till	  18	  June	  1944.	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from	  one	  another.	   	  Don	   Luigi	   Sturzo	  had	   founded	   the	  PPI	   as	   a	  Christian	  Democratic	  party	  
independent	  from	  the	  Vatican	  hierarchy.	  His	  aim	  had	  been	  to	   liberate	  political	  Catholicism	  
from	   the	   influences	   of	   the	   Bishops	   and	   to	   create	   a	   party	   that	   was	   more	   than	   merely	   a	  
political	  arm	  of	  the	  Vatican.27	   Indeed,	  “The	  unity	  of	  the	  Partito	  Popolare	  should,	  according	  
to	   Sturzo,	   not	   be	   fostered	   through	   a	   common	   reference	   to	   the	   Christian	   faith	   but	   rather	  
through	   the	   honest	   support	   of	   the	   program.”28	   In	   contrast,	   the	   founders	   of	   the	  DC	   knew	  
that	  without	  support	  from	  the	  Vatican	  they	  would	  fade	  away	  as	  quickly	  as	  the	  PPI	  had	  done	  
two	  decades	  earlier.29	  
	  
9.1.4 De	  Gasperi	  and	  the	  DC	  
De	  Gasperi’s	   ideas	  about	   the	  party,	   the	  State	  and	   the	  Church	  were	  essential	   for	   the	  early	  
setup	  of	  the	  DC.	  	  Indeed,	  his	  interpretations	  were	  already	  somewhat	  controversial	  during	  his	  
active	  career.	  While	  the	  Left,	  and	  especially	  the	  Catholic	  left,	  accused	  him	  of	  being	  radically	  
market	   liberal,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  clerical	  Conservatives	  and	  Catholic	  right	  crucified	  him	  
for	  his	  democratic	  stance	  and	  his	  initial	  rhetorical	  distancing	  from	  the	  Vatican.30	  In	  fact,	  De	  
Gasperi	  had	  affinities	  to	  classic	  liberalism	  and	  a	  “vision	  of	  the	  State	  as	  a	  liberal-­‐democratic	  
type”.31	   	   His	   ideal	   vision	   of	   the	   DC	   was	   one	   of	   a	   pluralist	   “national	   party”	   rather	   than	   a	  
clerical	   one.	   Nevertheless,	   against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   the	   disappointing	   experience	  with	   the	  
PPI,	  De	  Gasperi	  was	  also	  keen	  not	  to	  distance	  himself	  too	  much	  from	  the	  Vatican.	  The	  result	  
was	  a	  permanent	  balancing	  act,	  an	  “equilibrio	  instabile”32	  (unstable	  equilibrium)	  as	  Pieretti	  
calls	  it.	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  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1988)	  p.	  238.	  28	  „Die	  Einheit	  des	  Partito	  Popolare	  sollte	  nach	  Sturzo’s	  Meinung	  nicht	  durch	  den	  gemeinsamen	  Bezug	  auf	  den	  christlichen	  Glauben,	  sondern	  durch	  die	  ehrliche	  Unterstützung	  des	  Programmes	  gesichert	  werden.“	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1988)	  Der	  Beitrag	  der	  Christlichen	  Demokraten	  zum	  politischen	  Wiederaufbau	  Italiens	  (1945-­‐1954),	  IN:	  Becker,	  U.	  &	  Morsey,	  R.	  (eds.)	  Christliche	  Demokratie	  in	  
Europa,	  Köln/Wien,	  Böhlau	  Verlag,	  p.	  238.	  29	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1988)	  p.	  239.	  30	  Giovagnioli,	  A.	  (1996)	  p.	  38.	  These	  accusations	  were	  also	  often	  evoked	  as	  De	  Gasperi	  had	  also	  wintered	  through	  the	  Fascist	  times	  as	  a	  refugee	  in	  the	  Vatican	  library.	  31	  Pieretti,	  M.	  (1989)	  p.	  77.	  32	  Pieretti,	  M.	  (1989)	  p.	  81.	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This	   “doppiezza”33	   of	   De	   Gasperi’s	   relationship	   with	   the	   Church	   exposed	   him	   to	  
criticism	  from	  the	  Catholic	  left	  but,	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  opened	  the	  possibility	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  
vast	   electoral	   resources	   of	   the	  Vatican	   in	   the	   form	  of	   its	   numerous	   grass	   roots	   level,	   civil	  
society	  organizations.	  Especially	   in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  1948	  elections,	  De	  Gasperi	  urged	  the	  
DC	  in	  the	  clerical	  direction.	  	  
De	  Gasperi’s	   thinking	  also	  had	  a	  substantial	   impact	  on	  the	  early	  organizational	   set	  
up	  of	  the	  DC.	  According	  to	  his	  organic	  conception	  of	  society	  every	  group	  had	  its	  own	  God-­‐
given	  place.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  State,	  and	  therefore	  the	  party,	  was	  to	  mediate	  between	  these	  
different	  groups	  rather	  than	  to	  alter	  their	  respective	  statuses.	  In	  other	  words,	  according	  to	  
De	   Gasperi,	   Christian	   Democracy	   should	   not	   provide	   the	   means	   for	   alleviating	   the	   social	  
status	  of	  certain	  classes.	  The	  State	  should	  preserve	  the	  relative	  position	  of	  each	  group.	  Galli	  
remarks	   that	   “De	   Gasperi	   saw,	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   people,	   in	   reality	   a	   hierarchically	  
differentiated	   society.”34	   Interclassism	   was	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   connect	   the	   different	  
hierarchical	   levels.	   It	   “was	   thought	   to	   be	   a	   methodology	   of	   bridging	   and	   shortening	   the	  
distances	  between	  the	  poorest	  and	  the	  richest”35	  rather	  than	  abolishing	  them.	  Interclassism	  
should	   therefore	   be	   a	   fundamental	   cornerstone	   of	   the	   new	   Italian	   post-­‐war	   Christian	  
Democratic	  project.	  What	  came	  with	  this	  organic	  view	  of	  societal	  organization	  was	  a	  central	  
patriachical	  belief	   in	   the	  superiority,	  but	  also	   in	   the	  commitment	   to	   the	  common	  good,	  of	  
certain	  groups	  of	  society	  over	  others.	  This	  theory	  of	  the	  leading	  class	  (classe	  dirigente)	  was	  
central	  to	  his	  understanding	  of	  society.	  Thus,	  for	  De	  Gasperi	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  party	  
should	  therefore	  also	  be	  organized	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  an	  elite	  party.	  Intermediary	  or	  auxiliary	  
organizations	  on	  the	  ground	  were	  unecessary,	  as	  were	  deliberative	  tools	  for	   internal	  party	  
democracy.	  According	  to	  De	  Gasperi’s	  concept	  of	  “organic	  patriarchy”,	   this	  elite	  party	  was	  
bound	  to	  do	  well.	  Galli	  notes	  that,	  for	  the	  DC	  leader	  of	  the	  1940s,	  “the	  party	  was	  always	  a	  
sum	  of	  persons	  of	  good	  will.”36	  As	  regards	  social	  policy,	  this	  liberal-­‐patriachic	  Catholic	  view	  
meant	  that	  social	  consciousness	  should	  come	  about	  through	  education	  and	  faith	  rather	  than	  
through	  policy	  measures.	  De	  Gaperi’s	  conviction	  was	   that	  “the	  party	  has	   to	  dedicate	   itself	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  “Doubleness”	  Pieretti,	  M.	  (1989)	  p.	  81.	  34	  Galli,	  G.	  (1978)	  “De	  Gasperi	  vedeva	  nell’idea	  di	  popolo	  in	  realtà,	  era	  riferita	  ad	  una	  società	  differenziata	  gerarchicamente.”,	  p.	  164.	  35	  Galli,	  G.	  (1978)	  „L’Interclassismo	  veniva	  indicato	  come	  metodologia	  di	  accostamento	  di	  accorciamento	  delle	  distanze	  tra	  i	  più	  poveri	  e	  i	  più	  ricchi.”,	  p.	  165.	  36	  Galli,	  G.	  (1978)	  „Il	  partito	  era	  sempre	  una	  sommatoria	  di	  persone	  di	  buona	  volontà.”,	  p.	  167.	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with	   persistence	   to	   the	   task	   of	   convincing	   and	   diffuse	   among	   the	   entrepreneurs	   a	   social	  
consciousness”.37	  
	  
9.2 The	  DC	  
As	  already	  mentioned,	  De	  Gasperi	  was	  central	  in	  launching	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  Italian	  
project	   as	   soon	   as	   the	   fall	   of	   fascism	   became	   predictable.	   De	   Gasperi	   recruited	   his	   early	  
collaborators	   from	   three	   different	   pools.38	   The	   central	   group	   consisted	   of	   former	   PPI	  
politicians,	   amongst	   which	   figures	   such	   as	   Scelba,	   Gronchi	   and	   Pella	   were	   central.	   The	  
second	   group	   came	   from	   the	   Catholic	   student	   organization,	   FUCI,	   which	   had	   survived	  
fascism	   by	   being	   protected	   by	   the	   Lateran	   Treaties.	   It	   included	   many	   later	   prominent	  
Christian	  Democratic	  leaders	  such	  as	  Andreotti	  and	  Moro.	  The	  third	  group	  was	  made	  up	  of	  
the	  “small	  professors”	  or	  “dossetians”	  who	  were	  recruited	  from	  a	  circle	  of	  young	  university	  
researchers	  around	  Giuseppi	  Dossetti	  –	  a	  professor	  and	  social	  philosopher	  who	  would	  later	  
become	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   Christian	   Democratic	   left	   and	   one	   of	   De	   Gasperi’s	   strongest	  
internal	  party	  rival.	  
This	  heterogeneous	  group	  drafted	  the	  first	  programmatic	  party	  manifesto	  during	  a	  
series	   of	   clandestine	   meetings	   that	   rotated	   around	   the	   homes	   of	   several	   of	   its	   founding	  
members	   during	   1942	   and	   the	   first	   months	   of	   1943.	   Copies	   were	   secretly	   diffused	  
throughout	  Italy	  during	  the	  German	  occupation.	  The	  manifesto	  is	  signed	  by	  a	  pseudonym	  of	  
De	  Gasperi	  but	  was,	  in	  fact,	  the	  result	  of	  an	  extensive	  collaboration	  of	  all	  party	  wings.39	  De	  
Gasperi’s	  reluctance	  to	  fix	  a	  clear	  cut	  programmatic	  line	  is	  evident	  throughout	  the	  program	  
which	   encompasses	   the	   whole	   spectre	   of	   political	   positions	   within	   Italian	   Catholicism	  
instead	  of	  emphasizing	  one	  single	  approach.	  The	  document	  was	  also	  to	  be	  the	  last	  of	  its	  kind	  
during	  the	  De	  Gasperi	  era.	  After	  this,	  the	  party	  released	  short	  summaries	  of	  the	  debates	  at	  
the	   party	   congresses	   that	   mirrored	   the	   heated	   disputes	   between	   right	   and	   left,	   but	   no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  “Il	  partito	  pero	  deve	  dedicarsi	  con	  tenacia	  a	  tale	  opera	  di	  suasione,	  suscitando	  fra	  gli	  imprenditori	  una	  coscienza	  sociale	  voluta	  e	  appoggiando	  lo	  sforzo	  dei	  sindacati	  liberi	  che	  vogliono	  essere	  liberi	  anche	  da	  pregiudiziosi	  politiche	  e	  marxiste.”	  De	  Gasperi,	  A.,	  cited	  IN:	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1979)	  p.	  179.	  	  38	  Masala,	  C.	  (2004)	  Born	  for	  Government:	  The	  Democrazia	  Cristiana	  in	  Italy.	  IN:	  Gehler,	  M.	  &	  Kaiser,	  W.	  (eds.)	  Christian	  Democracy	  in	  Europe	  Since	  1945,	  Volume	  2,	  London,	  Routledge,	  p.	  101.	  	  39	  Masala,	  C.	  (2004)	  p.	  106.	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comprehensive	  party	  program.	  As	  Masala	  remarks,	  during	  De	  Gasperi’s	  time	  the	  DC	  was	  in	  
fact	  more	  a	  party	  of	  “hefty	  debate”40	  than	  of	  program.	  
The	  manifesto	  demonstrates	   that,	   at	   the	   very	  beginning,	   all	   of	   the	  different	  party	  
wings	   were	   still	   able	   to	   work	   out	   a	   common	   programmatic	   proposal.	   Like	   Adenauer	   in	  
Germany,	   De	   Gasperi	   had	   the	   unique	   talent	   for	   bringing	   all	   the	   different	   facades	   of	   the	  
Italian	  Catholic	  worldview	  together.	  The	  program	  incorporated	  a	  detailed	  plan	  for	  the	  future	  
institutional	   framework	   of	   the	   new	   Italian	   state,	   and	   also	   featured	   prescriptions	   for	  
industrial	   relations	   and	   a	   detailed	   social	   policy	   agenda.	   All	   in	   all,	   the	   program	   was	  
archetypical	   for	   Christian	   Democracy	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   era	   as	   it	   tried	   to	   walk	   the	   typical	  
Christian	   Democratic	   line	   between	   calls	   for	   nationalization	   of	   key	   industries	   and	   the	  
importance	  of	  private	  entrepreneurship.	  The	  most	  remarkable	  prescription	  of	  the	  program	  
is	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   two	   parliamentary	   chambers,	   of	   which	   one	   would	   be	   elected	  
while	   the	   other	   would	   serve	   as	   a	   forum	   for	   corporatist	   interest	   representation.	   	   This	  
“National	   Assembly	   of	   the	   Organized	   Interests”41	   should	   be	   “founded	   foremost	   on	   the	  
elected	   representatives	   of	   the	   organized	   professions.”42	   This	   represented	   an	   almost	  word	  
for	  word	  incorporation	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  social	  encyclical	  Quadragesimo	  Anno	  into	  the	  
Christian	   Democratic	   program.	   The	   concept	  was	   one	   of	   a	   “liberal	   Christian	   idea	   of	   a	   free	  
organic	   collaboration	   of	   all	   means	   of	   production”.43	   In	   line	   with	   the	   provisions	   of	  
Quadragesimo	  Anno,	  the	  State	  should	  be	  confined	  to	  a	  role	  of	  “vigilance”44	  that	  guarantees	  
the	   functioning	   of	   the	   neo-­‐corporatist	   model.	   Regarding	   the	   issue	   of	   Social	   Security,	   the	  
program	   spelled	   out	   that	   “social	   insurance	   should	   be	   extended,	   simplified,	   their	  
organization	  decentralized	  and	  their	  management	  put	   into	  the	  hands	  of	   the	  people	  that	   it	  
concerned“.45	   This	   meant	   that	   the	   old	   social	   security	   system	   should	   be	   cleansed	   of	   the	  
characteristics	  of	  fascism,	  but	  that	  the	  basic	  subsidiarity	  aspect	  should	  remain	  in	  place.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Masala,	  C.	  (2004)	  p.	  101.	  41	  “Assemblea	  Nazionale	  degli	  interessi	  organizzati”	  DC	  (1943)	  Le	  Idee	  Ricostruttive	  della	  
Democrazia	  Cristiana,	  Rome,	  p.	  1.	  42	  “fondata	  prevalente	  sulla	  rappresentanza	  eletta	  dalle	  organizzazioni	  professionali.”	  DC	  (1943),	  p.	  1.	  43	  “l’idea	  democratica-­‐cristiana	  della	  libera	  collaborazione	  organica	  di	  tutti	  i	  fattori	  della	  produzione”	  DC	  (1943)	  p.	  2.	  44	  “vigilanza	  dello	  stato”	  DC	  (1943)	  p.	  2.	  45	  “estese	  le	  assicurazioni	  sociali,	  semplificato	  il	  loro	  organismo	  e	  decentrata	  la	  loro	  gestione	  che	  va	  affidata	  alle	  categorie	  interessate”	  DC	  (1943)	  p.	  2.	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One	   striking	   aspect	   of	   this	   early	  manifesto	   is	   that	   it	   does	   not	   include	   a	   synthetic	  
recapitulation	  of	  the	  fascist	  havoc	  and	  the	  carnage	  of	  the	  War.	  Such	  reflections	  on	  fascism	  
and	   how	   to	   avoid	   it	   in	   the	   future	   are	   central	   to	  most	   early	  German	   Christian	  Democratic	  
manifestos	   but	   are	   absent	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Italian	   DC.	   Nor	   is	   there	   any	   overarching	  
reference	   to	   spiritual	   matters	   as	   there	   was	   in	   Germany.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Italian	  
manifesto	   has	   some	   points	   that	   the	  German	  manifestos	   do	   not	   have.	   There	   is	   a	   stronger	  
emphasis	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   family	   and,	   therefore,	   also	   the	   promotion	   of	   family	  
home	  ownership	  and	  the	  call	  for	  a	  large	  scale	  land	  reform.	  Furthermore,	  the	  DC	  manifesto	  
takes	   the	   corporatist	   and	   Christian	   Socialist	   claims	   further	   than	   the	   CDU	   as	   it	   explicitly	  
demands	   the	  enshrining	  of	   corporatist	   institutions	   into	   the	   institutional	  and	  constitutional	  
setup	  of	  the	  new	  Italian	  State.46	  
Nevertheless,	   despite	   the	   strong	   emphasis	   on	   Christian	   Socialist	   ideas	   in	   the	  
program,	  De	  Gasperi	  followed	  a	  largely	  liberal	  economic	  policy	  during	  his	  first	  years	  as	  Prime	  
Minister.	  His	  policy	  was	  very	  market-­‐orientated	  and	  the	  liberal	  “Linea	  Einaudi”47	  almost	  led	  
to	  a	  split	  in	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  in	  the	  late	  1940s.	  
	  
9.2.1 The	  first	  elections	  
The	  2nd	   June	  1946	  was	   the	  day	  on	  which	   a	   referendum	  was	  held	   to	   decide	  on	   the	   future	  
institutions	   and	  power	   balances	   of	   post-­‐war	   Italy.	   The	   Italian	   people	   faced	   a	   double	   task:	  
first,	  they	  had	  to	  decide	  whether	  they	  wanted	  to	  stick	  with	  a	  monarchy	  or	  have	  a	  republic.	  
Secondly,	   they	  were	   asked	   to	   elect	   a	   constitutional	   assembly.	   The	  election	   results	   for	   the	  
constitutional	  assembly	  were	  not	  only	  a	  first	  political	  manifestation	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	   Italian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  However	  this	  second	  ‘corporate’	  chamber	  of	  parliament	  was	  never	  to	  materialize. 47	  Einaudi	  was	  a	  liberal	  economist,	  Budget	  Minister	  in	  the	  early	  De	  Gasperi	  cabinets	  and	  later	  Italian	  president.	  De	  Gasperi’s	  market	  liberal	  “Linea	  Einaudi”	  in	  economic	  policy	  was	  not	  a	  good	  alternative	  to	  the	  socialization	  ideas	  of	  Socialists	  and	  Social	  Democrats	  against	  the	  background	  of	  the	  souring	  economic	  conditions.	  In	  line	  with	  his	  classic	  liberal	  economic	  beliefs,	  De	  Gasperi	  had	  delegated	  the	  post	  war	  economic	  reconstruction	  tasks	  to	  the	  Liberals.	  First	  it	  was	  Corbino,	  whom	  he	  made	  Minister	  of	  Finance,	  and	  later	  by	  appointing	  Luigi	  Einaudi,	  the	  former	  head	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  Italy,	  into	  the	  cabinet.	  Pieretti,	  M.	  (1989)	  De	  Gasperi	  e	  la	  Democrazia	  Cristiana,	  IN:	  Cherubini,	  G.;	  Della	  Peruta,	  F.;	  Lepore,	  E.;	  Mori,	  G.;	  Procacci,	  G.;	  Villardi,	  R.	  (eds.)	  Storia	  Della	  Società	  Italiana	  
23:	  La	  Società	  italiana	  della	  resistenza	  alla	  guerra	  fredda,	  Milano,	  Teti	  Editore.	  See	  also:	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1979)	  La	  democrazia	  Christiana	  in	  Europa	  (1891-­‐1963),	  Milano,	  Mursia,	  p.	  126.	  
	   	   	   292	  
political	  power	  balance	  but	  also	  opened	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  the	  first	   institutional	  
lock	  ins	  of	  worldviews	  and	  programmatic	  ideas.	  
Through	  the	  abdication	  of	  King	  Victor	  Emmanuel	  in	  favor	  of	  Crown	  Prince	  Umberto,	  
the	   Savoyans	   tried	   to	   save	   their	   monarchy	   but	   the	   involvement	   and	   cohabitation	   of	   the	  
House	  of	  Savoy	  with	  Fascism	  weighed	  too	  heavily.	  The	  Monarchists	  lost	  the	  referendum	  in	  
1946	  by	  a	  slim	  margin	  (45.7%	  to	  54.3%)	  and	  Italy	  became	  a	  republic.	  This	  marks	  the	  starting	  
point	  of	   the	   first	   republic.	   The	   referendum	  result	  was	  geographically	   split,	  with	   the	  South	  
overwhelmingly	  voting	  Monarchist	  while	  the	  North	  was	  Republican.48	  As	  for	  the	  elections	  to	  
the	   constitutional	   assembly,	   the	   left	   had	   been	   forecast	   as	   the	   big	   winner.	   Instead,	   the	  
Christian	  Democrats	  got	  the	  most	  votes	  (35.2%	  -­‐	  207	  seats)	  while	  the	  Socialists	  became	  the	  
second	   largest	  parliamentary	  group	   (20.7%	  -­‐	  115	  seats)	  and	  the	  Communists	  came	   in	  only	  
third	   (19%	   -­‐	   104	   seats).	   This	  meant	   that	   together	  Communists	   and	  Socialists	  were	   still	   far	  
from	  having	  the	  majority	  of	  279	  seats	   in	   the	  556	  member	  assembly.	  Apart	   from	  the	  three	  
key	  players	  –	  Christian	  Democrats,	  Socialists	  and	  Communists	  –a	  vast	  number	  of	  minuscule	  
party	  groups	  also	  entered	  the	  assembly.	  Worth	  mentioning	  is	  the	  Party	  of	  the	  Common	  Man	  
(Il	  uomo	  qualunque),	  a	  populist	  and	  fascist	  party	  based	   in	  the	  South	  that	  got	  30	  seats	  and	  
the	  Liberals	  (PRI	  –	  Partito	  Reppublicano	  Italiano)	  who	  took	  23	  seats.49	  Liberalism,	  which	  had	  
been	   dominating	   Italian	   politics	   since	   unification	   until	   the	   advent	   of	   fascism,	  was	   all	   of	   a	  
sudden	  degraded	  to	  a	  small	  minority	  position.	  
There	  were	  three	  important	  post-­‐war	  trends	  manifested	  during	  the	  18	  month	  term	  
of	  the	  constitutional	  assembly	  that	  would	  prove	  constitutive	  for	  the	  Italian	  political	  system	  
until	   the	   1990s.	   The	   Christian	   Democrats	   had	   become	   the	   dominant	   force,	   the	   Left	   was	  
confined	  to	  the	  position	  of	  “the	  eternal	  second”	  and	  there	  was	  an	  extreme	  fragmentation	  of	  
the	   rest	   of	   the	   constitutional	   assembly	   into	   small	   splinter	   groups.	   In	   total,	   sixteen	  parties	  
were	   elected,	  many	   of	  which	   had	   no	  more	   than	   one	   deputy.	   The	   constitutional	   assembly	  
therefore	   already	   represented	   what	   Giovannio	   Sartori	   later	   described	   as	   polarized	  
pluralism.50	  Nevertheless,	  one	  aspect	  was	  still	  different	  from	  later	  post-­‐war	  politics.	  Under	  
the	   fresh	   impressions	  of	   fascism	  and	  war,	  Christian	  Democrats,	  Communists	  and	  Socialists	  
formed	  an	  “anti-­‐fascist”	  alliance	  that	  would	  draft	  the	  constitution	  together.	  Such	  an	  open,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  319.	  49	  Clark	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  319.	  50	  Sartori,	  G.	  (1982)	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direct	   and	   encompassing	   collaboration	   between	   Christian	   Democracy	   and	   Communists	  
would	  not	  happen	  again	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  First	  Republic.51	  
	  
9.2.2 Christian	  Democratic	  influence	  on	  the	  Constitution	  
The	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  hammered	  out	  a	   constitution	   that	  has	  been	  held	   responsible	  
for	  many	  of	  the	  defects	  and	  pathologies	  that	  the	  Italian	  political	  system	  suffers	  to	  this	  day.	  
Similar	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  German	  constitution,	  it	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  
ascendance	  of	  fascism	  in	  the	  interwar	  period.	  The	  constitution	  certainly	  tried	  to	  diffuse	  and	  
not	  centralize	  power.	  Therefore	  Ginsborg	  is	  not	  quite	  right	  when	  he	  writes	  that:	  “The	  Italian	  
Constitution	  embodies	  a	  fairly	  standard	  system	  of	  representative	  democracy”.52	  Instead,	  it	  is	  
more	   adequate	   what	   Clark	   notes:	   “Here	   was	   a	   charter	   for	   weak	   government,	   unable	   to	  
dominate	   parliament	   or	   people,	   a	   charter	   for	   liberty.”53	   The	   idea	   to	   settle	   for	   weak	   and	  
decentralized	  governmental	  institutions	  was	  not	  only	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  fascist	  past	  but	  also	  
due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Vatican	  wanted	  to	  see	  key	  Catholic	  concepts	  such	  as	  subsidiarity	  at	  
the	  forefront.54	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  draft	  was	  mainly	  produced	  by	  liberal	  constitutional	  lawyers	  
contributed	   further	   to	   the	   limited	  power	  of	   the	   executive.55	   The	   assembly	   agreed	  on	   two	  
different	  election	  systems	  for	  the	  two	  Chambers.	  The	  Chamber	  of	  Representatives	  (Camera	  
dei	  Deputati)	  was	  elected	  via	  Proportional	  Representation	  in	  multi	  member	  districts	  for	  five	  
years.	   The	   Senate,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   was	   elected	   for	   seven	   years	   on	   a	   regional	   basis	  
through	   a	   mix	   of	   Proportional	   Representation	   and	   single	   member	   constituencies.	   This	  
election	   system	   was	   potentially	   dangerous	   as	   it	   offered	   the	   possibility	   to	   attribute	  
preferential	   votes.	   It	   was	   one	   of	   the	   prime	   mechanisms	   through	   which	   the	   Christian	  
Democrats	  later	  ran	  their	  clientelist	  party	  machine.	  
All	   in	   all,	   the	   constitution	  was	   largely	   a	   collaboration	  project	   enacted	  by	  Christian	  
Democrats,	  Social	  Democrats,	  Communists	  and	  Liberals	  together.	  Nevertheless,	  there	  were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  The	  term	  ‘First	  Republic’	  is	  usually	  used	  to	  describe	  post	  war	  Italian	  politics	  up	  to	  the	  point	  when	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  party	  implodes	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  	  52	  Ginsborg	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  100.	  53	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  320.	  54	  Maybe	  in	  the	  articles	  41	  and	  42	  of	  the	  Constitution	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  influence	  becomes	  most	  evident.	  Article	  41	  limits	  private	  enterprise	  to	  social	  utility	  and	  Art	  42.	  Defines	  the	  right	  to	  private	  property	  according	  to	  social	  function.	  See:	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1991)	  p.	  264.	  55	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  320.	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conflicts.	  One	  of	  the	  fiercest	  clashes	  during	  the	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  revolved	  around	  the	  
wording	  of	  Article	  7	  which	  foresaw	  the	  embedding	  of	  the	  Concordat	  (Lateran	  Pacts)	  into	  the	  
constitution.	  The	  Communists	  and	  all	   lay	  parties	  were	   fiercely	  opposed	  to	   it,	  while	   the	  DC	  
thought	  it	  essential	  to	  give	  the	  Concordat	  constitutional	  status	  –	  not	  least	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  
the	   Vatican’s	   future	   electoral	   support	   for	   their	   own	   party.	   Surprisingly	   the	   Communist	  
leader	  Togliatti	  concluded	  that	  it	  was	  too	  much	  a	  risk	  to	  offend	  the	  Vatican	  in	  a	  country	  like	  
Italy.	  Therefore,	  the	  Communists	  also	  voted	  in	  favor	  Article	  7	  in	  the	  end.	  
The	  sealing	  of	  this	  top	  priority	  for	  the	  Church	  secured	  the	  Vatican’s	  support	  for	  the	  
DC	  and	  was	  the	  first	  step	  towards	  the	  DC’s	  landslide	  electoral	  success	  of	  1948.	  However,	  the	  
DC	  not	  only	  pleased	  the	  Vatican	  on	  this	  issue.	  Clark	  writes	  that	  “Even	  so,	  article	  seven	  was	  a	  
real	   victory	   for	   the	   Church.	   And	   many	   of	   the	   Constitution’s	   other	   clauses	   reflected	  
traditional	   ‘social-­‐Catholic’	   ideals	   of	   a	   weak	   State,	   political	   liberties	   and	   small-­‐scale	  
property.”56	  Therefore,	  even	  if	  the	  Constitution	  was	  hammered	  out	  by	  a	  coalition	  between	  
Christian	  Democrats,	  Socialists,	  Communists	  and	  Liberals,	  De	  Gaspari	  still	  seemed	  to	  get	  the	  
most	  out	  of	   it.	   The	  provisions	   that	  he	  managed	   to	  put	   into	   the	   text	  were	  partly	   Christian	  
Democratic	  but	  also,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  provisions	  that	  would	  secure	  the	  Vatican’s	  support	  in	  
the	  upcoming	  elections.	  	  
	  
9.3 Between	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  and	  first	  elections	  
The	   run	   up	   to	   the	   1948	   elections	   entailed	   a	   series	   of	   problems	   for	   the	   DC.	   Even	   though	  
Christian	  Democracy	  had	  distanced	  itself	  from	  the	  two	  other	  major	  parties	  in	  the	  elections	  
to	  the	  Constitutional	  Assembly,	   the	  electoral	  outlook	  for	  the	  1948	  election	  was	  bleak.	  The	  
economic	  situation	  had	  worsened	  since	  the	  referendum	  and	   it	  was	  forecast	  to	  deteriorate	  
further.	   Defeat	   in	   a	   series	   of	   municipal	   and	   local	   elections	   pointed	   towards	   a	   potential	  
national	  electoral	  fall-­‐off	  for	  the	  DC.	  De	  Gasperi	  knew	  that	  the	  Left	  would	  do	  everything	  to	  
blame	  the	  deteriorating	  economic	  situation	  on	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  and	  his	  own	  liberal	  
economic	   policies.	   The	   fact	   that	   he	  had	   signed	   the	  peace	   treaty	  made	   the	  DC	  even	  more	  
electorally	   vulnerable.	   The	   provisions	   of	   the	   Treaty	   provided	   for	   Italy	   to	   lose	   all	   of	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  321.	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colonies	  plus	  vital	  parts	  of	   its	  European	  territory	  such	  as	  Trieste	  and	  most	  other	  territories	  
that	  had	  been	  assigned	  to	  it	  after	  World	  War	  One.	  	  
The	  “ideological	   feebleness	  of	   the	  nascent	  DC”57	  as	  Vecchio	  calls	   it	  was	  becoming	  a	  major	  
problem.	   A	   rapid	   buildup	   of	   auxiliary	   organizations	   that	   could	   canvass	   for	   and	   bind	   the	  
electorate	   to	   a	   Christian	   Democratic	   lifestyle	   was	   proving	   difficult.	   During	   fascism	   the	  
Vatican	   had	   intensified	   its	   efforts	   to	   build	   Catholic	   civil	   society	   organizations	   and	   had	  
tightened	   its	   grip	   on	   the	   existing	   ones.	   It	   was	   impossible	   for	   the	   DC	   to	   rival	   these	  
organizational	   legacies.	  With	   the	  Lateran	  Treaties	   the	  Vatican	  had	  effectively	   tightened	   its	  
grip	  on	  all	  Catholic	  lay	  organizations,	  and	  especially	  on	  Catholic	  Action	  (Azione	  Cattolica).	  In	  
fact,	   the	   Vatican’s	   grip	   on	   Italian	   society	   in	   general	   was	   very	   strong	   during	   the	   1950s.	   In	  
1956,	  69%	  of	  all	   Italians	  attended	  mass	  at	   least	  once	  a	  week	  and	  Catholic	  Action	   (Azzione	  
Cattolica)	  had	  2,655,578	  members	  in	  1954.58	  Vecchio	  remarks	  that	  the	  “Catholic	  world	  was	  
totally	  administered”59	  by	  the	  Church	  which	  left	  little	  room	  for	  the	  DC.	  	  
If	  De	  Gasperi	  wanted	  to	  win	  the	  elections,	  he	  needed	  the	  Vatican	  and	  the	  Vatican	  
used	  this	  to	  put	  a	  squeeze	  on	  him.	  	  It	  was	  under	  these	  conditions	  that	  a	  high	  ranking	  Vatican	  
official	  went	  to	  De	  Gasperi	  and	  told	  him	  that:	  	  
any	  kind	  of	  collaboration	  with	  the	  anticlerical	  parties,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  municipality	  of	  Rome	  but	  in	  government,	  is	  
no	   longer	   admissible.	   If	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   were	   to	   continue	   with	   such	   collaboration,	   they	   would	   be	  
considered	   a	   party	   favoring	   the	   enemy.	   The	   Christian	   Democrats	   would	   no	   longer	   have	   our	   support	   or	   our	  
sympathy.60	  	  
	  
In	  exchange	  the	  DC	  could	  completely	  rely	  on	  the	  Catholic	  subculture,	  a	  “formidable	  
instrument	  of	  social	  and	  political	  control”,61	  for	  its	  electoral	  success	  in	  the	  “white	  regions”.	  
The	   result	   was	   that	   the	   “DC	   had	   become	   ‘party	   of	   the	   Church’”.62	   The	   Vatican	   provided	  
votes	  while	  the	  DC	  enacted	  legislation	  for	  the	  Church.	  Pollard	  notes	  that	  under	  De	  Gasperi,	  
“the	   Italian	  state	  seemed	  to	  have	  truly	  become	  the	   long	  arm	  of	  the	  Church.”63	  De	  Gasperi	  
subsequently	  quelled	  all	   substantial	   critical	   debate	  within	   the	  DC	  on	   the	   relationship	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  “debolezza	  ideologica	  della	  nascente	  DC”	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1979)	  p.	  123.	  58	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  169.	  59	  “<<mondo	  cattolico	  totalmente	  amministrato>>”	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1979)	  p.	  125.	  60	  Andreotti	  G.,	  Intervista	  su	  De	  Gasperi,	  Bari	  1977;	  pp.72-­‐73,	  cited	  IN:	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  324.	  61	  Pollard,	  J.	  (2008)	  p.	  117.	  62	  “dal	  ’45	  che	  la	  DC	  diventa	  semmai	  il	  <<partito	  della	  Chiesa>>.”	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1979)	  p.	  124.	  63	  Pollard,	  J.	  (2008)	  p.	  117.	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the	  Church.64	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1947	  the	  formerly	  liberal	  Catholic	  De	  Gasperi	  had	  “left	  the	  task	  
of	  creating	  and	  organizing	  the	  party	  consensus	  to	  the	  Church.”65	  	  
Through	  catering	  to	  the	  Church,	  De	  Gasperi	  had	  secured	  the	  Catholic	  electorate	  of	  
the	  white	  regions	  in	  the	  North.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  the	  South	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  position	  
was	   in	   jeopardy.	   The	   referendum	   had	   proven	   that	  monarchists	   and	   the	   far	   right	   (l’uomo	  
qualunque)	   were	   strong	   there	   and	   had	   frightening	   future	   potential.66	   In	   the	   South	   the	  
ecclesiastical	   hierarchy	  was	   traditionally	  weaker.	  Here,	  De	  Gasperi	   needed	   the	   support	   of	  
the	  Allies.	  US	  aid	  could	  help	  to	  alter	  this	  and	  De	  Gasperi	  had	  good	  contacts	  with	  the	  Allies.	  
The	   intensification	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   helped	   and	   De	   Gasperi	   was	   a	   master	   in	  
intstrumentalizing	  the	  unfolding	  competition	  between	  systems.	  The	  US	  gave	   its	  backing	  to	  
the	   Christian	   Democrats.	   Washington	   started	   to	   flood	   the	   peninsula	   with	   Western	   aid.	  
Special	   propaganda	   celebrations	  were	   orchestrated	   for	   each	   relief	   ship	   that	   arrived	   in	   an	  
Italian	  port.	  Meanwhile,	  Marshall	  warned	  that	  all	  US	  aid	  would	  be	  frozen	  instantly	  in	  case	  of	  
a	  Communist	  victory	   in	   the	  elections.67	  Western	   relief	  was	  used	  by	   the	  DC	   to	  bind	  voters,	  
especially	   in	  the	  South.	  This	  distribution	  was	  the	  prototype	  for	  the	   later	  evolving	  Christian	  
Democratic	   clientelist	   party	   machine	   in	   Southern	   Italy.	   It	   was	   essential	   for	   the	   Christian	  
Democrats	  that	  they	  make	  inroads	  in	  the	  North	  and	  South	  as	  the	  ‘red-­‐belt’	  of	  central	  upper	  
Italy	   was	   basically	   impenetrable	   due	   to	   the	   strong	   Communist	   subculture.	   Nevertheless,	  
both	  regions	  needed	  very	  different	  mechanisms	  of	  vote	  aggregation.	  While	  one	  was	  based	  
on	  programmatic	  appeals,	  the	  other	  was	  fostered	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  club	  goods.	  
	  
9.3.1 The	  elections	  of	  1948	  
the	  elections	  were	  conducted	   in	  a	   tense,	   turbulent,	  almost	  hysterical	  atmosphere	  because	   to	   the	  Church	   they	  
represented	  a	  cosmic	  struggle	  between	  Catholicism	  and	  atheistic	  Communism,	  Good	  and	  Evil.	  
J.	  Pollard	  68	  
Getting	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Vatican	  and	  Allies	  in	  the	  elections	  required	  concessions	  and	  was	  
only	  possible	  by	  transforming	  the	  anti-­‐fascist	  coalition	  into	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  coalition.	  De	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1979)	  p.	  123.	  65	  “De	  Gasperi	  ha	  finito	  per	  lasciare	  in	  delega	  alla	  stessa	  Azione	  Cattolica	  e,	  in	  definitive,	  alla	  Chiesa	  il	  compito	  di	  creare	  ed	  organizzare	  il	  consenso	  al	  politico.”	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1979)	  p.	  133.	  66	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996).	  67	  Ginsborg	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  115.	  See	  also	  Clark	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  324.	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Gasperi	   and	   the	   DC	   distanced	   themselves	   as	   quickly	   and	   as	   clearly	   as	   possible	   from	   the	  
Communists	  with	  whom	   they	  had	   collaborated	  peacefully	  on	   the	  Constitution	  only	   a	   year	  
earlier.	  The	  climate	  of	  the	  unfolding	  election	  campaign	  was	  extremely	  polarized.	  The	  Vatican	  
topped	  all	  of	  its	  previous	  efforts	  and	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  excommunicate	  anyone	  who	  
voted	   for	   the	   Communists.69	   Cardinal	   Siri	   even	   proclaimed	   it	   a	   mortal	   sin	   not	   to	   vote	  
Christian	   Democrat.70	   Ginsborg	   notes	   that	   “To	   provide	   further	   support,	   Luigi	   Gelda,	  
president	   of	   Catholic	   Action,	   founded	   the	   civic	   committees,	   local	   action	   groups	   whose	  
principal	  task	  was	  to	  convince	  Catholics	  to	  turn	  out	  en	  masse	  on	  polling	  day	  and	  to	  instruct	  
the	  illiterate	  and	  aged	  amongst	  them	  on	  what	  to	  do	  once	  inside	  the	  polling	  both.”71	  	  
	   The	   strategy	  of	   getting	   votes	   through	   cooperation	  with	   the	  Vatican	   and	   the	  Allies	  
paid	  off.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  landslide	  victory	  for	  the	  DC	  that	  saw	  them	  poll	  48.5%	  and	  obtain	  
an	   absolute	  majority	   of	   305	   of	   the	   574	   seats.	   The	   popular	   front	   formed	  by	   an	   alliance	   of	  
Socialists	   and	   Communists	   was	   bitterly	   defeated	   and	   together	   obtained	   only	   31%	   of	   the	  
vote	  compared	  to	  the	  39.7%	  that	  they	  had	  received	  in	  the	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  in	  1946.	  
The	  real	  losers	  were	  the	  Socialists,	  who	  crashed	  from	  115	  to	  41	  deputies.	  The	  Communists,	  
on	  the	  other	  hand,	  surprisingly	  increased	  their	  seats	  from	  106	  to	  140.72	  The	  1948	  elections	  
cemented	  Communist	  hegemony	  on	  the	  Left	  for	  decades	  to	  come.	  
	   The	   1948	   elections	   had	  major	   implications.	   First,	   “The	   Church	   had,	   unexpectedly,	  
provided	  mass	  backing	  for	  democracy.”73	  This	  was	  the	  Vatican’s	  final	  consent	  to	  having	  the	  
Christian	  Democrats	  as	   the	  official	   interlocutor	   for	   the	  Church	   in	   the	  new	  political	   system.	  
Furthermore,	  this	  signaled	  that	  the	  Vatican	  had	  accepted	  the	  new	  democracy	  and	  no	  longer	  
wanted	   to	   achieve	   an	   authoritarian	   Iberian	   solution.	   Secondly,	   due	   to	   the	   highly	   pitched	  
anti-­‐communist	  election	   campaign,	   “Virtually	  overnight	   the	  party	  became	   the	  defender	  of	  
western	   Civilization”74	   (at	   least	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   US).	   Third,	   with	   the	   exclusion	   of	   the	  
Communists,	   the	   phase	   of	   imperfect	   bipartisanship	   (bipartismo	   imperfetto)75	   had	   started.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Ginsborg	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  115.	  70	  Ginsborg	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  117.	  71	  Ginsborg	  P.	  (1996)	  p.	  117.	  72	  This	  result	  was	  also	  less	  surprising	  as	  is	  often	  portrayed	  because	  De	  Gasperi	  and	  Togliatti	  had	  actively	  sparked	  conflict	  in	  the	  Socialist	  party	  from	  the	  right	  as	  well	  as	  from	  the	  left,	  which	  eventually	  led	  to	  its	  split	  in	  1947.	  73	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  328.	  74	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  325.	  75	  Galli,	  G.	  (1967)	  Il	  Bipartismo	  Imperfetto,	  Bologna,	  Il	  Mulino.	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From	   now	   on,	   the	   Italian	   political	   system	   was	   one	   in	   which	   two	   large	   parties	   (Christian	  
Democrats	  and	  Communists)	  dominated	  the	  political	  scene	  though	  only	  one	  of	  which	  could	  
accede	  to	  power.	  
Nevertheless,	   the	  reliance	  of	   the	  DC	  on	  the	  help	  of	   the	  Vatican	  and	  the	  Allies	  had	  
come	  at	  a	  price.	  This	  was	  the	  total	  stagnation	  of	  the	  party	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  development	  
of	  programmatic	  Christian	  Democratic	   ideas.	  Ginsborg	  notes	   that	   “Especially	   in	   the	  South,	  
the	  party	  was	  viewed	  as	  an	   instrument	   to	  be	  used	   than	  as	   representing	  a	   set	  of	  values	   in	  
which	   to	  believe.”76	  This	   fueled	  dissatisfaction.	  The	   left	  wing	  around	  Dossetti	   and	  Gronchi	  
were	   furious:	   not	   only	   about	   De	   Gasperi’s	   liberal	   economic	   policies	   but	   also	   about	   the	  
electoral	   arrangements	   with	   Catholic	   Action,	   which	   they	   perceived	   as	   a	   sell	   out	   to	   the	  
Vatican.	   Demands	   for	   a	   split	   started	   to	   openly	   surface	   after	   the	   1948	   elections	   under	  
slogans	  such	  as	  “unity	  at	  what	  price”	  (“unita	  per	  quale	  prezzo”).	  
De	  Gasperi’s	  system	  faced	  a	  dilemma.	  It	  was	  able	  to	  win	  elections	  but	  only	  with	  the	  
help	  of	  Vatican	  and	  Allies	  and	  essentially	  against	  a	   large	  part	  of	  the	  party	  membership.	  De	  
Gasperi’s	  universal	  claim	  of	  a	  party	  that	  represented	  all	  Italian	  Catholics	  seemed	  ever	  more	  
misplaced.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  185.	  On	  the	  development	  of	  the	  program	  of	  familialism:	  Though	  there	  was	  one	  important	  exception	  to	  this	  which	  was	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  embracing	  of	  familialism.	  While	  anti-­‐communism	  was	  mainly	  a	  rhetoric	  device,	  ‘familialism’	  was	  nurtured	  and	  fostered	  by	  the	  DC.	  ‘Familia	  Cristiana’	  the	  ‘family	  magazine’	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  circulated	  one	  million	  copies	  in	  1961.76	  As	  women	  obtained	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  1945,	  familialism	  was	  used	  to	  secure	  the	  female	  vote	  for	  the	  DC.	  Women	  were	  actively	  mobilized	  by	  the	  Catholic	  women’s	  organizations	  ‘Gioventu	  Femminile	  di	  Azione	  Cattolica’,	  ‘Centro	  Italiano	  Femminile’	  and	  ‘Unione	  Donne	  di	  Azione	  Cattolica’	  to	  vote	  for	  the	  DC.	  The	  general	  perception	  of	  the	  Catholic	  apparatus	  regarding	  the	  new	  possibilities	  of	  the	  female	  vote	  are	  described	  nicely	  by	  Van	  Kersbergen:	  “Pope	  Pius	  XII	  had	  given	  the	  Women’s	  organization	  of	  Catholic	  Action	  their	  ‘magna	  carta	  della	  donna’	  by	  urging	  them	  to	  become	  active	  in	  public	  life,	  but	  warning	  too	  zealous	  women	  not	  to	  enter	  the	  male	  domain	  of	  power	  and	  politics.”	  This	  bore	  considerable	  fruits	  for	  the	  DC	  whose	  average	  female	  vote	  share	  hovered	  around	  64	  percent	  between	  1947	  and	  1960. 
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9.3.2 Fractionalism	  
The	   advent	   of	   Imperfect	   Bipartisanship	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   programmatic	   development	  
within	   the	  DC	  meant	   that	   governance	   in	   Italy	   quickly	   relapsed	   into	   its	  worst	   19th	   century	  
modes.	  After	  1948,	  transformism	  made	  its	  way	  forcefully	  back	  into	  the	  Italian	  parliament.77	  
De	  Gasperi’s	  neglected	  to	  actively	  foster	  party	  unity	  as	  the	  help	  of	  the	  Vatican	  and	  
the	  Allies	   in	  election	   times	  was	   such	   that	   it	  meant	  he	   could	  win	  elections	  even	  without	   a	  
coherent	  party.	  This	  made	  the	  DC	  the	  largest	  political	  group	  in	  parliament	  but	  at	  the	  same	  
time	   the	  most	   incohesive,	   loose	   and	   fragmented	  one.	   The	   scission	  between	   the	   right	   and	  	  
began	   to	   exacerbate	   from	  1948	   onwards.	   This	   is	  where	   the	   legendary	   fractionalization	   of	  
the	   Italian	   Christian	   Democrats	   has	   its	   roots.	   While	   the	   Christian	   Democratic	   left	   was	  
frenetically	   demanding	   a	   broad	   programmatic	   and	   organizational	   overhaul,	   the	   right	   was	  
occupied	  with	   particularistic	   interest	   politics.	   Against	   this	   background,	   a	   disillusioned	   Left	  
started	  to	  challenge	  the	  idea	  of	  Catholic	  unity	  by	  pushing	  the	  slogan	  “Unity	  of	  Catholics	  but	  
united	  for	  what?”78	   In	  order	  not	  to	  risk	  a	  fracture	  of	  the	  party,	   in	  1949	  the	  Left	  was	  finally	  
granted	  permission	  to	  form	  its	  own	  party	  subsections.	  From	  that	  point	  onwards,	  the	  party	  
started	   to	   split	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   powerful	   factions	   (correnti).	   This	   made	   common	  
ideological	  development	  even	  more	  difficult.	  However,	   ideological	  development	  within	  the	  
correnti	  did	  happen.	  De	  Gasperi’s	  election	  strategy	  of	  1948	  had	  reduced	  the	  DC	  to	  a	  bundle	  
of	  party	  factions,	  each	  building	  up	  its	  own	  organizational	  micro	  cosmos	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  
maximum	  influence	  on	  the	  government.	  Each	  one	  of	  the	  factions	  had	  its	  own	  financing	  (and	  
spoils)	   system,	   its	   own	   representatives	   with	   the	   ecclesiastical	   hierarchy,	   its	   own	   auxiliary	  
organizations	   and	  even	   its	   own	  newspapers.	   They	  were	   indeed	   small	  micro	  parties	  within	  
the	  main	   party	   and	   also	   differed	   in	   their	   mode	   of	   political	   representation.	   Although	   this	  
system	  was	   less	   fragmented	   than	   the	  atomized	   Italian	  parliaments	  of	  19th	   century	   Italy,	   it	  
still	  impacted	  on	  the	  way	  of	  governance.	  Mamarella	  notes	  that	  the	  DC	  “represented	  during	  
the	  years	  of	   the	  quadripartito	  a	  vast	  bracket	  of	  political	  positions	   that	   ranged	   from	  a	  Left	  
that	  was	  open	   to	   the	  most	  advanced	  social	  petitions	   to	  a	   right	   that	  was	  Conservative	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  For	  a	  nice	  description	  of	  the	  continuity	  and	  functioning	  of	  Transformismo	  in	  Italy	  See:	  La	  Palombara,	  J.	  (1987)	  Democracy,	  Italian	  Style,	  New	  Haven,	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  12-­‐13.	  78	  “Unita	  dei	  Cattolici	  ma	  unita	  per	  cosa?”	  Giovagnioli,	  M.	  (1996)	  pp.	  48-­‐49.	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monarchist.”79	  While	  the	  right	  wing	  of	  the	  DC	  was	  interest,	  constituency	  and	  notable	  based,	  
the	   Left	   had	   ideological	   and	   programmatic	   foundations.	   De	   Gasperi’s	   followers	   had	   the	  
support	  of	  the	  industrial	  bourgeoisie	  and	  the	  mainstream	  positions	  within	  the	  Vatican.	  They	  
obtained	  a	  majority	  at	  the	  first	  four	  party	  congresses	  in	  1946,	  1947,	  1949	  and	  1952.	  Further	  
to	   the	   right	   was	   the	   corrente	   di	   destra,	   later	   labeled	   as	   dorotei.	   They	   were	   close	   to	   the	  
monarchy	  and	  the	  radical	  and	  authoritarian	  exponents	  of	  the	  Vatican	  that	  were	  connected	  
to	  Catholic	  Action	   (Azione	  Cattolica).	   A	  different	   and	   smaller	   group	  on	   the	   right	  were	   the	  
vespisti	   (named	   after	   a	   Roman	   motorcycle	   club)	   which	   represented	   the	   interests	   of	  
southern	   large	   estate	   holders.	   On	   the	   left,	   there	   were	   two	   important	   groups	   and	   both	  
feverishly	   opposed	   De	   Gasperi’s	   liberal	   social	   policy	   line.	   The	   dossetians	   were	   formed	  
around	   the	  professor	   and	   social	  philosopher	  Giuseppe	  Dossetti.	   They	  were	   the	  most	   vivid	  
advocates	   of	   Christian	   Socialism	   and	   their	   journal	   “Cronache	   Sociali”	   was	   a	   forum	   for	  
modern	  social	  and	  economic	  policy.	  Mamarella	  writes	  about	  the	  Christian	  socialist	  character	  
of	  the	  Dossetian’s	  that	  “Beyond	  a	  political	  program	  analagous	  to	  the	  other	  party	  groups	  on	  
the	  Left,	  […]	  the	  dossetian	  fraction	  affirmed	  a	  need	  for	  close	  collaboration	  between	  political	  
action	   and	   the	   social	   doctrine	   of	   the	   Church	   and	   between	   Catholic	   moral	   and	   political	  
action”.80	  The	  second	  group	  on	  the	  Left	  was	  the	  Gronchians	  who	  represented	  the	  Catholic	  
union	  wing	  in	  the	  party.	  The	  Left	  made	  up	  around	  30	  %	  of	  all	  party	  delegates	  of	  the	  DC.	  
To	   sum	   up,	   the	   DC	   under	   De	   Gasperi	   could	   rely	   on	   the	   Vatican	   and	   the	   Allies	   to	  
canvass	   the	   vote.	   Furthermore,	   it	   had	   successfully	   excluded	   its	   strongest	   rival,	   the	  
Communists,	   from	   party	   competition	   but	   this	   caused	   a	   complete	   standstill	   of	   the	  
programmatic	  development	  of	  the	  DC.	  After	  the	  founding	  manifesto,	  the	  DC	  did	  not	  issue	  a	  
party	  manifesto	  for	  many	  years.	  Instead,	  what	  happened	  were	  small	  micro	  developments	  of	  
programmatic	  ideas	  within	  each	  fraction	  of	  the	  DC	  that	  developed	  parallel	  to	  each	  other.	  A	  
large	  scale	  initial	  struggle	  and	  compromise	  between	  different	  programmatic	  ideas	  in	  search	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  “la	  DC	  presentava	  negli	  anni	  del	  quadripartito	  una	  vasta	  gamma	  di	  posizioni	  politiche	  che	  andavano	  da	  una	  sinistra	  aperta	  alle	  istanze	  sociali	  più	  avanzate	  a	  una	  destra	  conservatrice	  e	  monarchica.”	  Mammarella,	  G.	  (1978)	  p.	  221.	  80	  ”Oltre	  ad	  un	  programma	  politico	  analogo	  a	  quello	  delle	  altre	  correnti	  di	  sinistra	  ,	  […],	  la	  correntie	  dossettiana	  affermava	  l’esigenza	  di	  una	  stretta	  colleganza	  fra	  l’attività	  politica	  e	  la	  dottrina	  sociale	  della	  chiesa	  e	  fra	  morale	  cattolica	  e	  azione	  politica..”	  Mammarella,	  G.	  (1978)	  p.	  224.	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for	   a	   common	   party	   platform	   as	   in	   Germany	   did	   not	   happen.	   De	   Gasperi’s	   strategy	   had	  
made	  the	  DC	  a	  “heterogeneous,	  ramshackle	  party”.81	  
	  
9.3.3 The	  return	  of	  Transformismo	  
Mamarella	   notes	   that	   “under	   certain	   aspects	   this	   heterogeneity	   of	   positions	   was	   even	  
advantageous	  for	  the	  DC,	  as	  it	  confirmed	  a	  certain	  interclassism,	  allowing	  it	  to	  present	  itself	  
to	   the	   electorate	   as	   a	   progressive	   and	   Conservative	   party	   at	   the	   same	   time.”82	   But	   the	  
dissatisfaction	  of	  the	  Catholic	  left	  increased.	  In	  1950,	  Giorgio	  La	  Pira	  wrote	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  De	  
Gasperi	   “it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   drag	   any	   longer	   on	  with	   the	  methods	   that	  we	   are	   using.”83	  
Furthermore	   he	   emphasized	   that	   the	   party	   needed	   a	   “hard”	   programmatic	   development:	  
“hard	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   will	   be	   possible	   to	   elaborate	   a	   broad	   national	   programmatic	  
platform	  that	  will	  have	  the	  force	  to	  realize	  it	  quickly.”84	  
The	  problem	  was	  not	  only	  that	  the	  party	  was	  internally	  split	  but,	  as	  the	  DC	  was	  the	  
main	  governing	  entity,	   its	   fractionalization	  started	   to	  degenerate	   the	  whole	  parliamentary	  
system.	  Though	  	  a	   large	  and	  fragmented	  block,	  the	  DC	  occupied	  the	  middle	  of	  parliament.	  
As	   it	   could	   not	   obtain	   a	   governing	   majority	   on	   its	   own,	   it	   formed	   various	   and	   ever	  
alternating	   coalitions	   with	   the	   smaller	   parties	   in	   parliament.	   These	   governments	   fell,	   not	  
because	  a	  coalition	  partner	  did	  not	  consent	  with	  the	  political	  direction	  of	  the	  government,	  
but	  rather	  because	  a	  faction	  inside	  of	  the	  DC	  was	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  amount	  of	  spoils	  it	  
was	   receiving.	   Indeed,	   “in	   the	   last	   years	   of	   the	   quadripartito	   it	   reduced	   increasingly	   to	   a	  
perpetual	   technique	   in	   order	   to	   keep	   the	   technical	   unity	   of	   the	  DC	   and	   to	   consolidate	   its	  
electoral	   success.”85	   In	   the	   South,	   “The	   voter,	   in	   his	   view,	   did	   not	   express	   an	   ideological	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  329.	  82“sotto	  un	  certo	  aspetto	  quell’eterogeneità	  di	  posizioni	  era	  anzi	  vantaggiosa	  per	  la	  DC,	  poche	  le	  conferma	  una	  caratterizzazione	  interclassista,	  permettendo	  di	  presentarsi	  di	  fronte	  al	  elettorato	  come	  partito	  progressista	  e	  conservatore	  ad	  un	  tempo.”	  Mammarella,	  G.	  (1978)	  p.	  221.	  83	  “non	  e	  possibile	  tirare	  avanti	  coi	  metodi	  che	  noi	  attualmente	  usiamo.”	  Letter	  from	  Giorgio	  La	  Pira	  to	  De	  Gasperi	  in	  1950,	  printed	  IN:	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1979)	  p.	  180.	  84	  “duro	  nel	  senso	  che	  sia	  capace	  di	  elaborare	  una	  programmazione	  vasta,	  nazionale,	  e	  che	  abbia	  l’energia	  per	  attuarla	  rapidamente.”	  Letter	  from	  Giorgio	  La	  Pira	  to	  De	  Gasperi	  in	  1950,	  printed	  IN:	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1979)	  p.	  180.	  85	  “negli	  ultimi	  anni	  del	  quadripartite,	  si	  ridusse	  sempre	  più	  ad	  una	  tecnica	  permanente	  per	  mantenere	  l’unita	  della	  tecnica	  per	  mantenere	  l’unita	  della	  DC	  e	  consolidarne	  il	  successo	  elettorale.”	  Mammarella,	  G.	  (1978)	  p.	  222.	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commitment	  when	  he	  went	  to	  the	  polls.	  He	  simply	  engaged	  in	  trade.”86	  Clark	  puts	  an	  even	  
finer	  point	  on	  it:	  
It	   was	   a	   regime	   of	   ‘Low	   Politics’,	   like	   that	   of	   parliament	   and	   local	   government	   in	   the	   nineteenth	   century:	   it	  
practiced	   the	   politics	   of	   compromise	   and	   patronage,	   of	   temporary	   deals	   and	   temporary	   governments,	   of	  
granting	   favors	   and	   buying	   support,	   and	   of	   political	   ‘interference’	   in	   administration.	  Many	   Italians,	   therefore,	  
regarded	  it	  as	  inherently	  corrupt,	  just	  as	  their	  nineteenth-­‐century	  predecessors	  had	  done.87	  
	  
and	  describes	  the	  DC	  after	  the	  1950s	  as	  a	  “complex,	  ill-­‐disciplined	  body	  with	  many	  different	  
local	  bases,	  some	  of	  them	  of	  dubious	  origins	  and	  talents.”88	  
9.3.4 The	  fall	  of	  De	  Gasperi	  
The	  tensions	  in	  the	  party	  did	  not	  go	  unnoticed	  by	  the	  electorate.	  After	  the	  landslide	  victory	  
in	   1948,	   the	   situation	   quickly	   started	   to	   deteriorate	   for	   the	   DC.	   It	   witnessed	   a	   series	   of	  
humiliating	  regional	  and	  local	  election	  defeats	  in	  the	  early	  1950s.	  De	  Gasperi’s	  response	  was	  
in	  line	  with	  his	  previous	  ones.	  Instead	  of	  trying	  to	  modernize	  or	  unite	  the	  party	  he	  chose	  to	  
enact	  a	  new	  election	  law	  that	  would	  give	  the	  electoral	  coalition	  that	  reached	  more	  than	  50	  
percent	  of	  the	  vote	  a	  boost	  to	  two	  thirds	  of	  seats	  in	  parliament.89	  This	  law	  was	  called	  legge	  
truffa	  (swindle	  law)	  by	  the	  opposition	  parties	  and	  also	  triggered	  a	  substantial	  backlash	  from	  
many	   parts	   of	   society	   because	   it	   resembled	  Mussolini’s	   Acerbo	   Law	  with	  which	   the	  Duce	  
had	   seized	  power	   in	  1923.90	  Not	  even	   such	   institutional	   foul-­‐play	  helped,	  however.	   In	   the	  
1953	   elections	   the	   DC	   and	   its	   coalition	   partners	   only	   garnered	   a	   49.85%	   of	   the	   vote	   and	  
therefore	  missed	  the	  quorum	  of	  the	  swindle	  law	  by	  a	  very	  low	  margin.	  De	  Gasperi	  took	  the	  
blame	   for	   this	   electoral	   defeat	   and	   stepped	   down	   as	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   party	   leader	  
causing	  the	  Degasperiani	  to	  lose	  their	  majority	  in	  the	  party.	  He	  died	  a	  year	  later	  at	  the	  age	  
of	  seventy	  three.	  The	  “swindle	  law”	  was	  quickly	  abolished	  in	  the	  same	  year.	  	  
The	  disaster	  of	  the	   legge	  truffa	  showed	  that	  during	  the	  last	  years	  of	  his	   leadership	  
De	   Gasperi	   had	   increasingly	   abandoned	   his	   own	   worldviews	   in	   favor	   of	   his	   interest	   in	  
creating	   an	   electorally	   successful	   DC.	   Mammarella	   notes	   that	   “The	   moderatism	   of	   De	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  329.	  87	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  327.	  88	  Clark,	  M.	  (1996)	  p.	  329.	  89	  Mammarella,	  G.	  (1978)	  L’Italia	  dalla	  Caduta	  del	  fascismo	  a	  oggi,	  Bologna,	  Il	  Mulino,	  pp.	  263-­‐267.	  90	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  142.	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Gasperi	   distanced	   itself	   gradually	   from	   ideological	  motivations	   that	   had	  originally	   inspired	  
him,	   especially	   in	   the	   last	   years	   of	   the	   quadripartite	   it	   reduced	   itself	   evermore	   to	   a	  
technique	  to	  maintain	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  DC	  and	  to	  consolidate	  the	  electoral	  success.”91	  The	  
crude	  institutional	  strategy	  of	  the	  legge	  truffa	  is	  the	  best	  example	  of	  this.92	  Ginsborg	  notes	  
about	  the	  late	  De	  Gasperi	  that	  “To	  hold	  power	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  enemy	  became	  almost	  an	  
end	  in	  itself,	  to	  which	  essential	  reforms	  were	  to	  be	  subordinated.”93	  
To	  conclude,	  it	  did	  not	  help	  that	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  DC	  were	  adherents	  of	  Christian	  
Socialism.	  As	  the	  party	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  Vatican’s	  votes	  under	  De	  Gasperi,	  it	  also	  depended	  
on	   the	   consent	   and	   the	   attitude	  of	   the	  Vatican	  on	  welfare.	   These	  were	   far	   from	  positive.	  
Pius	  XII	  had	  drifted	  away	  from	  the	  Christian	  Socialist	  provisions	  of	  the	   last	  social	  encyclical	  
Quadragesimo	   Anno.	   Pius	   XII	   essentially	   regarded	   the	   Dossetian	   wing	   of	   the	   Christian	  
Democrats	   as	   a	   bunch	   of	   untrustworthy	   utopian	   socialists.	   The	   influence	   of	   the	   Vatican	  
brought	  a	  restoration	  of	  the	  liberal	  and	  fascist	  legacies	  of	  the	  Italian	  welfare	  system,	  but	  no	  
innovation.	  The	  Christian	  Democratic–Communist	  alliance	  from	  the	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  
had	  been	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  change	  but	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  fierce	  
opposition	  of	  the	  Vatican	  put	  paid	  to	  any	  reform	  plans	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	   left	  might	  
have	  had.	  
Welfare	  reform	  was	  given	  a	  second	  chance	  after	  De	  Gasperi’s	  dismissal	  and	  the	  DC’s	  
left	   wing	   takeover	   under	   Amintore	   Fanfani.	   Fanfani’s	   zeal	   was	   to	   liberate	   the	   Christian	  
Democratic	   Party	   from	   the	   influence	  of	   the	  Vatican,	   business	   and	   the	  Allies,	   as	  well	   as	   to	  
correct	   De	   Gasperi’s	   liberal	   economic	   policies.	   The	   next	   section	   will	   scrutinize	   why	   the	  
organizational	   reforms	   that	   Fanfani	   enacted	  within	   the	   party	   unintentionally	   undermined	  
and	  destroyed	  his	  deeply	  held	  zeal	  for	  welfare	  reform.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  “Il	  moderatismo	  di	  De	  Gasperi	  si	  allontano	  gradualmente	  dai	  motivi	  ideologici	  che	  lo	  avevano	  originariamente	  ispirato	  e,	  specie	  negli	  ultimi	  anni	  del	  quadripartite,	  si	  ridusse	  sempre	  più	  ad	  una	  tecnica	  per	  mantenere	  l’unita	  della	  DC	  e	  consolidarne	  il	  successo	  elettorale.”	  Mammarella,	  G.	  (1978)	  p.	  222.	  92	  The	  ’legge	  truffa’	  was	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  package	  of	  authoritarian	  measures	  under	  the	  late	  De	  Gasperi	  usually	  summarized	  by	  the	  term	  ‘protected	  democracy’.	  93	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  144.	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9.3.5 Fanfani	  and	  the	  opening	  to	  the	  Left	  
The	  1950s	  were	   in	   fact	   the	  crucial	  period	   in	  which	   the	  Christian	  Democrats	   laid	   the	   foundations	  of	   their	   state	  
system,	  and	  by	  this	  and	  other	  means	  created	  a	  new	  consensus	  in	  Italian	  society.	  
Ginsborg,	  P.	  94	  
	  
De	   Gasperi’s	   fall	   was	   a	   victory	   for	   the	   Christian	   Democratic	   left.	   The	   Christian	   Socialist	  
Amintore	  Fanfani	  became	  the	  leading	  figure	  of	  the	  party.	  Fanfani’s	  strategy	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  
electoral	  problems	  of	  the	  DC	  differed	  strongly	  from	  De	  Gasperi’s.	  He	  was	  convinced	  that	  the	  
party	  had	  to	  liberate	  itself	  from	  the	  Vatican	  and	  Confindustria	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  This	  diverged	  
fundamentally	  from	  De	  Gasperi’s	  idea	  of	  an	  elite	  party.	  Fanfani’s	  vision	  was	  a	  modern	  mass	  
party	   firmly	   anchored	   on	   the	   territory	   and	   all-­‐encompassing	   in	   its	   aspirations	   to	   the	  
electorate.	   Two	   elements	   were	   fundamental	   to	   this	   strategy:	   First,	   the	   reliance	   on	   the	  
Church	   as	   a	   vote	   provider	   in	   the	   North	   should	   be	   substituted	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  
dense	   local	   network	   of	   Christian	   Democratic	   grass	   roots	   organizations.	   Second,	   Fanfani	  
wanted	   the	  DC	   to	   become	   independent	   of	   the	   external	  money	   transfers	  which	  were	   first	  
done	  by	  the	  Allies	  and	  later	  by	  the	  employer’s	  organization	  Confindustria.	  Fanfani	  did	  this	  by	  
following	  a	  corporatist	  strategy	  that	  went	  beyond	  Christian	  Socialist	  provisions.	  His	  strategy	  
was	  to	  have	  the	  large	  state	  enterprises	  withdraw	  from	  Confindustria	  and	  to	  create	  yet	  more	  
nationalized	  oligopolies	  under	  the	  close	  control	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats.	  This	  was	  highly	  
successful.	  The	  move	  from	  elite	  to	  a	  mass	  based	  party	  under	  Fanfani	  was	  not	  only	  a	  rational	  
modernization	  strategy.	  Rather,	   it	  also	  reflected	  the	  differences	  between	  Fanfani’s	  and	  De	  
Gasperi’s	  overall	  ideas	  on	  society.	  De	  Gasperi	  represented	  centrist	  and	  mediating	  positions	  
in	   the	  DC	  and	  he	  was	   a	   strong	  believer	   in	   the	  power	  of	  private	  business	   and	  pluralism	  of	  
interests	   in	   an	   organic	   and	   hierarchically	   organized	   society.	   Furthermore,	   he	  was	   a	   leftist	  
dossetian	  for	  whom	  the	  fascist	  past	  had	   inspired	  great	  excitement	  for	  a	  society	  structured	  
along	   the	   lines	  of	   corporatism.	   Fanfani	  was	  a	  Christian	  Socialist	  who	   favored	   corporatism.	  
With	  him	  at	  the	  helm,	  encompassing	  social	  reform	  seemed	  possible	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  
Indeed,	  Fanfani	  was	  a	   leftist	  reformer	  for	  whom,	   in	  the	  words	  of	  the	   leader	  of	  the	  
Catholic	  union	  wing	  in	  the	  party	  in	  1952,	  “the	  battle	  of	  the	  DC	  has	  to	  be	  fought,	  […],	  on	  the	  
territory	   of	   social	   justice,	   on	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   new	   rights	   and	   the	   new	   status	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Ginsborg	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  145.	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work”.95	  Gronchi	  demanded	  a	  comprehensive	  social	  policy	  program	  and	  the	   integration	  of	  
the	   lower	   classes	   as	   the	   “resistance	   to	   Bolshevism,	   as	   doctrine	   as	   well	   as	   social	   political	  
regime,	   does	   not	   equal	   blocking	   the	   working	   classes	   from	   their	   aspirations	   for	   more	  
justice.”96	   These	   thoughts	  were	   not	  mere	   lip	   service.	  Under	   the	   leadership	   of	   Fanfani	   the	  
party’s	   left	   wing,	   with	   its	   connections	   to	   farm	   leagues	   and	   Catholic	   unions,	   gained	  
considerable	   strength	   within	   the	   party.	   Fanfani	   wanted	   to	   compensate	   for	   the	  
organizational	  agony	  of	  the	  DC	  under	  De	  Gasperi.	  	  As	  a	  contemporary	  fellow	  party	  member	  
observed,	   they	   were	   convinced	   “if	   the	   absolute	   majority	   had	   not	   been	   reached	   in	   the	  
country,	  it	  was	  partly	  the	  fault	  of	  the	  DC,	  due	  to	  its	  organizational	  insufficiencies,	  the	  scarce	  
comprehensive	   penetration	   of	   the	   various	   social	   classes,	   […],	   its	   complicated	   and	   tired	  
apparatus”.97	  
The	   only	   downside	  was	   that,	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   it	   fueled	   existing	   pathologies	   in	   the	  
country.	  The	  grass	   roots	  organizations	   that	   flourished	   in	   the	  North	  were	  turned	   into	  party	  
machines	   in	   the	   South.	   In	   the	   same	   way,	   some	   of	   the	   large	   state	   holdings	   became	  
synonymous	  with	   the	   rampant	   favoritism	   and	   clientelism	   of	   the	   DC.	   The	   special	   blend	   of	  
corporatism	  that	  Fanfani	  had	  elaborated	  in	  his	  1948	  book	  “Economia”98	  was	  too	  vulnerable	  
to	  corruption	  and	  clientelism.	  The	  transformation	  of	  the	  DC	  under	  Fanfani	  into	  a	  corporatist	  
party	  was,	   especially	   in	   the	   South,	   coupled	  with	   a	  drifting	   towards	   a	   clientelist	   party.	   The	  
South	   was	   therefore	   the	   dark	   side	   of	   Fanfani’s	   attempt	   to	   build	   a	   strong	   party	   that	  
penetrated	  state	  and	  society	  –	  an	  aspect	  which	  would	  eventually	  forestall	  modern	  welfare	  
reform	  in	  Italy	  and	  lead	  to	  the	  degeneration	  of	  social	  security	  into	  a	  transmission	  belt	  that	  
facilitated	  clientelist	  and	  corrupt	  exchanges	  between	  the	  DC	  and	  its	  electorate.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  “Perciò	  la	  battaglia	  della	  DC	  va	  combattuta,	  […],	  sul	  terreno	  della	  giustizia	  sociale,	  del	  riconoscimento	  concreto	  dei	  nuovi	  diritti	  e	  della	  nuova	  posizione	  del	  lavoro“Gronchi	  in	  1952	  presenting	  his	  alternative	  to	  De	  Gasperi’s	  line.	  Gronchi,	  G.	  14.	  Feb	  1952.	  ‘Torniamo	  alle	  origini’,	  IN:	  Politica	  Sociale,	  Cited	  IN:	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1979)	  p.	  182.	  96	  “resistenza	  al	  bolscevismo,	  come	  dottrina	  e	  come	  regime	  politico-­‐sociale,	  non	  equivale	  a	  sbarrare	  il	  passo	  alle	  classi	  lavoratrici	  nelle	  loro	  aspirazioni	  ad	  una	  migliore	  giustizia.”	  Gronchi	  in	  1952	  presenting	  his	  alternative	  to	  De	  Gasperi’s	  line.	  Gronchi,	  G.	  14.	  Feb	  1952.	  ‘Torniamo	  alle	  origini’	  IN:	  Politica	  Sociale,	  cited	  IN:	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1979)	  p.	  181.	  97	  “se	  non	  era	  stata	  raggiunta	  la	  maggioranza	  assoluta	  nel	  paese,	  ciò	  era	  dovuto	  in	  parte	  alla	  DC,	  per	  le	  sue	  insufficienze	  organizzative,	  la	  scarsa	  penetrazione	  capillare	  nei	  vari	  ceti	  sociali,	  …	  il	  suo	  macchinoso	  e	  stanco	  apparato,	  …>>”	  Boiardi,	  F.,	  cited	  IN:	  Galli,	  G.	  (1978)	  p.	  161.	  98	  Fanfani,	  A.	  (1948)	  Economia,	  Brescia,	  Morcelliana.	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9.4 Doctrine	  
Fanfani	  foresaw	  for	  the	  DC	  a	  much	  more	  active	  role	  in	  the	  penetration	  of	  society	  than	  under	  
the	  liberal	  Catholic	  De	  Gasperi.	  Fanfani’s	  view	  was	  that	  the	  party	  should	  not	  only	  be	  a	  pure	  
transmission	   belt	   and	   interlocutor	   between	   state	   and	   society	   but	   actively	   influence	   and	  
model	  both	  institutions.	  Fanfani	  was	  a	  fervent	  exponent	  of	  the	  Catholic	  left	  but,	  at	  the	  same	  
time,	  he	  had	  sympathized	  with	  fascism	  and	  held	  some	  minor	  offices	  during	  fascist	  times.	  His	  
interpretation	  of	  Catholic	  social	  teaching	  came	  close	  to	  the	  fascist’s	  corporatist	  organization	  
of	   society.	  While	  German	  Catholicism	  was	  pulled	   in	   a	   liberal	   direction	  by	   the	  Ordoliberals	  
and	   Protestants	   after	   World	   War	   Two,	   and	   therefore	   away	   from	   stronger	   corporative	  
thinking,	   no	   such	   counter	  weight	   existed	   in	   Italy.	   Catholic	   social	   teaching,	   as	   executed	   by	  
Fanfani	   and	   his	   DC	   in	   the	   1950s,	   effectively	   relied	   on	   pre-­‐war	   modes	   of	   socioeconomic	  
organization.	  This	  was	  facilitated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Italian	  fascism	  had	  not	  become	  totalitarian	  
so	  a	  clear	  cut	  distancing	  from	  the	  past	  was	  not	  regarded	  as	  necessary.	  	  
The	  new	  corporatist	  strategy	  entailed	  that	  the	  DC	  aimed	  at	  tightening	  its	  grip	  over	  
the	   existing	   state	   entities	   and	   creating	   yet	   more	   new	   ones.	   The	   party	   also	   had	   to	  
simultaneously	   distance	   itself	   from	   the	   liberal	   employer’s	   association,	   Confindustria,	   in	  
order	  to	  increase	  its	  financial	  autonomy.99	  The	  prime	  means	  for	  this	  were	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  
Ministry	   of	   State	   Holdings	   (Ministro	   delle	   partecipazioni	   statali)	   which	   was	   approved	   by	  
parliament	   after	  prolonged	  and	   fierce	  debate	  on	  22nd	  December	  1956.	  One	  year	   later,	   on	  
11th	   Januray	   1957,	   followed	   the	   law	   on	   fossils	   (legge	   idrocarburi)	   which	   gave	   the	   state	  
company	  ENI	  (Ente	  Nazionale	  Idrocarburi)	  a	  monopoly	  on	  research	  and	  exploitation	  in	  that	  
sector.	  The	   strategy	   to	   curb	   the	  power	  of	  business	  over	   the	  party,	   and	   society	   in	  general,	  
was	   completed	   by	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   all	   IRI	   (Instituto	   per	   la	   Riconstruzione	   Italiana)	  
companies	  from	  Confindustria	  only	  a	  year	  later	  on	  1st	  of	  January	  1958.	  Galli	  notes	  that,	  from	  
this	   point	   on,	   “the	   party	   that	   used	   to	   be	   the	   prince	   of	   the	   industrial	   complex	   controlled	  
progressively	  the	  means	  of	  production,	  which	  are	  the	  source	  of	  true	  power.”100	  The	  huge	  oil	  
and	   gas	   company	   founded	   in	   1953,	   ENI	   (Ente	  Nazionale	   Idrocarburi),	   is	   exemplary	   of	   this	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  Galli,	  G.	  (1978)	  Storia	  Della	  Democrazia	  Cristiana,	  Bari,	  Editori	  Laterza,	  p.	  164.	  See	  also:	  Giovagnoli,	  A.	  (1996)	  Il	  Partito	  Italiano:	  La	  Democrazia	  Cristiana	  dal	  1942	  al	  1994,	  Bari,	  Editori	  Laterza,	  p.	  72.	  100	  Galli,	  G.	  (1978)	  p.	  180.	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process.101	   The	   Christian	   Democrat	   Enrico	   Mattei	   “a	   man	   of	   few	   principles	   and	   great	  
entrepreneurial	  skill”	  (Ginsborg)	  became	  its	  restless	  president.	  Starting	  with	  the	  state	  petrol	  
company	  AGIP,	  Mattei	   built	   up	   an	   industrial	   empire	   in	   the	   state	   sector	   that	  within	   a	   few	  
years	  encompassed	  business	  as	  diverse	  as	  petrochemicals,	  highway	  construction,	  synthetic	  
rubber	  production,	  contract	  engineering,	  construction	  and	  nuclear	  research.102	  Despite	  the	  
rampant	  clientelism	  and	  often	  corrupt	  practices	  within	  ENI,	   it	   contributed	  –	   together	  with	  
IRI,	  the	  second	  large	  state	  holding	  –	  as	  a	  key	  driver	  of	  Italy’s	  after	  war	  economic	  miracle.	  The	  
flipside	  of	   this	  success	  was	  that	   it	   tightened	  the	  State’s,	  and	  therefore	  the	  party’s,	  grip	  on	  
society	  and	  created	  a	  class	  of	  politico-­‐economic	  Christian	  Democratic	  barons.	  	  
	  
9.4.1 Three	  Worlds	  of	  building	  a	  party	  
To	   ease	   the	   DC’s	   often	   burdensome	   symbiosis	   with	   the	   Vatican,	   Fanfani	   planned	   to	  
transform	  the	  DC	   into	  a	  modern	  mass	  party.	  The	  setting	  up	  of	  auxiliary	  organizations	  was	  
difficult	   as	   there	   was	   a	   constant	   danger	   of	   overlap	   with	   the	   Church’s	   grass	   roots	  
organization	   in	   the	  North.	   In	   the	  South,	   the	  persistent	   strong	   client-­‐patron	   relations	  were	  
also	  an	  obstacle.	  Furthermore,	  the	  party	  had	  to	  make	  inroads	  into	  the	  urban	  electorate	  and	  
create	   some	   leeway	   for	   itself	   against	   the	   left	   among	   Catholic	   workers.	   These	   different	  
scenarios	  required	  different	  strategies	  and,	  in	  fact,	  Fanfani’s	  DC	  deployed	  three	  contrasting	  
approaches	  for	  each	  of	  them.	  
Fanafani	  started	  with	  the	  countryside	  by	  ordering	  Paolo	  Bononi	  to	  build	  up	  a	  dense	  
network	  of	   rural	   savings	  banks	  and	  peasant	   leagues,	   the	   so	  called	  Coldiretti.	   They	  did	  not	  
only	  give	  out	  loans	  to	  farmers	  but	  became	  also	  an	  increasingly	  strong	  interest	  group	  within	  
the	  DC.103	  In	  order	  to	  anchor	  in	  the	  urban	  areas,	  Fanfani	  promoted	  the	  expansion	  of	  a	  huge	  
network	   of	   Christian	  Democratic	   circoli	   (social	   organizations)	  which	   usually	   consisted	   of	   a	  
venue	  with	  an	  alcohol	  license	  in	  the	  center	  of	  the	  town	  or	  neighborhood	  in	  which	  Catholic	  
workers	   could	   gather.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1950s,	   these	   ACLI	   (Associazioni	   Cristiane	   dei	  
Lavoratori	  Italiani)	  circoli	  boasted	  over	  one	  million	  members.	  Many	  of	  them	  still	  exist	  to	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  ENI	  is	  today	  still	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  industrial	  companies	  of	  Italy	  with	  a	  state	  share	  of	  30%	  and	  79	  000	  employees	  in	  2007.	  102	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990)	  pp.	  164-­‐165.	  103	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  171.	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day,	  even	  though	  the	  DC	  is	  long	  gone.	  In	  order	  to	  acquire	  more	  members,	  Fanfani	  initiated	  
large	  scale	  membership	  subscription	  campaigns	  that	  were	  held	  in	  festival-­‐like	  atmospheres	  
where	  prizes	  were	  handed	  out	  for	  inscription.	  These	  yearly	  canvassing	  campaigns	  increased	  
the	  membership	  of	  the	  DC	  from	  1,341,000	   in	  1955	  to	  1,377,286	   in	  1956	  and	  boosted	   it	  to	  
1,400,179	   in	   1958.	   This	   went	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   a	   decisive	   shift	   of	   the	   socioeconomic	  
background	   of	   the	   DC	   members	   in	   favor	   of	   working	   class	   members.	   Between	   1955	   and	  
1959,	   the	   proportion	   of	  members	   emanating	   from	   the	  working	   and	   lower	  middle	   classes	  
increased	  from	  52.2%	  to	  56.7%.104	  The	  figures	  added	  up	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  the	  presence	  
of	  workers	  increased	  from	  19%	  to	  21%	  while	  landless	  farm	  laborers	  accounted	  for	  6,8%	  as	  
opposed	   to	   6%.	   This	   saw	   the	   share	   of	   working	   class	   members	   rise	   from	   one	   quarter	   to	  
28%.105	   Though	   these	   figures	   do	   not	   display	   a	   substantial	   increase	   on	   their	   own,	   they	   do	  
when	  one	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  family	  dimension	  of	  Italian	  society.	  During	  the	  same	  time	  
the	  number	  of	  housewives	   (casalinge)	  went	  up	   from	  24%	  to	  25.4%	  while	  pensioners	  went	  
from	   2.9%	   to	   3.7%.	   Galli	   notes	   that	   “the	   DC	   of	   Fanfani	   started	   to	   gain	   control	   over	   the	  
electorate	  independent	  from	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie.”106	  	  
	   Things	  were	  different	  in	  the	  South.	  There,	  the	  DC	  built	  a	  party	  machine	  that	  secured	  
and	  facilitated	  votes	  through	  clientelism	  and	  patronage.	  On	  the	   local	   level,	  the	  DC	  did	  this	  
through	  the	  domination	  of	  local	  government	  entities	  that	  controlled	  public	  utilities	  such	  as	  
public	  transport,	  distribution	  of	  gas	  and	  local	  savings	  banks.	  During	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  the	  
Christian	  Democrats	  installed	  themselves	  on	  the	  boards	  of	  all	  such	  entities	  in	  the	  South.	  The	  
party	  had	  thirty-­‐three	  directors	  and	  thirteen	  presidents	  on	  such	  public	  entities	   in	  1955.	  By	  
1965	  it	  had	  expanded	  the	  quota	  to	  seventy-­‐nine	  directors	  and	  twenty-­‐three	  presidents.	  This	  
allowed	   the	   party	   to	   acquire	   a	   superb	  mechanism	   to	   influence	   the	   distribution	   of	   public	  
positions	  (which	  they	  inflated),	  the	  access	  to	  public	  credit	  and	  the	  number	  of	  public	  works.	  
Beyond	   the	   capturing	   of	   state	   and	  municipality	   administration,	   other	   obscure	   and	   rather	  
quaint	  practices	  also	  persisted.	  In	  the	  Vittorio	  Emmanuele	  hospital	  in	  Catania,	  Sicily,	  healthy	  
persons	  were	  moved	  from	  other	  constituencies	   into	  hospital	  beds	  during	  election	  times	   in	  
order	   to	   secure	   the	   victory	   of	   the	   contested	  DC	   candidate	   in	   the	   constituency	  where	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Galli,	  G.	  (1978)	  p.	  178.	  105	  Galli,	  G.	  (1978)	  p.	  178.	  106	  “la	  DC	  di	  Fanfani	  cominciava	  ad	  avere	  un	  controllo	  sul	  corpo	  elettorale	  indipendente	  dalle	  istituzioni	  della	  borghesia.”	  Galli,	  G.	  (1978)	  p.	  178.	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hospital	   was	   situated.107	   Ginsborg	   notes	   that	   during	   election	   times	   “many	   jobs	   were	  
deliberately	  left	  unfilled	  so	  that	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  aspirants	  could	  be	  drawn	  into	  the	  
net	  for	  as	   long	  as	  possible.”108	  At	  the	  national	   level,	  the	  big	  public	  entities	   IRI,	  ENI	  and	  the	  
Cassa	  del	  Mezziogiorno	  were	  also	  used	  for	  clientelist	  exchanges	  with	  voters.	  
This	  multifaceted	  system	  of	  aggregating	  the	  vote	  had	  consequences	  for	  the	  internal	  
party	   organization.	   Each	   mode	   of	   aggregation	   was	   more	   or	   less	   affiliated	   to	   one	   of	   the	  
dominant	   party	   factions.109	   Even	   though	   Fanfani’s	   declared	   zeal	   was	   to	   overcome	   the	  
disunity	   in	   the	   party,	   he	   cemented	   and	   exacerbated	   it.	   After	   De	   Gasperi	   the	   deep	  
fragmentation	   of	   the	   party	   was	   no	   longer	   just	   one	   of	   ideological	   belief	   but	   started	   to	  
become	  a	  function	  of	  the	  different	  ways	  of	  Christian	  Democratic	  vote	  aggregation.	  
A	  true	  strategic	  problem	  arose	  for	  Fanfani	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  cross-­‐class	  incorporation	  
into	  the	  DC	  electorate.	  The	  differences	  in	  collecting	  votes	  between	  North	  and	  South,	  as	  well	  
as	   between	   rural	   and	  urban	  areas,	   overlapped	  with	   the	  different	  ways	  of	   aggregating	   the	  
vote	  of	  different	  societal	  strata.	  The	  problem	  was	  that	  most	  of	  the	   left	  corporatist	  policies	  
frightened	  the	  upper	  middle	  class	  in	  the	  DC	  electorate.	  De	  Gasperi’s	  had	  firmly	  believed	  in	  
interclassism	   and	   set	   up	   the	   party	   accordingly:	   “We	   cannot	  make	   the	   party	   of	   the	   wage	  
earners	   or	   of	   the	   salary	   earners,	   of	   the	   burghers,	   the	   small	   farmers	   or	   of	   the	   union	  
members,	   it	   is	   necessary	   instead	   that	   we	   represent	   the	   entire	   nation”.110	   Ginsborg	   also	  
assesses	  that	  “The	  interclassism	  of	  the	  DC	  was	  no	  illusion.”111	  In	  fact	  the	  first	  reliable	  Italian	  
election	  surveys	  from	  1968	  and	  1972	  show	  that,	  even	  then,	  the	  DC	  electorate	  was	  much	  less	  
class	  distinct	  than	  in	  any	  other	  Italian	  party.112	  De	  Gasperi’s	  interclassism	  was	  founded	  on	  a	  
specific	  “politics	  of	  mediation”.113	  De	  Gasperi	  himself	  elaborated	  that	  “Our	   interclassism	   is	  
not	   static	   ambivalence,	   but	  means	   cooperation	   of	   the	   firm,	   a	   responsible	   handling	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  179-­‐180.	  108	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  179.	  109	  Giovagnoli,	  A.	  (1996)	  Il	  Partito	  Italiano,	  La	  Democrazia	  Cristiana	  dal	  1942	  al	  1994,	  Bari,	  Editori	  Laterza,	  p.	  73.	  Giovagnoli	  analyses	  on	  the	  same	  page	  righthly	  that	  the	  leadership	  of	  Fanfani	  was	  the	  decisive	  point	  when	  the	  DC	  turned	  away	  from	  a	  “parlamentary	  system	  to	  a	  partytocratic	  system.”	  –	  “il	  passaggio	  da	  un	  sistema	  parlamentare	  a	  un	  sistema	  partitocratico.”	  110	  “Non	  possiamo	  fare	  il	  Partito	  dei	  salariati	  o	  degli	  stipendiati,	  dei	  cittadini	  o	  dei	  piccolo	  agricoltori	  o	  dei	  sindacati,	  bisogna	  che	  rappresentiamo	  tutta	  la	  Nazione”	  De	  Gasperi,	  A.	  (1974)	  Idee	  sulla	  Democrazia	  Cristiana.	  A	  cura	  di	  Guiso,	  N.	  (1974)	  Roma,	  cited	  IN:	  Vecchio,	  G.	  (1979)	  p.	  178.	  111	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  183.	  112	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1991)	  pp.	  261-­‐262.	  	  113	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1994).	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right	  to	  strike	  (and	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  profits),	  and	  a	  special	  focus	  on	  the	  unemployed	  and	  
most	   miserable.”114	   This	   interclassism	   was	   endangered	   through	   Fanfani’s	   organizational	  
reforms	  that	  seemed	  to	  exclusively	  target	  the	  lower	  social	  stratus.	  The	  potential	  loss	  of	  the	  
middle	   classes	   that	   were	   skeptical	   –	   and	   particularly	   disliked	   most	   of	   Fanfani’s	   Christian	  
Socialist	  and	  corporatist	  party	  reforms	  –	  was	  especially	  perceived	  as	  a	  problem.	  De	  Gasperi’s	  
had	  seen	  the	  DC	  core	  constituency	  as	  being	  in	  these	  ceti	  medie115	  (artisans,	  self-­‐employed,	  
merchants,	   shop	   keepers,	   state	   officials	   and	   small	   business	   men).116	   In	   fact,	   De	   Gasperi	  
himself	   reasoned	   that	   the	   DC	   “has	   to	   intervene	   with	   actions	   that	   do	   not	   worsen	   the	  
conditions	  of	  the	  middle	  classes,	  who	  represent	  the	  most	  useful	  part	  of	  the	  private	  initiative	  
and	   are	   the	   frame	   of	   liberal	   democracy	   which	   is	   tied	   to	   the	   development	   of	   human	  
personality.”117	   The	   boosting	   of	   auxiliary	   organizations	   and	   the	   nationalization	   of	   industry	  
did	   certainly	   not	   contribute	   to	   secure	   their	   long-­‐term	   support.	   Fanfani’s	   response	   to	   this	  
problem	  was	  twofold:	  taxation	  and	  clientelism.	  There	  existed	  basically	  no	  taxation	  for	  small	  
bars	  and	  family	  shops	  and,	  due	  to	  these	  exemptions,	  those	  sectors	  flourished.	  Other	  levers	  
were	  used	  too.	  Ginsborg	  writes	  that	  “shopkeepers	  found	  that	  it	  was	  easy	  to	  obtain	  licenses	  
and	   keep	   them,	   while	   chain	   stores	   and	   supermarkets	   were	   obstructed	   at	   every	   turn.”118	  
Public	   infrastructure	   projects	   brought	   an	   endless	   supply	   of	   contracts	   and	   jobs	   for	   self-­‐
employed	  professionals	  such	  as	  engineers,	  architects	  and	  accountants.	  Meanwhile,	  cohorts	  
of	   law	   graduates	   from	   the	   southern	   universities	   found	   jobs	   in	   the	   hugely	   inflated	   central	  
bureaucracy	   in	   Rome.	   The	   real	   new	   lever	   and	   tool	   to	   secure	   middle-­‐class	   support	   was,	  
however,	  welfare.	  The	  fact	  that	  voting	  was	  regarded	  by	  the	  ceti	  medie	  as	  a	  technical	  trade,	  
rather	   than	  a	  deep	  seated	  pact	  between	   the	  citizens	  and	   the	  party,	  had	  devastating	   long-­‐
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  “Il	  nostro	  interclassismo	  non	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  del	  diritto	  di	  sciopero	  (e	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  del	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  preferenziale	  ai	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  De	  Gasperi,	  A.,	  IN:	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  G.	  (1979)	  p.	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  115	  Galli,	  G.	  (1978)	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  Della	  Democrazia	  Cristiana,	  Bari,	  Editori	  Laterza,	  p.165.	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  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1991)	  Social	  Capitalism.	  A	  Study	  of	  Christian	  Democracy	  and	  the	  Post-­‐War	  settlement	  of	  the	  Welfare	  State.	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  University	  Institute,	  Florence,	  p.	  259.	  Van	  Kersbergen	  points	  out	  on	  the	  same	  page	  that	  these	  ‘ceti	  medie’	  were	  essentially	  the	  former	  core	  supporters	  of	  Mussolini.	  117	  “bisogna	  intervenire	  con	  provvedimenti	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  medi,	  I	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  della	  personalità	  umana.”	  De	  Gasperi,	  A.,	  cited	  IN:	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  G.	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term	   effects.	   As	   Ginsborg	   writes	   “the	   Christian	   Democrats	   could	   not	   be	   said	   to	   have	  
imported	  an	  effective	  moral,	  intellectual	  and	  political	  leadership	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole.”	  119	  
To	  sum	  up,	  Fanfani	  had	  intended	  to	  build	  a	  party	  with	  electoral	  ties	  independent	  of	  
the	  Vatican,	  the	  Allies	  or	  Confindustria.	  He	  wanted	  to	  do	  this	  with	  a	  strong	  left	  corporatist	  
program.	   But,	   owing	   to	   Italy’s	   regional	   disparities,	   this	   played	   out	   in	   different	   ways	   in	  
different	  parts	  of	   the	   country.	  While	   the	  North	   saw	   the	  construction	  of	  a	   strong	  Christian	  
Democratic	  subculture	  based	  on	  a	  Christian	  Democratic	  worldview,	  the	  South	  witnessed	  the	  
establishing	   of	   a	   gigantic	   clientelist	   party	   machine.	   The	   party	   was	   Catholic-­‐Christian	  
Democratic	   in	  the	  North	  and	  clientelist-­‐corrupt	   in	  the	  South.	  As	  Fanfani’s	  concept	  foresaw	  
the	  takeover	  of	  the	  State	  by	  the	  Christian	  Democrats,	  this	  meant	  that	  not	  only	  the	  party	  but	  
also	   the	   State	   became	   again	   the	   “bastard”	   as	   which	   Gramsci	   had	   already	   described	   the	  
Italian	  state	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  	  
	  
9.5 Social	  Security	  under	  De	  Gasperi	  
The	   welfare	   regime	   that	   the	   DC	   put	   into	   place	   after	   the	   war	   was	   not	   the	   result	   of	   an	  
implementation	   of	   Christian	   Democratic	   ideas	   on	   social	   security	   but	   rather	   the	  
reestablishment	   of	   institutions	   inherited	   from	   its	   liberal	   and	   fascist	   predecessors.	   This	   is	  
rather	  surprising	  as	  the	  period	  directly	  after	  war	  opened	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  that	  could	  
have	  allowed	  the	  party	  to	  depart	  from	  the	  particularist	  welfare	  arrangements	  of	  the	  past.120	  	  	  
The	  international	  trend	  was	  very	  much	  in	  favor	  of	  Universalist	  arrangements	  and,	  as	  late	  as	  
with	   the	   ascendance	   to	   power	   of	   Fanfani	   and	   the	  DC’s	   shift	   to	   the	   Left,	   there	  was	   also	   a	  
strong	   political	   motivation	   to	   revise	   the	   pathologies	   of	   the	   Italian	   welfare	   system.	   The	  
foundational	   manifesto	   of	   the	   DC	   in	   1943	   explicitly	   called	   for	   “the	   extension	   of	   social	  
security,	  a	  simplification	  of	  its	  organization	  and	  the	  decentralization	  of	  its	  administration.”121	  
The	   Beverdige	   plan	   had	   just	   been	   implemented	   in	   Britain	   and	   other	   North	   European	  
countries	   soon	   followed	   suit.	   In	   fact,	   as	   early	   as	   the	   second	   Christian	   Democratic	   party	  
congress	   of	   1947,	   the	   party	   demanded	   “a	   substantial	   reform	   of	   social	   welfare	   which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  Ginsborg	  P.	  (1990)	  p.	  184.	  120	  Van	  Kerbergen,	  K.	  (1991)	  p.	  277.	  121	  “estese	  le	  assicurazioni	  sociali,	  semplificato	  il	  loro	  organismo	  e	  decentrata	  la	  loro	  gestione”	  DC	  (1943)	  p.	  2.	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confirms	   the	   solidarity	   principle	   and	   extends	   it	   to	   everyone”.122	   This	   pointed	   into	   the	  
direction	   of	   a	   universalizing	   Beveridge-­‐style	   reform.	   	   A	   detailed	   plan	   for	   a	   similar	  welfare	  
renewal	   in	   Italy	  was	   proposed	   by	   the	   D’Aragona	   Commission	   but	   never	   realized.	   The	   old	  
institutions	   were	   never	   purged	   of	   their	   clientelist	   and	   particularistic	   bias	   inherited	   from	  
fascism.	   Instead,	   these	  pathologies	  were	  greatly	  enforced	  during	   the	  1950s	  and	  1960s.	  At	  
the	   end	   of	   this	   process	   Italy	   ended	   up	   with	   one	   of	   the	   most	   fragmented	   social	   security	  
systems	  of	  the	  world.	  
Many	   scholars	   attribute	   this	   fragmentation	   to	   the	   particularistic	   characteristics	   of	  
Catholic	   Social	   teaching.123	   It	   is	   true	   that	   Christian	   Democracy	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	  
developments	   of	   the	   after	   war	   period,	   but	   not	   because	   it	   followed	   its	   worldviews	   or	  
programmatic	   ideas.	   	   In	   his	   doctoral	   thesis	   Van	   Kersbergen	   observes	   that	   “The	   social	  
capitalist	   ingredients	  of	  Italian	  welfare	  statism	  has	  been	  more	  an	  effect	  of	  an	  incapacity	  to	  
act	   rather	   than	   the	   result	   of	   intentional	   sociopolitical	   intervention.”124	   Lynch	   follows	   suit	  
almost	  twenty	  years	  later	  and	  states	  that	  “Social	  Catholic	  ideology	  is	  perhaps	  the	  force	  least	  
plausibly	  responsibe”.125	  The	  question	  thus	  is	  why	  Christian	  Democracy	  did	  not	  mold	  welfare	  
in	  line	  with	  its	  own	  worldview.	  As	  indicated	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  it	  was	  due	  to	  the	  partly	  
unintended	  consequences	  of	  Fanfani’s	  organizational	  overhaul	  of	  the	  DC.	  Lynch	  echoes	  Van	  
Kersbergen	  when	  putting	  forward	  that	  	  
This	  policy	  interpretation	  has	  often	  been	  interpreted	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Christian	  Democratic	  subsidiarity	  doctrine,	  but	  
is	  better	  understood	  as	  the	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  original	  choice	  for	  occupationalism	  taken	  during	  the	  liberal	  period,	  
reinforced	  by	  the	  DC’s	  clientelism	  during	  the	  postwar	  period.126	  
Path	   dependent	   development	   is	   certainly	   central	   in	   the	   Italian	   case,	   but	   it	   has	   to	   be	  
highlighted	  that	  Christian	  Democrats	  actively	  used	  social	  security	  schemes	  to	  fuel	  their	  own	  
power	  resources.127	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  “una	  sostanziale	  riforma	  della	  previdenza	  sociale	  che	  sia	  affermazione	  del	  principio	  di	  solidarietà	  estesa	  a	  tutti”	  II	  Congresso	  Nazionale	  della	  DC:	  Mozione	  Sindacale	  (Napoli,	  15-­‐19	  novembre	  1947)	  p.	  1.	  123	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1990).	  124	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1991)	  p.	  288.	  125	  Lynch,	  J.	  (2009)	  p.	  111.	  126	  Lynch,	  J.	  (2009)	  p.	  111.	  127	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1991)	  p.	  279.	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9.5.1 Why	  Universalism	  failed	  in	  Italy	  
The	   late	  1940s	  had	  opened	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  that	  would	  have	  allowed	  for	  a	  break	  
with	   the	   preceding	   twenty	   years	   of	   “particularistic-­‐fascist	   legacies”.128	   In	   fact,	   two	   non-­‐
partisan	   commissions129	   were	   set	   up	   in	   the	   late	   1940s	   to	   investigate	   possibilities	   for	  
structural	   reforms	   in	   the	   Italian	   welfare	   state	   sector.	   “The	   heavy	   crisis	   of	   public	   policy	  
triggered	   by	   the	   war	   in	   fact	   opened	   vast	   opportunities	   for	   institutional	   change	   and	  
encouraged	   a	   broad	   reformist	   mobilization.”130	   The	   first	   commission,	   the	   so	   called	  
Commissione	   Pesanti,	   was	   set	   up	   during	   the	   Constitutional	   Assembly	   to	   investigate	  
questions	   connected	   to	   work	   and	   labor.	   The	   second	   one,	   the	   famous	   Commissione	  
D’Aragona,	  was	  established	   in	   1947	  by	  Amintore	   Fanfani,	  who	  headed	   the	  department	  of	  
labor	   at	   that	   time.	   The	   D’Aragona	   Commission	   is	   certainly	   the	   one	   that	   triggered	   the	  
broader	  historical	   echo.	   Its	   report	  proposed	  path	  breaking	   changes	   for	   the	   Italian	  welfare	  
regime	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  Beveridge	  style	  system	  of	  universal	  coverage.131	  Even	  if	  the	  propositions	  
were	   “not	   a	   Beveridge	   plan,	   nevertheless,	   their	   approach	   was	   markedly	   innovative	   and	  
inspired	  by	  principles	  of	  equity	  and	  efficiency.”132	  For	  the	  1940s	   it	  was	  a	  very	  modern	  and	  
progressive	   policy	   proposal	   which	   could	   count	   on	   the	   support	   of	   the	   left	   part	   of	   the	  
Christian	  Democrats	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  wing	  of	  the	  Communists.	  Nevertheless,	  
“not	  only	  did	   the	  D’Aragona	  plan	  not	  have	  any	   successive	   legislative	   follow	  up	  but	   it	   also	  
stipulated	  only	  the	  policy	  debate	  to	  a	  very	  limited	  extent.”133	  
Ferrera	  provides	   three	  explanations	   for	   this.	  The	   first	   is	  procedural	  and	  points	  out	  
that	   the	   D’Aragona	   Commission	   did	   not	   have	   enough	   time	   to	   have	   a	   substantial	   policy	  
impact.	  In	  the	  six	  months	  in	  which	  the	  Commission	  had	  to	  draft	  a	  report	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  
to	   formulate	   a	   fully-­‐fledged	   legislative	   proposal.	   A	   second	   consequence	   of	   the	   time	  
constraint	   was	   that	   the	   report	   did	   not	   contain	   a	   detailed	   calculation	   of	   the	   cost	   of	   the	  
reform	   plans.	   Nevertheless,	   these	   two	   aspects	   were,	   according	   to	   Ferrera,	   only	   minor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  233.	  129	  Lynch,	  J.	  (2009)	  p.	  104.	  130	  “La	  grave	  crisi	  di	  politica	  pubblica	  originata	  della	  guerra	  apri	  infatti	  vaste	  opportunità	  di	  cambiamento	  istituzionale	  e	  sollecito	  un’ampia	  mobilitazione	  riformista.”	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  233.	  131	  See	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  pp.	  238-­‐239	  for	  more	  details	  on	  the	  plan.	  132	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1986)	  p.	  390.	  For	  a	  detailed	  summary	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  D’Argaona	  plan	  see	  Cherubini,	  A.	  (1977)	  pp.	  363-­‐372.	  133	  “Non	  solo	  il	  piano	  D’Aragona	  non	  ebbe	  alcun	  seguito	  legislative,	  ma	  suscito	  anche	  un	  interesse	  relativamente	  scarso	  nel	  dibattito	  di	  policy.”	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  239.	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reasons	   for	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   plan.	   Instead,	   Ferrera	   argues	   that	   the	   true	   reason	   for	   the	  
failure	  of	  universalism	  was	   the	   lack	  of	   leverage	   for	   compensating	   the	  upper	  classes	   in	   the	  
after	  war	  years.	  Such	  a	  compensation	  for	  potential	  losers	  of	  the	  reform	  had	  been	  available	  
in	  Holland	  or	  Sweden	  and,	  indeed,	  was	  key	  in	  making	  universalism	  possible	  there.	  Based	  on	  
Baldwin’s134	   seminal	   account	   on	   class	   coalitions	   and	   welfare	   regimes,	   he	   argues	   that	   no	  
group	   in	   society	   in	   the	   1940s	   and	   1950s	   wanted	   a	   vertical	   or	   horizontal	   risk	   pool.135	   His	  
argument	  is	  based	  on	  his	  observation	  that	  “The	  Confindustria	  and	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  
self-­‐employed	  were	  amongst	  the	  fiercest	  critics”.136	  This	   is	   in	  contrast	  to	  his	  claim	  that	  the	  
plan	  was	  not	  really	  discussed	  in	  public	  and	  that	   it	  therefore	  essentially	  remained	  a	  “ballon	  
d’essai”.137	  Carrying	  much	  more	  substantial	  weight	  for	  the	  non-­‐realization	  of	  the	  D’Argaona	  
proposals,	   therefore,	   is	   Ferrera’s	   third	   explanation.	   Ferrera	  points	   out	   that	   the	  D’Aragona	  
Commission	   was	   put	   in	   place	   by	   the	   Christian	   Democratic–Socialist	   alliance	   of	   the	  
Constitutional	  Assembly.	  This	  coalition	  dissolved	  due	  to	  De	  Gasperi’s	  election	  pact	  with	  the	  
Allies	   and	   the	   Vatican.	   It	   was	   therefore	   not	   enough	   that	   the	   “nominating	   minister	   was	  
Amintore	   Fanfani,	   an	   exponent	   of	   this	   Christian	   Democratic	   left	   that	   was	   devoting	   very	  
much	   attention	   to	   the	   social	   questions	   and	   disposable	   for	   reforms.”138	   In	   particular,	   the	  
polarization	  of	  the	  1948	  elections,	   that	  saw	  the	  competition	  between	  Christian	  Democrats	  
and	  Communists	  characterized	  as	  an	  eternal	  struggle	  between	  good	  and	  evil,	  resulted	  in	  the	  
blocking	  of	  any	  welfare	  reform	  proposal	  that	  had	  been	  elaborated	  in	  collaboration	  with	  the	  
Left.	  
	  
9.5.2 The	  failure	  of	  Christian	  Socialism	  
As	  we	  have	   seen,	   the	   surprising	   fact	   that	   not	   even	   the	  massive	   left-­‐shift	   of	   the	  DC	  under	  
Fanfani	  did	  produce	  a	  coherent	  social	  policy	  reform	  can	  be	  put	  down	  to	  Fanfani’s	  strategy	  of	  
party	   reform.	   Fanfani	   had	   led	   the	   Left	   to	   internal	   party	   hegemony.	   However,	   his	   aim	   to	  
liberate	   the	   party	   from	   external	   electoral	   support	   came	   at	   the	   price	   of	   establishing	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Baldwin,	  P.	  (1990).	  135	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  243.	  136	  “La	  confindustria	  e	  i	  rappresentanti	  delle	  libere	  professioni	  furono	  tra	  i	  critici	  più	  severi”	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  244.	  137	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  245.	  138	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  245.	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clientelist	   party	  machine	   in	   the	   South.	   This	   structural	   choice	   constantly	   counteracted	   any	  
attempts	   at	   a	   comprehensive	   policy	   reform	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   Christian	   Democratic	  
worldview	  and	  programmatic	   ideas.	   Instead,	   in	   order	   to	   support	   the	   clientelist	   ties	   in	   the	  
South,	  the	  party	  needed	  targeted	  benefits	  for	  single	  vote	  segments	  which	  could	  signal	  their	  
clientelist	   commitment	   to	   target	   groups.	   A	   closer	   look	   at	   the	   proliferation	   of	   individual	  
pension	   schemes	   for	   different	   occupational	   categories,	   especially	   for	   the	   self-­‐employed	  
middle	  classes,	  supports	  this.	  After	  all,	  “Occupational	  pensions	  that	  provide	  different	  levels	  
and	  types	  of	  benefits	  for	  different	  groups	  of	  workers	  are,	  clearly,	  a	  gold	  mine	  for	  politicians	  
who	  use	  particularistic	  strategies	  to	  compete	  for	  votes	  and	  win	  elections”.139	  New	  schemes	  
were	  introduced	  basically	  on	  a	  yearly	  basis.	  Directors	  of	  small	  firms	  (dirigenti)	  were	  granted	  
their	   own	   pension	   scheme	   in	   1953.	   Farmers,	   farmworkers	   and	   sharecroppers	   (coltivatori	  
diretti,	  mezzadri	   e	   coloni)	   followed	   in	   1957.	   In	   1958,	   fishermen	   (pescatori)	  were	   included	  
and	  then	  artisans	  (artigiani)	   in	  1959.	  A	  separate	  pension	  scheme	  for	  midwifes	  (ostertriche)	  
was	  created	  in	  1962	  and	  commercial	  doctors	  (dottori	  commercialistsi)	  followed	  a	  year	  later	  
in	  1963.	  Accountants	   (ragionierie	  e	  pertiti	  commercialisti)	  were	  granted	  their	  own	  scheme	  
the	   very	   same	   year	   as	   were	   lawyers	   and	   attorneys	   (avvocati	   e	   procuratori)	   as	   well	   as	  
housewives	   (casalinghe).140	   This	   is	   only	   a	   small	   sample	   of	  what	   happened	  overall	   but	   it	   is	  
clear	  that	  a	  universalist	  remodelling	  of	  Italian	  welfare,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  pooling	  of	  risk	  along	  class	  
lines	  instead	  of	  occupational	  segmentation,	  would	  have	  strongly	  decreased	  the	  DC’s	  ability	  
to	   maintain	   its	   spoils	   system.	   Lynch	   therefore	   highlights	   that	   “Christian	   Democratic	  
politicians	   advocated	   extending	   pension	   benefits	   to	   the	   self-­‐employed	   on	   very	   generous	  
terms	   during	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s	   as	   part	   of	   a	   strategy	   to	   purchase	   loyalty	   from	   these	  
groups.”141	  	  
	  
9.5.3 Fanfani’s	  fall	  	  
Fanfani’s	   slide	   from	   power	   started	   in	   1957	   with	   the	   party	   congress	   in	   the	   abbey	   of	  
Vallombrosa	   near	   Florence	   in	   Tuscany.	   The	   Dorotei	   –	   an	   increasingly	   strong	   party	   faction	  
centered	  on	  the	  recognition	  of	  and	  adherence	  to	  ecclesial	  power,	  strict	  anticommunism	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  Lynch,	  J.	  (2009)	  p.	  109.	  140	  This	  list	  is	  a	  transcription	  of	  a	  table	  in	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1993)	  p.	  247.	  	  141	  Lynch,	  J.	  (2009)	  p.	  109.	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close	  ties	  with	  business	  –	  rallied	  forcefully	  against	  Fanfani’s	  plans	  of	  opening	  the	  DC	  towards	  
a	  coalition	  with	  the	  parliamentarian	  left.	  They	  posed	  especially	  fierce	  resistance	  to	  Fanfani’s	  
collaboration	  plans	  with	   the	  Socialist	  party	   (PSI).	  Despite	   this,	  Fanfani	  still	  managed	  to	  get	  
reelected	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  in	  1958	  and	  subsequently	  also	  took	  over	  the	  position	  of	  Foreign	  
Minister.	  Fanfani	  now	  held	  three	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  offices	   in	  the	  republic.	  Being	  Prime	  
Minister,	  Foreign	  Minister	  and	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	  Leader	  at	   the	  same	  time	  meant	  
an	  overstretching	  of	  his	  leverage,	  especially	  with	  his	  fascistophile	  past.	  The	  Dorotei	  tried	  to	  
harm	   their	   own	   government	   whenever	   they	   could.	   After	   failing	   to	   obtain	   a	   majority	   on	  
numerous	   occasions,	   Fanfani	   stepped	   down	   as	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   resigned	   as	   party	  
secretary	  on	  26th	  January	  of	  1959.	  
	  
9.5.4 Conclusion	  
The	   non-­‐development	   of	   Italian	   welfare	   after	   World	   War	   Two	   can	   be	   described	   as	   an	  
incompatibility	  between	  interests	  and	  programmatic	   ideas	  within	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  
Party.	   	   Indeed,	   it	  was	   a	   battle	   between	   interests	   and	   ideas	  where	   the	   interests	  won.	   The	  
reluctance	  to	  build	  a	  coherent	  programmatic	  basis	  after	  fascism	  proved	  to	  be	  very	  much	  a	  
burden	   on	   any	   future	   attempt	   to	   do	   so.	   It	   also	   inhibited	   a	   sounder	   re-­‐launch	   of	   Italian	  
welfare	  after	  the	  war	  and	  a	  break	  with	  the	  particularist	  connotations	  of	  the	  system	  inherited	  
from	   the	   fascist	   past.	   A	  window	  of	   opportunity,	   not	   only	   for	  welfare	   but	   also	   for	   a	  more	  
coherent	   stance	  on	  welfare,	  would	  have	  been	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  D’Aragona	  plan.	  
The	   advent	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   and	   pressure	   from	   the	   Vatican	   quickly	   put	   an	   end	   to	   such	  
aspirations	  and	  led	  to	  the	  DC’s	  break	  with	  the	  Communists.	  This	  subsequently	  triggered	  the	  
slide	  into	  Imperfect	  Bipartisanship	  which	  meant	  that	  the	  Communists	  were	  to	  be	  excluded	  
from	   any	   future	   government	   coalition.	  With	   this,	   any	   further	   incentive	   for	   programmatic	  
party	   competition	   was	   gone.	   Competition	   had	   been	   corrupted.	   The	   rather	   clear	   cut	  
boundaries	   of	   electoral	   competition	   led	   to	   a	   diverse	   set	   of	   vote	   aggregation	  mechanisms	  
within	   the	   DC,	   which	   were	   furthermore	   all	   attributable	   to	   different	   party	   factions.	   The	  
correnti	  system	  brought	  about	  a	  new	  version	  of	  transformism	  governance.	  This	  exacerbated	  
the	  problem	  of	  programmatic	  development	  even	  further.	  	  The	  last	  real	  chance	  to	  stop	  these	  
developments	  that	  had	  been	  kicked	  off	  during	  the	  De	  Gasperi	  era	  was	  when	  Fanfani	  and	  the	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Left	  took	  over	  the	  DC.	  However,	  this	  strategy,	  which	  provided	  the	  party	  with	  new	  systems	  of	  
vote	  aggregation,	  backfired	  in	  the	  field	  of	  welfare	  reform.	  Combined	  with	  the	  pathologies	  of	  
trasformism	   governance,	   it	   sealed	   Italy’s	   –	   as	  well	   as	   the	   DC’s	   –	   descension	   into	   a	   highly	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10 Conclusion	  
I	  am	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  traditions	  of	  our	  welfare	  system	  born	  of	  religious	  voluntary	  organizations	  and	  our	  “social	  
saints”	  like	  Don	  Bosco.	  On	  this	  story	  layers	  a	  Nordic	  dream,	  one	  of	  a	  rich	  welfare	  that	  could	  accompany	  us	  
throughout	  our	  whole	  lifetime	  in	  situations	  of	  need.	  Today	  the	  final	  nail	  in	  the	  coffin	  of	  this	  idea	  has	  been	  
provided	  by	  the	  debt”	  	  	  
Elsa Fornero, Minister of Welfare (2012-Present), Monti Government26	  	  	  	  	  
	  This	   concluding	   chapter	   will	   bring	   together	   and	   analyze	   the	   main	   comparative	   empirical	  
dimensions	  along	  which	  this	  study	  has	  been	  carried	  out.	  After	  an	  analytic	  summary	  of	   the	  
main	  findings	  of	  the	  thesis,	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  conclusion	  will	  close	  with	  an	  assessment	  of	  
how	  much	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  can	  travel	  in	  the	  historical	  dimension	  of	  other	  cases.	  
In	  the	  second	  part,	  it	  will	  summarize	  and	  evaluate	  the	  theoretical	  implications	  of	  the	  thesis.	  I	  
will	   discuss	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   an	   embedding	   of	   the	   framework	   of	   vicious	   and	   virtuous	  
cycles	   of	   competition	   within	   the	   broader	   framework	   of	   an	   evolutionary	   theory	   of	   ideas	  
might	  be	  plausible	  or	  not,	  as	  well	  as	  looking	  at	  what	  should	  be	  done	  about	  it	  in	  the	  future.	  In	  
the	   last	   part,	   the	   chapter	   will	   show	   how	   the	   argument	   on	   virtuous	   and	   vicious	   cycles	   of	  






	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  “Io	  conosco	  bene	  la	  tradizione	  del	  nostro	  Welfare	  nato	  dal	  volontariato	  religioso,	  i	  nostri	  "santi	  sociali"	  come	  Don	  Bosco.	  Su	  quella	  storia	  s'innestò	  un	  sogno	  nordico,	  di	  un	  Welfare	  ricco	  capace	  di	  accompagnarci	  per	  tutta	  la	  vita	  nelle	  situazioni	  di	  bisogno.	  Oggi	  il	  colpo	  di	  grazia	  a	  quel	  Welfare	  gliel'ha	  dato	  il	  debito,	  che	  trasferisce	  oneri	  sulle	  future	  generazioni	  e	  quindi	  è	  il	  contrario	  dell'equità.	  La	  crisi	  finanziaria	  ha	  frantumato	  quel	  sogno	  importato	  dal	  modello	  nordeuropeo.”	  Fornero,	  E.	  (2012)	  IN:	  La	  Repubblica,	  interview	  with	  Federico	  Rampini	  of	  the	  Ministro	  del	  Welfare	  Elsa	  Fornero,	  Governo	  Monti,	  27.02.2012.	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10.1 	  Framework	  and	  Empirics	  
The	   first	   part	   of	   this	   conclusion	   brings	   together	   the	   empirical	   results	   and	   discusses	   the	  
implications	  of	   their	  comparative	  dimensions.	   It	  comes	  to	   the	  conclusion	  that	  none	  of	   the	  
traditional	  welfare	   state	   theories	   can	   sufficiently	  explain	   the	  origins	  of	  modern	  welfare	  at	  
the	  end	  of	   the	  19th	   century	   in	   Italy	   and	  Germany,	   and	   can	  only	  partially	   account	   for	   their	  
development	   after	   WWII.	   In	   particular,	   the	   mono-­‐causal	   material,	   rational	   or	   ideational	  
explanations	  have	  had	  trouble	  in	  grasping	  the	  surfacing	  of	  19th	  century	  and	  post-­‐World	  War	  
II	   welfare.	   Furthermore,	   the	   classic	   coalition-­‐centered	   approaches	   also	   have	   trouble	   in	  
accounting	  for	  the	  welfare	  outcomes	  in	  Germany	  and	  Italy.	  Instead,	  welfare	  emerged	  twice	  
in	  the	  German	  case	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  of	  competition	  on	  welfare	  that	  emerged	  
first	   in	   the	   German	   Empire	   and	   later	   in	   the	   post-­‐WWII	   period.	   The	   virtuous	   cycles	   of	  
ideational	   competition	   and	   compromise,	   which	   determined	   welfare,	   unfolded	   twice	  
between	  Protestant	  Conservatism	  and	  political	  Catholicism.	  In	  Italy,	  the	  19th	  century	  saw	  the	  
unfolding	  of	  a	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  competition,	  a	  stalemate,	  between	  the	  Vatican	  and	  the	  liberal	  
political	  elites	  whereby,	  through	  a	  ‘perverted	  match’	  between	  Catholic	  subsidiarity	  principle	  
and	   liberal	   anti-­‐state	   laissez	   fairism,	   neither	   of	   the	   two	   sides	   developed	   any	   new	  welfare	  
ideas	  or	  policies.	  After	  WWII	  the	  situation	  in	  Italy	  was	  slightly	  different.	  The	  exclusion	  of	  the	  
second	  largest	  party,	  the	  Italian	  Communists,	  caused	  a	  de	  facto	  sabotaging	  of	  any	  virtuous	  
cycle	  of	  competition	  on	  welfare.	  However,	  the	  result	  was	  not	  a	  ‘perverted	  match’	  between	  
the	   two	   major	   political	   forces	   of	   Communism	   (PCI)	   and	   Catholicism	   (DC)	   and	   a	   resulting	  
vicious	   cycle	   of	   competition	   as	   in	   the	   19th	   century.	   Instead,	   the	  DC	  used	   its	   hegemony	   to	  
implement	   new	   Catholic	   welfare	   ideas	   that	   had	   been	   largely	   developed	   in	   the	   interwar	  
period.	  However,	   the	  absence	  of	  pressure	   from	  a	  virtuous	   cycle	  of	   ideational	   competition	  
soon	  led	  to	  a	  drifting27	  and	  degeneration	  of	  the	  Catholic	  welfare	  ideas	  and	  institutions.	  The	  
result	  was	  a	  fragmented	  and	  clientelist	  system	  of	  welfare	  provision	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  
1960s	  in	  Italy.	  
	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  For	  a	  framework	  of	  institutional	  drift	  see	  Streeck,	  W.	  &	  Thelen,	  K.	  (2005)	  Introduction:	  Institutional	  Change	  in	  Advanced	  Political	  Economies,	  IN:	  Streeck,	  W.	  &	  Thelen,	  K.	  (eds.)	  Beyond	  Continuity:	  Institutional	  Change	  in	  Advanced	  Political	  Economies,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	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10.1.1 Concurring	  Frameworks	  of	  Welfare	  
The	  main	  empirical	  task	  of	  this	  thesis	  was	  to	  assess	  the	  influence	  of	  Catholic	  social	  teaching	  
on	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Continental	  European	  welfare	  states.	  It	  found	  mixed	  evidence.	  The	  
influence	  of	  Catholic	  social	  teaching	  existed	  but	  was	  not	  as	  linear	  and	  straightforward	  as	  is	  
assumed	  by	  the	  literature	  that	  analyzes	  Catholicism	  or	  Christian	  Democracy	  as	  an	  influential	  
variable	  on	  welfare	  state	  formation.28	  Instead,	  Catholicism	  exerted	  its	  influence	  on	  modern	  
welfare	  formation	  in	  competition	  against,	  and	  together	  with,	  other	  worldviews.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  thesis	  found	  that	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  the	  first	  early	  modern	  
social	   security	   in	   Italy	   and	  Germany,	   both	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   as	  well	   as	   after	  
World	  War	   II,	   could	  not	   be	   explained	  by	   any	  of	   the	   classic	  welfare	   state	   theories	   alone.29	  
This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   classic	   welfare	   state	   theories	   may	   be	   rejected	   outright.	  
However,	  the	  influential	  forces	  to	  which	  they	  attribute	  welfare	  formulation	  did	  seem	  to	  play	  
a	  role	  –	  surprisingly	  often,	   in	  fact	  –	  but	  in	  ways	  other	  than	  how	  they	  postulate	  and	  almost	  
never	  in	  the	  monolithic	  fashion	  that	  they	  propose.	  
Functional	  interpretations,30	  that	  see	  the	  welfare	  state	  as	  an	  automatic	  result	  of	  the	  
degree	   of	   industrialization,	   argue	   that	  modern	   welfare	   came	   about	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	  
deterioration	  of	  older	  forms	  of	  social	  protection	  and	  new	  challenges.	  However,	  they	  cannot	  
explain	  why	   it	   came	   about	   in	   the	   form	   and	   the	  way	   that	   it	   did.	   In	   other	  words,	   accounts	  
following	  the	  Logic	  of	   Industrialism	  struggle	  to	  explain	  variation	  between	  different	  welfare	  
states.	   	   By	  excluding	   all	  motives	  of	   actors	  besides	  mere	   functionalist	   logics,	   this	   approach	  
also	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  political	  purpose	  and	  the	  targeted	  impact	  of	  social	  legislation.	  In	  
the	   late	   19th	   century,	   functional	   pressures	   were	   certainly	   responsible	   for	   putting	   a	   grand	  
welfare	   reformation	   onto	   the	   political	   agenda	   in	   both	   countries.	   The	   problems	   the	   old	  
welfare	  system	  had	  in	  coping	  with	  the	  social	  dislocation	  brought	  about	  by	  rapid	  urbanization	  
and	   industrialization	   were	   not	   the	   only	   ones	   it	   faced.	   In	   addition,	   it	   had	   been	   partly	  
undermined	   through	   the	   liberalization	   policies	   enacted	   in	   Prussia	   and	   Piedmont	   which,	  
though	   they	  made	   industrialization	   and	   urbanization	   of	   the	   scale	   of	   the	   late	   19th	   century	  
possible,	  also	  triggered	  a	  strong	  de-­‐corporation	  of	  society	  that	  can	  be	  observed	  throughout	  
the	   century.	   Hence,	   from	   the	   very	   beginning	   industrialization	   itself	   was	   therefore	   a	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  Kahl,	  S.	  (2004);	  Manow,	  P.	  (2004);	  van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1995);	  van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  &	  Manow,	  P.	  (2009)	  29	  Wilensky,	  H.	  (1975);	  Korpi,	  W.	  (1983);	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1990);	  Swenson,	  P.	  (1991).	  30	  Wilensky,	  H.	  (1975);	  Flora,	  P.	  &	  Albers,	  J.	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phenomenon	  that	  was	  stipulated	  and	  reinforced	  through	  political	  will	  and	  not	  a	  process	  that	  
just	   ‘naturally’	  or	   ‘mechanically’	  unfolded.	   Industrialization	  arrived	   in	   Italy	  only	  one	  or	  two	  
decades	   later	   than	   in	   Germany.	   Furthermore,	   the	   regional	   confinement	   of	   the	  
industrialization	   process	   to	   a	   few	   industrial	   cities	   in	   the	   North	   made	   the	   impact	   of	  
urbanization	  there	  even	  more	  drastic	  than	  in	  Germany.	  The	  impact	  of	  industrialization	  and	  
its	  side	  effects	  on	  the	  existing	  social	  fabric	  in	  Italy	  was	  therefore	  arguably	  stronger	  than,	  or	  
at	   the	   least	   similar	   to,	   those	   felt	   by	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich.	   Long	   standing	   grief	   and	   societal	  
dislocation	   in	   the	   South	   were	   further	   accelerated	   through	   the	   failed	   land	   reforms	   of	   the	  
Liberal	   governments.	   Societal	   discontent	   and	   revolts	   (all	   signs	   of	   a	  widespread	   functional	  
demand	   for	   welfare)	   became	   ever	   more	   frequent	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	   century.	   The	  
differences	  between	  Germany	  and	  Italy	  were,	  therefore,	  not	  so	  much	  grounded	  in	  diverging	  
functional	   demands	   in	  both	   countries	  but	   rather	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   any	   response	   to	   these	  
problems	  from	  the	  liberal	  governments	  in	  Italy.	  The	  divergent	  cases	  of	  Italy’s	  (rudimentary)	  
and	   Germany’s	   (comprehensive)	   welfare	   state	   formation	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   19th	   century	  
therefore	   remain	   a	   puzzle	   for	   the	   Logic	   of	   Industrialization	   that	   attributed	   differences	   in	  
modern	  welfare	  to	  differences	  in	  timing	  of	  functional	  pressures.	  A	  similar	  picture	  arises	  from	  
the	   study	   of	   the	   reintroduction	   of	   welfare	   after	   World	   War	   II	   in	   both	   countries.	   The	  
functionalist	  Logic	  of	  Industrialization	  (LoI)	  can	  only	  point	  out	  demands	  that	  lead	  to	  welfare	  
formation,	   such	   as	   the	   large	   scale	   destruction	   of	   housing	   or	   the	   demand	   for	   invalidity	  
compensations	   after	   World	   War	   II,	   but	   it	   cannot	   explain	   the	   political	   purpose	   of	   the	  
resulting	  legislation	  and	  why	  it	  took	  on	  such	  diverging	  forms	  in	  Germany	  and	  Italy	  from	  the	  
1960s	  onwards.	  However,	  functional	  theory	  has	  a	  strong	  appeal	  and	  purpose	  as	  it	  reminds	  
the	  researcher	  to	  take	  changes	  and	  impacts	  of	  the	  socioeconomic	  environment	  seriously.	  
Class	  based	   frameworks,	   like	  Power	  Resource	  Approaches	   (PRAs),31	  also	  only	  offer	  
limited	  help	  in	  explaining	  the	  empirics	  of	  early	  modern	  social	  security	  formation.	  Socialism	  
expanded	   in	   numbers	   and	   followers	   as	   a	   subculture	   but	  was,	   up	   until	   the	   1890s,	   blocked	  
from	  making	  viable	   inroads	   into	  parliament.	  This	   is	   true	   for	   Italy,	  where	   the	   franchise	  was	  
heavily	  restricted,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  Imperial	  Germany	  where	  Bismarck’s	  repressive	  measures	  of	  
the	   Socialist	   Laws	   prevented	   them	   from	   acceding	   to	   parliament.	   During	   the	   1880s,	   the	  
decade	   when	   all	   major	   social	   security	   laws	   were	   enacted,	   the	   Social	   Democrats	   never	  
received	  more	  than	  24	  mandates	  (1884)	  out	  of	  a	  total	  of	  397	  in	  the	  Reichstag.	  Furthermore,	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the	  Socialists	  never	  managed	   to	  entirely	  exploit	   the	  class	   cleavage	  and	  while	   in	   Italy	   large	  
parts	  of	  the	  working	  class	  also	  found	  a	  home	  in	  the	  Catholic	  movement.32	  Even	  at	  the	  height	  
of	  the	  Socialist	  movement	  during	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich,	  the	  party	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  attract	  the	  
votes	  of	  more	  than	  50	  %	  of	  the	  total	  working	  class.33	  The	  other	  half	  of	  the	  working	  class	  (if	  it	  
voted)	   gave	   their	   vote	   to	   other	   subcultures.	   Furthermore,	   the	   empirical	   investigation	   has	  
shown	  that	  Socialists	  did	  not	  once	  vote	  for	  any	  of	  Bismarck’s	  major	  social	  security	  projects.	  
They	   did	   this	   for	   two	   reasons.	   First,	   German	   Social	   Democracy	  was	   embracing	   ever	  more	  
maximalist	   positions	   of	   scientific	   Marxism	   after	   Marx’s	   death.34	   Second,	   German	   Social	  
Democrats	   were	   much	   more	   interested	   in	   legislation	   that	   yielded	   emancipating	   political	  
potential	  for	  them.	  Their	  focus	  lay	  on	  work	  protection	  that	  would	  enable	  them	  to	  dispatch	  
Social	  Democratic	  factory	  inspectors	  while	  they	  repeatedly	  emphasized	  the	  introduction	  of	  
collective	  wage	  bargaining	  institutions,	  minimum	  wage	  provisions	  or	  limitations	  of	  working	  
hours.	   In	  Italy,	  meanwhile,	  the	  socialist	  movement	  was	  much	  more	  revisionist	  towards	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  However,	  even	  with	  their	  programmatic	  ideas	  on	  welfare	  they	  were	  
not	   able	   to	   find	   suitable	   coalition	   partners	   nor	   could	   they	   push	   them	   through	  parliament	  
because	  in	  Italy	  the	  Catholics	  were	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  potential	  coalition	  partner	  due	  to	  the	  Non	  
Expedite	  of	  Pope	  Pius	  IX	  until	  the	  inter	  war	  period.	  
However,	   the	   threat	   of	   Socialist	   revolution	   has	   always	   been	   perceived	   as	   a	  major	  
driver	  for	  social	  security	  expansion.	  That	  said,	  this	  was	  not	  so	  much	  due	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  
violent	   overthrow	   but	   more	   because	   of	   the	   virtuous	   cycle	   that	   it	   unfolded	   through	   its	  
presence	  and	  the	  new	  ideas	  it	  put	  on	  the	  agenda.	  It	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  Bismarck’s	  original	  
Social	   policy	   ideas	   were	   heavily	   influenced	   by	   Lorenz	   from	   Stein	   and	   other	   conservative	  
thinkers	  that	  believed	  in	  a	  cushioning	  of	  revolutionary	  aspirations	  through	  the	  installation	  of	  
social	  shock	  absorbers.	  This	  thesis	  has,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  dismantled	  the	  “Bismarck	  Myth”	  
on	  social	  security.	  In	  line	  with	  more	  recent	  historiography,	  it	  could	  be	  taken	  as	  showing	  that,	  
although	  Bismarck	  wanted	  welfare,	  he	  did	  not	  get	  the	  one	  he	  wanted.	  The	  possibility	  for	  the	  
other	   subcultures	   to	   influence	   legislation	   in	   parliament	   was	   too	   strong.	   This	   is	   also	   the	  
conclusion	  that	  has	  to	  be	  drawn	  for	  the	  case	  of	  Italian	  social	  security	  legislation	  after	  WWII.	  
After	  1945,	  Italy	  became	  the	  home	  of	  the	  largest	  European	  Left	  party,	  the	  Communist	  PCI.	  
Nevertheless,	   it	   could	   not	   exert	   any	   influence	   on	   social	   policy	   legislation	   after	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1999b).	  33	  See	  Chapter	  4	  of	  this	  thesis.	  34	  Berman,	  S.	  (2006).	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Constitutional	   Assembly	   because	   the	   Communists	   were	   soon	   excluded	   from	   any	  
parliamentary	  collaboration.	   In	  contrast,	   in	  Germany,	   the	  early	  social	  security	  proposals	  of	  
the	   SPD	   after	   the	   war	   stipulated	   a	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	   ideational	   competition	   that	   pushed	  
Adenauer	  into	  welfare	  and	  helped	  him	  to	  overcome	  the	  ordoliberal	  welfare	  blockade	  in	  his	  
own	   party.	   The	   Social	   Democratic	   impact	   was	   therefore	   indirect	   and	   can	   also	   only	   be	  
analyzed	   in	   combination	   with	   the	   other	   political	   forces	   that	   were	   in	   play	   for	   Post	   WWII	  
welfare	  legislation.	  
Rational	   Choice	   grounded	   Employer	   Centered	   Approaches	   (ECAs)35	   also	   have	  
trouble	   in	   explaining	   the	   emergence	   of	   early	   modern	   state-­‐driven	   social	   security.	   	   There	  
were	  some	  employers	  in	  both	  countries	  that	  had	  visions	  of	  a	  harmonious	  production	  regime	  
within	  their	  firms	  that	  was	  centered	  around	  a	  reconciliation	  of	  employers	  and	  employees,	  a	  
model	  most	  notably	  embodied	  in	  the	  mills	  of	  some	  spinning	  entrepreneurs	  in	  the	  Veneto	  or	  
in	   Krupp’s	   worker’s	   villages.	   Nevertheless,	   overall	   employers	   tended	   to	   strongly	   oppose	  
welfare	  legislation	  in	  both	  countries.	  It	  was	  surprising	  that	  their	  power	  to	  do	  so	  was	  rather	  
limited,	  especially	  as	  this	  runs	  contrary	  to	  the	  intuition	  of	  the	  legacy	  left	  by	  the	  Rye	  and	  Iron	  
coalition.	   That	   is	   why	   Bismarck	   could	   bluntly	   put	   forward	   that	   “the	   objections	   of	   the	  
Industrialists	   should	   no	   longer	   be	   considered”.36	   Employers	   in	   both	   countries	   opposed	   all	  
social	   security	  projects	   from	  the	  very	  beginning.	  The	  general	  pattern	  was	   that,	  as	   soon	  as	  
employers	  saw	  that	   they	  could	  no	   longer	  prevent	  or	  postpone	  the	   introduction	  of	  welfare	  
provisions,	   they	   tried	   to	   influence	   lawmakers	   into	   choosing	   non-­‐mandatory	   and	   private	  
market-­‐based	  social	  security	  solutions.	  Employer	  Centered	  Approaches	  on	  welfare	  are	  also	  
problematic	   in	  the	  case	  of	   Italian	  post-­‐war	  social	  security	  formation.	  When	  the	  employers’	  
association	   Confindustria	   was	   still	   influential	   in	   the	   DC,	   during	   the	   De	   Gasperi	   era,	   it	  
opposed	  welfare	  legislation	  that	  went	  beyond	  liberal	  market-­‐based	  approaches.	  In	  order	  to	  
implement	   his	   (neo-­‐)	   corporatist	   regime	   and	   his	   welfare	   vision,	   Fanfani	   had	   to	   actively	  
distance	  himself	   from	  Confindustria	  and	  push	  the	  employers’	  association	  out	  of	  politics.	   In	  
Germany,	  a	  similar	  solution	  emerged	  during	  the	  Korea	  crisis	   in	   the	  1950s.	  Employers	  used	  
the	   crisis	   to	   re-­‐implement	   their	   traditional	   ways	   of	   interwoven	   neo-­‐corporatist	   finance	  
models	   and	   industrial	   relations	   that	   had	   been	   so	   severely	   attacked	   and	   damaged	   by	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Swenson,	  P.	  (1991),	  Mares,	  I.	  (2003).	  36	  “daβ	  die	  Einwände	  der	  Industriellen	  nicht	  weiter	  zu	  berücksichtigen	  seien“	  Bismarck	  cited	  IN:	  Ayaß,	  W.,	  Tennstedt,	  F.	  &	  Winter,	  H.	  (2003a)	  	  p.	  XXXIII.	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ordoliberals	  immediately	  after	  the	  war,	  but	  they	  did	  not	  want	  welfare.	  This	  thesis	  therefore	  
corroborates	  Paster’s37	  findings	  on	  the	  hostility	  of	  German	  employers	  to	  social	  security.	  
To	  sum	  up,	  most	  second-­‐generation	  (revisionist)	  approaches38	  to	  welfare	  also	  have	  
to	  be	   taken	  with	   a	   grain	  of	   salt.	   In	   the	   Italian	   case,	   no	  explicit	   cross-­‐class	  or	   risk-­‐coalition	  
discourse	   could	   be	   detected	   within	   the	   machine	   of	   the	   hegemonic	   Christian	   Democratic	  
party.	   The	   clientelist	   and	   hyper-­‐fragmented	   welfare	   outcome	   is	   more	   a	   reflection	   of	   an	  
individual	  group	  rather	  than	  coalition	  logic.	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  Germany	  where	  welfare	  was	  
a	  denominational	  rather	  than	  a	  class	  compromise	  (A	  Rye	  and	  Rome	  coalition	  instead	  of	  the	  
classic	   Rye	   and	   Iron	   coalition).39	   I	   am	   also	   puzzled	   as	   to	   how	   some	   revisionist	   welfare	  
accounts	  can	  speak	  of	  a	  class	  compromise	  when	  the	  political	  representations	  of	  both	  classes	  
are	  politically	  so	  heavily	  fragmented,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Imperial	  Germany.	  During	  the	  late	  19th	  
century,	  the	  Left	  in	  Germany	  never	  managed	  to	  mobilize	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  workers	  in	  
elections.	  The	  political	  representation	  of	  the	  capitalist	  class	  was	  fragmented	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  
between	   the	   national-­‐Protestant	   conservative,	   national	   liberal,	   left	   liberal	   and	   even	   the	  
Catholic	   parties.	   Hence,	   the	   split	   between	   capital	   and	   labor	   even	   ran	   through	   their	   own	  
parties	  and	  subcultures	  (except	  for	  the	  Socialists).	  The	  thesis	  has	  also	  found	  no	  evidence	  for	  
political	   coalitions	   between	   groups	   that	   share	   similar	   risks	   (the	   same	   goes	   for	   coalitions	  
between	   capital	   and	   labor	   that	   are	   situated	  within	   the	   same	  productive	   sector)	   as	   newer	  
revisionist	  accounts	  argue.40	  Besides	  finding	  no	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  such	  coalitions,	  I	  am	  
also	   puzzled	   by	   the	   way	   that	   most	   supporters	   of	   these	   ‘revisionist’	   welfare	   approaches	  
assume	  that	  people	   that	   share	  similar	   risks	  automatically	  act	  as	  coherent	  collective	  actors	  
that	  form	  coalitions	  and	  enact	  welfare	  legislation	  that	  falls	  within	  their	  own	  interests.	  
However,	  if	  not	  the	  ‘usual	  suspects’	  that	  the	  classic	  welfare	  state	  theory	  identifies	  as	  
the	   founders	  of	  welfare	  and,	   if	   the	   literature	  on	  Catholic	   influences	  got	   it	   right	  but	   in	   the	  
wrong	   way	   (as	   I	   put	   it	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   chapter),	   what	   then	   were	   the	   drivers	   for	  
welfare	  state	  formation	   in	   Italy	  and	  Germany,	  and	  did	  universal	  patterns	  emerge	  from	  the	  
empirical	  analysis	  across	  the	  cases	  and	  the	  time	  slots	  studied	  that	  allow	  for	  one	  conclusive	  
argument	  with	  which	  this	  thesis	  can	  close?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Paster,	  T.	  (2011).	  38	  Baldwin,	  P.	  (1990);	  Iversen,	  T.	  (2005),	  Rehm,	  P.,	  Hacker,	  J.	  &	  Schlesinger,	  S.	  (2012b).	  39	  Cross	  class	  coalition	  approaches	  might	  have	  a	  contribution	  to	  make	  as	  regards	  the	  welfare	  generation	  in	  the	  interwar	  and	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  era.	  40	  Rehm,	  P.,	  Hacker,	  J.	  &	  Schlesinger,	  M.	  (2012b).	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10.1.2 Ideas	  compete	  in	  Cycles	  
The	  question	  raised	  by	  the	  above	  discussion	  of	  the	  classic	  welfare	  state	  theories	  against	  the	  
backdrop	   of	   the	   empirical	   findings	   of	   this	   thesis	   is:	   if	   they	   cannot	   explain	   welfare	   state	  
formation	   in	   Italy	   and	   Germany,	   what	   can	   explain	   welfare	   state	   development	   in	   both	  
countries?	  
	   To	   give	   credit	   to	   the	   classics,	   it	   is	   undeniable	   that	   functionalist	   and	   material	  
pressures	  existed	  but	   these	  did	   in	  not	   translate	   into	  policy	   in	   a	   linear	  way.	   Instead,	   these	  
functional	  and	  material	  pressures	  triggered	  a	  series	  of	  social	  and	  political	  repercussions	  that	  
led	  to	  welfare.	  The	  most	  important	  of	  these	  was	  certainly	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  type	  of	  
occupational	  class,	  the	  industrial	  worker,	  whose	  members	  were	  not	  embedded	  in	  or	  part	  of	  
any	  of	  the	  pre-­‐industrial	  social	  protection	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  the	  guild,	  feudal	  relations	  or	  
the	   family.	  This	  group	  of	  people,	  often	  also	  called	   the	  new	   fourth	  estate,	  grew	  ever	  more	  
rapidly	  once	  industrialization	  gathered	  pace.	  By	  itself	  this	  was	  not	  a	  big	  problem,	  neither	  for	  
employers	   nor	   the	   state.	   The	   endless	   supply	   of	   cheap	   labor	   through	   accelerated	  
urbanization	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   regulation	   provided	   the	   raw	   materials	   necessary	  
attaining	  great	  power	  status	  and	  profits.	  This	  changed	  once	   these	  workers	  obtained	  some	  
principles,	  in	  other	  words	  became	  conscious,	  through	  the	  ideas	  that	  Marx	  provided	  from	  the	  
mid-­‐19th	  century	  onwards.	  Together	  with	  a	  new	  institutional	  model	  of	  politics	  that	  started	  to	  
emerge	   in	  Western	   Europe	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	   century,	   through	   the	   introduction	   of	  
universal	  male	  suffrage,	  the	  game	  changed.	  The	  reason	  was	  not	  only	  that	  an	  ideologized	  and	  
revolutionary	  working	  class	  would	  be	  dangerous	  for	  the	  state	  and	  the	  existing	  property	  and	  
production	  regime,	  but	  much	  more	  important	  (as	  this	  thesis	  has	  found	  in	  the	  empirics)	  was	  
that	  workers	  became	  a	  positive	  asset	  for	  each	  organized	  political	  sub-­‐fraction	  of	  the	  polity.	  
Whichever	  party	  had	  the	  loyalty	  of	  the	  workers,	  or	  at	  least	  parts	  of	  them,	  could	  increase	  its	  
numerical	   strength	   in	   parliament.	   Social	   security	   ideas,	   as	   they	   developed	   in	   the	   late	   19th	  
century	   on	   all	   sides	   of	   the	   political	   spectrum,	   were	   not	   only	   something	   to	   appease	   the	  
workers	  with	   “false	   consciousness”	   but	  much	  more	   a	   tool	   to	  woo	   the	  workers	   into	   one’s	  
camp.	  
Nevertheless,	  this	  process	  did	  not	  unfold	  in	  a	  linear	  or	  automatic	  fashion.	  Instead,	  it	  
was	   a	   highly	   dynamic	   and	   contingent	   process	   dependent	   on	   several	   factors.	   Both	   cases	  
showed	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  that,	  out	  of	  the	  above	  told	  narrative,	  social	  security	  can	  evolve	  –	  	  
but	   that	   it	   could	   also	   be	   that	   it	   does	   not	   evolve.	   The	   key	   to	   this,	   the	   thesis	   found,	   is	   the	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absence	  or	  presence	  of	  virtuous	  or	  vicious	  cycles	  of	  competition.	  In	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  there	  is	  	  
an	  update	  of	  social	  security	  ideas,	  while	  in	  a	  vicious	  cycle	  no	  new	  ideas	  are	  generated.	  The	  
clue	   is	   that	   these	  cycles	   seem	  to	  unfold	   largely	   independently	   from	   functional	  or	  material	  
stimulus.	   Hence,	   the	  welfare	   regime	   that	   one	   gets	   is	   largely	   dependent	   on	   the	   ideational	  
configuration	  and	  the	  dynamics	  that	  come	  with	  the	  cycle.	  Functional	  or	  material	  stimuli	  are	  
certainly	  needed	  (for	  example,	  a	  cycle	  on	  modern	  state	  driven	  welfare	  would	  not	  emerge	  in	  
the	  Stone	  Age)	  but	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  brings	  the	  problem	  on	  to	  the	  political	  agenda.41	  	  
In	   the	  German	  Empire,	   the	  growth	  of	   the	  working	  class	  was	  perceived	  by	  the	   four	  
major	  subcultures	  of	  the	  Kaiser	  Reich	  as	  a	  political	  asset	  that	  had	  to	  be	  captured	  as	  quickly	  
as	   possible.	   Bismarck	   and	   his	   Protestant	   Conservatives	   recognized	   the	   potential	   political	  
advantages	  of	  successfully	  wooing	  the	  workers	  to	  their	  side.	  Very	  much	  following	  Gramsci,	  
Bismarck	   perceived	   hegemony	   as	   being	   achievable	   only	   through	   the	   imposition	   of	   the	  
hegemony	   of	   his	   worldview	   in	   the	   Kaiser	   Reich.	   However,	   in	   Germany	   the	   Catholics,	   the	  
Liberals	   and	   of	   course	   the	   Socialists	   all	   had	   the	   same	   thought	   as	  well.	   Together	  with	   the	  
introduction	   of	   full	   male	   suffrage,	   the	   incorporation	   of	   the	   workers	   into	   their	   respective	  
subcultures	  became	  a	  question	  of	  political	  survival	  for	  each	  subculture.	  As	  soon	  as	  Bismarck	  
had	  started	  to	  develop	  explicit	  plans	  on	  social	  security	  the	  others	  had	  to	  react.42	  Either	  they	  
developed	  own	  programmatic	  ideas	  on	  welfare	  in	  line	  with	  the	  overarching	  postulations	  of	  
their	   worldviews	   or	   they	   risked	   losing	   the	   workers	   to	   the	   Bismarckian	   Protestant	  
Conservative	   camp.	  The	   reactions	  of	   the	  other	   subcultures	  were	  highly	   visible.	  During	   the	  
last	   third	   of	   the	   19th	   century,	   the	   Liberals	   started	   to	   launch	   the	   Hirsch	   Dunckersche	  
Gewerkvereine,	   the	   so	   called	   yellow	  unions,	   and	   their	   politicians	   increasingly	   pronounced	  
liberal	   and	   market	   based	   anti	   etatist	   social	   security	   ideas	   in	   parliament.	   The	   Catholics	  
experienced	   a	   similar	   development.	   Sparked	   by	   the	   ‘worker’s	   bishop’	   Ketteler,	   Catholic	  
unions	   and	   associations	   like	   Arbeiterwohl	   were	   formed	   and	   the	   Center	   party	   based	   its	  
platform	   explicitly	   on	   social	   security	   demands.	   Bismarck	  was	   so	   concerned	   that	   he	   called	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  The	  Left	  is	  prominent	  in	  such	  processes	  as	  it	  is	  usually	  the	  political	  force	  that	  spins	  off	  such	  cycles.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  true	  in	  every	  instance	  as	  the	  Left	  can	  also	  be	  too	  orthodox	  to	  indulge	  in	  revisionary	  social	  security	  action.	  In	  the	  German	  case	  it	  was	  also	  Bismarck	  who	  made	  the	  first	  step	  on	  social	  security.	  	  42	  The	  process	  had	  already	  started	  earlier.	  Bismarck	  only	  kicked	  off	  the	  virtuous	  cycle	  for	  concrete	  legislative	  proposals	  and	  action.	  The	  first	  impulse	  on	  how	  to	  integrate	  the	  working	  class	  through	  the	  development	  of	  new	  ideas	  into	  one’s	  own	  worldview	  came	  through	  Marx,	  first	  with	  the	  Communist	  Manifesto	  in	  1847/48	  and	  then	  reinforced	  through	  the	  issuing	  of	  Das	  Kapital	  in	  1867.	  In	  the	  end	  one	  could	  also	  argue	  that	  Adam	  Smith	  had	  triggered	  the	  cycle	  by	  stimulating	  Marx	  in	  his	  replies.	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them	  the	  ‘black	  international’	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  socialist	  international.	  	  Only	  the	  Socialists	  
remained	  mute.	   They	   organized	   the	  workers	   but	   did	   not	   develop	   social	   security	   ideas	   as	  
they	  were	  seen	  as	  an	  anachronism	  to	  the	  class	  struggle.	  	  
Bismarck’s	   Bonapartist	   social	   security	   plans	   therefore	   sparked	   a	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	  
ideational	  competition	  in	  which	  each	  of	  the	  subcultures	  developed	  and	  updated	  its	  ideas	  on	  
modern	  social	  security	   in	  congruence	  with	  their	  own	  worldviews.	   In	  a	  comparatively	  short	  
time	  frame,	  Germany	  had	  seen	  the	  formation	  of	  Catholic,	  Liberal	  and	  Conservative	  welfare	  
ideas	  and	  unions.43	  This	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  social	  security	  laws	  and	  
the	   formation	  of	  modern	  German	  welfare	   state	   legislation.	   It	  was	   guided	  not	   only	   by	   the	  
relative	  strength	  of	  the	  political	  outlets	  of	  the	  subcultures	  in	  parliament,	  as	  Power	  Resource	  
Theory	   would	   assume,	   but	   also	   by	   the	   degree	   of	   ideational	   and	   interest	   compatibility	   of	  
their	  programmatic	  ideas	  on	  social	  security.	  
	   The	   situation	   in	   Italy	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   was	   different.	   In	   contrast	   to	  
Imperial	  Germany,	  the	  specific	  political	  stalemate	  that	  arose	  between	  the	  Liberals	  and	  the	  
Vatican	  did	  not	   lead	  to	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  of	   ideational	  competition	  but,	  rather,	  resulted	   in	  a	  
vicious	   standoff.	   The	   existence	   of	   only	   two	   powerful	   subcultures,	   the	   Liberals	   and	   the	  
Catholics,	  and	  the	  ‘perverted	  match’	  between	  their	  main	  programmatic	  ideas	  of	  subsidiarity	  
and	  laissez	  faire	  anti	  statism	  led	  to	  a	  stalemate	  that	   inhibited	  the	  development	  of	  modern	  
programmatic	  ideas	  on	  social	  security	  on	  both	  sides.	  After	  a	  fierce	  initial	  battle	  between	  the	  
liberal	   state	   elites	   and	   the	   Vatican	   in	   the	   unification	   process,	   both	   sides	   retreated	   to	   the	  
orthodox	  fallback	  positions	  of	  their	  worldviews	  on	  social	  security.	  The	  embracing	  of	   laissez	  
faire	   ideology	   by	   liberalism	   and	   the	   resurfacing	   of	   the	   subsidiarity	   concept	   in	   Catholicism	  
resulted	   in	  a	  residual	  role	  for	  the	  state	  that	  suited	  both	  subcultures.	  Liberalism	  was	  happy	  
not	   to	   see	   the	   state	   engage	   in	   welfare	   while	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   could	   hold	   on	   to	   its	  
century-­‐old	   monopoly	   of	   poor	   relief	   institutions	   (Operé	   Pie).	   This	   vicious	   cycle	   of	   non-­‐
development	  delayed	  the	  development	  of	  modern	  welfare	  ideas	  on	  both	  sides	  for	  the	  first	  
three	  decades	  after	  unification.	   It	  was	  only	  broken	   in	  the	  1890s	  but	  by	  then	  the	  effects	  of	  
the	  vicious	  cycle	  were	  already	  so	  great	  that	  a	  modern	  welfare	  regime	  in	  Italy	  could	  take	  but	  
a	  rudimentary	  form	  and	  would	  only	  fully	  develop	  in	  the	  20th	  century.	  
Even	  though	  Italy	  and	  Germany	  exhibited	  some	  dissimilarities	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  
century,	   the	  comparative	  analysis	   suggests	   that	   the	  single	   factor	   that	  contributed	  most	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Here	  the	  typical	  continental	  split	  of	  unions	  along	  Weltanschauungen	  (worldviews)	  originates.	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the	  real	  difference	  in	  the	  outcomes	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  was	  the	  dynamic	  that	  arose	  
from	   the	   ideological	   and	   ideational	   figuration	   of	   the	   different	   political	   actors	   in	   both	  
countries.	   Industrialization	   was	   different	   in	   each	   country	   but	   overall	   did	   not	   diverge	  
drastically.	  The	  institutional	  set	  up	  differed	  (universal	  male	  suffrage	  vs.	  suffrage	  restrictions,	  
authoritarian	  vs.	  constitutional	  monarchy,	  party	  system)	  but	   this	  was	  not	   the	  main	  reason	  
for	  the	  divergences	  in	  welfare	  policy.	  The	  main	  difference	  was	  the	  difference	  in	  state-­‐church	  
relations	  which	  was	  represented	  by	  the	  antagonism	  between	  Catholic	  and	  Liberal	  ideas.	  The	  
blockade	   on	   state	   driven	   welfare	   in	   Italy	   was	   down	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   two	   found	   a	  
perverted	  match	  between	  one	  another.	  The	  counterfactual	  to	  this	  are	  the	  social	  ideas	  on	  a	  
state	  provided	  welfare	  system	  that	  Italian	  Liberalism	  had	  developed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
19th	  century	  –	  ideas	  which	  were	  abandoned	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century	  after	  the	  clash	  
with	  the	  Vatican.	  	  
The	  conclusion	   is	   that	  situations	   in	  which	  virtuous	  cycles	  of	   ideational	  competition	  
unfold	  are	  fruitful	  for	  the	  generation	  of	  new	  ideas.	  In	  contrast,	  situations	  of	  vicious	  cycles	  of	  
competition	   tend	   to	   lead	   to	   stalemates	  and	  have	  a	  deteriorating	  effect	  on	   the	  generation	  
and	  adaptation	  of	  new	  ideas.	  While	  the	  one	  situation	  sees	  political	  actors	  striving	  to	  adapt	  
the	  ideas	  of	  their	  worldviews	  to	  match	  new	  surrounding	  circumstances,	  the	  other	  situation	  
leads	   to	   an	   ideational	  monoculture	   that	   does	   not	   reply	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   environment.44	  
While	   one	   system	   comes	   closer	   to	   the	   people,	   the	   other	   becomes	   more	   distant	   as	   it	   is	  
incapable	  of	  integrating	  changes	  emanating	  from	  the	  people.	  
The	   second	   part	   of	   the	   thesis	   examined	   the	   re-­‐cementing	   of	   social	   security	  
institutions	  in	  the	  post-­‐1945	  period	  after	  the	  disasters	  of	  fascism	  and	  World	  War	  II	   in	  both	  
countries.	  Again,	   events	   unfolded	  quite	   differently,	   despite	   starting	   from	   relatively	   similar	  
points	  in	  both	  cases.	  Both	  countries	  had	  to	  overcome	  fascist	  legacies,	  war	  defeat,	  intensive	  
destruction	   and	   occupation.	   Furthermore,	   in	   both	   countries,	   Christian	   Democracy	   soon	  
emerged	  as	  the	  dominant	  political	   force	   in	  the	  newly	  founded	  parliamentary	  democracies.	  
However,	  developments	  on	  welfare	  soon	  started	  to	  diverge	  again	  and	  the	  key	  can	  again	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  religious,	  and	  especially	  the	  Catholic,	  component	  was	  still	  the	  most	  influential	  element	  in	  each	  of	  these	  battles	  of	  ideas	  on	  welfare	  provides	  the	  counterfactual.	  If	  Bismarck	  had	  succeeded	  with	  his	  state	  socialist	  Protestant	  Conservative	  ideas,	  Germany’s	  socioeconomic	  structure	  would	  indeed	  look	  today	  much	  more	  like	  an	  authoritarian	  version	  of	  Social	  Democratic	  Scandinavia.	  If	  in	  Italy,	  meanwhile,	  the	  Liberals	  had	  stuck	  to	  their	  initially	  liberal-­‐progressive	  ideas	  and	  implemented	  them	  despite	  the	  hostilities	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church,	  than	  Italian	  welfare	  would	  greatly	  resemble	  that	  of	  pre-­‐Beveridgian	  or	  even	  Beverigian	  Britain.	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found	  less	   in	  structural,	  material,	  power	  resource	  or	   institutional	  differences,	  but	  rather	   in	  
the	  different	  cycles	  of	  ideational	  competition	  that	  emerged.	  
	   In	   Germany,	   the	   experiences	   of	   totalitarianism	   and	   the	   Holocaust	   led	   to	   a	  
denominational	  compromise	  being	  struck	  between	  Conservative	  Protestants	  and	  Catholic’s	  
subculture.	  These	  two	  joined	  forces	  in	  the	  newly	  founded	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	  (CDU)	  
which	  entailed	  a	  series	  of	  compromises	  and	  battles	  over	  the	  party’s	  programmatic	  ideas	  on	  
welfare	  and	  the	  regulative	   framework	  of	   the	  economy.	  A	  virtuous	  cycle	  of	   ideas	  was	  once	  
again	   stipulated	   by	   the	   Social	   Democrats	   that	   pushed	   for	   social	   security	   legislation	   and	  
proposed	  a	  comprehensive	  reform	  in	  September	  1952.45	  Adenauer	  had	  to	  react	  to	  this	  and	  
pushed	   for	  welfare	   against	   the	  will	   of	   the	  ordoliberals	   in	  his	   party.46	   	   	   In	   Italy,	   a	  Christian	  
Democratic	   party	   also	   formed	   but	   the	   absence	   of	   Protestantism,	   the	   smoother	   relations	  
between	  Catholicism	  and	  the	  former	  fascist	  regime	  and	  the	  non-­‐totalitarian	  nature	  of	  Italian	  
fascism	   allowed	   for	   a	   path	   that	   diverged	   less	   from	   the	   past.	   In	   the	   De	   Gasperi	   era	   the	  
Christian	   Democratic	   party	   was	   beholden	   to	   the	   Vatican	   and	   Confindustria	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
benefitting	  from	  their	  electoral	   linkages	  and	  resources,	  and	  so	  found	  themselves	  squeezed	  
between	   the	   Catholic	   conservatism	   of	   the	   former	   and	   the	   liberalism	   of	   the	   latter.	   The	  
situation	  was	   therefore	   initially	   not	   too	  different	   from	   that	   in	  Germany,	   also	   because	   the	  
liberal	   finance	   minister	   Einaudi	   was	   a	   strong	   admirer	   of	   ordoliberal	   ideas.47	   However,	   in	  
contrast	   to	   Germany,	   no	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	   ideational	   competition	   unfolded	   in	   Italy.	   The	  
reason	  behind	  this	  was	  the	  artificial	  blockade	  of	  party	  competition	  through	  the	  exclusion	  of	  
the	  second	  largest	  Italian	  party,	  the	  Communist	  PCI	  (then	  labeled	  as	  antidemocratic),	  from	  
any	   government	   coalition.	   The	   consensus	   among	   all	   the	   other	   “democratic”	   parties	   to	  
exclude	   the	  Communists	   from	  all	   law	  making	   blocked	   any	   pressure	   that	  might	   have	  been	  
stimulated	   by	   Communist	   social	   security	   ideas.	   The	   threat	   that	   the	   PCI	  might	   implement	  
their	   social	   security	   was	   precluded	   through	   the	   cartelization	   of	   the	   system	   by	   the	   DC.	  
Despite	   this	   “artificial”	   stalemate,	   and	   the	   resulting	   vicious	   cycle	   of	   competition,	   welfare	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  See	  chapter	  7.3.4	  of	  this	  thesis	  on	  page	  263-­‐264.	  46	  This	  was	  possible	  because	  he	  could	  appease	  the	  ordoliberals	  later	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  independent	  central	  bank.	  Electoral	  considerations	  also	  played	  a	  strong	  role	  for	  Adenauer	  when	  he	  introduced	  his	  big	  pension	  reform	  in	  1957.	  47	  He	  was	  also	  the	  first	  director	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Sciences	  at	  Milan’s	  Bocconi	  University	  which	  would	  become	  a	  stronghold	  of	  Ordoliberal	  ideas	  in	  Italy.	  Famous	  Ordoliberal	  economists	  and	  austerity	  promoters	  such	  as	  Alberto	  Alesina	  or	  Mario	  Monti	  (who	  used	  to	  be	  president	  of	  Bocconi)	  all	  graduated	  from	  Bocconi.	  See	  :	  Blyth,	  M.	  (2012)	  Unpublished	  manuscript.	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was	   nevertheless	   constructed	   in	   post	  WWII	   Italy.	   The	   reason	   can	   be	   found	   partly	   in	   the	  
social	   doctrine	   of	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   and	   Catholics,	   but	   also	   strategic	   party	  
considerations.	   During	   the	   1940s	   and	   1950s	   the	   DC	   had	   no	   auxiliary	   organizations	   that	  
linked	  it	  to	  the	  Catholic	  subculture	  and	  its	  voters.	  The	  party	  therefore	  relied	  on	  the	  Liberal	  
employers’	  association	  Confindustria	  and	  the	  conservative	  Vatican	  to	  gather	  its	  votes	  which	  
severely	   limited	   its	   policy	   autonomy.	   After	   De	   Gasperi’s	   fall,	   the	   DC	   consciously	   tried	   to	  
emancipate	   itself	   from	  both	   institutions	  during	   the	   Fanfani	   period.	   The	  price	   for	   electoral	  
autonomy	   was	   high.	   Although	   the	   DC	   managed	   to	   partly	   build	   its	   own	   subculture,	   large	  
parts	   of	   the	   system	   had	   to	   be	   maintained	   through	   clientelist	   welfare	   ties	   with	   the	  
electorate.	   While	   it	   developed	   a	   strong	   Christian	   Democratic	   subculture	   based	   on	   the	  
nurturing	   of	   an	   encompassing	   worldview	   in	   the	   North,	   which	   also	   included	   the	  
implementation	   of	   Catholic	   social	   ideas,	   the	   legacy	   of	   this	   phase	   was	   the	   practice	   of	  
transformismo	  and	  the	  welfare	  clientelism	  that	  was	  needed	  to	  achieve	  electoral	  cohesion	  in	  
the	   South.	   This	   echoed	   once	   again	  Gramsci’s	   famous	   judgment	   about	   the	   nation	   building	  
effort	  of	  the	  Italian	  Liberal	  elites	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  that	  had	  created	  a	  “Bastard”.48	  It	  was,	  
therefore,	   not	   simply	   the	   predominance	   of	   Catholic	   religion	   that	   conditioned	   the	  welfare	  
politics	   of	   the	   peninsula,	   as	   most	   static	   and	   linear	   religion-­‐centered	   approaches	   would	  
suggest.	  Instead,	  it	  was	  the	  contextual	  interaction	  of	  sub-­‐entities	  of	  this	  religion	  that	  formed	  
the	  specific	  clientelist	  welfare	  outcome	   in	   Italy	   that	  made	   it	  a	  “Southern	  Welfare	  State”.49	  
The	  path	  towards	  a	  more	  efficient	  and	   less	   fragmented	  and	  clientelist	  welfare	  regime	  had	  
been	  blocked	  because	  political	  competition	  that	  could	  have	  pressured	  the	  DC	  to	  adopt	  such	  
ideas	  was	  absent.	  
The	  synthesis	  of	   the	  parallel	  developments	   in	  both	  countries	  after	  WWII	  shows	  that	  
virtuous	  and	  vicious	  cycles	  of	  competition	  were	  once	  again	  crucial	   for	  the	  development	  of	  
social	  security	   legislation.	  At	  first	  glance	  it	  seems	  that,	  even	  though	  scope	  conditions	  were	  
largely	   the	   same,	   ideational	   configuration	   of	   the	   newly	   founded	   Christian	   Democratic	  
parties	   in	   both	   countries	   was	   very	   much	   different	   in	   both	   cases.	   While	   conservative	  
Protestantism	  with	   its	  ordoliberal	   ideas	  and	  Social	  Catholicism	   joined	   together	   in	  one	  and	  
the	  same	  Christian	  Democratic	  movement	  after	  the	  war,	  no	  such	  convergence	  occurred	   in	  
Catholic	   Italy.	   However,	   Ordoliberal	   ideas	   had	   also	   settled	   in	   Italy	   and	   found	   strong	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010).	  49	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1996).	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promoters	  in	  the	  Liberal	  movement	  around	  the	  first	  president	  of	  Italy’s	  central	  bank,	  finance	  
minister	   and	   later	   state	   president	   Luigi	   Einaudi.50	   Nevertheless,	   the	   decisive	   influence	  
between	  the	  two	  was	  not	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  German	  case	  Ordoliberals	  and	  Catholics	  were	  
bound	  together	  within	  the	  same	  party	  while	  in	  the	  Italian	  case	  they	  were	  not.	  Instead,	  the	  
decisive	   difference	  was	   the	   presence	   of	   vicious	   cycles	   of	   competition	   through	   the	   locking	  
out	  of	  the	  Left	  from	  political	  competition	  in	  Italy,	  while	  the	  legislative	  proposals	  of	  the	  Left	  
in	  Germany	  had	  prompted	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  of	  competition.	  
From	  all	  this	  follows	  that	  an	  analysis	  of	  welfare	  and	  public	  policy	  can	  and	  must	  look	  at	  
more	   than	   just	   structural,	   functional	   material	   or	   institutional	   constraints.	   Instead,	   much	  
more	   attention	   should	   be	   paid	   to	   the	   configuration	   of	   programmatic	   ideas	   of	   the	   various	  
political	   actors	   and	   how	   these	   interact	   and	   reconfigure	  with	   one	   another.	   However,	   such	  
processes	  cannot	  be	  analyzed	  as	  static	  snapshots	  but	  should	  rather	  be	  seen	  as	  constituting	  
moving	  targets	  as	  they	  are,	  by	  definition,	  composed	  through	  a	  dynamic	  process.	  Hence,	  this	  
suggests	  the	  development	  of	  new	  analytical	  frameworks	  that	  can	  better	  capture	  the	  entire	  




This	   thesis	   has	   frequently	   used	   the	   terminology	   that	   ideas	   and	   ideational	   cycles	   evolve.	  
Indeed,	   the	   empirics	   showed	   that	   ideas	   evolve	   and	   are,	   to	   a	   certain	   degree,	   exposed	   to	  
mechanics	   that	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   ones	   that	   drive	   biological	   evolution.	   The	   advantage	   of	  
applying	   evolutionary	   theory	   to	   the	   level	   of	   programmatic	   ideas	   and	  worldviews	   is	   that	   it	  
escapes	  “biological	  reductionism”.52	  As	  Streeck	  rightly	  observes,	  “in	  the	  real	  historical	  world,	  
it	   is	   this	   socially	   and	   culturally	   generated	   diversity	   that	   matters,	   not	   its	   biological	  
substructure.”53	   Furthermore,	   applying	   evolutionary	   theory	   to	   ideas	   and	  not	   to	  organisms	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (2000).	  51	  We	  also	  need	  a	  much	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  framework	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  programmatic	  ideas	  of	  political	  actors	  that	  goes	  way	  beyond	  left	  right	  or	  material-­‐post	  material	  classifications.	  52	  For	  a	  very	  good	  overview	  and	  discussion	  of	  the	  Pros	  and	  Cons	  of	  an	  import	  of	  Evolutionary	  Theory	  to	  the	  Social	  Sciences	  see	  Streeck,	  W.	  (2009)	  and	  Steinmo,	  S.	  (2010)	  The	  Evolution	  of	  
Modern	  States,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  53	  Streeck,	  W.	  (2009)	  p.	  17.	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helps	   to	   rescue	   the	   theory	   from	   Spencer’s	   social	   Darwinist	   	   “survival	   of	   the	   fittest”54and	  
from	  linear	  forms	  of	  “adaptive	  functionalism”.55	  	  
	   If	   evolutionary	   theory	   is	   interested	   in	   “understanding	   how	   and	   why	   populations	  
adapt,	   prosper	   and	   die	   out”56	   then	   ideational	   scholars	   should	   be	   interested	   in	   how	  
“programmatic	   ideas	   and	  worldviews	   adapt,	   prosper	   and	   die	   out”.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   a	  
social	   Darwinism	   of	   ideas.	   As	   this	   thesis	   has	   discovered,	   ideas	   and	   worldviews,	   unlike	  
biological	   species,	   do	   not	   die	   out.	   Their	   carriers	   and	   political	   vehicles	   can	   die,	   and	   they	  
themselves	  can	  be	  relegated	  to	  ephemeral	  positions	  for	  extended	  periods,	  but	  they	  cannot	  
die	  (see	  for	  example,	  the	  numerous	  reincarnations	  of	  various	  neo-­‐liberalisms,	  the	  survival	  of	  
Nazism	   as	   Neo	   Nazism,	   or	   the	   return	   of	   corporatism	   as	   neo-­‐corporatism).	   Hence,	   an	  
evolutionary	  approach	  to	  ideas	  or	  culture	  must	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  cultural	  Darwinism	  in	  
which	  the	  best	  culture	  and	  idea	  survives	  by	  wiping	  out	  other	  cultures	  and	  ideas.	  
	   Concepts	   of	   cultural	   evolution	   have	   existed	   since	   the	   18th	   century	   and	   were	  
especially	  popular	  in	  Victorian	  England.	  Early	  accounts	  of	  cultural	  evolution	  imply	  that	  every	  
society	  was	  situated	  on	  a	  unilinear	  continuum	  of	  cultural	  evolution.	  Exposed	  to	  pressures	  of	  
evolution,	  societies	  evolved	  from	  simple	  to	  complex	  societies.	  Where	  you	  were	  situated	  on	  
this	   continuum	  was	  dependent	  on	   your	   evolutionary	   status	  but,	   in	   the	   end,	   every	   society	  
would	   inevitably	   finish	   at	   the	   complex	   endpoint	   of	   this	   continuum	   (which	   was	   not	   very	  
surprisingly	   perceived	   to	   be	   industrializing	   Victorian	   England).	   This	   concept	   shared	   many	  
similarities	  with	  the	  modernization	  theory	  so	  popular	   in	  political	  science	  of	  the	  1960s.	  The	  
Victorian	   legacy	  of	   the	  concept	   that	  emerged	  at	  a	   time	  when	  Britain	  was	   indisputably	   the	  
most	  modern	   country	   on	   earth	  might	   also	   be	   the	   reason	  why	   still	   today	   the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  
model	   of	   liberalism	   and	   capitalism	   are	   often	   implicitly	   seen	   as	   the	   end	   stage	   of	   human	  
evolution.57	  Only	  during	   the	   last	   two	  decades	  has	   the	  view	  of	   the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  model	  as	  a	  
paramount	  end	  stage	  been	  increasingly	  challenged	  in	  political	  economy.	  Esping-­‐Andersen58	  
did	  so	  by	  simply	  inverting	  the	  modernization	  continuum	  and	  putting	  the	  Scandinavian	  model	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Streeck,	  W.	  (2009)	  p.	  18.	  55	  Streeck,	  W.	  (2009)	  p.	  18.	  56	  Lewis,	  O.	  &	  Steinmo,	  S.	  (2007)	  p.	  10	  57	  The	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  seemed	  to	  think	  the	  same	  for	  most	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  the	  early	  2000s.	  Also	  most	  work	  of	  historians	  obsessed	  with	  the	  question	  why	  many	  continental	  European	  countries	  diverged	  from	  the	  liberal-­‐democratic	  role-­‐model	  of	  development,	  which	  is	  implicitly	  always	  the	  British	  one.	  For	  them	  the	  divergence	  from	  the	  ‘normal’	  path	  is	  found	  in	  an	  absent	  liberal	  revolution	  and	  the	  consequence	  was	  fascism	  and	  genocide.	  58	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1990).	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on	   top.	  Hall	   and	   Soskice	   followed	  up	  with	   the	   slightly	   less	  normative	   implications	  of	   their	  
VoC	  approach.59	   Streeck	  and	  Yamamura60	  explored	  differences	  and	  communalities	   in	  non-­‐
Anglo-­‐Saxon,	  non-­‐liberal	  Capitalism	  while	  Steinmo61	  put	  forward	  an	  approach	  that	  pointed	  
out	  that	  states	  that	  can	  be	  found	  on	  a	  comparable	  position	  of	  the	  modernization	  continuum	  
can	  have	  evolved	  and	  taken	  fundamentally	  different	  forms	  and	  shapes.	  
However,	   other	   fields	   that	   work	   with	   the	   concept	   of	   cultural	   evolution	   had	  
abandoned	  the	  concept	  much	  earlier.	  By	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s	  archeology	  and	  anthropology	  
had	  already	  reached	  	  a	  consensus	  that	  unilinearity	  was	  not	  empirically	  sustainable	  and	  that,	  
instead,	   many	   multilinear	   developmental	   pathways	   of	   cultural	   evolution	   exist.62	   The	  
question	  that	  this	  begs	  is	  how	  the	  evolution	  of	  ideas	  that	  this	  thesis	  scrutinizes	  differs	  from	  
the	  multilinear	  evolutionary	  concepts	  of	  anthropologists	  and	  archeologists	  from	  the	  1930s?	  
The	  difference	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  analysis.	  While	  neo-­‐evolutionary	  anthropologists	  are	  occupied	  
with	  the	  evolution	  of	  societies,	  populations	  or	  cultures	  as	  a	  whole,	   I	  am	  only	   interested	   in	  
the	  evolution	  of	  ideas	  within	  a	  society	  or	  culture.	  The	  empirics	  of	  this	  thesis	  imply	  that	  the	  
way	  ideas	  evolve	  is	  often	  very	  congruent	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  biological	  species.	  
Three	  mechanisms	   are	   central	   to	   classic	  Darwinian	   evolutionary	   theory:	   selection,	  
variation	   and	   retention.	   All	   three	   find	   expression	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   evolving	   vicious	   and	  
virtuous	   cycles	   of	   ideas	   that	   this	   thesis	   has	   put	   forward.	   First,	   as	  we	   have	   seen,	   virtuous	  
cycles	  are	  provoked	  and	  stipulated	  by	  functional	  pressures.	  These	  functional	  pressures	  rise	  
from	   a	   changing	   environment.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   unfolding	   of	   a	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	  
competition	   is	  a	  process	  of	  adaptation	  of	  older	   ideas	   to	  a	  new	  environment.	  The	  virtuous	  
cycle	  of	  ideational	  competition	  is	  the	  selection	  mechanism	  through	  which	  this	  cycle	  works.	  If	  
old	   ideas	   caught	   up	   in	   a	   cycle	   do	   not	   renew	   and	   update	   themselves,	   they	   are	   extracted,	  
relegated	  to	  the	  background	  and	  become	  ephemeral	  in	  the	  political	  process.	  Second,	  at	  the	  
same	   time	   the	   cycles	  are	   the	  explanation	   for	   the	  empirical	   fact	   that	  no	   two	  countries	  are	  
alike	  and	  yet	  one	  can	  still	  categorize	  countries,	  welfare	  systems	  and	  polities	  into	  groups	  that	  
share	  similar	  traits.	  This	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  Darwinian	  concepts	  of	  variation	  and	  population	  
thinking.	  Just	  as	  there	  are	  no	  human	  clones,	  nor	  can	  there	  be	  two	  political	  entities	  that	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Hall,	  P.	  &	  Soskice,	  D.	  (2001).	  60	  Streeck,	  W.	  &	  Yamamura,	  K.	  (2001).	  	  	  61	  Steinmo,	  S.	  (2010).	  62	  One	  of	  the	  most	  convincing	  rejections	  of	  unilinear	  cultural	  development	  came	  from	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  neo-­‐evolutionist	  anthropologist	  Franz	  Boas.	  Technical	  innovations	  and	  diffusion	  of	  technical	  knowledge	  became	  a	  major	  aspect	  of	  cultural	  development	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totally	   congruent.	   Third,	   as	   this	   thesis	   has	   shown,	   there	   is	   also	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   vicious	  
cycle	   which	   leads	   to	   a	   stalemate	   and	   non-­‐development	   of	   ideas.	   This	   is	   similar	   to	   the	  
concept	   of	   retention	   in	   Evolutionary	   Theory,	   which	   essentially	   describes	   biological	   path	  
dependency.	  
Yet,	  there	  are	  also	  of	  course	  several	  divergences	  and	  problems	  that	  arise	  from	  such	  
an	  analogy.	  First,	  if,	  as	  this	  thesis	  has	  shown,	  ideas	  do	  not	  die	  in	  the	  selection	  process,	  like	  
biological	   subentities	   of	   species	   (only	   their	   political	   carriers	   can	   die)	   but	   are	   merely	  
relegated	   to	   the	  background,	  how	  can	   then	  a	   true	   selection	  pressure	  unfold?	  Or,	   in	  other	  
words,	  what	   is	   the	   level	   and	   unit	   of	   selection	   that	   applies	   to	   programmatic	   ideas?	   Is	   the	  
programmatic	  idea	  itself	  the	  target	  or	  its	  political	  carrier?	  However,	  the	  level	  of	  selection	  is	  
a	  problem	  that	  has	  not	  even	  been	  fully	  resolved	  by	  biological	  evolutionists.	  There	   is	   fierce	  
controversy	  over	  whether	  the	  unit	  of	  selection	  is	  the	  gene	  (Richard	  Dawkins)63	  or	  the	  whole	  
organism	   (Charles	   Mayr).64	   In	   any	   case,	   this	   requires	   further	   empirical	   and	   theoretical	  
investigation.	  A	  second	  problem	  is	  posed	  by	  gradualism	  in	  biological	  evolution	  and	  the	  lack	  
of	   agency.	   If	   “Evolution	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   the	   genetic	   turnover	   of	   the	   individuals	   of	  
every	  population	  from	  generation	  to	  generation”65	  as	  Ernst	  Mayr	  puts	  it,	  then	  this	  indicates	  
that	   it	   is	   a	   very	   long	   lasting	   and	  only	   gradually	   unfolding	  process.	   Yet,	   from	   the	  empirical	  
material	   in	   this	   thesis	  we	  can	   see	   that	  especially	   virtuous	  cycles	  of	   ideational	   competition	  
can	  unfold	   very	   fast.	  However,	   it	   is	   by	  now	  common	  ground	   that	   “saltations”	   (spurts)	   are	  
not	   possible	   in	   biological	   evolution.	   Nevertheless,	   “saltations”	   are	   possible	   in	   ideational	  
evolution	   (arguably	   because	   ideas	   can	   cross-­‐fertilize	   to	   a	   certain	   extent).	   This	   is	   why	  
ideational	  evolution	  unfolds	  much	   faster	   than	  biological	  evolution.66	  This	  brings	  me	  to	   the	  
last	  point	  of	  divergence,	  which	  is	  the	  seeming	  absence	  of	  agency	  in	  the	  Darwinian	  model	  of	  
natural	  selection.	  In	  politics,	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  ideas,	  agency	  is	  everywhere.	  If	  a	  
political	   carrier	  chooses	   to	  update	  his	   ideas	   in	   light	  of	   the	  pressures	  of	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  of	  
competition,	   it	   is	   often	   a	   conscious	   and	   even	  deliberated	  decision	   that	   can	   also	   lead	   to	   a	  
vicious	   cycle	   and	   the	   non-­‐adaptation	   of	   the	   programmatic	   idea	   or	   worldview.	   Recent	  
advances	   in	  evolutionary	  psychology	  point	  even	   to	   the	   importance	  of	   agency	   in	  biological	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Dawkins,	  R.	  (1976)	  The	  Selfish	  Gene,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  64	  Mayr,	  E.	  (2001).	  65	  Mayr,	  E.	  (2001)	  p.	  76.	  66	  Cultural	  evolution	  also	  evolves	  in	  spurts	  as,	  for	  example,	  the	  move	  from	  the	  stone,	  to	  the	  bronze	  and	  later	  to	  the	  iron	  age	  through	  the	  invention	  of	  new	  tools.	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evolutionary	   processes	   for	   mate	   choice	   and	   courtship	   behavior.67	   However,	   the	   problem	  
with	   this	   is	   that,	   unlike	   the	   reminders	   of	   natural	   selection,	   “behaviors	   do	   not	   fossilize”.68	  
This	  might	  be	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  research	  of	  behavior	  in	  the	  biological	  evolution	  of	  animals	  
but	   not	   for	   human	   evolution	   as	   our	   ability	   to	   communicate	   and	   preserve	   communication	  
leaves	  us	  cultural	  artifacts	  or	  historical	  material	  with	  which	  we	  can	  explore	  such	  processes.	  
To	   conclude,	   to	   think	   about	   ideas	   and	   their	   development	   in	   evolutionary	   terms	  
seems	  to	  be	  a	  plausible	  and	  fruitful	  way	  of	  thinking.	  However,	  much	  more	  time	  and	  research	  
is	   needed	   to	   draw	   up	   a	   comprehensive	   framework.	   The	   biggest	   nut	   to	   crack	   is,	   in	   my	  
opinion,	   the	   ‘level	   of	   selection’	   question.	   This	   thesis	   might	   have	   shed	   light	   on	   how	   the	  
selection	  and	  transformation	  of	  ideas	  works	  but	  the	  findings	  offer	  no	  watertight	  conclusion	  
about	  the	  level	  that	  guides	  the	  actual	  selection	  impulse	  (e.g.	  does	  the	  survival	  impulse	  come	  
from	  the	  idea,	  the	  worldview,	  the	  carrier?).	  The	  thesis	  has	  also	  not	  come	  to	  a	  final	  verdict	  
about	  the	   level	  on	  which	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  selection	  manifest	  themselves	  (Catholic	  
social	   teaching,	  political	  Catholicism,	  Christian	  Democracy,	   the	  Vatican	  or	   the	  conservative	  
German	  welfare	  state?).69	  
	   A	   stronger	   focus	   of	   evolutionary	   theory	   on	   cultural	   solutions,	   hence	   ideas	   and	  
worldviews,	  could	  lead	  to	  an	  enrichment	  of	  comparative	  politics	  as	  it	  is	  a	  nice	  way	  to	  solve	  
the	  variation	  of	  systems	  question.	  It	  has	  decisive	  advantages	  relative	  to	  most	  contemporary	  
comparative	   research,	  which	   remains	   firmly	   rooted	   in	   a	   Newtonian	   physical	   and	  material	  
perception	  of	  social	  structure	  that	  is	  studied	  according	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  comparative	  statics.	  
Let	  me	   close	   the	   empirical	   and	   theoretical	   assessment	   of	   this	   thesis	   with	   a	   short	  
note	   on	   the	   normative	   implications	   of	   this	   thesis.	   This	   thesis	   implicitly	   suggests	   that	  
pluralism	  is	  a	  good	  thing.	  More	  political	  players,	  worldviews	  and	  ideas	  not	  only	  lead	  to	  more	  
choice	   for	   the	   citizen	   but	   also	   yield	   a	   higher	   probability	   of	   sparking	   a	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	  
competition.	  The	  advantage	  therefore	  lies	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  ideational	  updating	  that	  can	  
be	  expected	   in	  an	   ideational	  multiculture	   in	  contrast	   to	  an	   ideational	  mono-­‐	  or	  bi-­‐culture.	  
Ideational	   monocultures	   lead	   to	   monocultures	   of	   thought	   and,	   hence,	   bring	   about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Miller,	  G.	  (1998).	  68	  Miller,	  G.	  (1998)	  p.	  16	  of	  the	  manuscript.	  69	  Ideas	  could	  be	  genes	  and	  states	  or	  societies	  organisms	  but	  this	  would	  take	  us	  back	  to	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  biological	  reductionism.	  I	  also	  doubt	  that	  there	  is	  a	  DNA	  like	  code	  inscribed	  in	  every	  Ideas	  but	  there	  are	  certainly	  compatibilities	  and	  incompatibilities	  between	  certain	  ideas	  that	  mirror	  some	  compatibilities	  and	  incompatibilities	  in	  biology.	  If	  one	  confines	  the	  feed-­‐back	  effect	  of	  an	  adaptation	  of	  an	  idea	  to	  a	  changing	  environment	  then	  one	  has	  also	  come	  much	  closer	  to	  unraveling	  the	  real	  unit	  of	  selection.	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ideational	   stasis	   that	   remains	   unresponsive	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   environment	   –	   and	   so	  
evolution	  comes	  to	  a	  halt.	  This	  is	  what	  makes	  plural	  settings	  advantageous.	  Note	  that	  this	  is	  
very	   different	   from	   the	   implications	   of	   classic	   pluralist	   theory	   formulated	   by	   scholars	   like	  
Dahl70	  and	  Polsby71	  as	   the	   implications	  of	   this	   thesis	  center	  around	  group	   ideas	   instead	  of	  
group	  interest.72	  
	  
10.3 Worldviews	  and	  Programmatic	  Ideas	  Today	  
One	  last	  question	  arises:	  can	  such	  a	  pluralist	  model	  of	  group	  ideas	  still	  work	  in	  a	  21st	  century	  
society	   that	   is	   ever	   more	   individualized	   and	   where	   the	   classic	   subcultures	   that	   structure	  
politics	  in	  the	  19th	  and	  20th	  century	  have	  lost	  grip,	  appeal	  and	  cohesion?	  In	  the	  last	  section	  I	  
will	  briefly	  explore	  whether	  the	  frameworks	  outlined	  can	  help	  in	  the	  study	  of	  contemporary	  
21st	   century	   welfare	   politics	   against	   the	   background	   of	   recent	   family	   policy	   reforms	   in	  
Germany.	  The	  tentative	  comparison	  to	   Italy	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  section	  unveils	  a	  number	  of	  
empirical	  hunches	  on	  the	  level	  of	  selection	  question	  that	  was	  discussed	  before.	  
	  
10.3.1 Christian	  Democracy	  in	  a	  new	  Cultural	  Environment	  
The	   Lipset-­‐Rokkanian	  model	   of	  Western	   European	   politics	   has	   become	   almost	   universally	  
accepted	   in	  political	   science.	   	  The	  European	  electorates	  were	  stable	  and	  segmented	  along	  
cleavage	   lines	   that	   translated	   into	   party	   systems.	   The	   dominant	   class	   cleavage,	   that	  
emerged	   during	   industrialization,	   produced	   “parties	   of	   organized	   labor”	   which	   were	  
supplemented	  by	  “historic	  religious,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  ethnic	  and	  regional	  divisions”73	  
that	  also	   translated	   into	   the	  party	   systems.	  These	  systems	  and	   their	  electorates	   remained	  
frozen	  from	  the	  1920s	  up	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1960s.	  The	  heightened	  volatility	  that	  Bartolini	  and	  Mair	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Dahl,	  R.	  (1961)	  Who	  Governs?	  Democracy	  and	  Power	  in	  an	  American	  City,	  Yale,	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  71	  Polsby,	  N.	  (1963[1980])	  Community,	  Power	  and	  Political	  Theory,	  Institute	  of	  Governmental	  Studies	  Press.	  72	  However,	  I	  agree	  with	  most	  neo-­‐marxist	  or	  elite-­‐theory	  critics	  of	  pluralism	  that	  a	  pluralism	  of	  ideas	  would	  still	  be	  a	  struggle	  about	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  one	  group	  over	  the	  ideas	  of	  another	  group.	  Therefore,	  ideational	  competition	  should	  be	  embedded	  in	  an	  institutional	  frmawork	  that	  inhibits	  such	  dominance.	  73	  Kitschelt,	  H.,	  Lange,	  P.	  ,	  Marks,	  G.	  &	  Stephens,	  J.	  D.	  (1999)	  Introduction,	  IN:	  Kitschelt,	  H.,	  Lange,	  P.	  ,	  Marks,	  G.	  &	  Stephens,	  J.	  D.	  (eds.)	  Continuity	  and	  Change	  in	  Contemporary	  Capitalism,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  2-­‐3.	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observed	  in	  the	  European	  electorate	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  onwards	  pointed	  out	  that	  politics	  
in	  Western	   Europe	   was	   increasingly	   confronted	   with	   what	   Kitschelt	   calls	   a	   “new	   cultural	  
environment”.74	  Society	  seemed,	  from	  the	  1970s	  onwards,	  less	  and	  less	  frozen	  into	  different	  
subcultures	   –	   a	   process	   that	   was	   stipulated	   by	   the	   diffusion	   and	   transformation	   of	   the	  
former	  main	  cleavages.	  For	  this	  thesis,	  three	  such	  developments	  are	  of	  utmost	  importance.	  
First,	   the	  process	  of	  deindustrialization	  and	  the	  shift	   towards	  a	  post-­‐industrial	  economy	   in	  
many	   European	   countries	   weakened	   and	   diffused	   the	   class	   cleavage.	   As	   Esping-­‐Andersen	  
projected,	  “postindustrial	  politics	  will	  mirror	  a	  society	  of	  highly	  differentiated	  working	  lives	  
and	  families”.75	  The	  second	  major	  aspect	   is	   the	  continuous	  emancipation	  of	  women.	  From	  
the	   late	   1960s	   onwards,	  more	   and	  more	  women	   entered	   higher	   education	   and	   the	   labor	  
market.	  Today	  the	  percentage	  of	  women	  in	  higher	  education	  has	  surpassed	  that	  of	  men	  in	  
most	  OECD	  countries.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  women	  are	  heavily	  discriminated	  against	  on	  the	  job	  
market	   in	   terms	   of	   pay	   and	   position.	   The	   third	   change	   is	   a	   process	   of	   accelerated	  
secularization	   from	   the	   late	  1960s	  onwards.76	  Church	  membership	  and	  church	  attendance	  
diminished	   significantly,	   which	   substantially	   decreased	   the	   potential	   for	   parochial	   control	  
through	  the	  religious	  authorities.	  
	   At	  first	  glance,	  these	  processes	  should	  have	  dried	  out	  the	  vote	  reservoir	  of	  Christian	  
Democratic	   parties.77	   However,	   as	   van	   Kersbergen	   notes,	   despite	   the	   strong	   decline	   in	  
religiosity,	   “no	   linear	   association	  with	  Christian	  Democratic	   success”78	   seems	   to	  exist.	  Van	  
Kersbergen’s	  explanation	  for	  this	  is	  that	  Christian	  Democratic	  politics	  might	  have	  completely	  
emancipated	  itself	  from	  its	  religious	  roots	  and	  instead	  already	  bases	  its	  success	  entirely	  on	  
politics	   of	   mediation	   –	   a	   system	   that	   allows	   for	   the	   reconciliation	   of	   different	   groups	   in	  
society	   through	  elaborated	  transfer	  systems	   incorporated	   in	  continental	  European	  welfare	  
regimes.	   Nevertheless,	   in	   the	   late	   1990s	   van	   Kersbergen	   argued	   that	   the	   changes	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Kitschelt,	  H.	  (1994)	  p.	  1.	  75	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1999)	  p.	  294.	  76	  Norris,	  P.	  &	  Ingelhart,	  R.	  (2004)	  Sacred	  and	  Secular:	  Religion	  and	  Politics	  Worldwide,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  83-­‐95;	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1999)	  Contemporary	  Christian	  Democracy	  and	  the	  Demise	  of	  the	  Politics	  of	  Mediation,	  IN:	  Continuity	  and	  Change	  in	  
Contemporary	  Capitalism,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  p.	  351.	  77	  Christian	  Democratic	  parties	  up	  into	  the	  1970s	  enjoyed	  large	  female	  vote	  surpluses.	  Wilarty,	  S.	  (2010).	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  ‘female	  Christian	  Democratic	  affinity’	  is	  often	  seen	  in	  the	  male	  breadwinner	  economies	  of	  Christian	  Democratic	  countries	  in	  which	  women	  were	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  shielded	  from	  the	  class	  cleavage	  by	  their	  role	  as	  housewives.	  Other	  explanations	  point	  to	  the	  higher	  religiosity	  of	  women	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  and	  the	  resulting	  stronger	  appeal	  of	  confessional	  parties	  for	  them.	  78	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1999)	  p.	  354.	  
	   	   	   339	  
production	   regimes	   that	   most	   European	   countries	   undergo	   during	   post-­‐industrialization	  
would	  make	  the	  old	  systems	  of	  mediation	  inadequate	  and	  unaffordable	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  For	  
him	  “the	  golden	  age	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  mediation	  has	  come	  to	  an	  end”.79	  	  However	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  1990s,	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  proclaimed	  that	  	  
	  
On	  hindsight,	   the	  amazing	  durability	  of	   the	  Social	  Democratic	  and	  Christian	  Democratic	  mass	  parties	   lay	   in	   their	   capacity	   to	  
secure	  working-­‐class	  welfare	   in	  the	  era	  of	  high	  industrialism.	  Their	  fate,	  today,	   is	  closely	  related	  to	  how	  they	  simultaneously	  
manage	  working-­‐class	  decline	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  new	  strata.80	  
	  
	  
What	  one	  can	  derive	  from	  Esping-­‐Andersen’s	  statement	  is	  that	  neither	  Christian	  Democracy	  
nor	   Social	   Democracy	   were	   doomed	   to	   cease	   to	   exist	   (as	   van	   Kersbergen	   argued)	   when	  
confronted	  with	  the	  value	  and	  class	  changes	  from	  the	  1970s	  onwards.	  Instead,	  their	  rise	  or	  
fall	  depended	  on	  their	  potential	  to	  adapt	  to	  their	  new	  social	  environment.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  
success	  or	  failure	  of	  Christian	  Democracy	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s	  depended	  largely	  on	  their	  
ability	   to	   incorporate	   new	   values	   and	   cleavages	   into	   their	   worldviews	   and	   develop	  
programmatic	  ideas	  that	  spoke	  to	  these	  new	  segments	  of	  the	  electorate.	  This	  ability	  was	  not	  
solely	   determined	   endogenously	   but	   also	   exogenously	   as	   it	   once	   again	   depended	   on	   the	  
unfolding	   of	   virtuous	   and	   vicious	   cycles	   of	   competition.	   In	   other	   words,	   a	   process	   of	  
adaptation	   by	   Christian	   Democratic	   parties	   was	   more	   likely	   and	   successful	   wherever	  
virtuous	  cycles	  of	  competition	  unfolded.	  	  As	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  system	  of	  mediation	  is	  
not	   exclusively	   built	   on	   transfer	   payments	   and	   the	  welfare	   state,	   as	   van	   Kersbergen	   puts	  
forward,	  but	  also	   features	  an	   internal	  party	  mechanism	  that,	  as	  Wilarty	  has	  emphasized,81	  
helps	   to	   appease	  and	   incorporate	  different	  programmatic	   ideas	   and	  worldviews,	  Christian	  
Democracy	  should	  in	  principle	  at	  least	  have	  the	  chance	  to	  escape	  the	  negative	  outlook	  of	  a	  
deterioration	  of	  religion	  and	  class.	  However,	  not	  every	  Christian	  Democratic	  party	  managed	  
to	   adapt	   to	   and	   survive	   the	   changes	   in	   the	   environment.	   While	   the	   German	   Christian	  
Democrats	  did	  manage	  to	  adapt	  and	  survive,	  the	  Italian	  Christian	  Democrats	  were	  selected	  
out.	  Once	  again,	  the	  difference	  is	  made	  by	  virtuous	  vs.	  vicious	  cycles	  of	  competition.	  
The	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  blocking	  of	  the	  party	  system	  through	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  
Communists	  from	  government	  in	  Italy	  led	  to	  an	  ideational	  monoculture.	  This	  was	  not	  even	  
broken	   through	   the	   social	   shifts	   of	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s.	   The	   situation	   was	   stabilized	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Van	  Kersbergen,	  K.	  (1999)	  p.	  365.	  80	  Esping-­‐Andersen,	  G.	  (1999)	  p.	  294.	  81	  Wilarty,	  S.	  (2010).	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through	  the	  clientelist	  vote	  exchange	  mechanisms	  that	  the	  party	  increasingly	  built	  up	  in	  the	  
1960s.	   In	   Germany,	   the	   situation	   was	   different.	   German	   Christian	   Democrats	   also	  
experienced	  harsh	  problems	   through	   the	  demise	  of	   the	  Catholic	   subculture	  as	  well	   as	   the	  
emergence	   of	   new	   post-­‐material	   cleavages,	   especially	   the	   gender	   question.	   However,	  
pressure	  for	  change	  became	  inescapable	  when	  the	  Green	  party	  slowly	  established	  itself	  as	  
an	  alternative	  first	  on	  the	  state	  and	  later	  on	  the	  federal	  level,	  especially	  for	  highly	  educated	  
middle	  class	  women.	  
	  
10.4 Germany	  
Much	  like	  the	  Italian	  DC,	  German	  Christian	  Democracy	  faced	  some	  challenging	  conditions	  in	  
the	  1980s.	  Religiosity	  had	  plummeted	  since	  the	  1960s	  and	  the	  churches	  had	  redefined	  their	  
relations	   with	   Social	   Democracy	   in	   a	   much	   more	   positive	   way	   since	   the	   Second	   Vatican	  
Council.	   Furthermore,	   the	   party	   struggled	   to	   adapt	   to	   the	   new	   post-­‐materialist	   and	   post-­‐
industrialist	  cleavage	  that	  had	  emerged	  in	  German	  society	  and	  had	  to	  witness,	  through	  the	  
rise	  of	   the	  Green	  Party,	   the	   surfacing	  of	   a	  new	  challenger	   in	   the	  party	   system.	  The	  highly	  
visible	  threat	  that	  the	  Green	  party	  posed	  through	  the	  altering	  of	  the	  coalition	  potential	  for	  
the	   Social	   Democrats	   (they	   could	   now	   align	   with	   either	   the	   Liberals	   or	   the	   Greens)	   was	  
supplemented	  by	   a	   “stealthier”	   less	   visible	   trend	   that	   challenged	   the	  Christian	  Democrats	  
from	  the	  1970s	  onwards.	  This	  was	  the	  constant	  erosion	  of	  the	  advantage	  that	  the	  party	  had	  
enjoyed	   in	   female	   votes	   since	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Second	  World	  War.	   The	  party	   tried	   to	   react	  
through	  a	  series	  of	  internal	  party	  reforms	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  better	  gender	  awareness	  
during	   the	  1980s	  but	   they	  all	   failed.	  Especially	  virulent	  were	   the	  controversies	  around	   the	  
male	  breadwinner	  model.	  This	  concept	  has	  been	  central	  to	  Christian	  Democratic	  politics	  and	  
transmitted	  into	  many	  policy	  fields	  such	  as	  industrial	  relations,	  family	  policy,	  tax	  policy	  and	  
social	   insurance.	   The	   following	   will	   scrutinize	   how	   difficult	   it	   was	   to	   extract	   the	   male	  
breadwinner	   model	   from	   the	   Christian	   Democratic	   worldview	   and	   how	   it	   led	   to	   a	  
recapturing	  of	  some	  of	  the	  female	  vote	  bonus	  that	  the	  party	  had	  lost	  since	  the	  1970s.	  
	  
10.4.1 The	  male	  breadwinner	  model	  and	  Christian	  Democracy	  
The	  male	  breadwinner	  model	  was	  not	  a	   traditional	  model	  of	  German	  society	  but	   largely	  a	  
creation	  of	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  and	  especially	  of	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  period.	  Up	  until	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the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  Germany	  was	  based	  on	  a	  society	  of	  dual	  income	  households.	  82	  
The	   male	   breadwinner	   model	   was	   made	   a	   fashionable	   social	   norm	   by	   the	   upcoming	  
bourgeoisie	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Catholic	  Church	   incorporated	  
the	   male	   breadwinner	   model	   into	   its	   worldview	   early	   on.	   Rerum	   Novarum	   stated	   that	  
"Paternal	  authority	  can	  neither	  be	  abolished	  nor	  be	  absorbed	  by	  the	  State"83	  and	  added	  that	  
"mothers	  on	  account	  of	  the	  father's	  low	  wage	  to	  be	  forced	  to	  engage	  in	  gainful	  occupations	  
outside	  the	  home	  to	  the	  neglect	  of	  their	  proper	  cares	  and	  duties,	  especially	  the	  training	  of	  
children."84	  
Bourgeoisie	  standards	  and	  Catholic	  worldviews	  caused	  the	  male	  breadwinner	  model	  
to	   spread	   as	   an	   ideal	   but	   it	   only	   became	   a	   predominant	   social	   reality	   in	   the	   post-­‐WWII	  
period.	  After	  1945	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  seized	  the	  male	  breadwinner	  model	  and	  enacted	  
policies	   that	  made	  "the	  housewife	  model	  of	   the	  male	  breadwinner	   family	   […]	   the	  basis	  of	  
West	   German	   family	   culture."85	   	   In	   the	   early	   Christian	   Democratic	   party	   manifestos	   the	  
family	  "is	  the	  foundation	  of	  social	  life"86	  and	  "is	  holy".87	  The	  manifestos	  promote	  that	  every	  
"adult	   and	  working	   human	   has	   the	   right	   to	   a	   salary	   that	  will	  make	   it	   possible	   for	   him	   to	  
found	   and	   sustain	   a	   family".88	   These	   are	   provisions	   that	   come	   very	   close	   to	   the	   papal	  
encyclical	  of	  1891.	  The	  Frankfurter	   Leitsätze,89	   issued	  by	   the	  Christian	  Democrats	   in	  1945,	  
set	   out	   that	   "men	  must	   […]	   be	   the	   head	   of	   the	   family"	   and	   that	   the	   "state	   must,	   by	   its	  
economic	  and	  social	  policy,	  give	  him	  the	  opportunity	  to	  nurture	  his	  family	  in	  honor".90	  	  
These	   were	   not	   mere	   Catholic	   catch	   phrases.	   The	   Christian	   Democrats	   also	  
implemented	  them.	  The	  male	  breadwinner	  concept	  not	  only	  became	  the	  core	  of	  Christian	  
Democratic	   worldviews	   and	   entered	   in	   its	   ideas	   but	   also	   formed	   a	   cornerstone	   of	   the	  
continental	  European	  welfare	  model.	  	  In	  order	  to	  further	  secure	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Catholic	  
Church,	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   built	   these	   provisions	   into	   the	   early	   family	   policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Gerlach,	  U.	  (2010)	  83	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  14.	  84	  Rerum	  Novarum,	  p.	  71.	  85	  Pfau-­‐Effinger,	  B.	  (2004),	  p.	  384.	  86	  CDU	  (1945c).	  87	  "Die	  Familie	  ist	  die	  Grundlage	  der	  sozialen	  Lebensordnung,	  Ihr	  Lebensraum	  ist	  heilig."	  CDU	  (1945c)	  p.	  10.	  88	  "Der	  Erwachsene,	  arbeitende	  Mensch	  hat	  Anspruch	  auf	  einen	  Lohn	  ,	  der	  ihm	  die	  Gründung	  und	  Erhaltung	  einer	  Familie	  ermöglicht.“	  CDU	  (1985c)	  p.	  12.	  89	  CDU	  (1945b).	  90	  "Der	  Mann	  muss	  in	  vollem	  Sinne	  das	  Haupt	  der	  Familie	  sein	  [...]	  dass	  ihm	  der	  Staat	  durch	  seine	  Wirtschafts-­‐	  und	  Sozialpolitik-­‐	  die	  Möglichkeit	  gibt,	  seine	  Familie	  in	  Ehren	  zu	  ernähren"	  CDU	  (1945b)	  p.	  4-­‐5.	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arrangements	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic.	  Adenauer	  founded	  the	  first	  Family	  Ministry	   in	  1953	  
and	   made	   the	   Catholic	   Josef	   Würmeling	   the	   responsible	   minister	   in	   exchange	   for	   the	  
Catholic	  Church’s	  support	  during	  the	  election	  campaign.	  
Würmeling	  opened	  his	   first	  parliamentary	   speech	  with	   the	   claim	   that	   "the	  Church	  
was	   his	   best	   and	   most	   important	   comrade-­‐in-­‐arms".91	   His	   policy	   was	   built	   on	   the	  
confinement	   of	   women	   to	   the	   household	   and	   on	   the	   promotion	   of	  marriage	   in	   order	   to	  
counter	   the	   increasing	   divorce	   rates	   in	   the	   1950s	   that,	   according	   to	   Würmeling,	   would	  
create	  moral	  havoc	  and	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  "stray	  kids".92	  The	  second	  family	  minister,	  a	  
Catholic	  by	   the	  name	  of	  Bruno	  Heck,	  was	  also	  a	  concession	   to	   the	  Church.	  Both	  ministers	  
engineered	   the	   first	   institutions	   of	   the	   Federal	   Republic	   in	   a	   way	   that	   made	   male	  
breadwinner	   families	   the	   overwhelmingly	   dominant	   social	   reality.	   Christian	   Democrats	  
manipulated	   the	   incentive	   structure	   for	   women	   so	   that	   they	   could	   benefit	   only	   if	   they	  
stayed	   at	   home.	   The	   tax	   break	   for	   married	   couples	   with	   children	   from	   1949	  
(Kinderfreibetrag),	  the	  house	  ownership	  promotion	  laws	  and	  the	  family	  allowance	  law	  from	  
1954	   were	   part	   of	   this	   strategy.	   Under	   the	   favorable	   economic	   conditions	   of	   the	   West	  
German	  economic	  miracle,	  this	  was	  possible	  and,	  even	  in	  light	  of	  the	  labor	  shortage	  of	  the	  
early	   1960s,	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   did	   not	   alter	   their	   strategy.	   Industry	   demanded	   the	  
entry	  of	  women	  into	  the	  job	  market	  but	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  opted	  for	  wooing	  foreign	  
‘Gastarbeiter’	  instead	  of	  putting	  women	  into	  jobs.93	  Daycare	  and	  the	  dual	  earner	  model	  was	  
essentially	   a	  moral	   taboo.	   This	   stance	  was	  not	   only	   appreciated	  by	  Conservative	  men	  but	  
also	  by	  Christian	  Democratic	  women.	   In	   fact	   the	  party	  had	  an	  advantage	  amongst	  women	  
voters.	   Wilarty	   analyzes	   that	   “Until	   1972,	   the	   CDU	   regularly	   received	   8	   percent	   to	   10	  
percent	  more	  from	  female	  voters	  than	  from	  male	  voters”.94	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  “die	  Kirche	  für…(…)	  (seinen)	  besten	  und	  wichtigsten	  Mitstreiter	  in	  (…)	  seinem	  aufgabengebiet“,	  Cited	  IN:	  Gerlach,	  I.	  (2010)	  p.	  179.	  92	  Würmeling	  cited	  IN:	  Gerlach,	  I.	  (2010),	  p.	  180.	  93	  This	  speaks	  against	  the	  currently	  popular	  interpretations	  by	  some	  scholars	  that	  attribute	  the	  turn	  in	  German	  family	  policy	  to	  the	  demand	  of	  employers	  for	  higher	  educated	  women.	  94	  Wilarty,	  S.	  E.	  (2010)	  The	  CDU	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Gender	  in	  Germany:	  Bringing	  Women	  to	  the	  
Party,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  p.	  20.	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Figure	  10-­‐1	  Female	  vote	  Bonus	  Christian	  Demcorats	  Germany	  Post	  WWII	  
	  
Figure	  by	  the	  author.	  Data	  from	  Wilarty,	  S.	  E.	  (2010)	  p.21.	  The	  0-­‐Line	  represents	  the	  male	  vote.	  
	  
As	  the	  above	  graph	  shows,	  Conservative	  female	  voters	  started	  to	  massively	  defect	  from	  the	  
party	   from	   the	   late	   1960s	   onwards.	   Women	   started	   to	   demand	   societal,	   political	   and	  
economic	  participation	  during	  the	  1960s.	  Furthermore,	  the	  numbers	  of	  females	  enrolling	  in	  
tertiary	   education	   increased	   steeply	   and	  Germany’s	   transition	   towards	   a	   service	  economy	  
started.95	  The	  late	  1960s	  led	  to	  what	  Jane	  Lewis	  calls	  “the	  erosion	  of	  the	  male	  breadwinner	  
model	  at	  the	  behavioral	  level”.	  
The	  deterioration	  of	  the	  women	  bonus	   in	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  votes	  from	  the	  
1960s	  onwards	  is	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  adaptation	  in	  Christian	  Democracy	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  
the	   female	   lifestyle	   and	   attitudes	   since	   the	   mid-­‐1960s.	   With	   the	   decline	   of	   religiosity	  
beginning	  in	  the	  1960s,	  the	  programmatic	  idea	  of	  the	  male	  breadwinner	  increasingly	  lost	  its	  
appeal	   amongst	   the	   female	   electorate.	   Furthermore,	   the	   shift	   to	   a	   service	   economy	   from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Bertram,	  H.	  (2009)	  Familienforschung	  und	  Familienpolitik:	  Themen,	  Felder	  und	  familiale	  Lebenslagen,	  IN:	  Mertens,	  G.;	  Frost,	  U.	  &	  Böhm,	  W.	  V.	  (eds.)	  Handbuch	  der	  Erziehungswissenschaft	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the	   1970s	   saw	  more	   and	  more	  women	   joining	   the	   active	  working	   population	   and	   further	  
deteriorated	   the	   societal	  base	  of	   the	  model.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  male	  breadwinner	   concept	  
stayed	   strongly	   entrenched	   in	   the	   Christian	   Democratic	   worldview	   and	   its	   programmatic	  
ideas.	  
Similar	  to	  the	  situation	  that	  Bismarck	  faced	  with	  the	  surfacing	  of	  the	  male	  working	  
class	   in	   the	   19th	   century,	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   found	   themselves	   confronted	  with	   the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  new	  socio-­‐economic	  active	  segment	  of	  society:	  women	  that	  had	  undergone	  
a	   strong	   value	   shift	   in	   the	   late	   1960s	   and	   1970s	   and	   who	   increasingly	   entered	   higher	  
education	   or	   the	   job	   market	   no	   longer	   saw	   their	   situation	   reflected	   in	   the	   Christian	  
Democratic	  worldview	  and	  programmatic	  ideas.	  
In	   itself	   this	   was	   not	   problematic	   for	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   and	   not	   even	   the	  
deteriorating	  number	  of	   female	  votes	  seemed	  to	  bother	   them.	  The	  situation	  only	  became	  
serious	   once	   a	   viable	   political	   alternative	   emerged	   that	   offered	   an	   ideational	   response	   to	  
the	  demands	  of	   these	  women.	  This	  came	   in	   the	  shape	  of	   the	  Green	  party	  which	  made	   its	  
presence	  felt	   first	  on	  the	  municipal	   level,	   later	  on	  the	  state	   level	  and	  finally,	  with	   its	  great	  
breakthrough	   of	   1983,	   on	   the	   federal	   level.	  Women	   that	   had	   voted	   Christian	   Democratic	  
could	  now	  vote	  for	  the	  Green	  party.96	  
The	  Christian	  Democrats	  were	  unwilling	  and	  unable	  to	  adapt	  their	  party	  platform	  to	  
the	   new	   situation.	   Hence,	   Germany	   saw	   at	   first	   a	   vicious	   cycle	   of	   competition	   unfolding	  
which	  made	  any	  policy	   that	  catered	  to	   the	  new	  needs	  of	  women,	  especially	   reconciliatory	  
regimes	   for	  work	  and	   family,	   impossible.	  However,	   this	   vicious	   cycle	  did	  not	   freeze	   into	  a	  
stalemate	   like	   the	   one	   in	   19th	   century	   Italy	   between	   the	   Vatican	   and	   the	   Liberal	   state.	  
Instead,	  the	  pressures	  of	  competition	   increased.	  These	  pressures	  would	  not	  only	  unfold	   in	  
the	   Christian	   Democrats	   but	   also	   hit	   the	   second	   big	   welfare	   and	   male	   breadwinner	  
promoting	  party,	  the	  Social	  Democrats.	  However,	  for	  the	  time	  being	  both	  parties	  were	  deaf	  
to	  the	  new	  demands.	  	  
During	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s,	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	   tried	   to	   reform	   their	   party	  
platform	   but	   the	   outcome	   was	   often	   embarrassing	   or	   at	   least	   ambiguous.	   The	   “women	  
party	   congregation”	   of	   1985	   should	   have	   been	   a	   watershed	   moment.	   Only	   one	   year	  
previously	   though	   the	   party	   had,	   under	   instructions	   from	   its	   general	   secretary	   Heiner	  
Geißler,	   flown	   in	   an	   entire	   bare	   breasted	   Parisian	   dance	   ensemble	   to	   entertain	   the	  male	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  The	  author’s	  mother	  was	  one	  of	  these	  women.	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delegates	   at	   the	   party	   congregation	   in	   Kiel.97	   The	   ambiguity	   of	   Christian	   Democratic	  men	  
towards	   a	  modernization	  of	   their	   party	   considering	   gender	   can	  be	  derived	   from	   the	  1985	  
program.	  At	  one	  point	  it	  states	  that	  “The	  CDU	  rejects	  a	  policy	  that	  confines	  women	  or	  men	  
to	   certain	   roles	   or	   which	   does	   not	   want	   to	   recognize	   the	   differences	   between	   men	   and	  
women.”98	   At	   another	   stage,	   however,	   it	   puts	   forward	   that	   “It	   is	   a	   mistake	   of	   radical	  
feminism	  to	  withdraw	  into	  a	  male	  free	  shelter	  and	  to	  dream	  of	  the	  matriarchy.”99	  
	  
10.4.2 Getting	  rid	  of	  the	  male	  breadwinner	  
The	  adaptive	  pressures	  on	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  regarding	  gender	  issues	  received	  a	  new	  
spin	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  
	   Unification	  further	  accelerated	  the	  decline	  of	  female	  votes.	  East	  German	  women,	  in	  
general,	  worked	  more	  and	  longer	  than	  their	  West	  German	  counterparts.100	  They	  were	  more	  
secularized	  and	  socialized	  in	  a	  dual-­‐earner/career	  society.101	  Furthermore,	  the	  percentage	  of	  
female	  members	  of	   the	  Christian	  Democrats	  was,	  at	  40%	   in	  1991,	   twice	  as	  high	  as	   that	   in	  
the	  West.	  That	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  did	  not	  cater	  to	  these	  members	  during	  the	  1990s	  is	  
indicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  membership	  had	  decreased	  to	  30%	  by	  2000.102	   	  Despite	  the	  
increased	   pressures	   for	   a	   change	   of	   Christian	   Democratic	   family	   policy	   brought	   on	   by	  
unification,	  the	  party	  did	  not	  alter	  its	  core	  family	  positions.	  Throughout	  the	  1990s,	  the	  West	  
German-­‐Catholic-­‐traditional	   party	   establishment	   remained	   hegemonic	   and	   colonized	   the	  
bulk	   of	   the	   former	   East	   German	   Christian	   Democratic	   block-­‐party103	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Bonn	  Reizt	  die	  Frauen,	  Der	  Spiegel,	  1985,	  No.	  3,	  pp.	  24-­‐30.	  98	  „Die	  CDU	  lehnt	  eine	  Politik	  ab,	  die	  Frauen	  oder	  Männer	  auf	  bestimmte	  Rollen	  festlegt	  oder	  die	  Unterschiede	  zwischen	  Mann	  und	  Frau	  nicht	  wahrhaben	  will.“	  CDU	  (1985)	  Leitsätze	  der	  CDU	  für	  eine	  neue	  Partnerschaft	  zwischen	  Mann	  und	  Frau,	  33.	  Bundesparteitag,	  20-­‐22	  März,	  Essen,	  p.	  2.	  99	  “Es	  ist	  ein	  Fehler	  von	  radikalen	  Feministinnen,	  sich	  in	  einen	  Männerfreien	  Schonraum	  zurückzuziehen	  und	  vom	  Matriarchat	  zu	  träumen.“	  CDU	  (1985)	  	  p.	  3.	  100	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2002)	  p.	  259.	  101	  Nickel,	  M.	  H.	  (2009)	  Paternalistische	  Gleichberechtigungspolitik	  und	  weibliche	  	  Emanzipation:	  Geschlechterpolitik	  in	  der	  DDR,	  IN:	  Lorenz,	  A.	  &	  	  Reutter,	  W.	  (eds.)	  
Ordnung	  und	  Wandel	  als	  Herausforderungen	  für	  Staat	  und	  Gesellschaft,	  Opladen,	  VS	  Verlag,	  pp.	  167-­‐183.	  102	  Bösch,	  F.	  (2002),	  p.	  255.	  103	  This	  becomes	  obvious	  when	  one	  considers	  the	  long	  list	  of	  Christian	  Democratic	  Prime	  Ministers	  of	  East	  German	  states	  that	  were	  Catholic	  West	  German	  imports.	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unification	  had	  tipped	  the	  denominational	  balance	  in	  Germany	  in	  favor	  of	  Protestantism.104	  
The	  family	  and	  gender	  policy	  platform	  of	  the	  party	  remained	  unchanged.	  Kohl’s	  unmatched	  
popularity	  as	  the	  “unification	  chancellor”	  which	  led	  him	  to	  win	  two	  subsequent	  elections	  in	  
the	   1990s	   is	   one	   reason;	   the	   other	   reason	   is	   that	   the	   pressure	   for	   a	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	  
competition	  eased	  when	  the	  Green	  party	  did	  not	  make	  it	  into	  the	  first	  unified	  Bundestag.	  
	   This	   all	   changed	   after	   the	   breakthrough	   electoral	   victory	   of	   the	   Social	   Democrat	  
Gerhard	   Schröder	   in	   1998	   that	   ended	   16	   years	   of	   Christian	   Democratic	   chancellorship.	  
Schröder	   had	   substantially	   altered	   the	   platform	   of	   the	   Social	   Democrats	   prior	   to	   the	  
elections.	   Similar	   to	   Tony	   Blair	   in	   Britain,	   he	   had	   re-­‐launched	   the	   SPD	   as	   a	   third	   way	  
alternative	  to	  the	  Christian	  Democrats.	  The	  third	  way	  was	  a	  belated	  response	  to	  the	  post-­‐
material	  value	  changes	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  included	  also	  many	  vows	  for	  more	  gender	  balanced	  
politics.	   This	   stipulated	   a	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	   ideational	   competition	   that	   did	   not	   remain	  
unattended	  by	  the	  Christian	  Democrats.	  
	   The	  electoral	  defeat	  of	  Kohl	  in	  1998	  finally	  opened	  up	  a	  wider	  opportunity	  not	  only	  
for	  the	  overhauling	  of	  the	  family	  positions	  of	  the	  CDU,	  but	  also	  for	  a	  takeover	  by	  groups	  that	  
had	  been	  marginalized	  during	  the	  1990s,	  such	  as	  Protestants,	  East	  Germans	  and	  women.105	  
Angela	  Merkel	  became	  party	  secretary	  and	  declared	  her	  intention	  to	  make	  the	  CDU	  "one	  of	  
the	  most	  modern	  parties	  of	  Europe"106	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  2002	  elections.	  The	  East	  German	  
Protestant	   Merkel,107	   was	   less	   than	   enthusiastic	   about	   the	   (West	   German)	   Conservative	  
male	   breadwinner	   family	   policy.	   The	   new	   credo	   of	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	  was	   to	   “stop	  
ordering	  people	  how	  they	  should	  lead	  their	  lives”.108	  The	  result	  was	  the	  manifesto	  "Lust	  for	  
family"	  from	  1999.	  As	  in	  1985,	  it	  was	  designed	  to	  ignite	  a	  fundamental	  Christian	  Democratic	  
reform	   process.109	   The	   Berlin	   congregation	   from	   which	   it	   originated	   was	   portrayed	   as	   a	  
Christian	   Democratic	   "cultural	   revolution".110	   Female	   commentators	   were	   astonished	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  After	  the	  territorial	  losses	  following	  WWII	  and	  partition,	  the	  balance	  in	  West	  Germany	  was	  roughly	  a	  50/50	  Catholic/Protestant.	  This	  changed	  again	  in	  favor	  of	  Protestantism	  after	  reunification.	  105	  Wilarty,	  S.	  (2010).	  106Lust	  auf	  Familie	  -­‐	  Lust	  auf	  Verantwortung.	  Beschluss	  des	  "kleinen	  Parteitages"	  der	  CDU	  Deutschlands.	  Berlin,	  13.	  December	  1999,	  p.	  3.	  107	  Merkel	  was	  Protestant	  and	  had	  been	  married	  twice.	  108	  "aufhören	  den	  Menschen	  vorzuschreiben	  wie	  sie	  leben	  sollen"	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  19.	  8.	  1999,	  p.	  6.	  109	  Lust	  auf	  Familie	  -­‐	  Lust	  auf	  Verantwortung.	  Beschluss	  des	  "kleinen	  Parteitages"	  der	  CDU	  Deutschlands.	  Berlin,	  13.	  Dezember	  1999.	  110	  "Es	  handelt	  sich	  um	  eine	  Christdemokratische	  Kulturrevolution"	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung‚	  Die	  Kulturrevolution	  der	  CDU,	  21.10.1999,	  p.	  4.	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the	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung	  remarked	  that	  "the	  proposal	   is	  almost	  too	  good	  to	  be	  true".111	   In	  
fact,	  the	  proposal	  marked	  the	  final	  departure	  from	  the	  male	  breadwinner	  postulation	  of	  the	  
CDU	  by	  proposing	  a	  system	  that	  would	  make	  work	  and	  family	  life	  reconcilable.	  The	  program	  
opens	   with	   an	   assessment	   of	   the	   socioeconomic	   gender	   realities	   in	   Germany	   that	   puts	  
forward	   that	   “Men	   can	   and	   want	   less	   and	   less	   to	   be	   the	   sole	   male	   breadwinner	   of	   the	  
family”.112	  Furthermore,	  it	  recognizes	  “that	  the	  simultaneous	  occupation	  of	  both	  partners	  is	  
nowadays	   a	   broadly	   desired	   lifestyle	   model	   choice.”113	   Furthermore,	   the	   manifesto	  
postulates	  that	  “A	  modern	  family	  policy	  cannot	  lead	  to	  a	  state	  supported	  institutionalization	  
of	  one	  sided	  gender	  patterns	  that	  lead	  to	  a	  work	  division	  between	  men	  and	  women.”114	  	  By	  
dismissing	   the	   male	   breadwinner	   model	   as	   outdated,	   it	   opened	   itself	   to	   a	   state	   driven	  
approach	  to	  daycare	  provision.	  The	  political	  competitors	  were	  irritated	  and	  frightened.	  Like	  
Marx	   complaining	   about	   the	   Catholics	   in	   1886115,	   the	   Green	   Party	   accused	   the	   Christian	  
Democrats	  in	  1999	  of	  stealing	  from	  their	  programs.116	  However,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  end	  point	  
of	  the	  reformation	  of	  Christian	  Democratic	  family	  and	  male-­‐breadwinner	  policy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  "das	  Papier	  ist	  fast	  zu	  schön	  um	  wahr	  zu	  sein"	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  ‚Abschied	  vom	  Heimchen	  am	  Herd‘,	  11.12.1999,	  p.	  10.	  112	  „Männer	  können	  und	  wollen	  immer	  seltener	  die	  alleinigen	  Ernährer	  der	  Familie	  sein.“	  Lust	  auf	  Familie.	  Lust	  auf	  Verantwortung.	  Beschluss	  des	  Bundesausschusses	  der	  CDU	  Deutschlands.	  Berlin,	  13.	  Dezember	  1999,	  p.	  3.	  113	  „Die	  gleichzeitige	  Berufstätigkeit	  beider	  Partner	  ist	  das	  heute	  mehrheitlich	  gewünschte	  Lebensentwurf-­‐Modell.“	  Lust	  auf	  Familie.	  Lust	  auf	  Verantwortung.	  Beschluss	  des	  Bundesausschusses	  der	  CDU	  Deutschlands.	  Berlin,	  13.	  Dezember	  1999,	  p.	  3.	  	  114	  „Eine	  moderne	  Familienpolitik	  darf	  nicht	  zu	  einer	  staatlich	  geförderten	  Verfestigung	  einseitiger	  Rollenmuster	  der	  Aufgabenteilung	  zwischen	  Mann	  und	  Frau	  führen.“	  Lust	  auf	  Familie.	  Lust	  auf	  Verantwortung.	  Beschluss	  des	  Bundesausschusses	  der	  CDU	  Deutschlands.	  Berlin,	  13.	  Dezember	  1999,	  p.	  13.	  115	  see	  Chapter	  4	  of	  this	  thesis.	  116	  "Lust	  auf	  Familie"	  Der	  Spiegel	  12.10.1999.	  This	  paradigmatic	  change	  in	  policy	  position	  was	  not	  solely	  Angela	  Merkel's	  personal	  contribution,	  but	  was	  rather	  the	  result	  of	  a	  specific	  power	  constellation	  that	  had	  emerged	  in	  the	  party	  after	  the	  electoral	  defeat	  of	  1998.	  The	  reform	  was	  actively	  pushed	  for,	  and	  engineered	  by,	  Conservative	  women.	  In	  particular,	  it	  was	  actively	  supported	  by	  the	  Frauen	  Union,	  headed	  by	  Rita	  Süssmuth,	  and	  the	  Junge	  Union	  youth	  organization	  of	  the	  party,	  at	  that	  time	  also	  headed	  by	  a	  women	  (Hildegart	  Müller)	  (Süddeutsche	  Zeitung	  18.10.1999,	  p.	  6).	  Rita	  Süssmuth,	  who	  had	  been	  at	  the	  helm	  of	  progressive	  family	  policies	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  (the	  promotion	  of	  Rita	  Süssmuth	  from	  the	  position	  of	  family	  minister	  to	  become	  president	  of	  the	  Bundestag	  was	  sold	  as	  a	  promotion	  but	  was	  de	  facto	  a	  sidelining	  strategy),	  was	  brought	  back	  into	  the	  fold	  by	  Merkel.	  (Personal	  Interview,	  07.01.2011,	  with	  Hans	  Bertram,	  Professor	  of	  Sociology,	  Humboldt	  University	  Berlin	  and	  member	  of	  the	  expert	  committee	  on	  the	  development	  of	  family	  policy	  from	  the	  federal	  government.)	  The	  women’s	  and	  youth	  organizations	  of	  the	  CDU	  were	  actively	  embraced	  by	  Merkel	  and	  supported	  by	  other	  young	  upcoming	  reformers	  such	  as	  Jügern	  Rüttgers.	  Similarly,	  the	  East	  could	  also	  now	  come	  to	  the	  forefront.	  Former	  party	  activists	  of	  the	  East	  German	  Christian	  Democratic	  block	  party,	  who	  had	  been	  sidelined	  by	  Kohl	  during	  the	  1990s,	  were	  reinvigorated	  by	  Merkel’s	  approach.	  The	  male	  Catholic	  Conservatives	  who	  opposed	  a	  deviation	  from	  the	  traditional	  family	  policy	  position	  were	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10.4.3 Family	  Policy	  as	  a	  Denominational	  Battle	  
In	   the	   2002	   elections,	   the	   Bavarian	   Edmund	   Stoiber	   from	   the	   CSU	   was	   filed	   as	   a	   joint	  
candidate	   for	   CDU	   and	   CSU.	   Surprisingly,	   the	   Conservative	   hardliner	   continued	   the	  
progressive	   family	   policy	   line	   of	   the	   1999	   manifesto.	   Stoiber	   declared	   that	   family	   policy	  
should	  become	  a	  major	  topic	   in	  his	  2002	  campaign.117	   In	   line	  with	  the	  prescriptions	  of	  the	  
1999	   manifesto,	   day-­‐care	   was	   to	   be	   expanded	   in	   order	   to	   make	   work	   and	   family	  
reconcilable.118	   A	   further	   progressive	   signal	   was	   the	   nomination	   of	   Katherina	   Reiche,	   a	  
young	  Protestant	  and	  unmarried	  mother	  from	  East	  Germany,	  as	  the	  designated	  family	  policy	  
expert	  in	  his	  cabinet.119	  	  
The	  Catholic	  Church	  reacted	  with	  bitter	  hostility	  towards	  the	  progressive	  family	  policy	  
ideas	   of	   Stoiber’s	   shadow	   cabinet.	   Cardinal	   Meisner	   from	   Cologne	   advised	   the	   Christian	  
Democrats	  to	  scrap	  the	  "C"	  from	  their	  name.120	  Many	  Catholics	  read	  Meisner’s	  reaction	  to	  
the	   nomination	   of	   Reiche	   as	   "one	  of	   the	   nails	   in	   the	   coffin	   of	   the	   electoral	   victory	   of	   the	  
Christian	   Democrats".121	   Furthermore,	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   blackmailed	   the	   Christian	  
Democrats	   by	   releasing	   an	  unfavorable	   letter	   from	   the	  pulpit	   (Hirtenbrief).122	   Such	   letters	  
are	  traditionally	  read	  from	  every	  German	  Catholic	  pulpit	   in	  the	  sermon	  on	  the	   last	  Sunday	  
before	  the	  elections.	  They	  usually	  amount	  to	  advice	  on	  how	  Catholics	  should	  cast	  their	  vote.	  
Pollsters	   subsequently	  predicted	   losses	   in	   the	  Catholic	   core	   vote	   for	   the	  party.123	   Cardinal	  
Ratzinger,	   then	   the	   chief	   of	   the	  Catholic	   congregation	   in	  Rome	  and	   today	   known	  as	  Pope	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  weakened	  by	  the	  party	  financing	  scandal	  of	  the	  late	  1990s.	  Even	  if	  not	  personally	  involved,	  the	  scandal	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  Conservatives	  to	  position	  themselves	  as	  beacons	  of	  morality.	  (Süddeutsche	  Zeitung	  7.Dezember	  1999,	  p.	  6.)	  117	  "Die	  Familie	  als	  Thema	  entdeckt"	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung	  25.	  March	  2002,	  p.	  6.	  See	  also:	  Höll,	  S.:	  ‚Familien	  Treffen	  auf	  der	  Edel	  Alm‘,	  IN:	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung.	  12.10.2002,	  p.	  8.	  118	  Leistung	  und	  Sicherheit	  -­‐	  	  Zeit	  für	  Taten	  -­‐	  Regierungsprogramm	  2002/2006	  von	  CDU	  und	  CSU.	  119	  „Die	  doppelte	  Frau“	  Kahlweit,	  C.,	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  23.7.2002	  120	  „legte	  der	  Kardinal	  der	  Partei	  nahe,	  das	  Christliche	  C	  aus	  dem	  Namen	  zu	  streichen.“	  Daenzer-­‐Vanotti,	  I.	  „Wider	  die	  Normabweichung“	  in	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  21.12.2002,	  NRW	  Issue,	  p.	  50.	  See	  also:	  „Weiße	  Kaninchen“	  Augstein,	  F.	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  17.7.2002,	  p.	  13.	  121	  "Im	  Bistum	  sahen	  manche	  in	  diesen	  Worten	  einen	  der	  Sargnagel	  für	  den	  Wahlsieg	  der	  CDU"	  Daenzer-­‐Vanotti,	  I.	  „Wider	  die	  Normabweichung“	  in	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  21.12.2002,	  NRW	  Issue,	  p.	  50.	  122	  „Katholische	  Bischöfe	  drohen	  Stoiber	  mit	  Hirtenbrief“	  Schwilk,	  H.	  in	  Die	  Welt.	  14.7.2002,	  See	  also:	  Ein	  Hirtenbrief	  gegen	  Katherina	  Reiche,	  wie	  es	  ein	  Gerücht	  besagte?“	  Dobrinski,	  M.	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung	  5.10.2002,	  p.	  1.	  	  123	  ‚Katholische	  Bischöfe	  drohen	  Stoiber	  mit	  Hirtenbrief‘	  Schwilk,	  H.,	  Die	  Welt,	  14.7.2002.	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Bendict	   XVI,	   was	   cited	   as	   having	   “great	   concern	   regarding	   the	   developments	   of	   German	  
Christian	   Democracy”.124	   The	   pressure	   was	   so	   high	   that	   Ms	   Reiche	   had	   to	   get	   married,	  
publicly	  announce	  it	  and	  renounce	  her	  liberal	  views	  on	  partnership	  outside	  wedlock	  and	  her	  
progressive	   stance	  on	  homosexual	  partnership.125	  Stoiber	  was	   forced	   to	  considerably	   tone	  
down	  his	  progressive	  family	  policy	  stance	  after	  being	  confronted	  with	  this	  massive	  criticism	  
and	  resistance.	  Pulled	  back	  to	  this	  orthodox	  family	  policy	  position,	  the	  party	  went	  into	  the	  
2002	  elections	  -­‐	  and	  lost.126	  
Most	   newspaper	   editorials	   pointed	   to	   the	   negative	   effect	   of	   the	   neo-­‐orthodox	  
family	  position	  for	  the	  2002	  election	  for	  the	  Christian	  Democrats.	  Susanne	  Höll	  commented	  
in	   the	   Süddeutsche	   Zeitung	   that	   “The	   Union	   claims	   to	   stand	   in	   the	  middle	   of	   life.	   That’s	  
right.	  It	  stands	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  life,	  however	  of	  a	  past	  century.”127	  Rita	  Süssmuth	  analyzed	  
after	  the	  2002	  election	  defeat	  that	  "The	  party	  gives	  itself	  a	  new	  perception	  of	  women	  but,	  
when	   it	  comes	  down	  to	   it,	   it	   retracts."128	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	   the	  party	   lost	  heavily	   in	  East	  
Germany	  and	  among	  young	  female	  voters.	   	  
	   The	  difference	  in	  how	  the	  electoral	  defeat	  was	  interpreted	  by	  Christian	  Democratic	  
progressives	   and	   Conservatives	   was	   depicted	   nicely	   in	   the	   programmatic	   discussion	   that	  
followed	   the	   electoral	   defeat	   in	   2002.	   The	   Conservative	   Catholics,	   like	   Teufel	   and	   Vogel,	  
argued	   that	   changing	   the	   stance	   in	   family	   policy	   had	   boiled	   down	   "to	   hawking	   the	  
Conservative	  silverware"129	  and	  to	  “driving	  the	  Union	  into	  oblivion”.130	  The	  traditionalists	  in	  
the	  party	  were	  deeply	  afraid	  of	  losing	  the	  Conservative	  core	  vote	  of	  their	  party.131	  In	  other	  
words,	   they	   were	   afraid	   of	   the	   instabilities	   that	   a	   change	   in	   the	   worldview	  might	   trigger	  
towards	   the	   remainders	   of	   the	   Catholic	   subculture.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   reformers	   around	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  „Kardinal	  Joseph	  Ratzinger	  der	  mit	  den	  Worten	  zitiert	  wird,	  er	  sei	  in	  „großer	  Sorge	  um	  die	  Entwicklung	  der	  deutschen	  Christdemokratie.“	  Cited	  IN:	  	  ‚Katholische	  Bischöfe	  drohen	  Stoiber	  mit	  Hirtenbrief‘	  Schwilk,	  H.	  in	  Die	  Welt.	  14.7.2002	  	  125	  ‚Reiche	  will	  Segen	  der	  Kirche‘	  Kahlweit,	  C.	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  17.6.2002,	  p.	  5.	  See	  also:	  „Reiche	  ist	  nun	  doch	  Familienexpertin	  Stoibers“	  Höll,	  S.	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  4.7.2002,	  p.	  6.	  126	  Against	  the	  Red-­‐Green	  coalition	  headed	  by	  Schröder	  who	  had	  promised	  a	  new	  family	  policy	  and	  harvested	  a	  considerable	  bonus	  in	  women’s	  votes.	  	  127	  „Die	  Union	  behauptet,	  sie	  stünde	  mitten	  im	  Leben.	  Das	  stimmt.	  Sie	  steht	  mitten	  im	  Leben,	  allerdings	  eines	  vergangenen	  Jahrhunderts.“	  Höll,	  S.	  ‚Familienbild	  von	  Anno	  Dunnemals‘,	  IN:	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  3.7.2002,	  p.	  3.	  128	  Rita	  Süssmuth	  cited	  by	  Franziska	  Augstein,	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  17.	  7.2002.	  129	  Heuwagen,	  M.	  „Union	  über	  Richtige	  Strategie	  zerstritten“	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung	  7.10.	  2002,	  p.	  5.	  130	  “warfen	  der	  Vorsitzenden	  vor	  das	  Familiensilber	  der	  Partei	  zu	  verscherbeln,	  sprich	  die	  Union	  in	  den	  Untergang	  zu	  treiben.“	  Höll,	  S.:	  ‚Familien	  Treffen	  auf	  der	  Edel	  Alm‘,	  IN:	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung.	  12.10.2002,	  p.	  8.	  131	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  24.10.2006,	  ‚Abschied	  von	  Gestern‘,	  p.	  4.	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Merkel	  argued	  that	  a	  new	  family	  policy	  cannot	  pay	  mere	  lip	  service	  if	  elections	  were	  to	  be	  
won.132	  The	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung	  commented:	  “After	  the	  electoral	  defeat,	  Schäuble,	  Merkel	  
and	   some	   others	   started	   to	   guide	   the	   party	   into	   the	   contemporary.	   There,	   however,	   it	  
seemed	  that	  many	  Christian	  Democrats	  did	  not	  want	  to	  arrive.”133	  
The	  lost	  election	  of	  2002	  and	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Red-­‐Green	  coalition	  on	  family	  policy	  
intensified	  the	  virtuous	  cycle	  for	  a	  new	  progressive	  family	  policy	  in	  2005.	  It	  became	  obvious	  
that,	   if	   the	   party	   did	   not	   adapt	   its	   gender	   stance	   to	   the	   social	   environment,	   it	   could	   lose	  
again.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   progressive	   camp	   around	   candidate	   Merkel	   was	   able	   to	   push	   its	  
position	  into	  the	  joint	  election	  manifest	  of	  CDU	  and	  CSU.	  
Angela	  Merkel	  did	  not	  leave	  many	  doubts	  about	  her	  ambitions	  to	  reform	  family	  policy	  
when	   she	   announced	   the	   appointment	   of	   Ursula	   von	   der	   Leyen	   as	   family	   affairs	  
spokesperson	  in	  her	  shadow	  cabinet.	  The	  nomination	  of	  the	  young	  career	  oriented	  von	  der	  
Leyen,	   who	   was	   also	   a	   mother	   of	   seven,	   was	   a	   sting	   for	   the	   Conservative	   Catholic	  
establishment.134	  Nevertheless,	  the	  topic	  did	  not	  gain	  salience	  during	  the	  election	  campaign	  
nor	   during	   the	   subsequent	   coalition	   negotiations	   between	   the	   Christian	   and	   Social	  
Democrats.135	   The	   quarrels	   began	  when	   the	   technical	   details	   of	  minister	   von	   der	   Leyen's	  
family	   policy	   reform	   plans	   became	   public.	   Von	   der	   Leyen	   had	   organized	   an	   intra-­‐party	  
commission	  to	  elaborate	  the	  new	  family	  paradigm	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats.	  Commenting	  
on	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  results,	  the	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung	  assessed	  that	  “It	  is	  striking	  that	  
the	   traditional	   family	  picture	   is	   no	   longer	   granted	  a	   central	   place”.136	   Protests	  were	  again	  
driven	   by	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   and	   the	   Conservative	   Catholic	   party	   establishment.	   Bishop	  
Reinhardt	  Marx	   commented,	   in	   an	   interview	  with	   Der	   Spiegel,	   that	   “Politics	   is	   erring	   if	   it	  
wants	   to	  make	  people	  believe	  that	   they	  can	  have	  everything	  at	  once:	  career,	  high	   income	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  „Zwar	  allerdings	  hatte	  Merkel	  verlangt,	  die	  CDU	  müsse	  in	  ihrer	  Forderung	  nach	  Vereinbarkeit	  von	  Familie	  und	  Beruf	  und	  nach	  der	  Wahlfreiheit	  junger	  Frauen	  zwischen	  verschiedenen	  Lebensentwürfen	  glaubwürdiger	  werden.“	  Marianne	  Heuwagen	  ‚Union	  über	  Richtige	  Strategie	  zerstritten‘,	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung	  7.10.	  2002,	  p.	  5.	  133	  „Nach	  der	  Wahlniederlage	  hatten	  sich	  Schäuble,	  Merkel	  und	  einige	  andere	  daran	  gemacht,	  die	  Parteien	  in	  die	  Jetzt-­‐Zeit	  zu	  führen.	  Dort	  so	  jedenfalls	  scheint	  es,	  wollen	  viele	  Christdemokraten	  aber	  gar	  nicht	  ankommen.“	  Höll,	  Susanne:	  ‚Familien	  Treffen	  auf	  der	  Edel	  Alm‘,	  IN:	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung.	  12.10.2002,	  p.	  8.	  134	  ‘Die	  Rabenmutter’	  Pölchau,	  N.	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  27.1.2006,	  p.	  8.	  135The	  Christian	  Democrats	  advocated	  a	  major	  tax	  deduction	  of	  8,000	  Euros	  per	  child	  whereas	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  wanted	  to	  introduce	  'Elterngeld'	  a	  parental	  leave	  scheme	  paid	  for	  one	  year	  modeled	  on	  the	  Swedish	  system.	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung	  9.	  August	  2005,	  p.	  8.	  136	  “Auffallend	  ist,	  dass	  dem	  traditionellen	  Familienbild	  kein	  zentraler	  Platz	  mehr	  eingeräumt	  wird.“	  Schneider,	  J.,	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  26.10.2006,	  ‘CDU	  soll	  ihr	  Familienbild	  modernisieren‘.	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and	  children.”137	  Cardinal	  Meisner	  criticized	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  family	  policy	  plans	  as	  
“Pay-­‐Check	  Politics”	  and	  put	  forward	  that	  the	  equation	  of	  “The	  more	  day	  care	  facilities,	  the	  
more	   children”	   was	   wrong.138	   Bishop	   Walter	   Mixa	   called	   von	   der	   Leyen’s	   family	   policy	  
“ideologically	   fatuous”	   and	   argued	   that	   “her	   concept	   was	   reducing	   women	   to	   baby	  
machines”.139	  The	  idea	  of	  giving	  two	  extra	  months	  of	  leave	  to	  each	  couple	  where	  the	  father	  
also	  went	   out	   on	  parental	   leave	   came	  particularly	   under	   fire.	   All	   older	   Conservative	   state	  
prime	   ministers	   expressed	   concerns.140	   Peter	   Ramsauer	   from	   the	   Bavarian	   Christian	  
Democrats	   sarcastically	   called	   the	   new	   arrangement	   "Diaper	   Volunteering".	   Similarly,	   the	  
centrality	   of	   marriage	   was	   highlighted	   by	   the	   Christian	   Democratic	   Prime	   Minister	   of	  
Hessen,	   Roland	   Koch,	   who	   declared	   to	   ample	   applause	   that	   he	   was	   “no	   expert	   on	  
patchwork”.141	  
	   The	   fact	   that	   the	  harshest	   criticism	  was	  mostly	  voiced	  by	   the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  
the	  Catholic	  parts	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  party	  indicated	  that	  the	  positional	  change	  on	  
family	  policy	  bothered	  mostly	  the	  Catholic	  parts	  of	  the	  party.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Protestant	  Bishop	  
and	   later	   head	   of	   the	   main	   congregation	   of	   the	   German	   Protestant	   Bishops,	   Margot	  
Käßmann,	   stated	   that	   she	   “could	   not	   understand	   the	   [Catholic]	   critique	   at	   all”.142	   The	  
Catholic	   Bishop	   Marx	   commented,	   in	   an	   interview	   with	   Der	   Spiegel,	   that	   “Through	   East	  
Germany	  and	  through	  Angela	  Merkel	  the	  Union	  has	  become	  more	  Protestant”	  and	  criticized	  
the	   “strong	   position	   of	   the	   Protestants	   in	   the	   Christian	   Democratic	   leadership”.143	   The	  
changes	   in	  Christian	  Democratic	   family	  policy	  were	   therefore	  not	  only	  an	   intra-­‐party	  clash	  
but	  also	  a	  denominational	  showdown.	  Protestants	  and	  Catholics	  were	  struggling	  over	  their	  
influence	  in	  party,	  state	  and	  society.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  “Die	  Politik	  geht	  in	  die	  Irre	  wenn	  sie	  den	  Menschen	  vorgaukelt,	  man	  könne	  alles	  zugleich	  haben:	  Karriere,	  hohes	  Einkommen	  und	  Kinder.“,	  interview	  by	  Rene	  Pfister,	  Bishop	  Reinhardt	  Marx,	  Der	  Spiegel.	  11.01.2010,	  p.	  22.	  138	  “Scheckbuchpolitik”,	  “Je	  mehr	  Krippen,	  desto	  mehr	  Kinder	  sei	  falsch“	  Kardinal	  Meisner	  commenting	  on	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  family	  policy	  in	  an	  editorial	  for	  the	  Frankfurter	  Allgemeine	  Zeitung.	  For	  a	  summary	  see	  ‚Kardinal	  Meisner	  zur	  Familienpolitik‘,	  Frankfurter	  Allgemeine	  Zeitung,	  24.3.2007.	  139	  “Ideologisch	  verblendet”,	  “sie	  würdige	  mit	  ihrem	  Konzept	  Frauen	  zu	  „Gebaermaschinen“	  herab“,	  Bischof	  Walter	  Mixa	  cited	  in	  ‚Bischof	  Mixa	  lässt	  nicht	  locker‘,	  Frankfurter	  Allgemeine	  Zeitung,	  23.2.2007.	  140	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung	  21.4.	  2006,	  p.	  1.	  141	  “Ich	  bin	  kein	  Experte	  für	  Patchwork“	  Roland	  Koch	  cited	  IN:	  Süddeutsche	  Zeitung,	  24.10.2006,	  ‚Abschied	  von	  Gestern‘,	  p.	  4.	  142	  “Ich	  kann	  die	  Kritik	  in	  keiner	  Weise	  nachvollziehen“,	  Käßmann	  cited	  IN:	  ‚Bischof	  Mixa	  lässt	  nicht	  locker‘,	  Frankfurter	  Allgemeine	  Zeitung,	  23.2.2007.	  143	  “Durch	  Ostdeutschland	  und	  durch	  Angela	  Merkel	  ist	  die	  Union	  protestantischer	  geworden.“	  interview,	  Bishop	  Reinhardt	  Marx,	  by	  Rene	  Pfister,	  Der	  Spiegel.	  11.01.2010,	  p.	  22.	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   This	   begs	   the	   question	   of	   why,	   in	   contrast	   to	   2002,	   the	   Christian	   Democrats	  
succeeded	   in	  keeping	   their	  progressive	   family	  policy	   intact	  as	  part	  of	   their	  party	  platform,	  
and	   even	  managed	   to	   execute	   it	   later.	   The	   key	  might	   well	   be	   that	   in	   2002	   Stoiber	   from	  
Catholic	  Bavaria	  could	  not	  confront	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  Protestant	  
Merkel	   did	   in	   2005.	   It	   is	   also	   true	   that	   during	   the	   2000s	   the	   party	   had	   become	   more	  
Protestant	   and	   East	   German,	   especially	   regarding	   the	   party	   executive.	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
question	   still	   remains	   as	   to	  why	   could	   the	  Catholic	   Church	   in	   2002	   still	   position	   the	  party	  
against	  the	  forces	  of	  the	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  competition	  that	  had	  been	  unfolding.	  	  However,	  the	  
most	  important	  factor	  that	  pushed	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  into	  compromise	  was	  that	  this	  time	  
its	  economic	  interests	  were	  threatened.144	  
	  
10.4.4 The	  economic	  interest	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  
Figure	  10-­‐2	  Employees	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  Germany	  
	  
Table	   by	   the	   Author.	   Figures	   from:	   Lührs,	   H.	   (2006)	   Kirchliche	   Arbeitsbeziehungen.	   Die	   Entwicklung	   der	  
Beschäftigungsverhältnisse	  in	  den	  beiden	  großen	  Kirchen	  und	  ihren	  Wohlfahrtsverbänden,	  WiP	  Working	  Paper,	  No.	  33,	  p.	  38.	  
	  
The	   table	   above	   shows	   the	   development	   of	   the	   number	   of	   employees	   engaged	   by	   the	  
Catholic	   Church	   in	  Germany.	   The	   table	  below,	  meanwhile,	   charts	   the	  development	  of	   the	  
employees	   of	   the	  German	   Caritas,	   the	   biggest	  welfare	   provider	   of	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   in	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Germany.	  The	  tables	   indicate	   that	   the	  Catholic	  Church	  employs	  roughly	  600,000	  people	   in	  
Germany.	  Together	  with	  the	  employees	  of	  the	  Protestant	  Church	  organizations,	  this	  makes	  
the	  German	   churches	   the	   second	   largest	   overall	   employer	   in	  Germany.	  Note	   that	   roughly	  
one	  third	  of	  the	  funding	  of	  Caritas	  Germany	  comes	  directly	  from	  the	  German	  federal	  budget	  
and	  that	  the	  budget	  for	  the	  personnel	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  is	  entirely	  state-­‐funded.	  
	  
Figure	  10-­‐3	  Employees	  of	  Caritas	  Germany	  
	  
	  Data	  from:	  Lührs,	  H.	  (2006)	  p.	  38.	  
	  
Capitalizing	   on	   this,	   in	   2006	   von	   der	   Leyen	   held	   a	   position	   of	   leverage	   over	   the	   Catholic	  
Church.	  A	  senior	  female	  member	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats,	  and	  long	  term	  member	  of	  the	  
committee	   on	   family	   affairs	   and	   board	   member	   of	   the	   Catholic	   women’s	   organization,	  
described	  this	  situation	  as	  the	  following	  to	  me:	  	  
We	  knew	  that	  if	  we	  wanted	  to	  get	  this	  thing	  through,	  we	  had	  to	  get	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  Churches.	  The	  Protestants	  
were	   easy.	  When	   von	   der	   Leyen	   sent	  me	   instead	   for	   the	   first	   time	   to	   present	   our	   new	   plans	   to	   the	   Catholic	  
Bishops	   it	   seemed	   to	   me	   as	   if	   I	   was	   speaking	   to	   a	   brick	   wall.	   The	   thirteen	   Bishops	   sat	   in	   front	   of	   me	   and	  
unanimously	   told	  me	   that	  what	  we	  wanted	   to	   do	  was	  witches	   brew.	  When	   I	  met	   them	   the	   second	   time	   and	  
confronted	  them	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  losing	  the	  four	  billion	  euros	  of	  federal	  funding	  for	  their	  daycare	  facilities	  
the	  situation	  changed.	  The	  hardliners	  did	  of	  course	  not	  change	  their	  mind	  but	   it	  was	  enough	  to	  get	  a	  majority	  
with	  the	  moderates	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  reform.145	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What	   helped	   furthermore	   was	   that,	   in	   contrast	   to	   2002,	   the	   2005	   elections	   had	  
already	  been	  won.	  The	  Catholic	  Bishops	  could	  no	   longer	  threaten	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  
with	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   their	   election	   support.146	   Von	   der	   Leyen	   could,	   in	   her	   position	   as	  
family	  minister,	   threaten	   the	  churches	  with	  serious	  cuts	   to	   their	   funding.	   It	  was	  no	   longer	  
possible	  for	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  to	  press	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  towards	  a	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  
competition	  as	  had	  still	  been	  the	  case	  in	  2002.	  
The	   enactment	   of	   the	   new	   policy	   regime	   paid	   off	   for	   the	   Christian	  Democrats.	   Not	  
only	  did	  they	  win	  the	  next	  federal	  elections	  and	  could	  exit	  the	  grand	  coalition	  but	  they	  also	  
recovered	   some	   of	   the	   women	   bonus	   that	   they	   had	   been	   losing	   continuously	   since	   the	  
1960s.147	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  party	  managed	  to	  recover	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  votes	  that	  it	  
had	   lost	   since	   the	   1960s.	   The	   Christian	   Democratic	   worldview	   had	   shown	   once	   again	   its	  
ability	  to	  adapt	  to	  a	  changing	  environment.	  The	  denominational	  plurality	  of	  the	  party,	  even	  
though	   it	  can	  be	  uncomfortable	  at	   times,	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  major	  resource	   for	  programmatic	  
reinvention	   and	   innovation.	   The	   two	   different	   worldviews	   of	   Protestants	   and	   Catholics	  
made	   the	   party	   approach	   structural	   change	   in	   different	   ways	   and	   advocate	   different	  
solutions	   to	   it.	   This	   is	   a	   constant	   source	   of	   debate	   and	   adaptation	   within	   the	   party	   –	   a	  
comparative	   advantage	   that	   the	   Italian	   Christian	   Democrats,	   based	   on	   a	   single	  
denomination,	  did	  not	  have.	  	  
	  
10.5 Italy	  
The	   remodeling	  of	   the	  electoral	   ties	  of	   Fanfani	   in	   the	  1960s	   through	   the	   special	  model	  of	  
socioeconomic	  relations	  between	  state-­‐economy,	  party,	  and	  citizens	  –	  backed	  by	  a	  heavily	  
clientelist	  welfare	  state	  –	  were	  the	  ultimate	  power	  resource	  for	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  Italian	  
Christian	  Democrats	  up	  until	  the	  1980s.	  The	  dominance	  of	  the	  DC	  (Democrazia	  Christiana)	  in	  
the	  Italian	  polity	  was	  all-­‐encompassing.	  It	  spanned	  the	  party	  system,	  the	  cabinets,	  the	  prime	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  Bishops	  this	  time	  had	  to	  remain	  silent	  during	  the	  election	  campaign	  due	  to	  the	  peaking	  of	  the	  paedophilia	  scandal	  that	  hit	  the	  Catholic	  Church.	  147	  On	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  family	  policy	  reforms	  on	  the	  female	  vote	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  opinion	  poll	  analyst	  Viola	  Neu	  comments	  in	  a	  report	  “Ob	  diese	  auf	  die	  Frauen	  und	  Familienpolitik	  der	  Bundesregierung	  zurückzuführen	  ist,	  kann	  nicht	  geprüft	  werden	  ist	  jedoch	  nicht	  unplausibel.”	  The	  link	  between	  the	  increase	  of	  the	  female	  bonus	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  and	  their	  family	  policies	  is	  made	  through	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  female	  votes	  was	  especially	  strong	  in	  the	  30-­‐44	  age	  cohorts,	  those	  that	  benefit	  most	  from	  the	  enacted	  policies.	  Neu,	  V.	  (2009)	  Bundestagswahl	  Deutschland	  am	  27.September	  2009:	  Wahlanalyse,	  Berlin,	  Konrad	  Adenauer	  Stiftung,	  pp.	  72;	  82.	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ministers,	   the	   state	   apparatus	   and	   the	   state-­‐driven	   economic	   sector.	   Considering	   this	  
dominance,	   the	  abrupt	   implosion	  of	   the	  party	   in	   the	  early	  1990s	   is	   surprising.	  However,	   if	  
one	  considers	  that	  the	  party	  had,	  since	  the	  1990s	  (when	  the	  communists	  were	  still	  banned	  
from	   party	   competition),	   never	   been	   exposed	   to	   any	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	   competition	   that	  
would	   have	   triggered	   its	   adaptation	   to	   an	   evolving	   environment,	   these	   developments	  
become	  less	  astonishing.	  
	   In	   the	  1960s	   the	  DC	  had	   liberated	   itself	   from	  the	  electoral	   ties	  of	   the	  Vatican	  and	  
the	  employers’	  association	  Confindustria	  and	  had	   instead	  coupled	   its	  electoral	  machine	  to	  
the	  state	  resources	  whose	  provision	  the	  party	  controlled.148	  Nevertheless,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  
sole	   mode	   of	   vote	   aggregation.	   Clientelist	   ties	   and	   favoritism	   were	   mainly	   used	   by	   the	  
southern	   Christian	   Democrats.	   In	   other	   parts	   of	   Italy	   the	   party	   relied	   on	   a	   mix	   of	  
programmatic	   and	   anti-­‐Communist	   programmatic	   ideas.	   Anti-­‐Communism	   spoke,	   in	  
particular,	   to	   the	  worldviews	  of	   the	  Catholic	   subculture.	  Meanwhile,	   Christian	  Democratic	  
policies	   also	   catered	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   middle	   classes	   of	   shopkeepers	   and	   small	  
businesses	   through	   targeted	   legislation	   (tax	   exemptions	   for	   bars,	   stationers,	   newspaper	  
shops,	   etc.).	   Together	  with	   the	  exclusion	  of	   the	   second	   largest	   party,	   the	  Communist	   PCI,	  
from	  any	  government	   coalition	  or	   legislation	   formation	   this	   generated	  a	  highly	   stable	  and	  
continuous	  vote	  share	  for	  the	  party	  without	  any	  electoral	  competition.	  The	  downside	  of	  this	  
was	   that	   it	   shut	  out	   the	  possibility	   for	   any	   virtuous	   cycle	  of	  programmatic	   competition	   to	  
unfold.	  
The	  societal	  changes	  of	  the	  late	  1960s	  led	  to	  a	  “crisis	  of	  the	  Catholic	  subculture”149	  
which	  led	  to	  a	  loosening	  of	  the	  electoral	  ties	  of	  the	  DC	  in	  the	  North.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  
gender	   revolution	   eroded	   the	   male	   breadwinner	   model	   at	   the	   behavioral	   level.	   As	   in	  
Germany,	   the	   DC	   started	   to	   lose	   its	   draw	   among	   women.	   As	   the	   Italian	   socioeconomic	  
model	  came	  under	  severe	  pressure	  due	  to	  globalization	  in	  the	  1980s,	  the	  welfare	  clientelism	  
of	   the	  DC	   in	   the	  South	   ran	   into	   trouble	  as	  “the	  DC	  was	  symbiotically	   tied	   to	   the	  state	   run	  
economy	  and	  bureaucracy.”150	  The	  huge	  public	  deficit	  created	  during	  the	  1980s	  turned	  the	  
“systematic	   colonization	   of	   the	   state	   machine”151	   into	   a	   burden	   for	   the	   DC152	   and	   “the	  
expropriation	  of	  the	  state	  by	  political	  parties	  began	  to	  meet	  its	  physical	  limits”.153	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (1990,	  2000).	  149	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.	  172.	  150	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.	  172.	  151	  Bull,	  M.	  J.	  &	  Rhodes,	  M.	  (1994)	  p.	  3.	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One	  consequence	  of	  being	  protected	  from	  political	  competition	  for	  so	  long	  was	  that	  
it	  was	  hard	   for	   the	  party	   to	   resume	  programmatic	  party	   competition	  once	   the	   stability	  of	  
their	  system	  started	  to	  crumble.	  Furthermore,	  the	  DC	  did	  not	  respond	  in	  any	  adequate	  way	  
to	   emancipation	   and	   the	   rising	   gender	   question.154	   In	   1983,	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   a	   Socialist	  
(Craxi)	   became	   Prime	   Minister.155	   However,	   this	   did	   not	   ignite	   any	   virtuous	   cycle	   of	  
programmatic	   competition.	   Developments	   gathered	   pace	  with	   the	   end	   of	   Communism	   in	  
the	   Soviet	   block	   and	   the	   subsequent	   realignment	   of	   the	   Italian	   Communists	   (PCI),	   under	  
Achille	  Occhetto,	   towards	  a	   Social	  Democratic	  party	  platform	   (PDS).	   This	   tended	   to	  nullify	  
the	  menace	  associated	  with	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  Communist	  society	  that	  had	  previously	  seen	  the	  
small	  shop	  keepers	  and	  private	  business	  entrepreneurs	  driven	  into	  the	  arms	  of	  the	  Christian	  
Democrats.	   Political	   competition	  was	   no	   longer	   blocked	   and	   the	  DC	  was,	   all	   of	   a	   sudden,	  
exposed.	  	  When	  the	  new	  functional	  pressures	  of	  a	  changing	  environment	  started	  to	  hit,	  the	  
party	   found	   no	   adequate	   response.	   The	   evolutionary	   consequence	   was	   that	   the	   DC	   was	  
selected	  out,	   it	  died	  so	   to	  speak.	  The	   final	  blow	  came	  when	  the	  widespread	  corruption	  of	  
Italian	  politicians	  was	  revealed	  by	  Italian	  magistrates’	  Mani	  Pulite	  (clean	  hands)156	  operation	  
at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   1990s.	   The	   outcome	   was	   “a	   crisis	   of	   parties,	   political	   class,	  
institutions	  and	  the	  state.”157	  As	  Ferrera	  points	  out,	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  the	  Italian	  model	  had	  
descended	   into	  a	  “systemic	  crisis”.158	  As	  the	  DC	  was,	  along	  with	  the	  Social	  Democrats,	   the	  
group	   most	   implicated	   in	   the	   prosecutions,	   it	   promptly	   dissolved.	   The	   Social	   Democrats	  
soon	  followed	  suit,	  while	  the	  former	  anti-­‐system	  parties	  –	  the	  Communists	  and	  Neo-­‐fascists	  
–	  embarked	  on	  the	  long	  march	  inwards	  from	  the	  edges	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum.159	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  Bull,	  M.	  J.	  &	  Rhodes,	  M.	  (1994)	  p.	  3.	  153	  Bull,	  M.	  J.	  &	  Rhodes,	  M.	  (1994)	  p.	  7.	  154	  Ginsborg,	  P.	  (2000)	  p.	  70-­‐72.	  155	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.	  172.	  156	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  p.174;	  Bull,	  M.	  J.	  &	  Rhodes,	  D.	  (1994)	  p.	  5.	  For	  a	  good	  discussion	  of	  why	  the	  corrupt	  practices	  were	  investigated	  at	  this	  moment	  in	  time	  and	  not	  before,	  see:	  Carter,	  N.	  (2010)	  pp.	  175-­‐176.	  157	  D’Alimonte,	  R.	  &	  Bartolini,	  S.	  (1994)	  ‘Electoral	  Transition’	  and	  Party	  System	  Change	  in	  Italy,	  IN:	  Bull,	  M.	  J.	  &	  Rhodes,	  M.	  (eds.)	  Crisis	  and	  Transition	  in	  Italian	  Politics,	  London,	  Frank	  Cass,	  p.	  110.	  158	  Ferrera,	  M.	  (1994)	  The	  Uncertain	  Future	  of	  the	  Italian	  Welfare	  State,	  IN:	  Bull,	  M.	  J.	  &	  Rhodes,	  M.	  (eds.)	  Crisis	  and	  Transition	  in	  Italian	  Politics,	  London,	  Frank	  Cass,	  p.	  234.	  159	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  on	  how	  the	  DC	  disintegrated:	  Di	  Virgilio,	  A.	  (2008)	  From	  proportional	  representation	  to	  plurality	  and	  back:	  Post	  Christian-­‐Democratic	  parties	  compared,	  Modern	  Italy,	  Vol.	  13,	  No.	  4,	  pp.	  429-­‐449.	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10.5.1 Still	  no	  competition	  for	  ideas	  
The	   “vacuum”160	   that	   the	   demise	   of	   the	   DC	   left	   was	   soon	   filled	   by	   new	   political	   players.	  
Berlusconi	  entered	  politics	  as	   the	  perceived	   (incorruptible)	   tycoon	  that	  did	  not	  care	  about	  
money	   but	   rather	   about	   the	   country.	   Berlusconi’s	   new	   party,	   Forza	   Italia,	   became	   a	   key	  
player	  in	  Italian	  politics.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  First	  Republic	  through	  clientelism	  and	  
corruption	   did	   not	   mark	   an	   evolution	   from	   an	   ideational	   monoculture	   to	   multipolar	  
programmatic	  party	   competition	   in	   Italy.	   Instead,	  Berlusconi	   and	  his	   electoral	   vehicle,	   the	  
“virtual	   party”,161	   Forza	   Italia	   skipped	   the	   stage	   of	   programmatic	   party	   competition	   and	  
entered	   right	   into	  a	   stage	  of	  predominantly	  mediatic	  party	   competition.	  Due	   to	  his	  media	  
hegemony	   and	   the	   vast	   resources	   of	   his	   business	   empire,	   Berlusconi	   could	   win	   elections	  
without	   offering	   programmatic	   ideas.	   Under	   Berlusconi,	   Italy	   moved	   quickly	   towards	   an	  
excessive	  form	  of	  “audience	  democracy”162	  (Indeed,	  by	  now	  it	  has	  arguably	  moved	  towards	  
what	  Trechsel	  calls	  “paparazzi	  democracy”163).	   Ideational	  programmatic	  competition	   in	  the	  
form	  of	  virtuous	  cycles	  seems	  ever	  more	  difficult.	  164	  
	  
10.6 The	  evolutionary	  end	  of	  Social	  Catholicism?	  
To	  wrap	  up,	  the	  functional	  pressures	  that	  unfolded	  since	  the	  1970s	  in	  both	  countries	  were	  
roughly	   the	  same.	  However,	  one	  case	  saw	  the	   fall	  of	  Christian	  Democracy	  while	   the	  other	  
witnessed	  its	  reincarnation	  as	  a	  neo-­‐Protestant	  party.	  What	  is	  surprising	  is	  that	  in	  both	  cases	  
social	   Catholicism	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   selected	   out	   or	   at	   least	   been	   relegated	   to	   the	  
background.	   It	   seems	  therefore	  plausible	   to	  draw	  the	  conclusion	  that	   the	   fate	  of	  Christian	  
Democracy	   in	   both	   countries	   (and	   indeed	   the	   empirics	   have	   shown	   this)	   is	   not	   only	   a	  
function	  of	  Christian	  Democracy	  itself	  but	  is	  also	  strongly	  intertwined	  with	  the	  development	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  Bull,	  M.	  &	  Rhodes,	  M.	  (1994)	  Between	  Crisis	  and	  Transition:	  Italian	  Politics	  in	  the	  1990s,	  IN:	  Bull,	  M.	  J.	  &	  Rhodes,	  M.	  (eds.)	  Crisis	  and	  Transition	  in	  Italian	  Politics,	  London,	  Frank	  Cass,	  p.	  6.	  161	  Bull,	  M.	  J.	  &	  Rhodes,	  M.	  (1994)	  p.	  6.	  162	  Manin,	  B.	  (1997)	  The	  principle	  of	  Representative	  Government,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  163	  Trechsel,	  A.	  (2012)	  Towards	  Paprazzi	  Democracy,	  Paper	  Presented	  at	  the	  19th	  Confernece	  of	  Europeaninsts,	  Boston,	  March	  22.-­‐24.2012.	  In	  an	  “audience	  democracy”	  politics	  is	  largely	  staged	  and	  modeled	  towards	  media	  appeals	  to	  the	  electorate	  that	  leave	  little	  room	  for	  real	  politics	  that	  imply	  a	  cost	  for	  the	  audience.	  Politicians	  are	  under	  constant	  threat	  of	  becoming	  caught	  up	  in	  perpetual	  mediatic	  scandals.	  Politicians,	  therefore,	  have	  to	  be	  careful	  and	  this	  leaves	  little	  room	  for	  governance.	  164	  The	  mediatic	  party	  competition	  that	  Berlusconi	  foisted	  onto	  Italian	  politics	  renders	  a	  cycle	  of	  ideational	  competition	  impossible.	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of	  Catholicism	  as	  such.	  Indeed,	  in	  Germany	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Italy,	  Catholicism	  has	  not	  adapted	  or	  
found	  any	  constructive	  reply	  to	  the	  changes	  from	  the	  1970s	  and	  especially	  failed	  to	  respond	  
to	   the	   neo	   liberal	   challenge	   that	   rose	   in	   the	   1990s.	   Protestantism	   was	   much	   better	   in	  
incorporating	   and	   molding	   this	   new	   ideological	   stream	   into	   its	   programmatic	   ideas.	  
However,	  the	  reactions	  of	  social	  Catholicism	  to	  the	  family	  reforms	  in	  Germany	  showed	  that	  
it	   could	   not	   come	   up	   with	   any	   constructive	   counterproposal.	   Its	   reactions	   were,	   instead,	  
those	   of	   retention	   and	   stasis	   which	   led	   in	   the	   end	   to	   its	   demise	   in	   the	   internal	   party	  
architecture	  of	  the	  Christian	  Democrats.	  This	  is	  strange	  as	  there	  were	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  
German	   social	   policy	   reforms	   that	   could	   be	   easily	   criticized	   form	   the	   standpoint	   of	   social	  
Catholicism	   (the	   creation	   of	   a	   large	   precarious	   section	   of	   society	   through	  Hartz	   IV	   that	   is	  
partly	   excluded	   from	  public	  healthcare,	  or	   the	  middle	   and	  upper	   class	   focus	  of	   the	   family	  
policy	   reforms).	  However,	   Social	   Catholicism	  missed	   the	  opportunity	   to	   reinvent	   itself.	   	   In	  
the	   end,	   the	  German	  Christian	  Democrats	   survived	  because	  of	   its	   Janus-­‐like	   qualities,	   not	  
because	  of	   Social	   Catholicism.	   Its	   double	   identity	   of	   Catholicism	  and	  Protestantism	  allows	  
the	  party	  to	  adapt	  and	  stay	  credible	  by	  simply	  shifting	  the	  balance	  within	  the	  party	  from	  one	  
worldview	  to	  the	  other.	  The	  exclusively	  Catholic	  DC	  did	  not	  have	  this	  possibility	  and	  hence	  
died.	  
However,	   the	   brief	   section	   about	   the	   German	   family	   policy	   has	   shown	   that	   such	  
adaptation	  processes	  are	  far	  from	  linear	  and	  easy.	  What	  instead	  emerged	  was	  a	  certain	  sub-­‐
level	   to	   the	  evolutionary	   adaptation	  process	  of	   programmatic	   ideas	  within	   the	  party.	   This	  
leaves	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  social	  Catholicism	  was	  in	  both	  cases	  been	  selected	  out	  and	  
has	   subsequently	   died.	   The	   answer	   is	   no	   -­‐	   as	   argued	   before,	   ideas	   cannot	   die,	   only	   their	  
carriers	  can.	  In	  Italy	  Catholicism	  has	  simply	  abandoned	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  experiment	  
and	  shifted	  its	  political	  power	  center	  back	  to	  the	  Vatican.	  However,	  only	  the	  distant	  future	  
can	  tell	  if	  it	  will	  come	  to	  a	  broader	  adaptation	  and	  an	  update	  of	  Catholic	  Social	  teaching,	  as	  
the	   Vatican	   operates	   with	   timeframes	   and	   ideational	   cycles	   that	   go	   far	   beyond	   usual	  
timespans	  of	  politics.	  Considering	  that	  it	  is	  an	  institution	  that	  has	  been	  in	  politics	  for	  roughly	  
2000	  years	  and	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  selected	  out	  through	  competition	  might	  very	  well	  point	  out	  
that	  it	  has	  adopted	  a	  much	  more	  ‘relaxed’	  approach	  to	  functional	  pressures	  of	  ‘normal’	  life.	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